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ABSTRACT 
Prior to 1986, Malaysia had a system whereby patents issued in the United Kingdom could 
be registered in Malaysia. On registration, the patent owner would have privileges and 
rights as those conferred by the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom. The Patents Act 
1983 introduces a completely new code for patent protection in Malaysia. This thesis 
analyses and evaluates the current provisions relating to the various incidents of ownership 
of patent and utility model rights in Malaysia with the aim of assisting in the proper 
construction of the relevant provisions. The issues of entitlement, the rights of co-owners, 
the exercise and scope of rights as well as the limitations to and loss of these rights are 
examined. The main objective of this study is to seek to achieve a proper balance between 
the rights of a patent owner and the public. Where necessary, proposals for reforms are 
made to amend various aspects of the Act with the aim of achieving this objective, ensuring 
at the same time that the relevant provisions are in conformity with Malaysia's obligations 
under the Paris Convention and the GAIT-TRIPS Agreement. Since there is a dearth of 
legal writing and judicial guidance on the relevant provisions of the Act, the approach 
adopted in the thesis is based on a comparative study of equivalent provisions of patent 
statutes in various Commonwealth countries and the United States, with special emphasis 
on United Kingdom law. Common law doctrines are also examined to determine their 
applicability in the Malaysian context. Where of assistance, the laws of other jurisdictions 
are examined. The experience of the working of the patent system in these countries is 
drawn upon in the search for a proper and viable balance between the rights of the 
competing groups. 
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Introduction to Thesis 
Review of the Problem 
Patent law in Malaysia is presently governed by the Patents Act, 1983. 1 Prior to this Act, 
there were three different pieces of legislation involved. Each one of Malaysia's component 
regions had its own legislation to provide for legal protection of a patent. 2 All the three Acts 
were based on the re-registration system whereby the grantee of a UK granted patent could 
apply to have the patent registered in the relevant component state. These three repealed 
legislation in tum superseded several other state Patents Enactments and Ordinances, the 
earliest of them being enacted in 1871. These were either originally based on an 
independent, indigenous system, a pure re-registration system, or a combination of both. 
However, by 1932, all the independent patent systems were replaced by the re-registration 
system, being dependent on the re-registration of a United Kingdom granted patent. So the 
Act introduces a completely new and unified code for patent protection throughout the 
whole of Malaysia. With this new Act Malaysia has again an independent patent system, 
based on an indigenous examination and granting system instead of the re-registration of a 
UK granted patent. 
From this it can be seen that Malaysian patent history is not of recent origin, patent 
protection being available in some of the component states of the Federation from more than 
a century ago. Despite this, a proper awareness and understanding of the working of the 
patent system is still lacking in Malaysia. Patent law and patent rights have not been the 
subject of much interest or concern among the legislators, legal practitioners and users. 
Hence it is not surprising that there is no developed body of legal principles and writing in 
this area. There is also a lack of judicial tradition and precedents regarding the substantive 
law. To date, there has been only a handful of reported patent cases, and these are devoid 
of any detailed discussion on the applicable legal principles. UK precedents and cases are 
cited and applied as a matter of routine. This in part was due to the re-registration system. 
However, even when the court was called upon to construe specific provisions of the 
Patents Act 1983, reliance was placed on UK precedents. This is not surprising given the 
historical colonial ties between the two countries and a Malaysian legal system which has its 
Patents Act 1983. Act 291. Malaysia. as amended in 1986 and 1993. and hereinafter referred to as 
the Act. The Act came into force on 1st of October. 1986. The Patents (Amendments) Act, 1993 
entered into force on August 1. 1995. On the 1st of January. 1989. Malaysia became a member of 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. and also the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation. She became a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works on the 1st of October. 1990. 
2 Malaysia was fmned in 1963. arising from the merger of the Federation of Malaya, Sabab ..s 
Sarawak. 
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roots in the British common law tradition. Accordingly, United Kingdom judicial 
precedents are heavily relied upon by the local courts as a guide to dispute resolutions. 
Occasionally, and given the common historical Anglo-Saxon legislative background, courts 
have relied on other Commonwealth decisions too. Though such decisions are not binding 
on our courts, they are, and will continue to be of persuasive authority. Further, most of 
our lawyers and judges were trained in the UK and as such, feel most comfortable to quote 
directly from the wisdom of English judges. 3 
It follows, therefore, that in the early development of her intellectual property laws, 
Malaysia had traditionally looked towards the United Kingdom for much of her intellectual 
property policies and drafting inspirations. Legislation in the past had closely paralleled that 
of the United Kingdom. For example, the Copyright Act, 1969 (and even the Copyright 
Act, 1987) draws its inspiration from the United Kingdom Copyright Act 1956). The Trade 
Marks Ordinance, 1950, and Trade Marks Act, 1976 which replaced it, have been modelled 
along the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1938 of the United Kingdom. Even the 
previous patent legislation in existence before the introduction of the fe-registration system 
were almost exact replicas of the patent statute then in force at the relevant prevailing dates 
in the United Kingdom. 
However, in the drafting of the Patents Act, 1983, there was a departure from this 
traditional approach. Instead of relying exclusively on the United Kingdom model, with 
minor changes to suit local circumstances, the drafters of the Act had referred to various 
other models. Besides the patent statute of the United Kingdom, guidance was also sought 
from the WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions (the WIPO Model 
Law),4 and the patent legislation of, inter alia, Australia and Sri Lanka. The influence of 
these models could be seen in various parts of the Act. 5 The fmal outcome of this is the 
1983 Act which is an amalgamation of elements found in these different statutes. This new 
Act is not anchored to anyone particular model, and is untested. This poses problems for 
the courts when it comes to applying the law. To ensure a proper and fair working of the 
patent system, the provisions and principles laid down in the Act require clarification and 
possible weaknesses in them identified. Further, due to inexperience with the working of 
the patent system, there may be gaps in existing provisions which need to addressed.6 
3 See generally. Lim. H.G .• "Malaysian Intellectual Property Law - A Survey" (1990) 2 MLJ xxxiii. 
4 WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions. Volume 1 Patents. World Intellectual 
Property Organisation. Geneva 1979. WIPO Publication No. S4O(E). 
5 Although the patent statutes of Japan and Thailand were referred to. there do not seem to be any 
elements of these statutes adopted in the Act. 
6 One glaring example of this lack of experience is the omission to lay down in section 27 the 
duration within which an applicant is entitled to claim a right of priority based on an earlier 
application in another country. Because of this. the court in Interlelo A.G. y. The Rclistrar of 
DJde Marks apd Patents. Malaysia [K.L. O.M. No. RS-32-36-87 - unreported]. and The Dow 
Chemical Co. y. The Rclistrar of Patents. Malaysia [K.L. O.M. No. RS-32-42-81. unreported] 
held that it was possible to claim priority from the basic application even though the application 
in Malaysia had been filed after a lapse of twelve months. Section 27 had to be amended by section 
15 
There is, therefore, a dire need for an in-depth study of the patent law provISIOns m 
Malaysia, 
Objectives and Scope of Study 
The justification and benefit of patents have been advocated for extensively in literature. 
Although the desirability of a patent system is here not disputed, it is equally true that patent 
rights, untrammelled and uncontrolled, may have adverse effects on the public.7 So, a 
balance needs to be struck to ensure that the deserved and justifiable rights of the patentee 
are upheld, and at the same time, that excessive rights do not enure to the patentee to the 
detriment of, and the imposition of undue burden on, the public.8 Similarly, there is a need 
to protect prior vested rights despite the grant of a patent to the fIrst applicant. As Turner 
commented, acceptance of a patent system does not necessarily mean that "any subtraction 
from the bundle of patentee's rights is necessarily bad public policy".9 
The above concerns are reflected in the Act. While the main objective in introducing the Act 
is the encouragement of the flow of foreign technology into Malaysia by the provision of 
adequate protection, another stated objective is the need to provide for safeguards to 
discourage "unfair monopoly practices".l 0 The latter objective is accomplished by the 
inclusion of certain provisions in the Act which provide this balance and reconcile the 
opposing interests of the patentee and the public. The Malaysian patent system, on the one 
7 
8 
9 
10 
14(a)(ii), Patents (Amendment) Act 1993, which now specifies that the right of priority could only 
be claimed if an application is made within a period of twelve months from the filing date of the 
first application. 
The arguments for and against the patent system are usefully summarised in Machlup. F .• ard 
Penrose. E.T., "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century", 10 Journal of Economic 
History 1 (1950), Stedman, J.C., "Invention and Public Policy", 12 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 649 (1947) and Cheung, S.N.S., "Property Rights and Inventions", in Palmer. J. (Ed.). 
The Economics of Patents and Copyrights. Research in Law and Economic. Vol. 8. pages 19-24. 
Connecticut, Jai Press Inc., 1986. See also, Machlup. F .• An Economic Review of the Patent 
System. Study No. 15, Before the Subcomm. on Patents. Trademarks. and Copyrights of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong .• 2d Sess. 79 (1958). pages 20-51. and pages 52-56; 
Plant. A.. "The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions". 1 Economica 30 (1934); 
Canadian Government: 1976, Working Paper on Patent Law Revision. Ottawa: Department of 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs; and United Nation Report 65: Report to the Secretary-General. 
The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries. United Nations. New 
York. 1964. Part 2, Chapters IV to VI. Despite any attraction that the arguments against patents 
may have. in the real world the necessity of a patent system remains the paramount rule. In view 
of the GA TT-TRIPS Agreement, any overall challenge to the patent system would be an exercise 
in futility. 
The term "public" is used here to include the consumers. competitors. and other patentees. 
See Turner. D.F., "The Patent System and Competitive Policy", 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 450 (1969), at 
page 458. 
See infra. Chapter I - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, footnote 131 -
"Country Statement on the Industrial Property Situation in Malaysia and WIPO's Development 
Cooperation Activities in Asia and the Pacific" by Mr Yuen Hung Chan, Assistant Secretary, 
Science and Technology Division, Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment. 
Malaysia (paper presented at the Regional Evaluation and Planning Meeting on Development 
Cooperation Activities in Asia and the Pacific - Thailand 2S - 28 June 1984. 
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hand, functions as an incentive or reward, by establishing that rights of the patent owner 
are exclusive .. On the other hand, there are preventative and limitative counter-balances laid 
down in the Act which function as safeguards of the public against uncontrolled and 
excessive monopoly rights. 
The discernible goal of the Act is the protection of the legitimate rights of the patent owner 
without imposing undue obstacles and burden on the freedom of the public to carry on 
legitimate scientific, research and commercial activities. This underlying philosophy is the 
yardstick under which the provisions of the Act should be construed and evaluated. 
The legal framework is now in place. But whether the Act, in its actual working, achieves 
the intended functions as expressly and implicitly stated, depends on how the various 
provisions are construed and applied in practice to achieve the desired harmony. 
Accordingly, clarifying the extent of the rights of ownership is an essential requirement for 
performing this balancing exercise and resolving tension between opposing rights. 
The lack of a body of local jurisprudence on the Malaysian patent law did not prove crucial 
in the past. Since the patent system was based on re-registration, reliance could be placed 
completely on UK precedents. However, the situation has changed now: the current system 
is an amalgamation of elements derived from various models, and it would be wrong, and 
impossible, to rely exclusively on the UK judicial approach in the interpretation of the Act. 
The equivalent UK provisions are now absent or not in pari materia with the provisions of 
the Act, so the traditional reliance on UK precedents has to be selective. Even for 
provisions which are the equivalent of UK provisions, there may be subtle differentiation, 
making reliance on UK precedents conceptually unsatisfactory and unsafe as precedents. 
Hence in determining the correct approach to adopt in the construction of the Act, the 
judges will be treading on unfamiliar ground. Although it is foreseeable that the courts will 
still look towards UK cases as the main source of guidance, the opportunity to do so may 
be much reduced. There is, therefore, a need for a fresh and in-depth study of the Act's 
new provisions. The need may not be crucial in the area of the substantive patentability 
criteria, which are substantially similar to the UK and the EPC laws and in respect of which 
there is a vast corpus of decisions and legal writings on these areas to guide the courts. 
The same, however, is not the case for the various provisions establishing and delineating 
the rights of a patentee. The issues of entitlement, the rights of co-owners, the exercise and 
scope of rights as well as the limitations to, and loss of, these rights, and their interaction 
with each other are untested. Therefore, the main objectives of this study are: 
1 . To ascertain the meaning and scope of the provisions concerning patent ownership, 
and the extent of ownership rights granted under the Act. 
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2. To suggest the proper construction of these provisions in order to achieve the 
desired balance between the rights of a patent owner and the public. 
3. H such a balance cannot be achieved by construing the provisions purposively, 
possible alternative solutions are offered to resolve the problems arising from the 
ambiguities in the Act. 
4. To identify the possible weaknesses and lacunae in the existing prOVIsIons, to 
examine the extent to which gaps in the existing law may be filled by reference to 
the common law and other jurisprudence, and to propose alternatives to consider in 
case of a need for revision of the law in the future. 
5. In cases of unduly excessive or restrictive rights, proposals for reforms are made to 
amend various aspects of the Act with the aim of achieving this objective, ensuring 
at the same time that the relevant provisions are in conformity with Malaysia's 
obligations under the Paris Convention and the GAIT-TRIPS Agreement. 11 
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, the GATT-TRIPS Agreement - MTNIFA II-AIC. Note that a series of discussions am 
meetings were held under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
from May 1984 to November 1990 with the objective of formulating a set of harmonised formal 
and substantive norms relating to patent laws throughout the world (for a summary of these 
meetings and the subject matters discussed, see Industrial Property, March 1991, page 168). The 
preparatory work by the "Committee of Experts on the Harmonisation of Certain Provisions in 
Laws for the Protection of Inventions" for the proposed Treaty Supplementing the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as Far as Patents are Concerned (Patent Law 
Treaty) culminated in a draft of the proposed Patent Law Treaty (see the "Basic Proposal", WIPO 
Doc. PLTIDC/3, in Industrial Property, February 1991, page 118). Final negotiations and the 
signing of the text of the Treaty were supposed to be held in 1991. However, the prospect for a 
successful conclusion of such a Patent Law Treaty is now in doubt and the whole project seems to 
be placed on a "slow burner" due to the reluctance of the United States to relinquish its "first-to-
invent" principle. In the May 1995 Consultative Meeting for the Further Preparation of the 
Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of the Patent Law Treaty, the US in essence declared 
that it could neither support the continuation of the Diplomatic Conference on the Patent Law 
Treaty nor continue the negotiations on the basis of the "Basic Proposal". Due to the absence of 
consensus on this "Basic Proposal", current WlPO activities seem to be confined to achieving 
harmonisation of patent laws in matters concerning the formalities of national and regional patent 
applications (see Industrial Property 239 (1995), see also Beier, F.K .• Schricker, G. (&Is). From 
GATT to TRIPS - The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. nc 
Studies Vol. 18. VCH. 1996. at page 178). Further, as Malaysia had not been present at any of the 
meetings of Committees of Experts relating to the Patent Law Treaty, it is uncertain whether she 
will be a signatory member to this Treaty if. and when it finally comes to fruition. In any case. the 
proposed provisions are mostly based on current norms of the developed countries as reflected. for 
example. in the existing provisions of the Community Patent Convention and the US patent law. 
Therefore. only passing references will be made to the proposed norms when the relevant issues IE 
analysed in the Malaysian context. For reports and other discussions relating to the proposed Patent 
Law Treaty. see Industrial Property 313 (1984). 267 (1985). 309 (1986). 204 (1987). 179 and 358 
(1988).53 and 269 (1989). 140 and 297 (1990), and 41 (1991). See also Beier. F.K., Schricker. O. 
(Eds). OA TT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property. nc 
Studies Vol. 11. VCH. Weinheim. 1989, Fryer. W.T., m. "Patent Law Harmonisation: The 
Current Situation and Alternatives Available". 72 JPTOS 242 and 298 (1990), Fiorito. E.G., ''The 
WIPO 'Basic Proposal' for Harmonisation of Patent Law Viewed from the U.S. Practitioners Point 
of View". 19 AIPLA Q.J. 24 (1991). Fiorito. E.G., "The 'Basic Proposal' for Harmonisation of 
US and World-wide Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO", 73 JPTOS 83 (1991). Pagenberg. J., "The 
WIPO Treaty", 19 AIPLA QJ. 1 (1991), and further references cited therein. 
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Methodology. Sources and Limitations 
From what has been stated above, it will be evident that the Malaysian patent system has 
not evolved in a systematic and coherent manner based on its own concepts and 
philosophical framework and/or national experience. The early patent laws had invariably 
been designed by means of the wholesale import of UK legislation. Whatever revisions that 
were carried out on such legislation then were not based on the functioning and expedience 
of the patent system as experienced in Malaysia, but on amendments made to the "parent" 
UK statutes due to the particular exigencies of the United Kingdom. Therefore, it may be 
inappropriate and unacceptable to draw wholly upon the experience of the past to assist in 
the understanding and the construction of the present Act. 
Further, the Bill which eventually led to the enactment of the Act in toto was drafted in 
circumstances of confidentiality rather than transparency. There was no public discussion 
of the proposed bill, the direction it should take, or its legal techniques.1 2 No record of the 
discussion of the officers of the Judicial and Legal Department involved in the framing of 
the Bill is available. So the rationale for the inclusion of the various provisions of the Act 
has to be derived from legal writing and judicial opinions relating to the equivalent 
provisions found in the different models relied upon in the enactment of the Act. 
In view of the patchwork nature of the Act, for the purpose of analysing and evaluating the 
relevant provisions and proposing their proper construction, a comparative legal study 
approach is, therefore, appropriate. Accordingly, the research methodology adopted in this 
thesis is based on the document and content analysis technique. 13 This involves reliance on 
two main sources of reference: 
1 . Reported judicial decisions from various jurisdictions. 
References to judicial decisions from countries having similar legislative provisions are 
made. This involves case studies, analyses and references, inter alia, to the relevant laws 
of the United Kingdom, various British Commonwealth countries, and the United States. 
Although the Malaysian Courts have not, traditionally, relied on US judicial opinions, 1 4 
12 Although advice and guidance were provided by expert missions from WIPO, including consultants 
from Sweden and the United States of America, these discussions were confmed "in-house" and 
were not made available to the public - see text accompanying footnote 130 in Chapter 1 -
Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System. 
13 See generally, Kripppendorff, K., Content Analysis: An Introduction to I~ Methodology, ~ 
Publications, Beverly Hills, CA., 1980; Rosengren, K.B. {Ed.). Advances an Content AnalYSIS, 
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA., 1981; Weber, R.P., Basic Content Analysis. Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills, CA., 1985. 
14 See Lim. H.O., "American Influence on the Development of Intellectual Property Law in 
Malaysia". seminar paper presented at the MAAS (Malaysian Association for American Studies) 
International Conference 1991 - The US Legal System: Its Influence on Malaysia and Asia. Kuala 
Lumpur (8-1017/1991). In fact, in the copyright field, US influence could be seen in the Copyright 
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the present thesis makes extensive use of judicial doctrines from the US. This is justified 
in view of the fact that certain concepts and doctrines in the Act, like the exhaustion 
doctrine, the best mode requirement, joint inventorship and doctrine of patent misuse, are 
more widely litigated upon and thus more developed by the US courts. Common law 
doctrines are also examined to determine their viability and applicability in the Malaysian 
context. The laws of civil law jurisdictions are also referred to. Where compatible with 
the Malaysian provisions, their approaches and rules may be of great relevance in the 
search for the appropriate solution. The difficulties encountered in these countries, in the 
construction and application of the corresponding provisions, are noted, and the methods 
adopted to overcome them have been utilised in assisting in the search for viable 
alternative conflict resolutions. 
2. Legal Literature, Legislative Reports and Consultation Documents 
Legal literature, committee reports, legislative reviews and consultation documents from the 
jurisdictions referred to above are also relied upon as a basis whereby the relevant 
Malaysian position is evaluated and compared. Recommendations and measures adopted in 
these jurisdictions are assessed, and where found appropriate, incorporated in the 
formulation of proposed solutions to fill in any lacunae in the existing law. Such literature, 
based on the practical experience of the working of the patent systems in these countries, is 
an invaluable source of ideas to draw upon. After all, the ultimate scope and function of all 
patent systems should, at least in theory, be the same. 
It is realised that such a wide coverage will necessarily and inevitably result in the 
sacrifice of more detailed analysis and evaluation of particular issues of the law under 
study. However, it is felt that at this stage of the development of our patent laws, the 
wider cohesive approach adopted, rather than the narrow specific issues approach, is to 
be preferred. This allows for a bird's eye view of the overall problem to be appreciated 
and if necessary, addressed in any future revision of the patent law. 
(Amendment) Act 1990. Under this Amendment Act, the recording of sound or video images from 
a radio or television broadcast is not deemed to be an infringement of the copyright involved, 
provided it is for private and personal use. 
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Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 is intended to lay down a background perspective to the thesis which examines 
the various incidents of patent ownership in Malaysia. It provides a brief historical outline 
of the various components states in Malaysia and the formation of a unified Federation of 
Malaysia. This is followed by an outline of the reception and present applicability of 
common law in the Malaysian territories. The evolution of the patent system in the various 
states and the enactment of a unified federal patent system is then described. A brief outline 
of the various substantive requirements that need to be fulfilled to be entitled to a grant of a 
patent or a utility innovation is then provided. This is not meant to be an exhaustive study 
as it is not within the scope of this thesis. 
The thesis encompasses four lines of inquiry. The first focuses on the ownership of patent 
rights. This is dealt with in Chapter 2 which centres on the ownership of patent rights inter 
se. The concepts of inventions, inventors and joint inventors are analysed. The rights of 
joint owners are examined. The provisions on employee's inventions are analysed and 
evaluated. Based on the conclusions reached, proposals for reforms are suggested. 
The second line of inquiry examines the extent of protection conferred on a patent owner. 
This first aspect of this inquiry is dealt with in Chapter 3, and concerns the various types of 
direct infringements. Special emphasis is placed on the examination of the extent to which 
indirect exploitation of a patent invention is actionable under the patent and common law. 
Since there are no statutory provisions on contributory infringement, the desirability for an 
express contributory infringement provision is examined in the next chapter, Chapter 4. 
The third line of inquiry relates to the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by a patent 
grant. The first of these inquiries, in Chapter 5, examines the rights and wrongs of the use 
of threats to enforce the patent rights. The common law remedies available to a person 
threatened is evaluated. Proposals are then made to introduce a threats section in the Act. 
The second issue under this line of inquiry is examined in Chapter 6. This chapter focuses 
on statutory measures introduced to curb the abuse of patent rights, the compulsory 
licensing provisions and the provisions regarding invalid clauses in licence contracts. 
The final line of inquiry, in Chapter 7, deals with the exceptions and limitations to, and loss 
of the exclusive rights. Among the issues dealt with under limitations to the rights is the 
common law doctrine of the implied licence to repair. The statutory doctrine of exhaustion 
of rights is also analysed. On the circumstances leading to loss of rights, the focus of the 
inquiry will be on the requirement of sufficiency in the specification and the duty to 
describe the best mode for putting the invention into effect. 
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The concluding chapter summarises the proposal for changes in the Malaysian patent law 
made in the earlier chapters and fonnulates the various revisions and amendments 
suggested to the Act, along the line of the analysis and conclusions reached in the earlier 
chapters. 
The ultimate goal of this study is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of this 
aspect of the law. It would be presumptuous to think that the recommendations or 
proposals put forward are the most suitable or will provide the right answers. However, by 
offering possible alternative solutions and construction of the provisions of the Act, and a 
body of relevant cases, articles, and reference materials relevant to the construction of the 
Act, it is hoped that they will serve as a guide to, and stimulate further studies and debates 
on various aspects of ownership in patent rights in Malaysia. Further it is hoped that the 
study will, in particular, contribute towards assisting officials in the Intellectual Property 
Division of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs in any future revision of 
the existing law, the Courts and the legal profession in the application of the law and the 
solution of legal disputes, and users of the system and the public as regards their rights and 
obligations under the law. 
This thesis is based on the law and materials available as on 31 st October, 1996. 
Chapter 1: Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System 
1 . Introduction 
The Patents Act 1983 was hailed as the frrst indigenous patent system in Malaysia. To a 
certain extent this is true, in that the 1983 Act created for the frrst time a single centralised 
system to encompass all the component states. But contrary to popular belief, prior to this 
statute, indigenous patent systems had existed for a century in all but two of the component 
states. 
To understand the reason for the proliferation of independent patent systems in the 
component states of Malaysia and better to appreciate the developments of patent legislation 
in the country, it is necessary to delve briefly into the various previously separate political 
entities that constitute present day Malaysia. 
This chapter, therefore, ftrst deals briefly with the history of the component states and 
describes how these states united to form the country of Malaysia. As English common law 
principles are relied upon when discussing the extent and scope of the rights which could 
be exercised by a patent owner, a section is devoted to discussing the introduction and 
extent of application of these common law principles in Malaysia. The chapter then goes on 
to trace the various independent patent systems that were in existence and the replacement 
of these systems with the re-registration system. This is followed by a discussion of the 
impetus which gave rise to the 1983 Act, together with a brief outline of the structure of the 
present Act. 1 A brief account is also given of the relevance and use of the former systems, 
and of the government's efforts to increase awareness and use of the patent system among 
the populace in conjunction with the coming into force of the present Act. 
In attempting to trace the development of the patent system in the Malaysian territories. reliance 
was placed on available materials in the National Archives of Malaysia. However. there are many 
gaps in documentation caused in part by termites and the climate. Great loss was also caused by the 
destruction of files that took place during the Japanese occupation (see for example. the comments 
by Paul Kratoska - A Selected List of Files in the Selangor Secretariat 1875-1953. Perpustakaan 
USM. Pulau Pinang. 1984). A striking example of such destruction was shown by the need for a 
special ordinance to be passed by the North Borneo Government, the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1949. No. 16 of 49. which inserted a new section 4B 
into the then existing patents ordinance. This section provided that all registers kept under that 
Ordinance prior to Ist day of January, 1942 were deemed to have been permanently lost Provisions 
were then made to have these old patents re-registered without any payment of fees. 1bere are a lot 
of other constraints. the main one being the unavailability of records through improper recml 
keeping or files which were either missing. untraceable or not available for public perusal. 
Therefore. some of the historical discussion will. at best, be patchy. 
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1. 1. Brief Outline of the Historical Development of Malaysia as a Political Entity. 
Malaysia consists of the components states of Malacca and Penang (the fonner Straits 
Settlements), Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor (the fonner Federated Malay 
States), lohore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu (the fonner Unfederated Malay 
States), Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and Sarawak. The first eleven states fonn part of 
Peninsular Malaysia, commonly known as West Malaysia. The last two are situated in the 
Island of Borneo and comprise East Malaysia. It was only in 1963 that all the component 
states were centrally administered as one political entity. 
European presence in the East, as far as Malaysia was concerned, started in the 16th 
century, beginning with the Portuguese, and followed by the Dutch. The British came upon 
the scene only towards the end of the eighteenth century, mainly in search of settlements 
and bases to further their trade with China.2 The Portuguese and the Dutch, though first to 
come, did not leave any lasting impact with regard to the legal system. It was the British 
influence which affected the introduction and developments of the legal system in general 
and the patent law of Malaysia in particular. 
1. 1. 1. The Straits Settlements 
The Straits Settlements comprised of Labuan, Malacca, Penang and Singapore. The first 
British foothold in Malaysia was in Penang, which was ceded to the East India Company in 
1786. This arose from the need for a better situated intermediate port for English trading 
ships between India and China than the one they had at Bencoolen in Sumatra. 3 
The next territory to come under the British was Malacca. It was captured by the 
Portuguese in 1511, and by the Dutch in 1641, who had by then also started penetrating the 
East in search of trade. 
Malacca was added to Penang when the British peaceably occupied it in 1795, as a result of 
the Dutch war against the French. It was returned to the Dutch in 1818. By the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1824, it was exchanged for the Island of Bencoolen in Sumatra. This 
marked the end of the Dutch presence in Malaya.4 
2 For a fuller account of this. see Milne. R.S .• Mauzy, O.K .. Politics and Government in Malaysia, 
Times Book International, Revised Edition. Singapore, 1980. pages 10-16. 
3 See Sheridan. L.A.. Malaya and Singapore and The Borneo Territories. The Development of their 
Laws and Constitutions. Stevens & Sons Limited, London. 1961, pages 9-10. 
4 Sec Sheridan, L.A.. Opt cit .. at pages 9-10. and Milne. R.S .. Mauzy. O.K .. Opt cit .• pages 10-16. 
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The restoration of Malacca to Holland in 1818 led the East India Company to seek another 
port in the Straits region, and Singapore was decided upon. By an agreement with the 
eldest son of the deceased Sultan of Riau, Singapore was ceded to the British. The 
occupation began in 1819. 
By the treaty of 1824 mentioned earlier, Great Britain also gave up all rights in Sumatra to 
the Dutch and the Dutch ceded Malacca to Great Britain and recognised Malaya (including 
Singapore) as a British sphere of influence. Thus, by 1824, Penang, Malacca and 
Singapore were governed by the East India Company. It was not, however, until 1826 that 
their administration was united under the title "Straits Settlements". The union was frrst 
administered by the East India Company, then by the British Government in India and 
finally became a Crown Colony, directly administered by the Colonial Office in London, in 
1868, and thus remained until the Japanese occupation. 
Labuan became a British colony in 1846 as a result of a treaty with the Sultan of Borneo. In 
1867, when the Straits Settlements Act, 1866 came into operation, Labuan was made one 
of the Settlements, and it so remained until the Japanese occupation. In 1946, it was made 
part of the Colony of North Borneo. 
1. 1.2. The Federated Malay States 
Originally the British were not much concerned with the rest of the Malayan hinterland, so 
long as disorder did not impinge on their interests. But in the middle of the nineteenth 
century the situation changed, as did British policy. An important reason for this was an 
increase in the scale of tin mining in Perak and Selangor. This new possible source of 
revenue for the Malay Rulers and chiefs led to disputes and resultant fighting between 
them. British firms in the Straits Settlements, to safeguard their trade in tin, petitioned the 
Colonial Office to intervene. The opportunity came as a result of a succession dispute 
among the claimants to the Perak throne. One of them sought British help to advance his 
cause, stating his willingness to accept a British adviser. With the guidance of the British, 
this particular claimant was chosen as Sultan. By the Pangkor Treaty of 1874, provisions 
were made for a British Resident "whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all 
questions other than those touching Malay Religion and Custom." 5 
5 For further accounts of the British "intervention" into these states, see, Sheridan, L.A., Ope cit., 
pages 8-9; Bowie, A., Crossing the Industrial Divide - State, Society, and the Politics of 
Economic Transformation in Malaysia. Columbia University Press, New York. 1991, pages 31-
34. See also Bastin, J., Winks, R.W., Malaysia - Selected Historical Readings, Oxford University 
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, and The British ''Forward Movement" 1874-1914, Caldwell, M., at 
pages 13-37, in Mohamad A., Caldwell, M. (Bds), The Making of a Neo-ColOllY, Spokesman 
Books, 1977. 
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The system of Resident was later applied to the states of Selangor, Pahang and Negri 
Sembilan. The separate sultanate of Selangor accepted the fIrst official British Resident in 
1882. This was followed by Pahang, which accepted British protection in 1888. By 1889, 
Negri Sembilan had also accepted British protection. 
These four Malay states of Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak and Selangor were later formed 
into a federation in 1895, the Federated Malay States.6 The British Residents of the four 
states were placed under a Resident -General, responsible to the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements who was designated High Commissioner of the Federation. A Federal Council 
was to be set up for the Federated Malay States which could pass laws intended to have 
force throughout the Federation or in more than one state, and laws passed by a State 
Council would not be valid if they were repugnant to the provisions of the laws passed by 
the Federal Council. Such a Council was finally set up in 1909.7 
1.1.3. The Unfederated Malay States 
In 1909 the four northern states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Pedis and Kedah, previously 
under Siamese suzerainty, were transferred to British sphere of influence, and in time all 
the Rulers accepted British advisers. Kelantan was the fIrst to accept a British Adviser in 
1910. Kedah and Pedis followed suit in 1923 and 1930 respectively. Though 10hore had 
accepted British protection much earlier, it was only in 1914 that the Sultan of 10hore 
formally accepted a British "General Adviser". These five states, Kedah, Pedis, Kelantan, 
Trengganu and 10hore, being "late-comers", were not included in the Federation, and were 
therefore, referred to as the "Unfederated Malay States".8 
6 Treaty of Federation. July 1895. 
7 In the intervening period, 1895-1909, there was no Federation organ of government with 
legislative functions. The technique used was for a federal official to draft a law which was passed 
by each State Council in practically identical fo~. See, ~lne, ~.~., Ma~, D.K., - Politics .. 
Government in Malaysia, Times Book Internabonal, Revised Edltton, Smgapore, 1980. at pages 
15-17. A good example was in the law passed by each state for protecting inventions - see series of 
letters exchanged during this period - Selangor Secretariat, British Resident's File 1895 - Misc. 
4684195, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
8 Milne, R.S., Mauzy, D.K., op. cit., at pages 16-18. and Sheridan, L.A., Malaya and Singapore 
and 1be Borneo Territories, The Development of their Laws and Constitutions, Stevens &: Sons 
Limited. London. 1961. pages 6-7. 
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1.1.4. The Borneo States9 
1.1.4.a. Sarawak 
The European incursion into the Borneo States had roughly the same pattern as in Malaya: 
the Portuguese were followed by the Dutch, and the Dutch by the British. In 1839 an 
Englishman, James Brooke, came to Borneo. In return for his help in suppressing an 
uprising against the rule of the Sultan of Brunei, he was installed as Rajah of Sarawak in 
1841. This was the beginning of the rule of the famous "White Rajahs". In 1888 Sarawak 
formally came under British protection. 
In 1946, shortly after the end of the Japanese occupation, Sarawak was ceded to Britain. 
The main reason given for cession in 1946 was that the burden of rehabilitation. 
reconstruction, and development would be too heavy for the Brooke regime and could be 
better undertaken if Sarawak became a British colony. 
1.1.4.b. Sabah 
Direct British influence in North Borneo was preceded by the commercial activities of 
several private individuals who were given trading concessions granted by the Sultan of 
Brunei. A series of negotiations in 1877 and 1878 with the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu 
resulted in the transfer of a large part of the north-east of the island of Borneo to them. 
Eventually the interest of these individuals were transferred to a Provisional Association, 
which in 1882 was replaced by the British North Borneo Company, a company formed by 
Royal Charter. Besides its trading activities, the Company was charged with the proper 
administration of the territory. The British Government maintained an indirect control over 
the administration of North Borneo by the insertion of a clause in the Charter which 
provided that the Governor had to be appointed with their consent. 
In 1888, together with Sarawak and Brunei, the new state became a British protectorate. 
The Governor of the Straits Settlements was appointed as the High Commissioner for these 
territories. As with Sarawak, it was decided that the devastation resulting from the Second 
World War was too great to repair under a continuation of the pre-war regime. 
Consequently, in 1946, North Borneo, together with Labuan, became a British colony. 
9 See generally Milne, R.S .. Mauzy, D.K., op. cit .. at pages 48-54, and Wu, M.A.. An Introduction 
to the Malaysian Legal System. 2nd Ed .. Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd. Singapore. 
1978. pages t 3-16. 
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1. 1.5. The Malayan Union. the Federation of Malaya and the Fonnation of Malaysia I 0 
Up to the Second Wodd War the peninsular part of present Malaysia was thus divided into 
the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the Unfederated Malay States. TIle 
last-mentioned component was itself made up of five separate and distinct political entities. 
All these states were under the British Military Administration from the period 1945-46.11 
After the war an attempt was made to create a more effective central government. This 
resulted in the fonnation of the Malayan Union, comprising all of the above three main 
components, i.e., all component states of the Malay Peninsula excluding Singapore, under 
a central administration. This Malayan Union was short-lived,12 and in 1948 the Federation 
of Malaya came into existence, consisting again of the same component parts as under the 
Malayan Union, but with a vastly different political and constitutional structure. On 31st 
August, 1957 the Federation of Malaya was granted independence from Britain. 
On 16th September 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, together with Singapore, merged with the 
Federation of Malaya to fonn Malaysia. 13 
1.2. Introduction of the Common Law into Malaysial4 
In theory, the law previously in force in these territories prior to the coming of the British, 
was Malay customary law and Islamic law, while the non-Malays were governed by their 
own personal laws. However, even before there was any statutory provision giving 
authority for the reception of English law in the various Malaysian territories, there was 
already de facto introduction by judges and lawyers involved in the administration of 
justice. This was due to the fact that members of the Bar and the judiciary at that time were 
entirely trained and educated in English law so that a great deal of reliance was placed on 
English law. Another route was through the indirect reception of English law via 
indigenous legislation patterned on the English model or that of British India. In this 
situation, however, "what was adopted was not English law, but English principles and 
10 For a fuller account of this topic. see Milne. R.S .• Mauzy. D.K., op. cit .• at pages 26-43, Rl 
Sheridan. L.A., Malaya and Singapore and The Borneo Territories. The Development of their Laws 
and Constitutions. Stevens &. Sons Limited. London. 1961. 
11 See generally. Daud. L .• The British Military Administration in September 1945 to April 1946, in 
Mohamad A., Caldwell. M. (Eds). The Making of a Neo-Colony, Spokesman Books, 1977. 
12 See Milne, R.S., Mauzy, O.K .• op. cit .• at pages 26-29. 
13 Singapore was to leave two years later on the 9th of August. 1965. Therefore, there will be no 
attempt to discuss the development of the patent system in Singapore. 
14 For a more detailed discussion of this area, see Braddell, R. St. John, The Law of the Straits 
Settlements - A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982; Sheridan, L.A., Malaya ani 
Singapore and The Borneo Territories, The Development of their Laws and Constitutions, Stevens 
& Sons Limited, London, 1961, and Wu, M.A .• An Introduction to the Malaysian Legal System, 
2nd Ed. Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, Singapore, 1978. 
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models for locallaws ... "15 The greatest impact, however, was made by legislation which 
allowed the importation of English law into the territory. 
1.2.1. The Straits Settlements and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States 
English commercial law was introduced into the Straits Settlements by section 6 of the Civil 
Law Ordinance, 1878,16 Statutory introduction of English law in the Malay States (the 
Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States) began only in 1937. The Civil 
Law Enactment, 1937, gave statutory authority for the introduction of English common law 
and equity in the Federated Malay States. This enactment was extended to the Unfederated 
Malay States in 1951 under the Civil Law (Extension) Ordinance after they became part of 
the Federation of Malaya in 1948. In 1956, these two enactments were replaced by the Civil 
Law Ordinance, 1956, which was also made applicable to Penang and Malacca, in addition 
to the nine former Federated and Unfederated Malay States. 
1.2.2. Sabah and Sarawak 
These two territories were in the same position as the Malay States with regard to the 
reception of English law. Prior to the enactment of specific legislation, principles of English 
law were already adopted by direct legislation and indirectly through the judiciary. The Law 
of Sarawak Ordinance, 1928, provided for statutory reception of English law in Sarawak, 
and the Civil Law Ordinance, 1938, in Sabah. 
1.2.3. The Present Statutory Provisions for the Reception of EnKlish Law in Malaysia 
When Malaysia was formed in 1963, there were three sets of laws in force providing the 
authority for the reception of English law in the territories, the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956 
for the Federation of Malaya, the Application of Law Ordinance, 1949 for Sarawak and the 
Application of Laws Ordinance, 1951, for Sabah. All these enactments were incorporated 
into a comprehensive Civil Law Act, 1956 (Revised 1972) which came into force on 1st 
April, 1972. 
IS Per Sproule Ag. C.J.C.t in Re the Will of Yap Kim Sena (1924) 4 F.M.S.L.R. 313. 
16 The whole section of this Ordinance was incorporated into the Civil Law Ordinance of 1909 ..t 
later enacted as section 5 of the Civil Law Ordinance (Cap. 42 of the 1936 Revised Edition). This 
was the position in the Straits Settlements until they were dissolved in 1946 with the fonnation of 
the Malayan Union and later became part of the Federation of Malaya. 
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The relevant section, section 3 of the Act, provides as follows: 
( 1) Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any 
written law in force in Malaysia the Court shall-
(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the 
rules of equity as administered in England on the 7th day of April, 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with 
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the first 
day of December, 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity. together 
with statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 
12th day of December, 1949, subject however to subsection (3)(ii); 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general 
application shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of 
Malaysia and their respective inhabitants pennit and subject to such qualifications as 
local circumstances render necessary. 
(2) Subject to the express provisions of this Act or any other written law in force in 
Malaysia or any part thereof, in the event of conflict or variance between the 
common law and the rules of equity with reference to the same matter, the rules of 
equity shall prevail. 
The dates 12th day of December, 1949, 1st day of December, 1951 and 7th April, 1956, 
refer to the date of coming into force of the three repealed Ordinances for Sarawak, 
Federation of Malaya, and Sabah respectively. They are significant because only English 
common law and equity (or in the case of Sabah and Sarawak, together with statutes of 
general application) as administered in England on these dates are applicable. 
It has to be noted that there is a significant difference of language in section 3( l)(a) 
applicable to West Malaysia and section 3(1)(b) and (c) for Sabah and Sarawak. Section 
3(1)(a) mentions the application of "the common law of England and the rules of equity" 
whereas sections 3( 1 )(b) and (c) pennit the application of "common law of England and the 
rules of equity, together with statutes of general application". The repealed 1956 Civil Law 
Ordinance for the Federation of Malaya, which contained the same provision, had given 
rise to great uncertainty and debates as to whether the whole of English law, including 
statutes, or only common law and equity unmodified by statutes, was applicable to the 
Federation. 17 It will seem that this uncertainty will continue until there is an authoritati\'c 
declaration by the court. 
17 A study llf the various contentions can be found in Bartholomew. O.W.o "The Commercial Law of 
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Another bone of contention is the question of how far the body of law comprised in the 
common law and equity could be adopted by the court. The issue was again brought about 
by the different cut-off dates for the reception of English laws. Are only the common law 
and equitable principles as declared by the courts up to the cut-off dates capable of being 
adopted by the Malaysian courts? This would mean that further refinements of these 
principles could not be adopted. It is arguable that to deny a continuing reception of the 
common law and equitable principles would result in the adoption of legal principles which 
may already be outdated, and which in England, may already have been replaced by other 
principles. On this point it is, however, useful to refer to the opinion of the Privy Council 
in Lee Kee Choong v. Empat Nombor Ekor (NS) Sdn Bhd & ors.18 On the application of 
English law, Lord Russell, delivering the judgement of their Lordships, said: 
"Their Lordships do not need to go to comment on possible developments since 
1956 in the law in England concerning ability to go behind a valuation on the 
ground of mistake or error in principle, having regard to the emergence of an ability 
to sue such a valuer for negligence: see for example Campbell v. Edwards [1976] 1 
WLR 403. For present purpose it appears that the Civil Law Ordinance 1956, 
section 3, adopted English law as administered at its effective date, so that any 
subsequent march in English authority is not embodied ... "19 
As will be discussed in later chapters,20 this issue may be crucial in determining whether in 
the absence of statutory provisions, a satisfactory remedy could be afforded the patent 
owner or other persons affected by his rights by reliance on the common law remedies. 
Finally, the application of the law of England throughout Malaysia is subject to two 
limitations. First, it is applied only in the absence of local statutes on the particular subjects. 
Secondly, only that part of the English law that is suited to local circumstances will be 
applied.21 
Malaysia - A Study in the Reception of English Law" (1965) MU 1; Sheridan. L.A .• op. cit., at 
pages 18-19. and Joseph Chia in his article. "The Reception of English Law under sections 3 and 5 
of the Civil law Act 1956 (Revised 1972)". J.M.C.L. Vol. No.1. pages 42-47. Although there 
appears to be no judicial decision directly on this point. the judgement of Smith J .• in Mokhtar y. 
Arumuaam (1959) MU 232 is of interest. He said that the Court could not awanl damages in the 
nature of interest for delay in the return of specific goods on the basis that such relief had been 
provided by section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act. 1833 (English). He remarked, "'Ibis relief, 
being a creature of English statute. is not available here: see section 3(1) of the Civil Law 
Ordinance. 1956." 
18 Lee K.ee Choana y. Empat Nombor Ekor CNS} Sdn BIxJ" ors (1976) 3 PCC 235. 
19 Lee K.ee Choana y. Empat Nombor Ekor CNS) Sdp BIxJ " ors (1976) 3 PeC 235, at paaes 240-
241. 
20 See Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights. and Chapter 
5 - The Issuance of 11ueats to Enforce Patent Rights. 
21 See the proviso to section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956. 
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1.3. The Development of Patent Law in the Various Component States of Malaysia 
1.3.1. The Straits Settlements 
As the Straits Settlements were the only Malaysian territories which had been conferred the 
status of a colony, their patent development was consequently different from the other 
component states of Malaysia. As mentioned earlier, they were at one time considered a part 
of India and administered from there, before being conferred the status of a Crown Colony. 
1.3.l.a. Protection via the English statute 
Prior to the enactment of any specific statute relating to the protection of inventions in the 
Straits Settlements, it was a matter of conjecture whether the English patent statutes were 
applicable to the Colony. It would seem that, in theory, an English patent could have been 
extended to the Malayan States, though there is no record of whether such had been done. 
It is arguable that patent protection could have been available in some parts of the territories 
by way of extension of the protection of a patent granted in the United Kingdom.22 This 
view is supported by section 18 of the Patent Law Amendment Act, United Kingdom,23 
which provided that: 
"such letters patent so sealed shall extend to the whole of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man; and in case 
such warrant so direct, such letters patent shall be made applicable to Her Majesty's 
Colonies and Plantations abroad, or such of them as may be mentioned in such 
warrant ... " 
22 See President's Inaugural Address, page 35, Transactions of the Institute of Patents Agents, Vol. I, 
Session 1882-83, at page 39, where it was stated that "prior to the passing of the Patent Law 
Amendment Act, 1852, the British Patent covered the colonial possessions ... " See also Martin, 
W., The English Patent System, The Temple Primers, 1904, at page 112, "Formerly patents 
which were granted here were not confined to the United Kingdom, for the area over which they 
extended varied according to the request of the patentees - a practice also contemplated by the Act of 
1852. Consequently, in a large number of instances patents were granted which availed here and in 
certain named colonies."; and Rushen, P.C., A Critical Study of the Form of Letters Patent for 
Inventions, Stevens and Sons, London, 1908, at page 71, " .. within our United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and Isle of Man," (in the document of grant of the patent) - This defines the 
territory reserved to the patentee. No doubt the Crown could if it chose restrict this territory. 
notwithstanding section 14 of the Act of 1907, which prescribed that a patent shall have etfec:.1 
throughout the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, because that provision is an infringement of 
the Royal prerogative saved by section 97. The territory also no doubt could be extended to any 
under the Crown dominion where the common law is the same as the English and no local statute 
obtains to the contrary. Most Crown Colonies. if not all. have their own local patent enactments 
now which have to be complied with in order to obtain local grants. but in the old days an English 
patent could be extended over the Colonies at the option of the applicant" 
23 18S2 IS & 16 Vict. c. 83. 
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1.3.l.b. Protection via legislation in India 
As mentioned earlier, the Straits Settlements, along with Labuan, were separated from India 
in 1867. They were then administered directly by the Colonial Office in London. Prior to 
that date, the Straits Settlements were administered from India. Therefore, prior to the 
existence of a local patent enactment, the law rela~g to patents enacted for India also 
extended to these territories. 
The frrst patent statute enacted in India was Patent Law, Act No. VI of 1856.24 This Act for 
the frrst time provided a statutory mechanism for the protection of inventions in India. 
However, it was repealed by Act IX of 1857 when the Court of Directors of the East India 
Company, in pursuance of the power vested in them by law, disallowed it, since it was 
passed by the Legislative Council of India without the sanction of Her Majesty having been 
previously obtained and signified. As this was not done, the Court of Directors, under 
advice, were of the opinion that the Legislative Council of India was, therefore, not 
competent to pass the Act. A new patent law was substituted for it by Act XV of 1859. 
Of relevance for present discussion was section 38 of this Act, wherein the word "India" 
was defined to mean "the territories which are or may become vested in Her Majesty by the 
Statutes of21 and 22 Vic., c. 106, entitled 'An Act for the Better Government of India.'" 
From this it is clear that when the territories of the Straits Settlements were part of India, 
Act XV of 1859 applied to them. 25 
As to the period after the separation of the Colony from India, no Ordinance of the Colony 
was passed in 1867 or at any other time, by which the Indian Act XV of 1859 ceased to 
have effect in the Colony. Moreover, by Ordinance No.2 of 1867, "the Enabling Act" of 
the Straits Settlements, the powers given by the Indian Acts to the Governor General and 
other officers of the Indian Government were vested in the Governor and other officers of 
the Colony. Therefore, Act XV of 1859 (India) could still be used by inventors wishing to 
have their inventions protected in the Straits Settlements. 
1.3.l.c. Indi~enous le~slation 
The situation remained thus until 1870 when a special legislation, The Electric Telegraph 
Exclusive Privileges Ordinance, 1870, was passed conferring special privileges on certain 
persons for inventions relating to electric telegraphs.26 Although it was a special and not a 
24 It received the assent of the Governor-General on 28th February. 1856. 
25 See An Act for the Better Government of India. 1858. 21 &: 22 Viet. c. 106 and the preamble to 
An Act to Provide for the Government of the "Straits Settlements" 1866. 29 &: 30 Viet. c. 115. 
26 See Ordinance No. XIV of 1870. "An Ordinance to confer on certain persons exclusive privileges 
in respect of certain patented inventions for the improvement of electric telegraph". Although at 
that time it was still possible to apply for protection under the Indian Act XV, this route wu not 
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general statute, its passage was important because it gave the impetus to enact a general 
enactment for the protection of inventions in the Straits Settlements. 27 
The fIrst general patent legislation to be enacted in any of the Malaysian territories was the 
Inventions Ordinance which was applicable to the Colony of the Straits Settlements. 28 
Since the Straits Settlements were at that time the only territories in Malaysia which were 
under the influence of the British, the other parts of Malaysia were left untouched. 
The patent law that was enacted was based on the Ceylon Act No.6 of 1859.29 Under this 
Ordinance, the inventor of any new manufacture might petition the Governor in Council for 
leave to file a specification thereof.30 An invention was deemed novel if, before the time of 
applying for leave to ftIe the specification, it had not been publicly used in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in this Colony or in any British Dominion 
or possession.31 The importer of an invention into the Colony could also apply for a patent 
grant.32 
To obtain a grant, the applicant had to petition the Governor in Council for leave to ftIe a 
specification. Upon such petition the Governor in Council might make an order authorising 
the petitioner to file a specification of the invention. However, before such order was made 
the Governor might, if he thought fit, refer the petition to any person or persons for inquiry 
and report. 3 3 If, within the space of six months from the date of such order the petitioner 
caused a specification of his invention to be filed in a manner required by the Ordinance, the 
Governor in Council might authorise the issue of a grant to the petitioner.34 The Governor 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
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open to the applicants because any extensions of the privileges under a United Kingdom grant lBJ 
to be applied for within one year of such grant, a condition which they were not able to fulfil. 
After the passing of this special enactment, a complaint was made to the Secretary of State for the 
Colony, Lord Kimberley, complaining about the excessive expenses that the beneficiaries of the 
special ordinance had to undertake, and that owing to the absence of an ordinance in the Colony for 
granting exclusive privileges to inventions it was necessary for each applicant for such privileges 
to incur an almost prohibitive expense in obtaining the passing of a special ordinance for each 
inventions - see correspondence relating to complaints regarding the introduction of special 
Ordinance No. 14 of 1870, by one Mr A.C. Brice to Lord Kimberley. Secretary of State for the 
Colonies - Microfilm M157n3, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. Because of this. Lml 
Kimberley instructed the Governor of the Straits Settlements to enact a local general ordinance to 
protect inventions. 
Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871, Straits Settlements. 
This Act was very similar to Patents Act No. 15 of 1859, India. 
See section 6, Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871, Straits Settlements. 
See section 3(1). Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871. Straits Settlements. 
The definition of "Inventor" in section 2 stated that "Inventor". when not used in conjunction with 
the word "Actual", included the importer of an invention not publicly known or used in the 
Colony. cfIndia, under the Indian Act of 1859. it was expressly stated that the importer into India 
of a new invention shall not be deemed an inventor unless he was the actual inventor. So it would 
seem that in the Straits Settlements. patents of invention and patents of importation were allowed. 
Unlike the legislation of Perak. Selangor. Negri Sembilan and Pahang. and later the FuJeraIed 
Malay States (as to these states. see later), there was no indication as to what the person appointed 
was supposed to inquire into and report upon, i.e.. whether it was merely to examine the 
application for the formality requirements or as to the substantive merits of the invention. 
See sections 6(1). (2),8(1) to (4) and 12, Ordinance No. IS (Inventions) 1871, Straits SeuJements. 
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in Council might, however, refuse to make any order under this section in any case in 
which it appeared to him that the granting of exclusive privileges under this Ordinance 
would be prejudicial to the public interest or of doubtful public utility.35 Provisions were 
also made for any person interested in opposing the prayer of the petition to serve on the 
Colonial Secretary a notice of his intention to oppose, and every person so serving a notice 
might be heard by the Governor in Council.36 
The owner of a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland patent, or a patent in 
any British possession, could petition, at any time during its existence, to have exclusive 
rights in the Colony)7 The procedures provided were simpler than the case for a local 
application. First, the Ordinance did not envisage the possibility of referring the petition to 
any person or persons for inquiry and report. There was also no provision for opposition in 
the case of a British patent. Thirdly, the provision giving the Governor in Council the right 
to refuse to make any order granting exclusive privileges in any case in which it appeared to 
him that the granting of exclusive privileges under the Ordinance would be prejudicial to the 
public interests or of doubtful public utility, did not apply to applications based on a British 
granted patent. However, it would appear that the Governor in Council did have a 
discretion as to whether to allow the petition, as the section provided that "the Governor in 
Council may make an order authorising the petitioner to ftIe a specification." Further, since 
no time limit to petition was imposed, it would appear that such grantee could petition at 
any time before the original grant expired in the United Kingdom)8 Except for these 
differences, and the duration of the rights (see later), the results of both types of 
applications were the same in the sense that the same type of grant would be issued.39 
The duration of protection granted was for a term of fourteen years from the time of filing 
the specification.4o Within this period the grantee had the sole and exclusive privilege of 
35 Section 8(5). Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871, Straits Settlements. 
36 See section 13(5). Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871, Straits Settlements. 
37 It is significant to note as indicative of the attitude of the colonial power at that time that to a 
majority of the members of the Legislative Council, this was deemed the most important part of 
the Ordinance. In his Report on Ordinance No. 15 of 1871, dated 14th November, 1871. the 
Attorney-General of the Straits Settlements, Mr T. Braddell, said that but for the Secretary of 
State's express instruction that an ordinance, similar to that in force in Ceylon, No.5 of 1859, 
should be passed. the ordinance would have been based on a registration of United Kingdom and 
Colonial patents only. This was because of the strong expression of opinion of the members of the 
Legislative Council that since it was unlikely that there would be many patent rights taken out in 
the Colony, the system should be based on the extension of granted patent rights to the Colony -
Microfilm M157n3, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. In fact, among the fust applications for a 
grant of patent rights under Ordinance No. 15 was a petition for extension to the Colony of a 
United Kingdom granted patent for "improvements in the treatment of fibre-bearing plants and in 
the machinery or apparatus employed" made on the 6th of June, 1872 - Microfilm M167n3, 
National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
38 See section 14( 1), which dealt with patents granted in the United Kingdom or in any British 
possession, and compare with sections 6 to 8, which dealt with the acquisition of exclusive rights 
in the Straits Settlements. 
39 See section 12 and Fonn of Grant in Schedule E, Ordinance No. IS (Inventions) 1871. Straits 
Settlements. 
40 See section 12(1). Ordinance No. IS (Inventions) 1871, Straits Settlements. There was provision 
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making, selling and using the said invention in the Colony, and authorising others so to 
do.41 In the case of a registration of a United Kingdom patent, the tenn of protection was 
only for the remainder of the tenn for which the said patent might be in force in the United 
Kingdom.42 The grant was not subject to any compulsory licensing. 
An important amendment ordinance was enacted in 1924.43 This amended Ordinance No. 
15 (Inventions) in various respects. Section 5 repealed the old sections 14 and 15 (the 
provisions dealing with the granting of exclusive privileges in the Colony to British granted 
patents) and introduced new sections 14 and 15. Under the new provisions, any person 
being the grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom might apply within three years from the 
date of the issue of the patent to have the same registered in the Colony.44 If all the 
procedural conditions were satisfied the Colonial Secretary was obliged to issue the 
certificate of registration. Thus it would appear that such an "extension" of a United 
Kingdom patent to the Colony was "as of right". The certificate of registration conferred on 
the applicant privileges and rights subject to all conditions established by the law in the 
Colony as though the patent had been issued in the Colony.45 Again there was no provision 
dealing with opposition, but a safeguard was introduced, providing that no action for 
infringement could be entertained in respect of any exploitation of the invention prior to the 
date of issue of the certificate of registration in the Colony.46 This event marked the advent 
of a dual system of original grant and re-registration system and was to be the precursor to 
the single re-registration system. 
The imperfections of the Ordinance, even with the various amendments, were vigorously 
criticised. First, it was pointed out that it was necessary for an invention, in order to be a 
good subject matter for a local grant, to be a new invention not only within the colony, the 
area to which the grant extended, but also within the whole Empire. It was manifestly 
impossible for a local examiner to satisfy himself that such was the case. There were also 
suggestions that provision for a local grant should be rescinded and that the Colony should 
contend itself with legislation, similar to that in other Colonies, for the registration of 
patents granted in the United Kingdom.47 This point was also raised by the Straits 
for an extension of protection for a further tenn of 14 years. These periods were later changed to 16 
and 10 years respectively - see section 2 Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) Amendment Ordinance. 
1922 (No. 24 of 1922). 
41 See Fonn of Grant in Schedule E. Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871. Straits Settlements. 
42 See section 14(1). Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871. Straits Settlements. 
43 Inventions (Amendment) Ordinance. 1924 (No. 15 of 1924). Straits Settlements. 
44 Note that whereas the original provision encompassed all United Kingdom patents and patents 
granted in any British possession. the amended section only applied to United Kingdom patents. A 
time period of three years was also imposed. whereas previously there was none. 
4S See section 14(3). Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) 1871. Straits Settlements. as amended. 
46 See section 5, Inventions (Amendment) Ordinance. 1924 (No. 15 of 1924), Straits Settlements. 
47 In fact this suggestion was not new: such a course was in fact proposed by the Government of the 
Colony and accepted by the Government of the Federated Malay States in 1929, although no 
follow-up actions were taken. 
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Settlements Trade Commission Report 1933-1934.48 The response to the Report was swift 
and by the 15th of February, 1935, the Governor of the Straits Settlements was able to 
report to the Secretary of State for the Colony that a Bill to amend Ordinance No. 15 was 
receiving consideration. 
However, it was only in 1937 that Ordinance 15 was repealed by the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937.49 By this Ordinance, the only means of obtaining 
exclusive privileges for an invention was via section 3 of the 1937 Ordinance which 
provided that "Any person being a grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom ... may apply 
to the Registrar of Patents50 within three years from the date of issue of the patent to have 
such patent registered in the Colony". This introduction of a single re-registration system 
marked the end of the independent patent system in the Straits Settlements. 
Again it would appear that the grantee of a United Kingdom patent was entitled, as of right, 
to have issued to him a certificate of registration. Such certificate of registration conferred 
on him privileges and rights, subject to any privileges or rights acquired under any previous 
Ordinance of the Colony relating to inventions, similar in all respects to those conferred by 
the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom.51 As in the repealed Ordinance, the 
privileges and rights so granted dated from the date of the patent in the United Kingdom 
and continued in force only so long as the patent remained in force in the United Kingdom. 
Similarly, there was a proviso that no action for infringement could be entertained in respect 
of any manufacture, use or sale of the invention prior to the date of issue of the certificate of 
48 
49 
50 
51 
The Commission appointed by Sir Cecil Clementi to inquire into the trade of the Straits 
Settlements, the directions in which it had gained or lost, the reasons for such gains and losses, and 
its future potentialities - see Chapter 60, para. 548. In summary, the Commission found that 
Ordinance 15 (Inventions) which had not been revised since originally enacted in 1871, was out of 
date and defective in omitting to provide for the filing of a provisional specification or provisional 
protection, or to make proper provision for opposition. The test for novelty, that an invention 
should not have been published anywhere within the Empire, was an impossible one, to which no 
local examiner could certify. The Commission recommended that the revision of the law which 
was under consideration should be proceeded with as soon as conveniently possible. It was also 
pointed out, in para. 547, that a grant was only valid within the Colony and that an inventor who 
wished to protect his invention in the Federated Malay States or lohore must make separate 
applications and obtain separate grants under the laws of those administrations. 1be Ordinance was 
out of date and required to be overhauled and modernised. 
The Commission's inquiry into the trading and economic conditions relating to the Straits 
Settlements covered a wide variety of subjects, including import, export and entrepot trades, 
communication, shipping conferences, crown agents, motor transport, marine insurance IDi 
lapanese competition. The fact that the patent system was included in its inquiries showed clemiy 
that it was viewed as a tool to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of British traders IDi 
manufacturers in the global trade and not as a tool to encourage local innovative activities. 
By section 14 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937 - S.S. No.2 of 
1937. 
In exercise of the powers vested in him by section 2 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patent 
Ordinance, 1937, the Governor appointed the officer for the time being holding the office of 
Registrar of Companies to be Registrar of Patents for the purpose of the said Ordinance, with effect 
from the 14th May, 1937 [2376137] - Straits Settlements Government Gazette, May 28, 1937, 
page 1526 - No. 1520 - The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937. 
See section 6, Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937 - S.S. No.2 of 1937. 
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registration in the Colony.52 However, no specific exceptions to the exclusive rights were 
provided for, nor were there any provision dealing with the rights of prior users.53 
, 
The structural changes in the patent system as practised from the time it was first introduced 
in the Colony and up to the 1937 Ordinance were substantial. The system started with a 
locally examined patent grant (although there were provisions enabling an owner of a 
United Kingdom patent or a patent granted in any of the British possession to petition for a 
grant in the Colony without an examination and opposition). This single grant system was 
later replaced with a dual system, the grant system for local applications resulting in the 
issue of a grant and the re-registration system confined only to a United Kingdom granted 
patent, which resulted in the issue of a certificate of registration. Up to this stage the legal 
fiction that the United Kingdom patent was to be regarded as if it was issued in the Colony 
was still maintained. However, this device was abandoned by the 1937 Ordinance, wherein 
such a certificate of registration conferred on the applicant privileges and rights similar in all 
respects to those conferred by the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, from 1937 onwards, the dual systems of original grant for local application and 
re-registration of United Kingdom patents had been converted into a simple re-registration 
system for United Kingdom granted patents only. 54 It was no more possible for an 
inventor to make an original application in the Colony. Anyone desiring a patent would 
have to apply for a patent in the United Kingdom and then apply in the Colony to obtain a 
certificate of registration for the same to be entitled to exclusive privileges in the Colony. 
This move was a reflection of the realisation that in the absence of the required 
administrative set-up and the proper personnel for evaluating the invention, it was not 
possible to carry out a proper examination to ensure that only deserving inventions were 
granted patent rights. 
1.3.2. The Federated Malay States 
1.3.2. a. The States Enactments 
Prior to the formation of the Federated Malay States, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and 
Pahang existed as separate and independent political entities, each with its own separate 
Legislative Council. Each of these states was eventually to have its own separate patent 
52 See section 7, Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937 - S.S. No.2 of 1937, IDI 
section 14(4), Ordinance No. IS (Inventions), Straits Settlements. 
53 As to these defences, see Chapter 7 - Exceptions and Limitations to, and Loss of Rights. 
54 It was surprising that the system of local grant was not retained despite the Report of the n.te 
Commission which recommended that in the interests of local inventors who were satisfied with a 
local grant and who did not wish to go to the expense of obtaining a United Kingdom grant, a dual 
system should be operated in tandem- see Trade Commission Report. Chapter 60, para. SSO. 
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law, granting provincial patents. Before such laws were enacted, the only way of protecting 
an invention was by way of a speciallegislation.55 
However, pressure was already mounting in these states. For example, in April 18th, 
1894, the Straits' Government had asked the four states to adopt their patent laws.56 
Further impetus to introduce such legislation was due to inquiries from interested parties.57 
The fIrst amongst these states to enact a patent law was Selangor with its Inventions 
Regulation, 1896.58 This was soon followed by Negri Sembilan with Inventions Order in 
Council, 1896.59 Perak followed suit with Inventions Order in Council, 1896.60 The last 
of the Confederation, Pahang, enacted similar statute on the 29th of January, 1897.61 
Presumably, the delay of about one year was due to the fact that there was still raging a 
debate as to the propriety of such a law in the State.62 
The patent enactments in the four states were identical and in fact modelled on the Selangor 
Enactment, which practised, in theory, the system of locally examined applications. 
Basically an invention could be protected in the state if it was new. Like the Straits 
Settlements, the invention had to be new throughout the whole of the British Empire and 
also within the state.63 The applicant had to petition His Highness, the Sultan in Council 
for a grant of exclusive privileges. The petition and specification might be referred to an 
examiner for enquiry and report. It is pertinent to note that the examiner referred to here did 
not go into the novelty (subject to what is said later) or merit of the invention. His task was 
merely to examine the application to ensure that it satisfied all the required formal 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
For example, prior to the general enactment, the only patent granted in Pahang was that respecting 
the cyanide process of gold smelting. A special ordinance was passed to protect the company's 
rights - see correspondence dated 221811896 regarding the introduction of patent law to Pahang -
Negri Sembilan Secretariat 1896, File No. R.O. 1957/96: Subject: Mr L. Charter's application for 
patent rights in Pahang re an invention for process of preserving fruits for export (9.6.1896) -
National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
See correspondence regarding the introduction of patent law to Pahang - Negri Sembilan Secretariat 
1896, File No. R.O. 1957/96: Subject: Mr L. Charter's application for patent rights in Pahang re 
an invention for process of preserving fruits for export (9.6.1896) - National Archives, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
See for example the enquiry from Messrs Drew and Napier, Singapore, sent to the Secretary to 
Government, Selangor, dated 11th September, 1895, regarding the availability of patent protection 
in Selangor - Selangor Secretariat, British Resident's File 1895 - Misc. 4684/95, National 
Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
Regulation V of 1896, Selangor. 
Order in Council IV of 1896, Negri Sembilan. 
Inventions Order in Council, No.2 of 1896, Perak. 
Invention Enactment No.5 of 1897, Pahang. By an oversight, no date was fixed for the coming 
into force of this Enactment until the 20th day of October, 1909. However, prior to this date, 
several grants were issued pursuant to the Enactment. To remove doubts as to the Validity of these 
grants, The Inventions (Validation) Enactment, 1909, Enactment No. 13 of 1909 was passed to 
rectify this omission. This Validation Act validated all Pahang grants issued prior to 2011011909 -
see section 2, The Inventions (Validation) Enactment, 1909, Enactment No. 13 of 1909. 
See correspondence regarding the introduction of patent law to Pahang - Negri Sembilan Secretariat 
1896, File No. R.G. 1957196: SUbject: Mr L. Charter's application for patent rights in Pahang re 
an invention for process of preserving fruits for export (9.6.1896) - National Archives, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
See section 3, Regulation V of 1896, Selangor. 
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requirements and that it did not contain more than one invention. The only novelty search 
he would carry out was to ensure that the application was not the subject of an earlier 
application for a grant in the State.64 Acceptance of the specification had to be notified in 
the gazette for a period of two months.65 During this period any person interested in 
opposing the grant might serve notice of opposition. Among the grounds for opposition 
were that the applicant had obtained the invention from the person opposing it, or that the 
invention or part of the invention had been granted exclusive rights on an application of 
prior date or that the invention was not new. If there was no opposition or if opposition 
was successfully defended, a grant would be issued giving the applicant a duration of 
fourteen years exclusive privileges to make, sell and use the invention, and to authorise 
others to do so, in the state.66 
In the case of a United Kingdom patent, unlike the procedure under Ordinance 15 of the 
Straits Settlements (as amended), the applicant had to go through the same procedure before 
64 
65 
66 
See section 6, Regulation V of 1896, Selangor. 
From the abstract of meetings of the Selangor State Council on 27th May, 1903, paragraph 6, on 
14th September 1903, paragraph 6, and on 16th November 1903, paragraph 4, it would seem that 
local expertise were occasionally used to determine the suitability of granting the patent requested 
for: 
- Abstract of meetin"s of the Selan"or State Council on 27th May 1903. param.ph 6 - A petition 
by Toh Naam, of Kuala Lumpur, for a grant of exclusive privileges in regard to an invention of a 
new apparatus for washing tin and other ore and separating it from amang, sand and other foreign 
bodies was taken into consideration. Mr Cummings states that he had been requested by the 
Honorary Secretary of the Malay States Miner's Association to point out that it would not be to 
the advantage of the mining industry generally that the exclusive privileges sought should be 
granted. There is no novelty, he stated, in the principle of the apparatus, which was that of the ore 
concentrator well known to scientific miners. He assured the Council that he believed there were 
valid grounds for this objection, and begged the Council, in spite of the fact that formal notice of 
objection as required by section 7 of the "Inventions Regulation, 1896," had not been lodged, to 
postpone the final decision as to the granting of exclusive privileges. After hearing Mr Cummings. 
the Council was of opinion that the granting of exclusive privileges without further inquiry am 
discussion would not be in the best interest of the community and resolved to postpone the grant 
or refusal of exclusive privileges until the next meeting. The Council desired that the petitioner and 
the objector should appear before the next meeting and that the Director of Public Works should be 
invited to attend. 
- Abstract of meetin" of the SeJan"or State Council on 14th Se.ptember 1903. parawapb 6. - An 
application by Mr E.H. Mathieu. of Singapore, for the grant of exclusive privileges in respect of 
an invention for the preparation of india-rubber from the milk of rubber trees by heat is taken into 
consideration by the Council. On the recommendations of the Superintendent, Experimental 
Plantations, and the Director of Public Works. His Highness. the Sultan in Council granted to the 
inventor the sole and exclusive privilege of making. selling and using the said invention in the 
State, and authorising others so to do. for a term of fourteen years from the 21st day of February. 
1903. 
The petition of Toh Naam. of Kuala Lumpur •... consideration of which had been postponed from 
the meeting of Council on 27th May, 1903. was again submitted for discussion. The inventor .n 
the representatives of the Malay States Miners' Association. which had given notice of its 
intention to oppose the grant, were present, and the Director of Public Works was also in 
attendance. After hearing the arguments on either side. the Council unanimously decided to refuse 
the grant of exclusive privileges, on the ground that the novelty of the invention has not been 
made out to their satisfaction. 
_ Abstract ofmeetinl of the SeJaoior State Council on 16th Noyember 1903. paraaqpb 4. - An 
application by Mr G.H. Huges. Agricultural Chemist ... for grant of exclusive privileges in respect 
of an invention for tan improved food for animals" is taken into consideration by the Council. 
After the nature of the invention had been explained by the Resident, His Highness the Sultan in 
Council granted to the inventor the sole privileges. 
See sections 4 to 8, and Form of Grant in Schedule C, Regulation V of 1896, Selanp. 
40 
being entitled to a Selangor patent. No time period was however, imposed for making the 
petition. The term of protection in this case was limited to the remainder of the term for 
which the patent might be in force in the United Kingdom. There was also a provision 
preserving the right of the Sultan in Council to refuse to grant exclusive rights in the state to 
a British patentee if it appears that such a grant would be prejudicial to the public interest.67 
Another major difference, when compared to the Straits Settlements' Ordinance was the 
provision for compulsory licensing.68 As in the case of the Straits Settlements, there were 
no specific exceptions to the exclusive rights provided by the legislation. 
1.3.2.b. The Federal Enactment 
The absurdity of the situation whereby the Confederation had four separate patent 
enactments was soon realised. As early as 1906, the Resident General had submitted a 
proposal to simplify the procedure in regard to patents in the Federated Malay States by 
establishing a Central Patents Office.69 There was also a move to introduce a legislation 
which was of a sufficiently comprehensive nature to cover a grant for the whole area of the 
Malay Peninsula, so far as that could be done by legislation in these States and in the Straits 
Settiements.70 However, nothing resulted from these proposals. It was only in 1914 that a 
Bill for a centralised patent system for the Federated Malay States was introduced,71 
resulting in The Inventions Enactment, 1914.72 
67 See sections 10 to 13, Regulation V of 1896, Selangor. 
68 See section 16, Regulation V of 1896, Selangor. A compulsory licence could be ordered where it 
was proved that by reason of the default of a grantee to give licences on reasonable terms:-
(a) The invention was not being worked in the State; or 
(b) The reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the invention could not be supplied; or 
(c) Any person was prevented from working or using to the best advantage an invention of which he 
was possessed. 
69 See Abstract of minutes of a meeting of the State Council, Selangor - 10th December, 1906 -
Selangor Government Gazette December 21, page 811, at 812, "The Acting British Resident of 
Selangor submitted a proposal from the Resident General to simplify the procedure in regard to 
patents in the Federated Malay States by establishing a Central Patents Office in the Federal 
Secretariat. He pointed out that the powers, which was given to His Highness the Sultan in 
Council under the Inventions Regulation, would have to be transferred to the Resident-General to 
give effect to this proposal. He drew attention to the cumbrous nature of the present procedure in 
the case of an application for patent rights extending over all four States and he DIed that the 
delegation of these powers was a matter of no great consequence in view of the fact that the 
Council must in most cases of applications for patents be guided almost entirely by outside expert 
advice. The Selangor Legislative Council agreed that the proposal was a good one and that it 
should be carried into effect." 
70 See correspondence datal 16th November, 1908, High Commissioner's Office (British North 
Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, 1897-1912), H.C.O Brunei Misc. 59/1908, National Archives, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
71 In introducing the Bill, the Legal Adviser stressed that "it seemed a ridiculous waste of money, 
time, and energy that anyone desirous of protection in these States for his invention should have 
to go through the same process of application in every State, instead of being able to get one grant 
which should cover the whole area of the Federation." See Federated Malay Stales - Shorthand 
Report of the proceedings of the Federal Council - speech of Mr F. Bellamy, Legal Adviser, 
Tuesday 24th November, 1914. 
72 Law No. 19, 1914. This Enactment followed as closely as practicable the provisions of the 
English law, i.e., The Patents and Designs Act 1907, in so far as that law related to patents. 
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The new law repealed the enactments of all the four states.7 3 Among the new features 
which this Enactment presented as compared with the existing law was the provision made 
for depositing, in cases where the inventor so desired, a provisional specification, and 
afterwards, at some later date, a complete specification. The Enactment provided for the 
same protection, known as provisional protection, given by the English law in the interval 
between the acceptance of an application and the date of the making of the actual grant. 74 
Unlike the repealed laws, every application had to be referred to an examiner. However, as 
in the previous laws, the examination was only as to formality. It was to ensure that the 
nature of the invention was fairly described, that the application, specification, or drawings 
had been prepared in the prescribed manner, and that the title sufficiently indicated the 
subject matter of the invention.75 There was no substantive examination. Another major 
difference was that it was no longer possible to oppose on the general ground that the 
invention lacked novelty.76 Such a ground could only be used in an action to revoke the 
patent. 77 Any patent granted under this Enactment was for a term of fourteen years from the 
date of application.7 8 There was no reference in the Enactment itself as to the nature of the 
exclusive rights granted, however, the form of patent indicated that the rights granted, i. e., 
the "exclusive privilege of making, using, and selling" the invention, were similar to those 
under the repealed state enactments.19 
Another novel feature, so far as these States were concerned, was contained in section 24, 
which dealt with the grant of exclusive privileges in the case of inventions protected in the 
United Kingdom or in any possession or dependency thereof. Power was given in the case 
of a British or Colonial patent, other than Straits Settlements patents, to deal with the 
application without referring it to an examiner, which was to be the rule in all other cases, 
but at the same time reserving to the public the right to lodge objections.80 
73 See section l(ii), The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
74 See section 6, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. The procedure prescribed 
was practically a copy of the British system. 
75 See section 5(ii), The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
76 See section II, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
77 See section 26(ii)(a), The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
78 See sections 13 and 17, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
79 See Schedule 2, Form E, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. 
80 This is the first time when a simple re-registration system was envisaged in the Malaysian 
territories. In the original Bill, the clause went even further and provided that in the case of a 
Straits Settlements patent, the application might be dealt with in a manner which would not give 
the public any opportunity of making objections. The object seemed to be that there should be 
reciprocal action between these States and the Colony in that matter and that, although it was not 
practicable that one grant should operate over the whole area, still the two places were so closely 
connected that it should be a matter of course that a grant made in one should without any 
opposition, or opportunity of opposition, practically take effect in the other. However, this 
provision was removed at the Committee stage on the objection of a Federal Council member, Mr 
Bric Macfadyen, who said that there would be many situation when an application in the Straits 
Settlements, like those relating to mining machinery or tapping implements, which would not be 
opposed in the Straits Settlements, would very likely be opposed in the Federated Malay States -
see Federated Malay States - ShorthaDd Report of the proceedings of the Federal Council - Tuesday 
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The compulsory licensing provision in this new Enactment was substantially different from 
those under the respective state enactments. It was now provided that any interested person 
might petition the Chief Secretary alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public 
with regard to an invention in respect of which a grant was in force had not been satisfied 
and pray for a grant of a compulsory licence, or in the alternative, for the revocation of a 
licence.81 
As in the British Act upon which this Enactment was modelled, there was also a provision 
regarding the use of groundless threats. This was the fust, and only such provision, found 
in any of the local patent statutes, and was to remain in the statute book only until the 1914 
Enactment was repealed.82 
The Invention Enactment, 1914 was further amended in 1925.83 Three important 
amendments were made. The term of protection of fourteen years was extended to sixteen 
years.84 Secondly, there was the addition of a new provision providing for extension of the 
term of grant where the grantee had been inadequately remunerated by his grant. Formerly 
the Chief Secretary might, by order, extend the term of the grant for a further term not 
exceeding seven, or, in exceptional cases, fourteen years, or might make a new grant for 
such terms as might be specified in the order. Under the amendment, the duration was now 
five and ten years respectively.85 Lastly, Section 24 of the principal Enactment (dealing 
with United Kingdom patents) was repealed and new sections substituted therefor. The 
new section imposed a time limit of three year from the date of issue of the patent in the 
United Kingdom within which the grantee could apply to have such patent registered in the 
Federated Malay States. Upon such application being received together with the necessary 
documents, the Chief Secretary should issue to the applicant a certificate of registration. 
Such certificate of registration conferred on the applicant all such exclusive privileges and 
rights subject to all conditions established by law as though a grant had been made under 
this Enactment. It is important to note that the amendment allowed the local registration of a 
United Kingdom patent as of right at any time within three years of the grant thereof. This 
marked a move away from the previous grant plus a modified grant system to a dual system 
of grant and simple re-registration system. 86 
24th November, 1914. 
81 See section 25, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Federated Malay States. Section 25(v) then listed 
the situations when the reasonable requirements of the public should be deemed not to be satisfied. 
For further discussion of compulsory licensing, see Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's 
Exercise of His Exclusive Rights. para. 6.2. 
82 See section 36, The Inventions Enactment, 1914. Federated Malay States. For further discussion 
on the use of threats to enforce patent rigbts, see later Chapter 5 - The Issuance of Threats to 
Enforce Patent Rigbts. 
83 See The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Amendment Enactment, 1925. Enactment No.2 of 1925. 
84 See section 3. The Inventions Enactment, 1914. Amendment Enactment, 1925, Enactment No.2 
of 1925. 
85 See section 4, The Inventions Enactment, 1914, Amendment Enactment, 1925, Enactment No.2 
of 1925. 
86 See section 5. The Inventions Enactment, 1914. Amendment Enactment, 1925, Enactment No.2 
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1.3.3. The Unfederated Malay States 
1.3.3.a. Johore 
Of the Unfederated Malay States, Johore was the fITst to introduce a patent law with the 
passing of The Inventions Enactment in 1911.87 This was a grant system which was 
identical in all substantive aspects to those enacted in the states of Negri Sembilan, Perak, 
Pahang and Selangor. 
Patents for 14 years were granted to inventors or their assigns for inventions not worked or 
published in the British Empire or Johore more than 6 months prior to the date of 
application for patent. The grant conferred upon the owner the exclusive privilege of 
making, selling and using the said invention in the State.88 British or British colonial 
patents could be extended to Johore to expire with the rights in the country of origin, but 
the Sultan for good cause could refuse to grant such extension.89 Patents about to expire 
could sometimes be extended when of sufficient merit for another 7 years. Being in the 
Selangor mould, it contained the same provision on compulsory licensing.9o 
An important amendment was passed in 1915. By this Amendment Act, the term "inventor" 
was redefined to included "the fITst importer into the State of an invention not publicly used 
or known in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or in any possession or 
dependency thereof or in the State".91 Hence patent of importation could now be protected 
within the State if the necessary conditions were satisfied. 
Three amendments of a substantive nature were passed in 1924. The fITst extended the 
period of protection from fourteen to sixteen years.92 The second, and most important 
change was the introduction of a new system for the protection of patents granted in the 
United Kingdom. Under the amendment, the grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom 
might apply within three years from the date of issue of the grant to have such patent 
registered in Johore without the necessity for an examination. Upon notification of receipt 
of the application in the Gazette, any person might oppose the application on certain 
prescribed grounds. If the opposition was not successful, then the applicant would be 
issued with a certificate of registration. Such certificate of registration conferred on the 
of 1925. 
87 Enactment No.3, 1911, Johore. 
88 See section 8 and Form of Patent in Schedule C, Enactment No.3, 1911, Johore. 
89 See section 10, Enactment No.3, 1911, Johore. The procedure was the same as that provided under 
the repealed Inventions Regulation 1896, Selangor. See supra, para. 1.3.2.a. 
90 See section 16, Enactment No.3, 1911, Johore. See footnote 68 for the Selangor provision. 
91 See section 2, 1be Inventions Enactment, 1911, Amendment Enactment, 191 S, Enactment No. 1 
of 1915, Johore. 
92 See section 2, The Inventions Enactment, 1911, Amendment Enactment, 1924, Enactment No. 13 
of 1924, Johore, 1924. 
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applicant similar rights and privileges as those conferred by the grant of exclusive 
privileges.93 Another important amendment was that relating to compulsory licences. 
Section 16 of the 1911 Act was repealed and replaced by a new section 16 which provided 
new grounds for the issue of compulsory licences.94 
Hence from 1924 until the 1937 Act, the system in lohore, following the lead of the 
Federated Malay States, was a combination of a grant and a re-registration system. In 1937, 
Enactment No.3 was repealed by the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Enactment, 
1937.95 This 1937 Enactment abolished the system of local original grant and instead 
retained the provision relating to the re-registration of United Kingdom patents. Thus, in 
line with the prevailing trend in the Straits Settlements, lohore had also moved to the simple 
re-registration model. There were, however, two key differences between the prior and 
new system of registration. Before the 1937 Enactment, there was a period for opposing 
the registration of the United Kingdom patent before the Sultan in Council could issue the 
certificate of registration.96 There was no provision for a period for opposition in the 1937 
Act. Secondly, under the old Enactment, power was specifically preserved to enable the 
Sultan in Council to refuse to issue a certificate of registration if it should appear to him that 
such issue would be prejudicial to the public interest.97 Under the 1937 Enactment, it 
would appear that on meeting all the necessary procedural requirements, the issue of a 
certificate of registration was mandatory. Perhaps as a balance to this, the Enactment 
provided further that no action for infringement should be entertained in respect of any 
manufacture, use or sale of the invention prior to the date of issue of the certificate of 
registration in the State.98 
There was also a provision whereby the Sultan in Council might, by notification in the 
Gazette order that the provisions of the 1933 Enactment should apply to patents issued in 
any British Dominion.99 
93 See section 5, The Inventions Enactment, 1911, Amendment Enactment, 1924, Enactment No. 13 
of 1924, Johore, 1924. 
94 See section 8, The Inventions Enactment, 1911, Amendment Enactment, 1924, Enactment No. 13 
of 1924, Johore. 
95 See section 15 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Enactment, 1937 (No.7 of 1937), 
Johore. It is interesting to note that reference was made to the difficulties encountered by the old 
enactment as summarised in Chapter 60 of the Trade Commission Report 1933-1934 in the objects 
and reasons for the introduction of the Bill. 
96 See section l1(iii) and (iv), Inventions Enactment, Enactment No.3 of 1911, as amended by 
Enactments No.1 of 1915, 17 of 1922, 13 of 1924, and 8 of 1933. 
97 See section 14, Inventions Enactment, Enactment No.3 of 1911, as amended by Enactments No.1 
of 1915, 17 of 1922, 13 of 1924 and 8 of 1933. 
98 See proviso to section 7(i) of tile Registration of United Kingdom Patents Enactment, 1937 (No.7 
of 1937), Johore. 
99 See section 14 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Enactment, 1937 (No.7 of 1937), 
Jobore. No such notification was, however, made. 
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1.3.3.b. Kelantan and Kedah 
With the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and lohore providing a mechanism 
for the protection of inventions in the respective states, it was but a matter of time before the 
other Unfederated Malay States followed suit. 1 00 
Kedah came out with Enactment No. 54 (Inventions) in 1914.101 Unlike the other states 
whose patent systems evolved from the original grant system, a modified grant system and 
fmally to a simple re-registration system, Kedah opted straight away for the simple re-
registration system, perhaps through the lessons learnt by the other states. Section 2 of the 
Enactment provided that any person who had obtained a grant (or a renewal of grant) of 
patent rights or exclusive privileges for the use of an invention in the Colony or in the 
Federated Malay States might petition the President of the State Council for a grant of 
exclusive privileges for the use of such invention in the State of Kedah. The President of 
the State Council, if he was satisfied that the granting of exclusive privileges for the use of 
such invention in Kedah would not be prejudicial to the public interest, might cause the 
certified copy of the grant in the Colony or in the Federated Malay States, as the case might 
be, to be registered in his office. Such a registration had the effect of conferring upon the 
grantee, for the term of his grant, the same privileges in Kedah as had been conferred upon 
him by the grant in the Colony or the Federated Malay States. 1 02 
This Enactment was subsequently amended in 1936.103 By section 2 of the amending 
Enactment, the right to apply for a certificate of registration in the state was extended to 
owners of any patents in the United Kingdom or in any Dominion. 
The Inventions Enactment, 1916 brought the patent system into Kelantan.104 This 
Enactment was similar to that in Kedah. For example, by section 2, it was provided that 
any person who had obtained a grant (or a renewal of grant) of patent rights or exclusive 
privileges for the use of an invention in the Colony of the Straits Settlements or in the 
Federated Malay States might petition the British Adviser for a grant of exclusive privileges 
100 In fact. prior to the passing of the first Kelantan Inventions Enactment in 1916. there were already 
several inquiries about obtaining patent protection in Kelantan • see for example letter from Mr 
H.D. Hensen. Kelantan. dated 291111915 . British Adviser. Kelantan 1915 . File No. 13711915. 
National Archives. Kuala Lumpur; letter from Down and Co .• Singapore dated 2414/1915 enquiring 
about patent protection for process for manufacturing rubber from lattices, British Adviser, 
Kelantan 1915, File No. 52011915, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. The reason given for the 
introduction of the enactment in Kelantan was that "from time to time applications were received 
from inventors. who desired to obtain patent rights in Kelantan. usually in connection with rubber 
machinery. The enactment would enable such applications to be granted"· see Keln: 4911916, File 
No. 14911916. National Archives. Kuala Lumpur. 
101 Enactment No. 54 (Inventions) [Enactment 16 of 1332] • 1914, Kedah. 
102 See section 4, Enactment No. 54 (Inventions) [Enactment 16 of 1332] • 1914, Kedah. 
103 By the Inventions (Amendment) Enactment (Enactment No. 16 of 1355), which came into force on 
1211211936. 
104 1be Inventions Enactment, 1916. Enactment No.3 of 1916. Kelantan. 
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for the use of such invention in the State of Kelantan. Similar provIsIons regarding 
procedural steps were also provided for. 105 
This 1916 Enactment was later repealed by The Inventions Enactment, 1928.106 By section 
2, the holder of a patent granted or renewed in the Colony of the Straits Settlements or in 
the Federated Malay States or in the United Kingdom might petition the British Adviser for 
a grant of exclusive privileges for the use of such invention in the State of Kelantan. 1 07 
In both States, there was no provision for opposition. There was also no specific provision 
for compulsory licensing. It is unclear whether the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
Federated Malay States were applicable in the case of patents from those states. 
1.3.3.c. Perlis and Trengganu 
Only Perlis and Trenggannu, among the Unfederated Malay States, were to remain 
untouched by the activities in patent legislation. It was only in 1951, after the formation of 
the Federation of Malaya, that patent protection was available in these states. l 08 
1.3.4. The Borneo Territories 
1.3.4.a. The Colony of North Borneo (Sabah) 
Sabah, unlike other Malaysian states, but in common with the Straits Settlements, 
introduced the patent system at a relatively early time. In 1887, it adopted the Straits 
Settlements Inventions Ordinance, 1871 as part of the law of the Colony of North 
Borneo. I 09 Because the Straits Settlements Ordinance was adopted in toto, there were 
references in Proclamation 1 to persons, places and subjects which did not exist in North 
Borneo and, for this reason, it was totally repealed by section 2 of The Patents 
Proclamation, 1908, II 0 which nevertheless, still followed the same model as that of the 
Straits Settlements. Hence, as in the Straits Settlements, there was a system for local grant 
and a modified system for grants based on United Kingdom patents. I 11 The extension of 
105 See section 4, The Inventions Enactment, 1916. Enactment No.3 of 1916, Kelantan. 
106 The Inventions Enactment, 1928 (Enactment No. 11 of 1928) Kelantan. 
107 The 1928 Act is substantially the same as the 1916 Act except for the inclusion of patents granted 
in the United Kingdom and also the requirement that the British Adviser should obtain the consent 
of His Highness, the Sultan in Council before deciding to register these patents. 
108 See later, para. 1.4, infra. 
109 Proclamation 1 of 1887, North Borneo. 
110 The Patents Proclamation, 1908, Proclamation No. 11, North Borneo. 
111 See sections 6 to 16. The Patents Proclamation, 1908. Proclamation No. 11, North Borneo. 
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rights in a United Kingdom patent was, however, subject to the Government's discretion to 
refuse such a grant if it would be prejudicial to the public interest or of doubtful utility .112 
Proclamation No. 2 was subsequently repealed by Section 2 of Registration of Uoited 
Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937.113 This Ordinance, like the case of the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malays States, introduced the simple re-registration system 
applicable only to U oited Kingdom patents. 
1.3.4.b. Sarawak 
In 1899, when an inquiry, on behalf of the International Office at Berne of the Union for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, was made to Sir Charles Brooke, the Rajah of 
Sarawak, regarding the existence of a patent law in Sarawak, he was able, loftily, to reply 
that "I do not know of any special ones being in force, nor have I found any really required 
except those to protect life and property." 114 However, despite the absence of any general 
enactment on patents, it would appear that an invention could be protected and privileges 
granted by applying directly to the Rajah for consideration and approval for exclusive 
privileges in the state. 1 IS 
There was also an attempt to introduce a patent law into Brunei, a neighbouring state of 
Sarawak, which was also under a Resident system, in 1908. The then British Resident to 
Brunei proposed to the High Commissioner the introduction of such a law which would be 
based on Ordinance No. 15 of the Straits Settlements. The response to this was that it was a 
little premature, there being no one in Brunei, nor in Labuan, who could examine 
specifications and claims and that without expert advice any law would be useless. 1 16 This 
was in line with the prevailing opinion at that time that, if there was a need to introduce a 
patent law, it had, of necessity, to be based on a re-registration system. 
112 Section 9, The Patents Proclamation, 1908, Proclamation No. 11, North Borneo. 
113 Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1931. Ordinance No.9 of 1931, North Borneo, 
as subsequently amended by Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 
1949, No. 16 of 49, Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1950, No. 
4 of 1950 and Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956, No. 1 of 
1956. The Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 inserted a new 
section 8A which declared certain acts carried out in vessels, aircraft and land vehicles to be non-
infringement of the patent rights. 
114 See correspondence dated 29/4/1899, 21/611899 and 131611899 - High Commissioner's Office 
(British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, 1897-1912), Borneo 148199, National ArchiVes, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
lIS See exchange of letters dated 24th August. 1908. 22nd October, 1908 and 16th October 1908, 
between Mr M.S.H. McArthur, Esq., British Counsel for Sarawak and British North Borneo IIId 
Resident at Brunei, the Residents Office, Sarawak. and the Acting Seaetary to the High 
Commissioner for Federated Malay States and Brunei and Cruikshank &: Fairweather. Ltd of 
Glasgow, who were engaged in preparing a book relating to patent practices in all countries - High 
Commissioner's Office (British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. 1891-1912), H.C.O. Misc. 
Brunei 5311908, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
116 See file H.C.O Brunei Misc. 5911908, High Commissioner's Office (British North Borneo, Bnmei 
and Sarawak, 1897-1912), National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
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However, the tide of progress could be resisted only until 1922. As in Kedah and 
Kelantan, when Sarawak ftrst introduced a patent system, it chose the simple re-registration 
model. This was implemented by the Patent Order 1922.117 Section 2 allowed the holder of 
a patent grant in the United Kingdom, the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay 
States to petition for exclusive rights in the State. There were no provisions relating to 
examination or opposition. The above Order was consolidated in 1927 and 1967. 118 
1.4. The Consolidation of the Various State Laws upon the Formation of the 
Federation of Malaya 
When the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1948, there were in existence ftve different 
sets of patent systems in Peninsula Malaya, practising either a simple re-registration system 
or a dual system. With the aim of having a centralised system, the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1951 was enacted. I 19 
This Ordinance, by section 18, repealed the following Ordinances and Enactments: 
117 
118 
119 
1. The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937 (S.S. No.2 
of 1937). 
2. The Inventions Enactment (F.M.S. Cap. 72). 
Patent Order 1922, Order No. 16, Sarawak. 
See Order No. L-l Letters Patent, 1927. After further modifications, this was subsequently renamed 
Patents Ordinance, Chapter 61, 1927. 
Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1951 (No.9 of 1951) which came into effect 
on 1.4.1953, later renamed The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, 1951 (Revised 1978) 
Act 215. 
The reason for opting for a simple re-registration system was explained in the objects and reasons 
section of the Bill: 
"At the present moment, the law relating to the protection of inventions is, in the former Federated 
Malay States, contained in the Invention Enactment (Cap. 72). This is an elaborate piece of 
legislation, following, to a great extent, the Patents and Designs Acts of the United Kingdom, aid 
containing provisions both for the registration of United Kingdom patents and also for the 
independent grant of protection to patents applied for in the Federated Malay States. Whilst this 
system is no doubt theoretically desirable, it had proved difficult to work in practice, since, before a 
patent can be granted, the application and specifications have to be examined and reported on by 
experts who, in addition to considerable scientific and mechanical knowledge, require long training 
and experience in this type of work, if it is to be done satisfactorily. Even before the last war, the 
difficulty of obtaining the services of suitable staff led the former Straits Settlements to repeal their 
Inventions Ordinance and to pass instead the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 
1937. This Ordinance provided simply that patents registered in the United Kingdom could be 
registered in the Straits Settlements and have there the same protection that they had in the United 
Kingdom. After the passing of this Ordinance, no further patents were granted locally in the 
Settlements. This system is still in force in the Settlements of Penang and Malacca and the 
Colony of Singapore. The difficulties experienced in obtaining a suitable trained staff, which led to 
the changed practice in the Straits Settlements, have since the war become so much more acute as 
to be insurmountable. It is accordingly proposed to adopt throughout the Federation the system of 
re-reglstration of United Kingdom patents solely and this Bill is intended to give effect to this 
proposal." 
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3. The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Enactment, 1937 (lohore En. 
No.7 of 1937). 
4. Enactment (No. 54) Inventions (Kedah En. No. 54). 
5. The Inventions Enactment, 1928 (Kelantan En. No. 11 of 1928). 
Hence from a situation where there was in place an indigenous system of grant, in certain 
states of the Federation, the Ordinance, as subsequently amended,I20 replaced all these 
with a single re-registration system. Subsequently, anyone desiring patent protection in the 
Federation of Malaya was obliged to apply for patent rights in the United Kingdom and 
then apply to register it in the Federation before he could have exclusive rights to his 
invention in the Federation. The application had to be made within three years of the date of 
the grant in the United Kingdom, although the Registrar had the discretion to extend this 
time period. 121 However, the issue of the certificate of registration was mandatory. there 
being no provision providing for the Registrar to refuse registration if all the formalities 
were complied with. The Patent Registry, therefore, only carried out administrative 
endorsements of patents registered in the United Kingdom. 
The duration of the rights started from the date of the patent in the United Kingdom and 
continued to be in force so long as the patent remained in force in the United Kingdom.122 
A prior user of the invention was protected from infringement action if it took place before 
the date of the issue of the certificate in West Malaysia. 123 However, no provision was 
made allowing for further use of the invention by the prior user. Special provisions were 
also included, listing acts which were not to be deemed infringements. These exceptions 
applied only in two situations. The first is the use of the patented invention on board a 
foreign vessel which was temporarily or accidentally in the territorial waters of the 
Federation and the second, such use of a patented invention in a foreign aircraft or foreign 
land vehicle. I 24 However, as in the previous Registration of United Kingdom Ordinances, 
the 1951 Act did not deal comprehensively with the other aspects of the rights and 
limitations to the rights of a patent owner. There were no provisions governing compulsory 
licences, the use of the patented invention by the Crown, or provisions prohibiting the use 
of threats, all of which were present in the United Kingdom statute of the time. There was 
only a reference back to the "privileges and rights ... similar in all respects to those 
conferred by the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom".I 25 Thus the extent of the 
rights and duties of the patent owner was uncertain. I 26 
120 By the Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956, No. 38 of 1956, 
and the Registration of United Kingdom Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957, No. 67 of 1957. 
121 See section 3, The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act. 1951 (Revised 1978) Act 215. 
122 See sections 6 and 7, The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act. 1951 (Revised 1978) Act 
215. 
123 See proviso to section 7( 1), The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act. 1951 (Revised 
1978) Act 215. 
124 See section 8. The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act. 1951 (Revised 1978) Act ~ 15. 
125 Section 6 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act 1951 stated that "Such certificate of 
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The only other legislative activity prior to the 1983 Act was the enactment of the Patents 
(Rights of Government) Act 1967, which provided that any manufacture, use or exercise of 
the patented invention by the Government of the federation or of any state would not 
amount to an infringement. Further, there was no need to pay any compensation for such 
use.l27 
1.5. The Emer~ence of a Malaysian Patent System 
1.5.1. The Situation Prior to the 1983 Act 
Malaysia was formed in 1963 with the merger of the Federation of Malaya, Sabah and 
Sarawak. On its formation, there were four pieces of patent legislation in existence, the 
Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, 1951 for the Federation of Malaya, the 
Patents Ordinance, Chapter 61, for the State of Sarawak, the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1937, for the State of Sabah, and the Patents (Rights of 
Government) Act 1967. Obviously this situation was undesirable, leading to unnecessary 
expense and duplication of efforts. Further, being a sovereign and independent nation, a 
system whereby a national of Malaysia had fIrst to apply to the United Kingdom Patent 
OffIce for a grant of patent rights before he could proceed to register it in Malaysia to enable 
him to enforce his rights is anomalous. It was to take another twenty years, though, before 
any changes were attempted. 
registration shall confer on the applicant privileges and rights similar in all respects to those 
conferred by the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom, but subject, nevertheless, to any 
privileges or rights acquired under any of the written laws specified in the Schedule or under any 
Ordinance or Enactment repealed by any of the said written laws." 
126 The provision of section 6 was to be the subject of several cases in various jurisdictions having 
similar systems of registration of United Kingdom granted patents. The issue in all these cases was 
whether the rights and privileges granted were subject to such limitations, conditions arxI 
qualifications as were imposed on the owner in the United Kingdom. See, for example, Poulenc 
and &nor y. Lodeka Pharmacy (1965) LLR 9 (Nigeria); Jack Blackburn & ors y. Boon EnKineerina 
& Construction Sdn Bhd & ors [1988] 2 MU 572; [1991] FSR 391 (H. Ct Brunei); Smith Kline 
French Laboratories Ltd y. The Attorney-General [1966] H.K.L.R. 498; [1966] FSR 254 (Ct of 
Appeal, Hong Kong); and Biosen. Inc. y Scitech Medical Products Pte Ltd & anor (H. Ct 
Singapore, Suit No. 692193, 221711994 (unreported), the first case involving the applicability of 
the United Kingdom compulsory licensing provision, the second and third on whether section 46 of 
the Patents Act 1949 (the Government use provision) applied in Brunei and Hong Kong 
respectively, and the last, the applicability of the groundless threats provision. In all these cases, 
the court held that the United Kingdom Patents Act 1949 (and the Patents Act 1977 in the last 
case) did not apply in its entirety since there was no specific provision extending the relevant 
sections to these countries. For a comment on the possible approaches to construe the equivalent 
provision of section 6 in relation to industrial designs, see Jayaram. H., "Protection of Industrial 
Designs in Malaysia - Issues in Ascertaining the Law", (1988) The Supreme Court Journal 289. 
See also Pendleton, M.D., The Law of Intellectual and Industrial Property in Hong Kong, 
Butterwortbs, 1984, at pages 236-240. 
127 See section 3, Patents (Rights of Government) Act 1967, Act No. 53 of 1967. 
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1.5.2. The Move towards a Unified System 
The move back to a unified indigenous patent system was mooted by the then Minister for 
Trade and Industry as a move to promote innovative and inventive efforts in the country .12 8 
It was felt that the patent system then was a hindrance to innovation and inventive activities 
in the country, as new innovations or inventions by Malaysian nationals had to be granted a 
patent first in the United Kingdom before they could be re-registered for protection in 
Malaysia. Such a lengthy and costly process would not encourage small-time inventors 
who did not have readily available fmancial resources. Further, the introduction of an 
indigenous patent system would not only introduce a machinery to protect local patent 
holders, but more importantly would stimulate the development of technological capabilities 
within the country. Indeed, the indigenous patent system with its administrative machinery 
and technical support infrastructure will act as a further stimulus for innovative and 
inventive activities within the country .129 A committee, comprising members from the 
government and private sectors was set up to look into this problem and to decide on the 
appropriate system to adopt. The drafters of the Bill sought guidance from the patent 
legislation of, inter alia, India, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom and the European Patent 
Convention. Several expert missions from WIPO, including consultants from Sweden and 
the United States of America, visited Malaysia in November, 1982. to advise the 
government on the establishment of a new patent system. 130 
The decision to introduce a new patent legislation for the country was based on four main 
objectives, i.e., 
1 . the need to give adequate protection to owners of foreign technology so as to 
encourage a greater inflow of up-to-date technology into the industrial sector. This 
would ensure a wider technological choice to the industrial sector; 
2. the need to set up technological information based on patent information to ensure 
that the industrial sector would be in a better technology bargaining position with 
knowledge on the current state-of-the-art of the technology to be acquired, on the 
owner of the technology, on alternatives to the technology to be acquired and other 
technological information necessary for a wise choice on the technology to be 
acquired; 
128 Datuk Dr Mahathir Mohamad. the present Prime Minister of Malaysia. 
129 Sec speech of Mr 00 Gin Sun, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry. in introducing the Patents 
Bill 1983 in Parliament - Penyata Rasmi Parlimen. Dewan Rakyat. Parlimen Ke enam, Penggal 
pertama. Jilid I Bil 54 dan 55. dated 25th and 26th July. 1983 respectively - Report of Second and 
Third reading in the House of Representati\,e. 
130 See Industrial Property in Asia and the Pacific. March 1983. page 3. 
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3. the need to encourage local inventions and innovations by providing an efficient and 
economical means of patenting for local inventors; this would encourage the move 
towards the creation of indigenous technology and appropriate technology suited to 
local production techniques and the local environment; 
4. the need to provide for safeguards in the patent legislation of the country to 
discourage unfair monopoly practices by foreign suppliers of technology through 
the introduction of utility models, compulsory licensing, etc.13 I 
Thus, on 28th November, 1983, the Patents Act 1983 was enacted. By section 89 of this 
Act, all the previous patent legislation mentioned above were repealed. However, it was not 
implemented until the 1st of October, 1986, after it was further amended by the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 1986. Further amendments were brought about in 1993.132 
1.5.3. Brief Outline of the Structure of the New System 
Although it could be improved upon, the 1983 Act for the fIrSt time provides a 
comprehensive set of provisions I 33 dealing with matters ranging from the administrative 
structure of the bodies set up to implement the provisions of the Act, appointment of 
examiners, to compulsory licensing. The acquisition, extent of and limitations to the rights 
acquired, invalid clauses in licensing contracts and ownership in employee inventions are 
for the fIrSt time specifically provided for. A petty patent system (called utility innovation in 
the Act) is also introduced. A new body, the Patents Board is set up. This Board,134 
constituted under section 4 has the following functions: 
131 See "Country Statement on the Industrial Property Situation in Malaysia and WIPO's 
Development Cooperation Activities in Asia and the Pacific", by Mr Yuen Hung Chan, Assistant 
Secretary, Science and Technology Division, Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment, Malaysia (paper presented at the Regional Evaluation and Planning Meeting on 
Development Cooperation Activities in Asia and the Pacific, Thailand 25-28 June, 1984). Reported 
in Industrial Property in Asia and the Pacific, September, 1984, No.7, page 19. 
132 Patents (Amendment) Act 1993, Act A 863/93. 
133 It is divided into 15 Parts. Part I deals with the preliminary matters, including the extent of the 
application of the Act. Parts IT and ill deal with the establishment of a Patents Board and the 
administration of the Patent Registration Office. The substantive aspects of patentability for an 
invention are described in Part IV and that for a utility innovation in Part IVA, whereas Part VI 
lays down the procedural steps for obtaining a grant. Part V lays down the rules for determining 
ownership of an invention while Part VIT provides for rights and limitation to the rights of a patent 
owner. Acts deemed to be infringement of a patent right are set out in Part XII. The assignment 
and transmission of patents, matters relating to licence contracts and compulsory licensing R 
detailed in Parts VUI, IX and X respectively. Part XI provides for surrender and invalidation of 
grants, while the provisions relating to offences are laid down in Part xm. Powers relating to 
enforcement and miscellaneous matters are found in Parts XIV and XV respectively. 
134 The BOBId consists of a maximum of eleven members, made up of representatives from various 
bodies like the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Ministry of International Trade. 
Ministry of Science and Technology, National Scientific Council for Research and Development, 
research institutes. institution of higher learning and persons who could contribute to the 
development of industrial property in Malaysia (section 4(2». 
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a) to issue certificates for utility innovations; 
b) to consider applications for compulsory licences; 
c) to appoint examiners; and 
d) to advise the Minister generally on matters pertaining to the Act. 
1 .5.4. Conditions for Grant of Patent Rights 
The substantive patentability criteria to be satisfied for a grant of a patent are modelled along 
the line of the WIPO Model Law. 135 These provisions are substantially similar in effect to 
those found in the United Kingdom Act and the European Patent Convention. 136 Three 
major requirements need to be satisfied under the Act before a patent for an invention could 
be granted. They are that the invention needs to be new, must involve an inventive step and 
finally that it must have industrial applicability .13 7 The first two requirements are generally 
measured against the state of the art existing at the time of the application for a patent. 
Under the Act an invention is deemed to be new if it is not anticipated by the prior art. The 
prior art base consists of everything disclosed to the public anywhere in the world, whether 
by written publication, oral disclosure, use, or in any other way, prior to the priority date of 
the patent application claiming the invention. 138 Hence the system of novelty that is 
applicable in Malaysia is the universal or absolute novelty system. 139 In the case of a co-
pending application, the contents of a domestic patent application having an earlier priority 
date than the later patent application is deemed to part of the state of the art in the 
assessment of novelty of the second application. 140 The system adopted by Malaysia in the 
case of co-pending applications is the whole contents approach instead of the prior claim 
approach. In three situations a disclosure to the public will not be prejudicial to the novelty 
of an invention provided that an application for a patent is made within one year of such a 
disclosure. They include disclosure by reason or in consequence of acts committed by the 
applicant or his predecessor in title, and disclosure by reason or in consequence of any 
abuse of the rights of the applicant or his predecessor in titIe. 141 There is also a similar 
135 See sections II to 16 of the Act, andcfwith sections 112 to 118 of the WIPO Model Law. The 
substantive requirements to be met before a utility innovation could be protected are substantially 
the same. The major difference is that the utility innovation does not have to possess any inventive 
step, see section 17 A of the Act. 
136 See sections I to 6, Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom, and Articles 52 to 57, European Patent 
Convention. 
137 See section II of the Act. 
138 See section 14(1) and 14(2)(a), Patents Act 1983 as amended by section 6(a)(i) Patents 
(Amendment) Act 1993. 
139 Before the 1993 Amendment Act. the system that was in place was the mixed novelty system. 
This meant that previously the novelty of an invention was destroyed. in the case of a disclosure 
other than a written disclosure, only if it took place in Malaysia. 
140 See section 14(2)(b) of the Act. 
141 See section 14( 3)( a) to (c) of the Act. The third situation refers to a disclosure by way of a pending 
application to register the patent in the UK Patent Office as at the date of coming into force of the 
Act. S IOce the Act came into force on I st of October, 1986, this provision is no longer relevant. 
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exception to the novelty rule, as found in the United Kingdom and EPC provisions, in the 
case of product patents relating to a fIrst medical use. 142 
The requirement of an inventive step is satisfied if it can be shown that, having regard to the 
state of the art, such inventive step would not have been obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art. 143 The Act states that "an invention shall be considered industrially 
applicable if it can be made or used in any kind of industry" .144 Unlike the patent statutes 
of the United Kingdom and the EPC, but following the WIPO Model Law, there is no 
provision deeming that method of medical treatment is not capable of industrial application. 
Such methods are, however, not regarded as patentable subject matter. 145 
Section 13 provides a specific list of subject matter which is not patentable, and 
substantially follows the WIPO Model law .146 Again, in substance they are similar to those 
found in the United Kingdom and the EPC systems.l47 
The granting procedure is based on a full examination system.148 An applicant may claim a 
right of priority of one or more national, regional or international applications filed during a 
period of twelve months immediately preceding the fIling date of the earlier application. 149 
After filing, the application is subject to a preliminary examination. This is to ensure that all 
the formal requirements of the Act and regulations are complied with. The procedure is 
automatic and there is no need to file a request for a preliminary examination. Following 
this, a request for a substantive examination of the application has to be made within 2 
years of the filing date. 150 During the substantive examination, the application will be 
examined to determine whether it satisfies the substantive requirements of the Act as to 
novelty, inventive step, etc. Where a patent has been granted to the applicant for an 
invention which is the same or substantially the same as the invention claimed in the 
application, the applicant may request for a modified substantive examination, which is a 
142 See section 14(4) Patents Act 1983 as amended. This provision was UJed by section 6(b) of the 
Patents (Amendment) Act 1993, Act A 863/93. See section 2(6) of the UK Act and Article 54(5) 
EPC. 
143 See section 15 of the Act. 
144 See section 16 of the Act. cf WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, Volume 
I, Patents, World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva 1979, section 116. 
14S See section 13(1)(d) of the Act and section 112(3)(iv) of the WIPO Model Law, and contrast with 
section 4(2) of the United Kingdom Act, and Article 52(4) of the EPC. 
146 See section I 12(3)(i) to (iv) of the WIPO Model Law. 
147 See sections 1(2) and 4(2) of the UK Act, and Articles 52(2) and (4) of the EPC. These exceptions 
are discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; plant or animal varieties or 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other than man-made 
living micro-organisms, micro-biological processes and the products of such micro-organism 
processes; schemes, rules or methods for doing business, performing purely mental acts or playing 
games; methods for the treatment of human or animal body by surgery or therapy, and diagnostic 
methods practised on the human or animal body. 
148 Sec generally, Part VI of the Act as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1993. 
149 Sec section 27 of the Act, as amended by section 14(a), Patents (Amendment) Act, 1993. 
150 Regulation 27, Patents Regulations, 1986, as amended. 
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much faster procedure since it does not have to involve a thorough substantive examination 
of the patentability criteria again. 15 I Once a patent has been granted, the owner is able to 
prevent anyone from exploiting the same invention for a duration of 15 years after the date 
of its grant. 152 
1.6. The Utility Innovation System 
The normal patent protects inventions which satisfy the normal requirement criteria of 
novelty, inventive step and industrial application. The second system of protection available 
under the Act aims to protect "minor inventions", called "utility innovations" in the statute, 
whereby a lower level of patentability criteria needs to be satisfied. The provisions 
governing the grant of protection for utility innovations are laid down in Part IVA of the 
Act. 
A utility innovation is defined in the Act as "any innovation which creates a new product or 
process, or any new improvement of a known product or process, which can be made or 
used in any kind of industry, and includes an invention". 153 The Act provides that with the 
exception of certain specific exclusions, the provisions of the Act applying to patents for 
inventions, subject to the modifications in the Second Schedule of the Act, are applicable to 
utility innovations. 154 
Following the requirement of section 17, a certificate for a utility innovation can be granted 
if it is new to Malaysia. For the purposes of satisfying this novelty requirement, the novelty 
provision of section 14 applies. 155 There is no requirement for an inventive step, this being 
specifically excluded by the Act. 156 The requirement of industrial application is also 
specifically excluded by the Act. However, as far as the requirement for industrial 
applicability is concerned, while section 17 A seemingly exempts utility innovation from the 
151 See sections 29. 29A and 30 of the Act, as amended by sections 16. 17. and 18, Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 1993. This applies only to patents granted in Australia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and by the European Patent Office - Regulation 27 as amended. 
IS2 See section 35. Under section 35(1) of the Act, the patent will expire fifteen years after the date of 
its grant, provided that action is taken to pay the required renewal fees - see section 35(2) and (3). 
By virtue of section 31(2) and (4), the patent is deemed to be granted on the date that the Registrar 
issues to the applicant a certificate of grant of the patent, and the patent is recorded in the Register. 
IS3 Section 17 of the Act (as amended in 1986 and 1993). The subject matter that cannot be potccted 
by a certificate for a utility innovation is the same as that for a patent - See section 13(1), • 
modified by the Second Schedule, of the Act 
IS4 Section 17A(l) of the Act (as amended in 1986 and 1993). Section 17A(2) of the Act provides that 
s.11 (definition of a patentable invention), s.15 (definition of inventive step), s.16 (definition of 
industrial application), s.26 (requirement for unity of invention), Part X (provisions fmo 
compulsory licences), and s.89 (repeal and saving provisions) and s.9O (transitional provisions) 
shall not apply to utility innovations. 
ISS The novelty SIandard is now based on an absolute novelty instead of local novelty. This change 
was brought about by section 47(a)(i), Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. 
I S6 See section 17 A(2) of the Act 
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requirement of industrial application in so far as it is contained in section 16, the definition 
of utility innovation in section 17 reintroduces this requirement by the phrase "which can be 
made or used in any kind of industry". 
Other than for some minor modifications specified in the Second Schedule, the procedure 
involved in an application for a certificate for a utility innovation is the same as that for a 
patent for an invention. Unlike a normal patent, where more than one claims can be applied 
for, in the case of a utility innovation, only one claim is allowed. 15? For this reason, the 
provision with regard to the requirement for unity of invention provided for in section 26 
does not apply to utility innovations. 
A certificate for a utility innovation exprres five years after the date of its grant. 158 
However, before the expiration of this five year period, an application for extension for an 
additional five years period of protection can be made. Before the expiration of this first 
extension, an extension of a further five years period can be applied for. This means that 
the total possible length of protection is 15 years from the date of grant of the certificate, 
which is the same period available for a normal patent. However, before such extensions 
can be granted the owner has to show that the utility innovation is in commercial or 
industrial use in Malaysia. Failing this, he has to give satisfactory explanations for its non-
use. 
It is not possible for an applicant to be granted both a patent and a certificate for utility 
innovation for the same invention. 159 However, it is possible to convert an application for a 
patent into an application for a utility innovation and vice versa. This has to be done within 
six months of the issuance of the Examination Report under section 30. 160 
1 .7. The Users of the Various Systems. Past and Present 
The first patent legislation to be enacted in a component state of Malaysia was at the behest 
of a group of British patentees, resulting in a special legislation to protect their interests in 
the Straits Settlements. The concern for the protection of foreign, especially colonial 
investment interests in Malaysia was also behind the impetus to put in place a patent system 
in the Straits Settlements and in the other component states of Malaysia. In fact, the then 
Administrator of the Straits Settlements, Lieutenant-Colonel Anson, admitted as such when 
he stated that "[t]he Patent Inventions Ordinance has been passed by desire of the Secretary 
of State, more immediately for the benefit of certain persons who desire to introduce their 
15? Section 28( I )(d). as modified by the Second Schedule. of the Act. 
158 Section 35. as modified by the Second Schedule. of the Act. 
159 See section 17C. which was added to the Act by section 9 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. 
160 Sec section 17B. which was added to the Act by section 9 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. 
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inventions into this Colony". That he was in some doubt as to the propriety of the 
introduction of a patent system could be detected in the later part of his speech when he said 
that to what extent the Ordinance might thereafter benefit the Colony it was impossible to 
foresee, but he noted that there was at that time great difference of opinion existing in 
England in "regard to the general question of the advantage to the public of the monopolies 
granted under the provisions of the Patent Laws".161 From the earlier discussion, it is also 
evident that the patent system was introduced into the other component states for the same 
reasons. It is significant to note that Perlis and Trengganu, the two states not touched by the 
patent system until 1951, were not economically important to British commercial interests at 
that time. The same concern was present when amendments were made to the system at 
various times. It is also significant to note that the interest groups clamouring for changes to 
the patent system at the relevant period, and whose demands were acceded to, were the 
Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines, the Planters' Association of Malaya, and the 
Rubber Growers' Association. For example, the suggestions made by these groups played 
a big part which led to suggestions for reforms of the patent system made in the Trade 
Commission Report, 1933-1934.162 In fact, the Registrar of Designs, Singapore, in 
drafting out the amendments to the Registration of Designs Ordinance, 1931 of the Straits 
Settlements, got in touch with various trade bodies, including the Singapore and Penang 
Chambers of Commerce, and more significantly, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
and the Federation of British Industries for their consideration and comments. 163 
Therefore, the patent system was introduced into these states, not with the ann of 
encouraging local inventive activities, but to exclude others from the use of patented 
inventions that were brought into the region to be utilised in the mainstay of the colonial-
type economic activities at that time. Under colonial rule the country was cast in the role of 
producers of raw materials, in particular, rubber, oil palm, coconut-oil, canned pineapple, 
and the two main extractive industries, tin and iron, and in Sarawak, petroleum and 
pepper.164 In fact, in 1951, roughly 4/5 of the total value of Malaya's export were made up 
of the two items of rubber and tin.165 Manufacturing activities played a minor role, and 
these were mainly ancillary to the agricultural and mining activities, concerned with the 
processing of these raw materials to a form suitable for export. Examples of these were 
plants and installations set up to smelt tin, mill rubber, cure copra, can pineapple and extract 
161 See Address of His Excellency Lieutenant-Colonel A.E.H. Anson. R.A.. Administrator of the 
Government of the Straits Settlements. on closing the session of the Legislative Council on 
Friday, 17th November, 1871 - Microfilm - M 160173, National Archives. Kuala Lumpur. 
162 See Chapter 60 of the Trade Commission Report 1933-1934. 
163 See H.C.O. File No. 478133, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. 
164 See Colonial Annual Report, Malaya, 1948, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1949. at 
pages 39-69; Settlement of Penang - Annual Report for 1949, Government Press, Government 
Printers, Kuala Lumpur, 1950; Silcock, T.H., The Economy of Malaya - An Essay in Colonial 
Political Economy, Donalcl Moore, Singapore, 1954, at pages 12-26; Grist, D.H., Malaya -
Apiculture, The Malayan Information Agency, Malaya House, London, 1929. 
16' See Annual Report - Federation of Malaya 1950, His M*,ty's Stationery Office, London, 1951. 
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oil from the fruits of oil palm. In order to ensure the efficient functioning of these plants 
and installations, another form of secondary industry was developed, involving light 
engineering works, repairing, servicing and making related equipment and machinery. 
Other light industries involving the manufacturing of consumer goods like foodstuff, 
beverage and tobacco were also in existence.166 However, in the main, consumer goods 
were mainly manufactured and imported from overseas, especially Britain.167 Hence the 
patent system was targeted to cater for users who were already familiar with it, the 
expatriate planters and miners, overseas manufacturers and suppliers of consumer goods 
and the basic infra-structures like railway, telegraph and road building. There had been no 
attempts to encourage its use, or spur inventive activities among the local inhabitants. From 
this it could be concluded that the patent system was introduced in the Malaysian territories, 
not as an incentive to encourage indigenous innovative and inventive activities, but as a 
protective measure to exclude others from using certain patented inventions brought in from 
overseas, or developed by the colonial investors. Hence it is hardly surprising that the local 
inhabitants were largely unaware of, and unaffected by, the patent system. 
The contrast with the attitude when the Act was implemented in 1986 could hardly be more 
different. In line with the Government's objective of encouraging local inventions and 
innovations, several steps were taken to create an awareness of, and familiarity with, the 
patent system. Several "road-shows" were conducted throughout the country to explain the 
patent system to members of the public. A Patent Information Unit (PIU) within the 
Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM), was set up to promote 
inventive and innovative activities, and to function as an information centre where patent 
documentation could be made available to members of the public. Patent advisory and 
reference service, as well as specific search service are also provided.168 SIRIM is also 
involved in various projects to encourage industrial technology development through R & 
D, and development programmes to enhance the establishment of more effective small and 
medium scale industry .169 Several other strategies were adopted by the Government to set 
166 See Ooi, lin-Bee, Land, People and Economy in Malaysia, Longmans, London, 1963, Chapter 12, 
pages 318-329. 
167 See Lim, Chong-Yah, Economic Development of Modem Malaya, Oxford University Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1969. For further accounts of the Malaysian economy before and after independence, see 
Information Malaysia 1992-1993 Yearbook, Berita Publishing Sdn Bhd, 1992, at pages 203-247; 
See Silcock, T.H., The Economy of Malaya, in Hooper, C., (Ed.), Economic Systems of the 
Commonwealth, Duke University Press, 1961; Bowie, A., Crossing the Industrial Divide - State, 
Society, and the Politics of Economic Transformation in Malaysia, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1991; lomo, K.S., Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy, 
Macmillan, London, 1990; Cho, George, The Malaysian Economy - Spatial Perspectives, 
Routledge, London, 1990. 
168 The PIU is a division of The Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) 
within the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment. The name was changed from the 
Patent Information and Documentation Centre (PIOC) to the Patent Information Unit (PIU) with 
effect from lanuary, 1, 1991, after the patent examining function was transferred, in October 1990, 
to the Patent Registration Office of the new Intellectual Property Division within the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. 
169 See SIRIM Corporate Plan 1991-1995 - Mid-term Review. 
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up the infrastructure to stimulate and encourage creativity, research and development, and 
innovation. 170 One of these, a Technology Park, was set up in January 1988 under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment. Among its 
objectives are to provide a national focus for action for new business formation and 
commercialisation of R&D, to be an active vehicle for technology transfer, and to act as a 
source of venture capital for tenants of the Technology Park. 171 
An important episode is the formation of a society called the Malaysian Invention and 
Design Society (MINDS). It was formed on the 29th November, 1986, one month after the 
Malaysian Patents Act came into force, with the support of both the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment (MOSTE) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). Among the objectives of MINDS are to encourage creative thinking 
and the spirit of invention among the people of Malaysia, to promote and enhance the 
development and utilisation of inventions and designs in Malaysia, to hold seminars, 
meetings, and workshops, publish and circulate newsletters, periodicals and other works in 
an effort to disseminate information about inventors and designers, their works and 
achievements, and to promote the utilisation of inventions and designs and the profitability 
of inventors' and designers' activities. As part of its activities, inventors clubs are set up in 
schools to organise various activities to promote and educate the students in particular and 
the public in general, on inventions, innovations, designs and patenting. 172 Together with 
SIRIM, MINDS co-organises the yearly MINDEX exhibition,173 one of the main events of 
the annual National Science and Technology Week started in 1987. 
The result of the Government's effort since the introduction of the Act is quite revealing 
when a comparison is made between the past and present users of the patent system. 
Although the records of applications and grants of patent rights in the various component 
states under the former systems are patchy and incomplete, a perusal of some of the 
available records is indicative of the type of users and the subject matter of protection 
170 For a more detailed discussion, see Review of the Industrial Master Plan 1986-1995, Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, Malaysia, Chapter 6 - Research and Development and Technology 
Policies, and Industrial technology Development - A National Plan of Action, Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment, Malaysia, 1992. 
171 See generally, Mohd Salleh, I., "Technology Park: The Growth Centre for Invention and New 
Technologies", paper presented at the Seminar on Promotion of Innovative Activity and Indigenous 
Technology, Kuala Lumpur, 15-17, August 1989. For a fuller discussion of the other steps taken 
by the government. see Mohd. Shazali, 0 .• "Promotion of Technological Innovation. A View of 
the Experience in Malaysia", WIPOlINN/S/4, August 1992. 
172 For further infonnation of the objectives and activities of MINDS, see Mindscope. Issue No. 14. 
April-June 1991. page 23. 
173 MINDEX (the Malaysian Inventions and Designs Exhibition) is an exhibition sponsored hy the 
Ministry of Science. Technology and the Environment. the Ministry of Education. the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry. and the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. The 
main objectives of MINDEX are to encourage creative thinking and innovative spirit among the 
people of Malaysia and to promote and enhance the further development and utilisation of 
inventions and designs in MalaYSia. 
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sought. 174 For example, in Kedah, for the period 1928 to 1931, of the 10 patents re-
registered, 7 were related to the rubber industry, the invention ranging from compositions 
for treatment of diseases in rubber and other trees, improvements in the production of 
preserved rubber sheets, tapping implements, to improvements relating to the manufacture 
of rubber articles. In Negri Sembilan, between 1897 to 1904, out of a total of 12 grants, 7 
were for inventions related to the tin mining industry, involving processes and mining 
machinery. For the same period in Selangor, out of a total of 17 grants, 9 were tin-mining 
related inventions, 3 rubber industry related and 2 for inventions relating to processing of 
coffee beans. For Johore, in the period from 1911 to 1913, there were 8 grants, of which 6 
were related to the rubber industry. Finally, out of the 29 patents registered in Sarawak in 
the period from 1928 to 1933, 21 were for inventions relating to the petroleum industry. 
All the patents granted above were to foreigners. A slightly improved figure is shown when 
reference is made to the statistics for patents re-registered in Malaya during the period from 
1953 to 30th September, 1986. 175 Out of a total of 8473 United Kingdom patents re-
registered, only 103 were by local patentees. This works out to a ratio of 1.2% of the total 
patents re-registered in Malaysia. In contrast to this, the figures for the period 1988 to May 
1996 show a slight improvement in terms of local use of the patent system. 176 Out of a total 
of 7724 patents granted during this period, 167 were granted to local patentees. This shows 
an improved ratio of 2.16 %. However, even more encouraging is the statistics in relation 
to utility innovations for the same period. Out of a total of 77 certificates for utility 
innovation issued, 49.4 % or 38 certificates were issued to Malaysians. 
It is uncertain whether these colonial industries would have thrived as they did in the 
absence of patent protection. There has as yet been no study of the economic impact of the 
patent system in Malaysia, especially in relation to the impact it had on the development of 
the primary industries relating to rubber and tin mining. 1 77 A study on the use of industrial 
property in the oil palm industry in Malaysia in 1993 reported that while there were many 
applications for, and grants of, patents relating to palm oil processing in Australia, France, 
Japan, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and United States of America, it was not known 
how many were actually translated into commercial applications. Anyway, as the study 
indicated, while commercial exploitation of oil palm in Malaysia begun in 1917, there was 
174 These figures are obtained from the respective State Gazettes which could be traced. 
175 See Gan. P.H .• Ler. L.T.. "Profile of the Malaysian Inventor and Associated Problems of 
Invention". paper presented at the Seminar on Promotion of Innovative Activity and Indigenous 
Technology. Kuala Lumpur. 15-17. August 1989. 
176 From statistics obtained from the Intellectual Property Division. Ministry of Domestic Trade aM 
Consumer Affairs. 
177 For the technologies involved in tin-mining. see Thoburn. J.T .. Primary Commodity Exports and 
Economic Development - Theory. Evidence and a Study of Malaysia. John Wiley & Sons. 
London. 1977. Chapter 5. at pages 83-85. and Fennor. Lewis Leigh. Report Upon the Mining 
Industry of Malaya. Government Press. Kuala Lumpur. 1939. Part A. at pages 111-117. For the 
technologics involvcd in the rubber industry. see Thoburn. J.T.. op. Cll .• at pages 140-144. 
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only a slow and transitory growth during the period from 1917 to 1960. It was only due to 
the Government's agricultural diversification policy that the period 1960-1985 showed a 
rapid growth in oil palm cultivation. 17 8 With regard to the rubber industries, it is interesting 
to note that "the most important single technological development, increasing both output 
per man and per acre, had been the development of high-yielding varieties of rubber" .179 
This fmding is significant since plant varieties were not protectable by the patent system 
then. Despite this, the above statistics may be used to support the contention that without 
the colonial patent systems in place, the agriCUltural and mining industries in pre-
independent Malaysia would not have been so successful. However, it is submitted that 
even without patent protection, the same level of investments would have been made by the 
colonial investors. It has to be remembered that "the objective of British Colonial policy in 
Malaya during this period was to manage the economy in such a way as to enhance the 
prosperity of Britain" and that "the principal goal of colonial administrators in Malaya was 
to extract resources and profits to be channelled back to Britain" .180 Bearing in mind that 
the agricultural and extractive products of Malaysia were the main sources of revenue in 
British Malaya,181 and that "[flor a long time, Malaya has been considered the 'dollar 
arsenal' of Great Britain", 182 it is very unlikely that the absence of patent protection would 
be a disincentive to investment in these economic activities. 
1.8. Conclusion 
The history of the Malaysian patent system has now completed one full cycle. From the 
system of original local grant to a re-registration system of United Kingdom patents, it has 
now reverted to the system of local grant. The various states enactments were passed 
because of pressure from those in the manufacturing and commercial sectors. However, 
178 See Ong, S.H., Study on Industrial Property Use in the Oil Palm Industry in Malaysia, W<rld 
Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva, 1993, at pages 38-43. 
179 Thobum, J.T., Primary Commodity Exports and Economic Development - Theory, Evidence and a 
Study of Malaysia, John Wiley & Sons, London, 1977, at pages 140-144. 
180 Bowie, A., Crossing the Industrial Divide - State, Society, and the Politics of Economic 
Transformation in Malaysia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, at pages 42-62. 
181 The Ormsby-Gore Report, Cmnd. 3235, 1928, at page 21, stated that ''The Government revenues 
of British Malaya ... were roughly 20,000,000 (sterling) last year. The overseas imports of British 
Malaya as a whole for the year 1926 were valued at 117,000,000 and the overseas exports at 
147,000,000 ... These remarkable totals exceed those of the total external trade of the whole of the 
rest of the colonial dependencies put together. The value of export per head of the population of 
British Malaya for the last 2 years has exceeded that of any other country in the world, and is 
higher even that the figures for New Zealand, which leads the self-governing D.ominio~s in this 
respect" See also Clementi. C, Malaya: Its Interests and Problems.. Empue Parliamentary 
Association (United Kingdom Branch). Westminster Hall. Houses of Parhament, London. 1931 -
Address by His Excellency, Sir Cecil Clementi, Governor of Malaya, at a meeting of the 
Committee of the Empire Parliamentary Association, on 7th May, 1931. at page 2. "I should like 
at the outset to give you some idea of the wealth of Malaya. I do not think it is usually UDderstood 
what a very important part of Imperial trade in involved in that peninsula." 
182 Lit Dun J .• British Malaya, An Economic Analysis (1895-1938). Insan, Kuala Lumpur. 1982, at 
page 41. 
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these pressures were brought about mainly to protect the interest of foreign entrepreneurs, 
mainly British, who were involved principally in the then primary industry of tin and gold 
mining, oil extraction and refining, rubber, oil palm. pineapple and coffee planting and also 
the basic infra-structures like railway, telegraph and road building. There was a lack of 
educational process and no attempt was made to set up an administrative structure with 
trained personnel to manage the system. Whatever system and changes that were 
implemented were merely to cater for the expediency of the moment. There were no long 
term objectives of encouraging and developing the innovative potentials of the indigenous 
population. 
The initial systems were established to cater for and protect the interests of foreign 
entrepreneurs. Though the system was used by local inventors, this was only to a very 
limited extent and was merely incidental to the whole scheme of the systems. Changes were 
brought about, not to cater for local interests, but for the convenience of the British 
concerns. This was evident by the series of amendments carried out in 1937 whereby the 
independent indigenous grant systems were all changed to the re-registration system under 
which only United Kingdom patents could be protected in the Malaysian territories. Since 
most of the entrepreneurs were British, it would cause no great hardship and expenses in 
applying for a patent in the United Kingdom and then getting it registered in the Malaysian 
territories. On the other hand, it was advantageous to them, because a single United 
Kingdom application which led to a grant would enable them to re-register the same patent 
in most of the other colonies and dependencies of Great Britain. No attempt was made to 
cater for the interest of the local inventors who might only be interested in getting a local 
grant. 1 8 3 In the words of Yankey, the introduction of the patent system during the colonial 
era was: 
"never meant to encourage either indigenous inventive activity, local research and 
development, innovation or to accomplish an effective transfer of technology. It 
was geared rather towards the protection of property rights in machinery technology 
relevant for the exploitation of gold and other minerals resources of the Colony. 
This is not surprising since the main aim of imperialism and subsequent colonialism 
was the investment of excess capital in and exploitation of mineral and human 
resources of the colonies." 184 
Though Yankey's remarks were made in the context of the introduction and development of 
the patent system in Ghana and Nigeria, his comment was equally apt in the Malaysian 
context if the words, tin and rubber, were added. 
183 See supra. footnotes 47 and 5..\. and comments therein. 
184 Yankey. G. S-A.. International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less Developed Countries. 
A vehury. Aldershot. 1987. at 106. 
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The 1983 Act is, therefore, timely and a move in the right direction. Its primary aim is to 
cater to the interest for indigenous inventors. It enables any modifications to be made in the 
interest and needs of the indigenous people and the nation as a whole. Further, the 
developments of the Malaysian patent system is now entirely in the hands of the local 
legislators instead of being dependent on the accident of legislative activities taking place in 
the United Kingdom. More importantly, the extent of the rights and privileges will be 
detennined according to local needs. Checks and balances, especially with regard to 
limitations on the exercise of these rights, can be introduced when required to prevent any 
abuses of these monopoly rights. 
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CHAPTER 2: Ownership of Patent Rights Inter Se 
2. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the issues and law relating to the right to apply for a patent and the 
rules as to ownership of the patent applied for or granted. In discussing the right to apply 
for a patent, the question of what an invention is will be important as this will pennit the 
detennination of who the inventor of an invention is. It is true that in the context of 
patentability it may not be necessary or crucial to detennine whether a particular subject 
matter is an invention, especially in view of the provision of a list of non-patentable 
inventions in the Act. l However, a proper appreciation of the meaning of invention is 
important, because through this understanding, the inventor could be identified. 
Inventorship could also be crucial in disputes between an inventor and someone who has 
allegedly stolen the inventive concept from him to gain a patent . 
Where more than one person is involved in creating the invention, the issue of whether all 
the participants can be regarded as inventors, and hence joint inventors, can be crucial, as 
each of the joint inventors has valuable rights provided for under the Act. 2 The criteria that 
can be relied upon in deciding whether there is joint inventorship involved, and the rights of 
joint inventors to make, use, sell and otherwise deal with the patent are analysed. The rights 
of joint owners under the common law are examined to provide a background to the later 
statutorily enacted rights.3 This is followed by an analysis of the statutory provisions 
relating to the rights of joint owners. Further, it may be a ground for invalidation of the 
patent that the right to the patent does not belong to the person to whom the patent was 
granted.4 The fact that one of several joint inventors has not been joined in the application 
for a patent may be a basis for invalidation of the patent on the ground that as a co-inventor, 
he is entitled to co-ownership of the patent. Hence these possibilities are also considered. 
1 See section 13 of the Act. 
2 Although inventions are still being made by individual inventors, the modem trend seems to be 
that more researches are being conducted by the research organisations of an industrial corporation, 
the industrial research association of a whole industry, specialised institutions and government 
research laboratories. This would mean that issues of joint inventorsbip would become increasingly 
more important See Jewkes, J., Sawers, D., and Stillerman, R., The Sources of InventiOD, 2nd 
Ed., Macmillan, 1969, chapters S and 6. In fact. even when ownenbip of the patent is not in issue, 
the question of inventorship could be, both for professional pride and reCognition - see, for 
example, K,kkw" anor y. Szelke" m [1989] 1 FSR 215. 
3 Joint ownership of a patent application or pateDt may exist from the outset if sewnI persons 1WR 
involved ill. IBdlppl.iedjointly for, IDd were panIIed. a pltent for - iaventioa. It may, however, 
come into existence later, for instance wheIe the patent appIicatioa or .,.. is II'Msfemd to 
several hein or is usigned to several assignees. 
4 Section S6(2)(d) of the Act, see later, Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights. 
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The last area affecting the question of ownership of patent is with regard to inventions made 
by an employee. What his rights are in relation to the patent will be examined. If the 
invention is deemed to belong to the employer, the employee's rights in terms of 
compensation over and above his normal salary for his contribution to the increased wealth 
of his employer will be looked into. Alternative provisions to further the interest of the 
employee, if it is seen that his rights under the Act are insufficient, are suggested. 
A common problem, also met in the other chapters, is the lack of reported local cases 
pertaining to the areas under consideration. Therefore, analysis and evaluation of the 
statutory provisions are made on a comparative basis by reference to cases from other 
jurisdictions. 
2.1. Right to Apply for and Ownership of Patent 
The Act provides that any person may make an application for a patent, either alone or 
jointly with another.s This follows exactly the provision of section 7(1) of the Patents Act, 
1977 of the United Kingdom. By virtue of section 22, where the right to obtain a patent is 
owned jointly, the patent may only be applied for jointly by all the joint owners. However, 
unlike the United Kingdom Act which then goes on to state the person or persons to whom 
a patent for an invention may be granted,6 the next two following subsections of section 18 
then follow the WIPO Model Law by providing that the right to a patent shall belong to the 
inventor, and that in the case of a patent having been made jointly, the right to the patent 
shall belong to them jointly.7 Section 20, relating to employee inventions also follows the 
scheme for employee inventions found in the WIPO Model Law.8 However, unlike the 
WIPO model which provides in section 119(3) that the rights to the patent may be assigned 
5 Section 18(1) of the Act. Unlike the situation in the United States, the applicant could be a natural 
or legal person. The applicant will normally be the owner of the right to the patent, either the 
inventor or an assignee of the rights of the inventor. However, the inventor must be named in the 
application. Where the applicant is not the inventor, a statement justifying the applicant's right to 
the patent must be submitted together with the application for a grant of a patent - see Schedule n, 
Patents Form 1. The same system is found in the United Kingdom, see section 7(1) of the 1977 
Act. In contrast to this, under the statutory scheme in the United States, the general rule is that 
only the first and true inventor has the right to apply for a patent - see USC 3S, section Ill, ami 
the exceptions in sections 116, 117 and 118. This means that the inventor or inventors have a 
personal obligation to participate in the patent application process, regardless of whether the patent 
right has been assigned. Failure to ensure that all the inventors involved in creating the invention 
apply for the patent could render the patent void. There have been many attempts to amend the 
procedure under the United States system to make it more in conformity with the practice of most 
countries. For an interesting discussion as to why this move away from the present US system is 
undesirable and unconstitutional, see Sears, M.H., ''The Corporate Patent - Reform or 
Regression 1", (1979) 61 JPas 380. 
6 In section 7(2) of the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. 
7 In section 18(2) and 18(3) of the Act respectively. See section 119(1) and (2) of the WIPO Model 
Law in Appendix. See also similar provisions in the Code of Intellectual Property Act [No. S2 of 
1979, as amended by the Code of Intellectual Property (Amendment) Act, No. 30 of 1980, and the 
Code of Intellectual Property (Amendment) Act, No.2 of 1983], the Sri Lankan Act, section 64. 
8 See section 120, WIPO Model Law. See later, para. 2.7 for discussions on employee inventions. 
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and may be transferred by succession, section 19 is silent on this point. There seems to be a 
missing link here. Nowhere in the Act is there a provision allowing for the assignee of a 
person, who is entitled to a patent under section 19(2) or (3), to have the right to own the 
patent. So while such an assignee has the right to apply for a patent by virtue of section 
18(1), he does not seem to have a right to own the patent, as neither section 18(2) or (3), 
nor section 20 apply in his case. Although section 39 of the Act allows for a patent 
application or patent to be assigned or transmitted, this section only applies to a situation 
where an application has already been made or a patent granted. However, it would seem 
from the tenor of the Act that a patent can be issued to a non-inventor, as long as he can 
trace his claim to a person entitled, either under section 18 or section 20.9 
Somewhat confusingly, section 18(2) begins with the proviso that subject to section 19, the 
right to a patent shall belong to the inventor. Section 19 lays down an avenue for judicial 
assignment of a patent application or patent. I 0 By virtue of this section, where the essential 
elements of an invention claimed in a patent application or patent have been unlawfully 
derived from an invention for which the right to the patent belongs to another person, that 
other person has the right to apply to the court for an order that the said patent application or 
patent be assigned to him. The limitation period for such judicial assignment is after five 
years from the date of the grant of the patent. I I It would have been more accurate to state 
"Subject to section 20, the right to a patent shall belong to the inventor", because section 
20, the provision regulating ownership of employees' inventions, is the exception to the 
general rule that the rights to a patent shall belong to the inventor. 
The lack of clarity in the particular section results from the "cut and paste" approach of the 
framers of the Act, with provisions of various parts of the Act and even sections being 
derived from "bits and pieces" from various legislative models. For the sake of clarity and 
to prevent unnecessary speculation, an additional provision should be inserted in section 
19, clearly stating that where the rights to a patent have been assigned or transferred by 
succession, the rights to the patent shall belong to the assignee or the successor in title, and 
that section 18(2) is to be read subject to section 20. 12 
2.2. Invention and Inventor 
There is no defmition in the Act as to who the inventor is. However, section 12(1) defmes 
an invention as "an idea of an inventor which permits in practice the solution to a specific 
9 See Schedule n, Patent Form No.1, where. if the applicant is not the inventor. he has to justify 
his right to the patent. 
10 The same arrangement is adopted in sections 64 and 6S of the Sri Lankan Act. 
11 See proviso to section 19. This section follows section 121 of the WIPO Model Law. 
12 For the United Kingdom approach. see section 7(2) in Appendix. 
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problem in the field of technology" .13 It follows from this definition that an inventor must 
be the person who devises such an idea. 14 From the definition, three elements must be 
present before an invention can be said to have been made under the Act. The fIrst is the 
mental act, the conception of the idea by the inventor, the second is that the conception must 
be sufficiently worked out to provide the solution to a particular problem, and lastly, the 
problem must be related to the field of technology. 
There has not been much analysis in the United Kingdom regarding the required elements 
constituting an invention. However, the case of Allen v. Rawson 15 provides some 
guidance. That case involved the issue of whether two workmen who had suggested 
various improvements to a patented machine should be considered as joint inventors 
together with the employer. Chief Justice Tindal, in denying joint inventors hip status to 
them, stressed the fact that the employer had already worked out the complete idea and 
principle of the object of the invention. In Hickton's Patent Syndicate v. Patents & Machine 
Improvements Co. Ltd,16 the Court of Appeal, in considering whether the plaintiffs' 
machine was a patentable invention, emphasised the fact that the invention was in the idea 
or conception, as distinguished from the thing manufactured. Lord Diplock, in the course 
of determining whether the invention claimed was patentable, referred to the "idea, when 
put into practice" In deciding on the issue of ownership in an invention in Greater Glasgow 
13 
14 
15 
16 
This definition follows exactly the definition in section 112(1) of the WIPO Model Law - see 
Appendix. In contrast, in the Patents Act 1977 of the United Kingdom, there is no definition of 
"invention" as such, although a list is provided in section 1(2) of things which are not considered 
invention. Further, for the purposes of the 1977 Act, section 125(1) defines an invention as "that 
specified in a claim of the specification ... as interpreted by the description and any drawings 
contained in that specification ... ". "Inventor" is defined in section 7(3) of the 1977 Act as "the 
actual deviser of the invention and "joint inventor" shall be construed accordingly". For interesting 
and illuminating discussions of the various meanings of the term "invention", see Williamson, E., 
"The Linguistic Basis of Patent Law", (1943) 25 JPOS 852, and Gardiner, R., "Language and the 
Law of Patents", 47 Current Legal Problems 255 (1994). See also Godula, E.A., "Judge Learned 
Hand and the Concept of Invention", 9 IDEA 159 (1965-66). In the United States, "invention" is 
statutorily defined in a circular fashion to mean "invention or discovery" - USC 35, section l00(a). 
Before a person can claim to be an inventor, the idea, or conception, must originate from him, 
unlike under previous indigenous patent statutes, where the first importer could also be deemed an 
inventor. See, for example, section 2, Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions), Straits Settlements, aId 
section 2, Enactment No. 19, Federated Malay States. See generally, Chapter 1 - Historical 
Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.3. 
Allen v. Rawson (1845)135 ER 656, at pages 665-667, per Tindal C.J. Two workmen, Shaw aId 
Milner, had variously made suggestions concerning improvements to certain structural parts of the 
patented invention invented by one William. Both of these features were described in the 
specification and mentioned in the claims. As a defence the defendant alleged that the patentee lBl 
no right to claim as part of his invention the structures which was alleged to be the invention of 
Shaw and Milner. The patent was, therefore, alleged to be void. 
Hickton's Patent Syndicate v. Patents & Machine Improyements Co. Ltd (1909) 26 RPC 339, per 
Cozens-Hardy M.R., at page 346, and Fletcher Moulton J., at page 347. Buckley L.J., at page 
348, said, "No doubt you cannot patent an idea, which you simply conceived. and have suggested 
no way of canying out. but the invention consists in thinking of or conceiving something ard 
suggesting a way of doing it". Diplock L.I. referred to the "idea. when put into practice .,,". when 
considering whether the invention in issue was patentable, in Johns-Manville Cmporation's Patent 
[1967] RPC 479 (CA), at page 493. See also Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] RPC 147, per 
Purchas L.I .• at pages 205-210. 
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Health Board's Application, Justice Jacob referred to "the patent of an idea" .17 From these 
cases, it can be seen that the approach is not any different from what is contained in the 
definition, i.e., that an invention relates to the conception of an idea. I 8 
In contrast to this dearth of judicial analysis of what constitutes an invention in the United 
Kingdom, the United States cases reveal a rich source of guidance. The courts there have 
consistently held that an invention consists of two operations, one, the conception of the 
idea, the mental operation, and the other, the reduction to practice, the physical operation. I9 
However, it must be remembered that the United States patent system practices a "first to 
invent" system. In the determination of who, among competing applicant, is the frrst to 
invent, and hence entitled to priority of invention, the Patent Office, and the Court, are 
bound to apply the statutory criteria in section l02(g) of USC 35. Under this section, in 
detennining priority of invention, "there shall be considered not only the respective date of 
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of 
17 
18 
19 
Greater Glaseow Health Board's Application [1996] RPC 207, per Jacob J., at page 219. 
Similarly, in Amateur Athletic Association's Applications [1989] RPC 717, the hearing officer, 
Mr Panchen, at page 720, concluded that the referrer was the actual inventor after holding that he 
was the one who had contributed the ideas for the various features of the invention. The hearing 
officer, Mr Vivian, in Viziball Ltd's Application [1988] RPC 213, at page 217, regarded the word 
"invention" used in section 8 of the 1977 Act as that "which was conceived" by the applicant to be 
the invention at the time he filed his application whether that be a patentable invention or not." In 
Merrell Dow Phaunaceuticals Inc. & anor v. H.N. Norton & Co. Ltd [1996] RPC 76, at page 86, 
Lord Hoffmann, in analysing the meaning of novelty under the 1977 Act, briefly alluded to the fact 
that "an invention is a piece of information". 
There is a provision in the 1977 Patents Act relating to compensation for employee inventions 
which states, in section 43(3), that "references to the making of an invention by an employee are 
references to his making it alone or jointly with any other person, but do not include references to 
his merely contributing advice or other assistance in the making of an invention by another 
employee". This provision has so far not been subject to any judicial analysis. If the phrase "advice 
or other assistance" refers to gratuitous advice given by a person who is not part of a team assigned 
to a particular project from which an invention is devised, this may be a correct statement of the 
law. Similarly if it refers to assistance of a non-conceptual nature. However. as will be discussed 
later, it will drastically cut down on the right to be recognised as a joint inventor if the word 
"advice" is construed strictly. 
See, for example. Bourne v. Jones 98 USPQ 206 (DC SD Florida, 1951), per Whitehurts, District 
Judge. at page 209, "Ordinarily. invention is construed to mean a mental operation involving the 
conception of an idea, and a physical operation involving reduction to practice of the mental 
concept ... Invention cannot be predicated on mere speculation or conjecture; it must be based on 
something ascertained. something definite and certain."; United States y. Dubilier Condenser Com. 
289 US 178; 17 USPQ 154 (US Sup. Ct 1933). per Justice Roberts for the Court. at page 158, 
" ... the peculiar nature of the act of invention, ... consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, 
nor in fruitful research as to the operation of natural laws, but in discovering how those laws may 
be utilised or applied for some beneficial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine. It is the 
result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea and its reduction to practice; the product of original 
thought; a conception demonstrated to be true by practical application or embodiment in tangible 
form."; Land y. Prem 69 USPQ 602 (CCPA 1946), per O'Connell, Judge, at page 605, ''The 
party claiming conception of an invention must show that it was complete and operative and such 
as would enable a person skilled in the art to reduce the conception into practice without any 
further research or exercise of the inventive skill. It is not sufficient, therefore, to show that a party 
claiming an invention has conceived a result to be obtained; the patentable thing is the means 
provided and disclosed by him to accomplish that result" See also ConsoJid• tM vula Aircraft 
<;rop. ct ale y. Maurice A. Qarbell. Inc .. Ct tie 98 USPQ 4 (CA 9th Cir. 1953) per Mathews, 
Circuit Judge, at page 6, citing CoroOa Cord Tire Co. y. Doyap Chemical Com. 276 US 358; 
Unitc;d States y. Dubilig Coodenser Cm:p. 289 US 178; 17 USPQ 154 (US Sup. Ct 1933); CD 
Jbrrad Co. y, Wmjmagtic I,joeo Co. 140 US 481; 35 L. Ed. 521 (US Sup. Ct 1891). 
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one who was frrst to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception 
by the other. "20 
It is submitted that this extended meaning of invention under the United States system, 
involving both a conception and a reduction to practice is not applicable in the Malaysian 
context. Unlike the United States system, the Malaysian system practises a frrst-to-fIle 
system. Hence there is no need for resolving conflicting claims for priority. Situations in 
which the question of inventorship arise are only in the context of ownership of the patent, 
claims to joint inventorship, and rights to compensation for employment inventions. The 
concept of reduction to practice is, therefore, not relevant in solving these issues, which are 
related only to inventorship and not to any issue of priority of an invention. This is borne 
out by the United States cases where priority of invention was not an issue.21 All these 
cases emphatically stress that the threshold question in determining inventors hip is who 
conceives the invention. A person cannot be regarded as an inventor unless he contributes 
towards its conception. As far as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to practice 
per se is irrelevant. 22 
20 
21 
22 
Hence, under this system, a person who is second to file may still establish priority by showing 
the earliest date of invention. The general rule as to priority of invention is that priority goes to 
the inventor who fIrst reduces an embodiment of the invention to practice. This rule is subject to 
two exceptions. The inventor who is the fIrst to conceive the subject matter but the last to reduce 
to practice will prevail if he exercises reasonable diligence in reducing to practice from a time just 
prior to when the fIrst person to reduce to practice conceives the subject matter. Further, the second 
to reduce to practice will prevail if the ftrst abandons, suppresses, or conceals the invention. For 
further discussion of this point, see generally, Chisum, D.S., Patents, Matthew Bender, Vol. 3, 
chapter 10. 
See Mer&enthaler v. Scudder 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C.C. 1897), at 276, where the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia said that, "The conception of the invention consists in the 
complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished 
in order to perfect the act or instrument belongs to the department of construction, not invention."; 
and In re Hardee 223 USPQ 1122 (Comm. of Pat. and Trademarks, 1984) per Denny, Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner for Patents, at page 1123, "The threshold question in determining 
inventorship is who conceived the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception of the 
invention, he is not an inventor .... Insofar as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to 
practice per se is irrelevant. One must contribute to the conception to be an inventor." See also 
Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States 182 USPQ 211 (US Ct CIs Trial Div. 1974), per Judge 
Cooper, at page 215, "Once conception has occurred, the inventor may use the services and 
assistance of others to perfect his invention without losing his right to a patent." 
Note that even though .there is ~o requi~ment for reduction to practice, it will normally be the case 
that there would be pnor expenm.entation to test the theory upon which the conception is based. 
This test could, however, be camed out by other persons under the direction and control of the 
inventor without detracting from his sole claim to inventorship. Further, as will be discussed later 
the idea should be sufficiently worked out to enable a person skilled in the art to be able to practi~ 
it. However, it is not required that the best mode should have been conceptualised nor a 
commer~ially viable mod~l m~e available, s~nce this will lie in the field of design. Althdugh the 
Act proVIdes that the specification must proVIde a means to carry out the invention into effect .. 
that the ~st mode known to ~e a~pli~ant mus! be disclo~, it is submitted that thi. goc. onl)' to 
the question whether the speclfication IS suffiCient to satisfy the requirement of the Act reprdin 
the description in the application, and not as to whether there is in exi.tence a complete concepti I 
of the in~ention. See Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Umitations and Lou of Righta, para. 7.4.5. for ,: 
duty to disclose the best mode. 
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However, an analysis of the decisional law of the United States with regards to the meaning 
of "conception" is useful to determine with more precision the meaning of "invention" and 
thus "inventor" This will be useful later in helping to determine whether a person claiming 
to be such is entitled to be granted status as a joint inventor. Hence, only the fIrSt 
component under the US approach is relevant in the consideration of the meaning of an 
invention, i.e., the mental element or the conception. To what degree must the conception 
be completed before it can be accorded the status of an invention under the Act? 
2.2.1. The Conception 
Inventions involves discovery, but discovery as such does not amount to an invention. A 
mere discovery will not fall within the defInition of invention under the Act. 23 So, for 
example, the discovery of the explanation of a process is not patentable since it will not 
amount to an invention in itself.24 However, the idea of how natural laws may be utilised 
or applied for some benefIcial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine will be 
patentable,25 provided there is a practical embodiment. A mere general conception or idea is 
not enough to qualify as an invention.26 The idea must be suffIciently worked out to enable 
the solution of a particular problem. The idea cannot be "a mere speculation or conjecture", 
it has to be based on "something ascertained, something defmite and certain".27 As was 
stated in Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan,28 the leading case on this area in the United 
23 The Act has adopted the pragmatic approach by stating in section 13(1) that "notwithstanding the 
fact that they may be inventions, discoveries, scientific theories ... etc. shall not be patentable." 
See Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.5.4. In contrast, 
the Patents Act, 1977, United Kingdom, in section 1(2) laid down a non-exclusive list of things 
which are not inventions for the purposes of the 1977 Act. These range from discovery, scientific 
theory or mathematical method to the presentation of information. 
24 Solyex Corp. v. Freeman et al. 199 USPQ 797 (W.D. Virginia, 1976), per Turk, Chief District 
Judge, at pages 804-805, "The discovery [is] of the fact that polycarbonate thread in the presence of 
perchlorethylene and with agitation is fractured into fragment and can be removed by either a 
washing or tumbling action. The explanation of a process is not patentable. E.g., DeForest Radio 
Co. y. General Electric Co. 283 US 664, 684, 685; 9 USPQ 297, 303-304 (US Sup. Ct 1931); 
Templeton patents. Ltd v. Simplot Co. 142 USPQ 428, 429-430 (8th Cir. 1964)." 
2S Per Justice Roberts for the Court, at page 158, in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Cm:p. 17 
USPQ 154 (US Sup. Ct 1933). See also Genentech Inc.'s Patent. [1989] RPC 147, per Purchas 
L.1., at page 208, "In my judgement there may be a critical distinction to be drawn between a 
claim to new knowledge or to a discovery 'as such' which is not patentable ... and a claim to a 
method embracing a discovery which may well be an invention which is patentable," 
26 Amax Fly Ash Coxp. V. United States 182 USPQ 211 (US Ct Cis Trial Div. 1974). per Judge 
Cooper. at page 215, "The conception must be more than the realisation of a desirable result. 
Garrett COI:p. v. United States 422 F. 2d 874 (1970), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 951, and more than a 
mere hope or expectation. Alpert v, Slatin 305 F. 2d 891. 894 (CCPA 1962)". See also Hickton's 
Patent Syndicate V. Patents & Machine Improvements Co. Ltd (1909) 26 RPC 339, per Bucldey 
L.1 .• at page 348. " ... the invention consists in thinking of or conceiving something at 
suggesting a way of doing it". 
27 See Bourne V. Jones 98 USPQ 206 (DC SD Florida, 1951). per Whitehurts. District Judge, at page 
209. 
28 Apwam Woolen Co, VI Jgrrlap (1868) 74 US (7 Wall.) 583, at page 602. 
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States, "He is the inventor and is entitled to the patent who fIrst brought the machine to 
perfection and made it capable of useful operation." 
In the oft-quoted case of Mergenthaler v. Scudder,29 it was said that "The conception of the 
invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act. All 
that remains to be accomplished in order to perfect the act or instrument belongs to the 
department of construction, not invention. It is, therefore, the formation, in the mind of the 
inventor, of a defInite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is 
thereafter to be applied in practice, that constitutes an available conception, within the 
meaning of the patent law." In Townsend v. Smith,30 the court, applying Mergenthaler v. 
Scudder, stressed that conception within the meaning of patent law is the formation of "a 
defmite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be 
applied in practice". The conception must be "sufficiently plain to enable those skilled in the 
art to understand it. "3 1 This has to be right, since if the conception has not reached such a 
stage, and inventive input still has to be made, it would mean that the conception has not 
reached the stage of an invention within the meaning of the Act. This emphasis on the 
possibility of the conception being put to practice by one skilled in the art was also 
emphasised in Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States,32 where it was said that "conception 
has been achieved when the inventive idea is crystallised in all of its essential attributes and 
becomes so clearly defIned in the mind of the inventor as to be capable of being converted 
to reality and reduced to practice by the inventor or by one skilled in the art." However, it 
must be appreciated that a conception can reach a stage where it can be described as a 
"defInite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention" even though some 
29 Mer&enthaler v. Scudder 11 App. D.C. 264 (Court of Appeals, District of Columbia) at 276. 
30 Townsend v. Smith 4 USPQ 269 (CCPA 1929), per Graham, Presiding Judge, at page 271, "It is 
therefore the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete 
and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice that constitutes an available 
conception within the meaning of the patent law. A priority of conception is established when the 
invention is made sufficiently plain to enable those skilled in the art to understand it." See also 
Polye v. UbI 140 USPQ 584 (CCPA 1964) an interference case, per Judge Smith, at page 588, 
"There is no showing here that UbI invented or suggested the entire invention as embodied in the 
combination of elements claimed in the counts in issue. His suggestion to use Allyl alcohol in the 
electrolyte is not a conception of the entire invention of the counts. It is what the courts referred to 
in Standard Cartrid&e Co. v. Peters CarujdiC Co. 77 P. 630, 645 (6th Cir. 1896), as the 'mere 
existence of an intellectual notion that a certain thing could be done, and if done, might be of 
practical utility'. As the court there stated, this 'does not furnish a basis for a patent', citing 
Apwam Woolen Co. v Jordap (1868) 74 US (7 Wall.) 583." 
31 See Land v. Dreyer 69 USPQ 602 (CCPA 1946), per O'Connell, Judge, at page 60S, "The party 
claiming conception of an invention must show that it was .c011~plete and. ope~tive and such as 
would enable a person skilled in the art to reduce the conceptlon Into practIce WIthout any further 
research or exercise of the inventive skill. It is not sufficient, therefore. to show that a party 
claiming an invention has conceived a result to be obtained; the patentable thing is the means 
provided and disclosed by him to accomplish that result. See Townsend V· Smith 4 USPQ 269; 
Rowe V. Holtz 12 USPQ 234, and authorities cited therein." 
32 Amax Fly Ash Corp. V. United States 182 USPQ 211 (US Ct CIs Trial Div. 1974), per Judge 
Cooper, at page 215; decision affirmed and opinion of Judge Cooper adopted, 18S USPQ 437 (US. 
Ct CIs 1975). 
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mechanical details still need to be worked out, as long as it could be worked out without the 
exercise of inventive skill.33 
The phrase "which permits in practice" in the defmition of "invention" in the Act leads to 
the conclusion that this level of conception has to be reached en route to the solution for it to 
be considered an "invention". The inventor may acquire the assistance of someone with 
mechanical skills to help him construct the machine and put it in concrete form. This 
assistance, however, will not make the engineer a co-inventor.34 Therefore, the fact that he 
requires the assistance of some one else to help him refme it mechanically will not mean that 
his conception is incomplete.35 The inventor does not have to be a mechanical genius - the 
conception is in the mental ability and not mechanical or commercial ability. A commercial 
decision does not constitute invention.36 
2.2.2. Solution of a Specific Problem 
The solution must relate to a specific problem in the field of technology. The WIPO 
Commentary to section 112(1) explains that the word "solution" is to be understood in a 
broad sense. Therefore, the solution need not be a solution to the specific problem which is 
under investigation.3 7 This approach should rightly be adopted. The invention need not be 
related to a pre-solution problem in the sense that there has to be a predetermined problem 
to be solved. A post solution problem, an "answer to an unasked question", in the sense 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
In re Tanse1117 USPQ 188 (CCPA 1958), per Worley, Judge, at page 189, "The Mer~entha1er y. 
Scudder 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C.C. 1897) decision has been repeatedly cited and approved by this 
court, ... but we do not construe it as holding that the final size and shape of every part and the 
location of every nut, screw, and bolt must be exactly foreseen before the conception of an 
apparatus can be said to be complete. It is sufficient if the inventor is able to make a disclosure 
which would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to construct the apparatus without 
extensive research or experimentation." 
See later, joint inventors hip, para 2.3., infra. 
See Alto Company v. Fish Maoufacturin& Co. 116 USPQ 331 (D.N.J. 1957), affd per curiam 116 
USPQ 306 (CA.\ 3rd Cir. 1958), Forman, Chief Judge said at page 334, "It is not disputed that 
Harrison contributed important refinements to the slicing machine mechanism ... But it is exactly 
the type of refinement that a qualified engineer and designer, such as Harrison claimed to be, can 
reasonably be expected to make in contrast to the efforts of Schmidt, who was not an engineer by 
profession. The fact that Harrison's contribution made the machine commercially practicable, 
however, by no means establishes him as the inventor .... It is clear that Harrison was called in 
when Schmidt's progress in developing a cluster-roll slicing machine had reached that plateau 
requiring a good mechanical engineer. It is also clear that he was not called in and asked, without 
prior experimentation by Schmidt, to produce a machine which would slice buns in clusters." See 
also Maenus Harmonica Corp. v. Lapin Products. Inc. 98 USPQ 94 (S.D. N.Y. 1953), per 
Conger, District Judge, at pages 99, "I do not think anyone will deny that an inventor may employ 
a mechanic to assist him in applying his conceptions without making him even a co-inventor." 
See Bioeen Inc. y. Medevaplc. [1995] RPC 25, at page 91; [1995] FSR 4, at page 34 (CA), per 
Hobhouse LJ. 
The Commentary gives the example of a solution to solve the problem of providing cooking 
utensil which can be taken from a refrigerator and placed in an oven, and vice versa, without 
damaging the utensil, as a spin-off from researches into the development of a material capable of 
withstanding the extreme temperature differences encountered by space vehicles - see WIPO Model 
Law - Commentary, page 57. 
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that there is no predetennined problem at hand when the inventor recognises that the 
solution is an answer to a particular problem which is not the subject of his research or 
investigation, will equally qualify as an invention. Likewise, in the case where identifying a 
problem is the inventive contribution, the solution, even though obvious once the problem 
has been identified, would fall within the defmition of an invention.38 
So an accidental invention in the sense of a solution presenting itself through the 
recognition that it is the answer to a problem which was never in contemplation of the 
inventor at the time when the solution was found will still amount to an invention. A good 
illustration is to be found in Townsend v. Smith,39 where in the course of investigating 
some problem with his screw-cutting machine, the appellant discovered that the fault was 
the result of a wrong set of gears being used, resulting in the threading tool, on the moment 
of initiating each cut on the screw blank, not starting in the same spot that it formerly did, 
and making a new mark each time the tool passed over the screw. He immediately 
conceived the idea that this was the solution required for making double-threaded screws.40 
2.2.3. In the Field of Technology41 
This last requirement merely emphasises the fact that the patent system is designed to 
protect inventions related to the technical field and not those relating to the aesthetics or 
which are of an abstract or intellectual character, as reflected in the list of excluded 
inventions in section 13.42 This requirement has often been stressed in the jurisprudence of 
the European Patent Convention when the import of Article 52 is considered. The Technical 
Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office has stressed that the word "invention" 
requires that the subject matter or activity must have a technical character or gives rise to a 
technical effect or provides a technical contribution to the art.43 The same is also true in 
38 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 84 and 85. 
39 Townsend y. Smith 4 USPQ 269 (CCPA 1929). It was held that there was a complete conception 
and reduction to practice of the invention at that time, and hence he was entitled to claim the 
invention. See Graham, Presiding Judge, at page 271. 
40 Another example of an accidental invention is seen in PLG Research Ltd & anor y. Ardon 
International Ltd & ors [1993) FSR 197. See Aldous J., at pages 207-208, "According to Dr 
Mercer, Mr Hureau made his invention while cleaning a die used for the Netlon process [which 
produced diamond-shaped nets). He stopped rotation of the outer die and lowered the inner die to 
clean it. The extruder continued to pump resin and therefore a horizontal ring was extruded through 
the opening between the dies. Upon raising the lower die a tube of vertical strands was extruded. He 
realised that the Netlon die head could be adapted to create an extruded tubular square net by 
reciprocating the inner die in the direction of the extrusion. The result is a square net with 
horizontal strands interrupted by horizontal strands." 
41 "Technology" - "the scientific study of the practical or industrial arts" - The Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary on Historical Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd Ed, 1987. 
42 See supra, footnote 23. 
43 See, for example, Yicomlcomputer reI.red inveption T204/84 (1987) OJ EPO 14; IBM! Document 
abst:ractipa and retrieyipa T 22185 [1990) OJ EPO 12; [1990) EPOR 98, Technical Board of 
Appeal, Reasons for the decision 2, "According to Article 52(2) certain subject matter or activities 
in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph (1) of the Article. 
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respect of the construction of section 1 (2), the equivalent section of Article 52 EPC, of the 
United Kingdom Patents Act 1977.44 
2.3. Joint Inventors and Concept of Joint Inventorship 
From the above analysis the important element in the determination of an invention is the 
complete conception. The requirement of the need for a complete conception is very 
relevant in the context of the determination of who, among the people involved in joint 
researches, are joint inventors. In theory, persons who have made the various small 
contribution towards the complete conception of the fmal solution, and not merely 
contributing mechanical skills, are eligible to be considered as joint inventors. The Act 
provides that "where two or more persons have jointly made an invention, the rights to a 
patent shall belong to them jointly" .45 No further guidance is provided in the Act as to 
which persons amongst collaborator should be regarded as having made the invention. 
However, based on the earlier discussion of the meaning of invention and hence 
identification of the inventor, and with guidance from decided cases in the United States, it 
may be possible to construct a defmition of joint invention and also some basic rules 
regarding the existence or non-existence of joint inventorship. 
2.3.1. Determination of Joint Inventorship 
Although there are several United Kingdom cases in which joint inventorship was an issue, 
in none of these cases was there an attempt to define in positive terms the meaning of joint 
... Whatever their differences, these exclusions have in common that they refer to activities which 
do not aim at any direct technical result but are rather of an abstract and intellectual character. 3. 
The requirement that an invention must have a technical character or in other words, must provide a 
technical contribution to the art is at the basis of a long-standing legal practice in at least the 
majority of the Contracting States of the EPO. "; Essweinl Automatic prommmer T579/88 [1991] 
EPOR 120, Technical Board of Appeal, Reasons for the decision 3.1.1 ; mMl Card wwJrr T854190 
[1993] OJ EPO 669, at page 675; and Stemheimerl Harmonic vibrations T366/87 [1989] 3 EPOR 
131, Technical Board of Appeal, Reasons for the decision para. 2.1. 
44 See, for example, Fox L.J., in Merrill Lynch's &1plication [1989] RPC 561, at page 569, 
"Something further is necessary. The nature of that addition is, I think, to be found in the Yicom 
case where it is stated: 'Decisive is what technical contribution the invention makes to the known 
art'. There must I think be some technical advance on the prior art in the form of a new result [e.g., 
a substantial increase in processing speed as in Vicom]." See also Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v. Pike 
Simals IJd [1993] RPC 107, per Aldous J., at page 139, "At the heart of many inventions is a 
discovery which is an excluded matter. What can be patented is the incorporation of that discovery 
into technology. As Fox L.J., stated (in Merrill Lynch's APPlication [1989] RPC 561 at 569), 
something more than the excluded matter is required to enable an invention to be patented. That 
something extra is a technical contribution to the art", and at page 144, "The invention provides a 
technical contribution to the known art in that it provides a controller with a one knob setting per 
set of lights so that it can be quicldy and easily operated by unskilled persons. It is not an 
invention for a system of regulating traffic as such." 
45 Section 18(3) of the Act. 
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inventorship.46 The exception is the case of Russell's Patent,47 where the opinion was 
expressed that if the parties involved had contributed towards the invention, and had from 
time to time contributed suggestions, then the invention should be considered as having 
been made by both parties. Similarly, Whitford 1. in Viziball Ltd's Application approved 
the approach taken by the hearing officer that since the invention involved two essential 
elements, and since each of the two inventors had contributed one of the elements, the 
invention should be jointly owned by them.48 In Norris's Patent,49 the issue was whether 
the patent was rightly issued to the named sole inventor or whether the referrer was the sole 
inventor. The court held that the referrer should be considered as a joint inventor together 
with the patentee. In coming to this conclusion, the court held that the invention involved 
two distinct and interrelated aspects. It was not shown that the referrer was involved in 
conceiving the first aspect, the optical aspect. The second aspects, the electronic control 
aspect, involved two matters, the concept and the electronic arrangements for giving 
practical effect to that concept. On the evidence, the court held that the referrer had 
contributed to the design of the electronic system which formed a significant aspect of the 
invention disclosed in the patent. However, it is not clear from the opinion whether the 
designing of this electronic means involved more than the use of general mechanical skills, 
or whether the arrangement in itself was inventive. The applicant, Neely, in Staen& 
Limited's Patents sought an order naming him as sole inventor of two patents in which one 
Robertson was named as the inventor. Although the hearing officer held that Neely was the 
actual deviser, in the sense that he was the one who contributed the idea which led to the 
invention, he declined to accept that Neely was the sole inventor. This was because the 
evidence showed that Neely did not come up with the idea "unprompted", and that "Mr 
Robertson posed the question, and Mr Neely came up with a suggested solution". 
46 Allen y. Rawson 135 ER 656 (1845) was concerned with whether a person who had contributed in 
some way to the final form of the invention could be regarded as a joint inventor (see footnote 15 
for the facts). There was no discussion in the opinions as to what would constitute joint 
inventorship. Only negative indications were given, i.e., what would not amount to joint 
inventorship. However, from the opinion, it is possible to say that where a person made 
suggestions subordinate to the main conception, and these suggestions do not in any way affect the 
main principle of the invention, since there was already in existence a complete conception, then 
the person making the suggestion could not be regarded as a joint inventor. 
47 Russell's Patent 44 ER 937 (1857). Two persons, Russell and Muntz, applied for patents for the 
same invention. Russell applied to have the great seal affixed to his letters patent. Muntz, 
Russell's servant, opposed on the ground that the invention was his, not his master's. The court 
ruled that the great seal should not be affixed to the letters patent of Russell except on the terms 
that they should be assigned to a trustee for Russell and Muntz, and Muntz agreeing to abandon his 
application for his own letters patent. See Lord Cranworth L.C., at pages 938-939, " ... the result 
of them appeared to be that the petitioner and the respondent ... had both contributed towards the 
invention, or had independently arrived at the same result... Both of them were engaged in the 
manufacture to which the patent applied. Both felt the want of such an invention, both were aware 
of the general principles on which such an invention must proceed, and I have no doubt that from 
time to time one contributed one suggestion and the other another, so that in the end when, on the 
27th of March last, the specification was finally drawn out, it was not in the power of either to 
state positively, and without doubt, to whom the merit of the invention was to be attributed. It 
was, in truth, to be ascribed, in some degree, to one, and in some degree, to the other." 
48 Yiziball Ltd's Ap,plication [1988] RPC 213, p~r Whitford J., at page 220. 
49 Noms's Patent [1988] RPC 159, an entitlement proceeding under section 8 (which was later treated 
as an application under section 37 when the patent was granted, see Falconer J., at pages 174-176. 
76 
Therefore, both should be considered as joint inventors.5o It has to be noted that a factor of 
significance in the determination of the issue was that the onus of proof lay with Neely to 
establish his claim to sole inventorship.51 
Useful as the above cases may be, they do not provide detailed analyses of the concept of 
joint inventorship. Therefore, to get further guidance as to exact parameters of "one of the 
muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysic of the patent law",52 guidance will have to be 
sought from the United States, where there is more relevant litigation. 
In Altoona Publix Theaters. Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp. ,53 Judge Buffington held 
that "there is a joint invention when two or more persons jointly work or collaborate in 
devising and putting into practical form the subject matter of the patent in question." 
Building on this definition Judge Y ankwich54 was of the opinion that in order for an 
invention to be truly called ajoint invention, two or more inventors must have "collaborated 
in evolving the patented device". They must have "worked together for a common end, 
which was, through mutual consultations and suggestions, fmally accomplished by the 
contributions and united efforts of the collaborators." Another pertinent description of joint 
inventorship can be found in the case of Monsanto Co. et al. v. Kamp et al. ,55 where 
Holtzoff, District Judge, said that a joint invention "is the product of collaboration of the 
inventive endeavours of two or more persons working towards the same end and producing 
an invention by their aggregate efforts". He further held that to constitute a joint invention, 
it is necessary that "each of the inventors work on the same subject matter and make some 
contribution to the inventive thought and to the final result." 
The crux of all these descriptions, therefore, is that before there is the entire conception of 
the invention, there must have been a voluntary pooling of ideas and suggestions, and 
through these contributions and efforts, the final concept is formulated. 56 A case in point to 
50 Staeng Limited's Patents [1996] RPC 183, in the Patent Office, decision of Dr Ferdinando, at 
pages 188-190. 
51 Staeng Limited's Patents [1996] RPC 183, in the Patent Office, decision of Dr Ferdinando, at 
pages 189 and 190. This point is important because normally the person who poses a problem to 
the inventor is not considered a joint inventor - see infra, para. 2.3.3.b. 
52 Mueller Brass Co. y. Reading Industries 176 USPQ 361 (B.D. Pa. 1972), per Newcomer, District 
Judge, at page 372. 
53 Altoona Publix Theaters. Inc. y. American TO-Brgon COW. 22 USPQ 8 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1934), per 
Buffington, Circuit Judge, at page 11. 
54 Pointer y. Six Wheel Cor:poration 83 USPQ 43 (CA 9th Cir. 1949), per Yankwich, District Judge, 
at page 47. 
55 Monsanto Co. et gl. y. Kamp et aI. 154 USPQ 259 (D.D.C. 1967), per Holtzoff, District Judge, at 
page 262. 
S6 Pointer y. Six Wheel Cm:poration 83 USPQ 43 (CA 9th Cir. 1949), per Yankwich, District Judge, 
at page 47, "And the product of the j~int endeavour is a joint i~vention wh~n ... 'before ~e en~ 
conception of the invention by one Inventor, another meets him and by his consent uDltes With 
him in exercising inventive skill upon the development and perfecting of the conception.'... Here, 
there is no voluntary pooling of ideas. " 
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illustrate the importance of the requirement for collaborative efforts between the parties 
before there could be a joint inventors hip is S.W. Farber. Inc. v. Texas Instruments. Inc,57 
where the court held that the inventor of an existing element which went into making the 
patented combination was not a joint inventor. Similarly, a mere teacher of the prior art will 
also not qualify as a joint inventor.58 The same applies where the invention involves an 
improvement of a prior device. The prior inventor will not be regarded as a joint inventor 
together with the inventor of the improvement invention.59 
From the above definition, it will be seen that the parties involved may not have started on 
the project at the same time. One may have started at an earlier time, and the other may have 
started before, at the same time, or after the first. They may initially not have been aware of 
the efforts of each other. However, if they got together before the final concept is 
formulated, and, pooling their ideas and resources, a solution is found to the problem they 
were researching into, there will be joint inventorship.60 
57 
58 
59 
60 
S.W. Farber. Inc. v. Texas Instruments. Inc. 135 USPQ 394 (DC Delaware 1962), per Steel, 
District Judge, at page 398. 
See O'Reilly y. Morse 56 US 62, at 109; 14 Law Ed. 601, at 622 (US Sup. Ct 1853), "Neither 
can the inquiries he made, or the information or advice he received, from men of science in the 
course of his researches, impair his right to the character of an inventor. No invention can possibly 
be made consisting of a combination of different elements of power, without a thorough knowledge 
of the properties of each of them, and the mode in which they operate on each other. And it can 
make no difference in this respect, whether he derives his information from books, or from 
conversation with men skilled in the science." See also Monsanto Co. et all v. Kamp et al. 154 
USPQ 259 (D.D.e. 1967), per Holtzoff, District Judge, at page 263. 
See, for example, Pointer v. Six Wheel Corporation 177 F.2d 153; 83 USPQ 43 (CA 9th Cir. 
1949), per Yankwich, District Judge, at page 47, "Here, the only basis for the claim of joint 
invention lies in the fact that the Knox device was an addition to, and an improvement upon, the 
Stebbins structure. If that were enough to make the invention joint, every 'improvement' which is 
claimed solely by the improver could be invalidated upon showing that it was grafted upon a prior 
structure. And the great body of improvement patents, which represents, perhaps, the most 
important contribution to patents in the field of mechanics could be entirely destroyed. In truth, the 
improver could be compelled to take in the inventor of the prior structure, whether his invention 
was merely disclosed in a patent or actually reduced to practice, lest some one, in the future, seek 
to invalidate the improvement patent upon the ground that it was not his sole invention. This is 
not the law. II 
McKinnon Chain Co. y. American Chain Co. 268 F. 353 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1920), Wooley, Circuit 
Judge, at pages 354-360, "[T]he controlling issue ... is whether the invention was the sole 
invention of Coulter, the sole patentee, or was the joint invention of Coulter and Hoff, the latter 
being superintendent of one of the defendant's mills .... From this evidence we make certain 
findings of fact. One is, that Hoff was the first to conceive the principle of simultaneous arxl 
successive arm movement mechanism. Another is, that later Coulter became possessed of the same 
idea, either from Hoff or from himself. ... The machine then contained in combination Hoff's 
conception and what we have assumed was Coulter's conception, so combined and interrelated that 
the presence of each was indispensable to the functioning of the other, for without either the 
machine would not work. As both Hoff and Coulter had at one time, the crucial time, w<rked 
together for a common end, which was finally accomplished by the contributions and united efforts 
of both, we are of opinion, after applying familiar law to the facts, that the invention was the 
invention of both, and was. therefore. joint invention. II See also General Motors Cmp. y. Toyota 
Motor Co. 667 F.2d 504; 212 USPQ 659 (CA 6th Cir. 1981) - a prior conception that is modified 
as a result of collaborative effort may become conception of a joint invention. 
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The contribution made by a person claiming to be a joint inventor needs to be a conceptual 
contribution as opposed to mere mechanical contribution. This was stressed in Pointer v. 
Six Wheel Corporation .61 
However, there may be a situation when two or more persons may not consciously have 
embarked on a scheme to invent something. For example, in the course of a casual 
conversation, some one may have brought out a particular problem, or the need to bring 
about a particular desired result. Assume that from this point there were mutual suggestions 
and contribution from each member of the group to find out a solution for the problem 
posed, and through such "brain storming" a solution is found. Could members of this 
group be considered as joint inventors? Admittedly there do not seem to be any reported 
decisions with respect to the scenario described above. However, the case of Polye v. 
W,62 concerning an appeal by the junior party Polye from a decision of the Board of 
Patent Interferences awarding priority of invention of the five counts in issue to the senior 
party UbI, neatly illustrates the problem envisaged above.63 Both the parties involved were 
working for non-related employers. Prior to the time when the invention in issue was 
made, Polye had been engaged in finding a solution to the problem of how to prevent the 
accumulation of hydrogen gas in the sealed electrolytic switch envelope. The gas built up a 
pressure sufficient to cause the sealed envelope to burst. Polye had been considering the 
use of several different types of hydrogen absorbers. In the course of a conversation with 
his neighbour, Uhl, in Uhl's house, the problem confronting Polye was casually brought 
up. UbI suggested the use of an unsaturated organic compound, in particular, allyl alcohol. 
Following this, Polye conducted tests on switches using Allyl alcohol in the electrolyte 
which tests resulted in a complete and successful reduction to practice of the invention in 
issue in September, 1958. On the issue of whose invention was reduced to practice, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the fmding of the lower court and awarded 
priority to Polye. Of interest for present purpose, however, is the comment of the court 
regarding the contribution of Uhl. The court held that the invention involved more than the 
mere general suggestion made by Uhl to Polye to use Allyl alcohol as a hydrogen getter, as 
the additional limitations in the counts related to features which were not disclosed by UbI 
to Polye. These limitations resulted from the work done by Polye and under his supervision 
61 Pointer y. Six Wheel Cm:poration 83 USPQ 43 (CA 9th Cir. 1949), per Yankwich, District Judge, 
at page 47, "And the produce of the j~int endeavour is a joint i~vention wh~n, ... before ~e en~ 
conception of the invention by one Inventor, another meets him and by his consent urutes WIth 
him in exercising inventive skill upon the development and perfecting of the conception." See also 
Kirby, P., "The Claim-by-Claim Approach", Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents, Vol. LXXXID, Session 1964-65, page C69, at page C8t. 
62 Polye y. Ubi 140 USPQ 584 (CCPA 1964), per Judge Smith, at pages 586-588. 
63 Polye y. Ubi 140 USPQ 584 (CCPA 1964). At the time the invention in issue was made, Polye 
was in the employ of Bendix Aviation Corporation. The Polye application, filed January 28, 1960, 
was entitled "Electrolyte for a sealed liquid level current control device". Uhl, at the time of the 
filing of his application, on February 12, 1959, was a chemist employed by American Cyanamid 
Company. UbI's application had since matured into US patent granted March 8, 1960, entitled 
"Level Switches". 
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in building and testing the switches in issue. The most that could be said of UhI's 
contribution was that "he had the intellectual notion that Allyl alcohol could be added to the 
switch electrolyte, and that it would probably act as a hydrogen getter." Then citing 
A&awam Woolen Co. v. Jordan and Land v. Dreyer, the court held that there was no 
showing that UbI invented or suggested the entire invention as embodied in the combination 
of elements claimed in the counts in issue. His suggestion to use Allyl alcohol in the 
electrolyte was not a conception of the entire invention of the counts but was the "mere 
existence of an intellectual notion that a certain thing could be done, and if done, might be 
of practical utility." At most, what Uhl did was to render partial aid to Polye. His idea was 
not "complete and operative and such as would enable a person skilled in the art to reduce 
the conception into practice without any further research or exercise of the inventive skill." 
It is clear from the above discussion that the whole issue was centred on who should be 
regarded as the inventor of the patented device. The issue was on sole inventorship, 
whether it be Polye or UhI. It is submitted that the decision would have been different if the 
case was argued on the basis of joint inventorship. Since it was accepted that UbI had 
rendered partial aid towards the conception of the entire invention, he would have answered 
to the description of a joint inventor had the issue been argued on this basis. It is submitted 
that in principle, there is no reason why those who have contributed towards the realisation 
of the invention should not be deemed to be joint inventors. The collaboration need not 
have to result from a formal arrangement, but could result from an informal setting. 
However in this kind of situation there will be problems associated with ownership of the 
patent granted on the invention. It would be hard on the employer of someone in the same 
situation as Polye that he would have to share the ownership of the invention with Uhl, 
with whom he had no knowledge of, and of whom he may not even have known. There 
would also be the question of whether an employee has the authority to bind the employer 
to a legal relationship with a third party without the knowledge and consent of the 
employer. Hence the need to stress the element of mutual agreement to collaborate in the 
definition of joint inventorship. In the above situation, since there was no mutual agreement 
to collaborate, joint inventorship would not exist, despite the contribution of Uhl, his 
contribution being deemed to be gratuitously given. However, in principle, the mutual 
agreement need not be formally based. 
The above defInitions still do not help in the determination of joint inventorship in specific 
situations where the parties involved may have participated in a project which gives rise to 
an invention, but where their involvement may not be clear-cut. The case law, however, 
sheds considerable light on the difficult issues relating to the nature and extent of 
involvement in questions of joint inventorship. 
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2.3.2. Amount of Conceptual Contribution Required 
Joint inventorship is present when two or more persons collaborated together to conceive a 
solution to a problem. Each person in this inventive entity has contributed in some way to 
the fmal formulation of the conception of the invention. However, further analysis of the 
respective "contributions" needs to be carried out before one can conclude that the several 
contributors are joint inventors of a particular invention. The fIrst question is the amount of 
contribution that should be put in by each one of them to qualify for joint inventor status. 
Should there be a certain threshold of contribution to qualify? Fortunately the courts have 
adopted a pragmatic approach for the resolution of this problem. In a refmement to the 
above description of joint inventorship, Judge Holtzoff in Monsanto Co. et aI. v. Kamp et 
01:.. 64 clarified the role, amount and extent of contribution required from each of the co-
inventors. He said that "each needs to perform but a part of the task if an invention emerges 
from all of the steps taken together. It is not necessary that the entire inventive concept 
should occur to each of the joint inventors, or that the two should physically work on the 
project together. One may take a step at one time, the other an approach at different times. 
One may do more of the experimental work while the other makes suggestions from time to 
time. The fact that each of the inventors plays a different role and that the contribution of 
one may not be as great as that of another, does not detract from the fact that the invention 
is joint, if each makes some original contribution, though partial, to the final solution of the 
problem." This, then is the answer to the popular misconception that for a joint invention to 
arise, the parties must work side by side, thinking out the same idea, and that there was no 
part of the invention which was not made by all of them.65 The above case further clarifIes 
that for joint inventorship to arise there is no requirement for unity of time or place or 
contribution.66 The judge in Consolidated Bunging Apparatus Co. v. Woerle67 admirably 
expressed it thus: 
64 Monsanto Co. et aI. y. Kamp et aI. 154 USPQ 259 (D.D.C. 1967), per HoItzoff, District Judge, at 
page 262. 
65 See Bowtell, P.L., "The True and First Inventor", Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents, Vol. LXXVI, Session 1957-58, page C75, where at page B103, Mr A.E. O'dell, a 
participant during the discussion, mentioned that United States examiners seemed to approacb joint 
inventorship on this basis. He, Mr O'dell, described this as nonsense. 
66 See also DeLaski & Throllll C.W.T. Co. v. Wm. R. ThroW & Sons CO. 218 F. 458, at 464, 
(D.NJ. 1914), affd, 226 Fed. 941 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1915), "In Older to constitute two persons joint 
inventors, it is not necessary that exactly the same idea should have occurred to each at the same 
time, and that they should work out together the embodiment of that idea in a perfected machine. 
The conception of the entire device may be due to one, but if the other makes suggestions of 
practical value, which assisted in working out the main idea and making it operative, or contributes 
an independent part of the entire invention, which is unit~ with .the parts produced by ~e other .and 
creates the whole, he is a joint inventor, even though his contnbution be of comparatively trunor 
importance and merely an application of an old idea." The decision of the District Court in that 
case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Woolley. 
He stated in WID. R. 'Ibroj)J) & Sons Co. y. De Laski" 11lro»1l C.W.T. Co. 226 F. 941 (CCA 
3rd Cir. 1915), at 949, that, "In a machine containing as many elements as this one, it is not to be 
thought nor by the law required. that the inventive conceptions of two inventors shall develop 
simultaneously. One may conceive a general or imperfect outline of an entirely novel thing, 
which. without the conception of another developing it and giving it body, might never amount to 
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"When two persons are jointly engaged in the work of invention, it must always be 
extremely difficult to determine how much of the successful result is due to each. 
The mere fact that two or more persons unite in an application for a patent as the 
product of their joint inventive effort, certainly creates a very strong presumption 
that the device is the result of their united ingenuity. It may be that the conception of 
the entire device is due to but one of them; but the other makes a suggestion of 
practical value in working out the idea, and making it operative. But that suggestion 
may be the very thing that the frrst failed to think of, and which was need to make 
the conception a success." 
It must not be thought that the contribution of each person claiming joint inventorship must 
be something that is novel per se. This is not so, since the suggested incorporation of an 
old feature or element into the nascent invention may be the turning point which leads to 
achievement of the final conception. In a similar vein, it is not necessary that each of the 
contributions should of itself be inventive. It may be that a particular idea, even though not 
inventive, is the spark which leads to the solution sought after. It can then be said that, but-
for that uninventive contribution, the fmal solution may not have been arrived at by the 
process of lateral thinking. What is important is that these ideas are essential progression to 
the completion of the final inventive concept.68 This is particularly so where the 
contributions of individual members of a team, taken separately, have no inventiveness, but 
when combined together is clearly new and inventive and, therefore, patentable, a good 
example being in the case of a combination patent. 
It would seem to follow from the above that when the invention is a "single idea" type 
invention, there can not be joint inventors involved in conceiving it.69 Kirby argues that a 
invention; but if the conceptions of one supplement and complement the conception of the other, 
the result might be invention, and therefore joint invention." 
67 Consolidated Bun~ing AWaratus Co. v. Woede 29 Fed. 449 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887), quoted in 
Tresansky, J.O., "Inventorship Determination", (1974) 56 ]POS 551, at 567. 
68 In the words of counsel in Staen~ Limited's Patents [1996] RPC 183, at page 189, one may have 
contributed "the spark that ignited the fire", however, both "were blowing on the fire". In such a 
situation, both should be considered as joint inventors. 
69 See the statement of the principle in Welsbach Lieht Co. y. Cosmopolitan Incandescent Lieht Co. 
104 F. 83 (CCA 7th Cir. 1900), per Woods, Circuit Judge, at page 86, "In his testimony one of 
them had said that the first thought of overcoming the difficulty about transporting mantles by 
dipping the mantle into a liquid was his; that he thought of it one night in bed; that the next day 
he tried it with paraffin; ... The patent contains two claims. The first, which is in suit, is for a 
single thought, the described improvement in strength~ning incand~nt mantles, con~isting in 
coating the completed mantle with paraffin or other swtable . matenal. That thought IIl1g~t well 
have come to one when in bed, and have been put to the practical test the next day, as testified. It 
is difficult to apprehend how two could have shared in the conception. The second claim, however, 
is distinctly different. It is for a method of forming incandescent mantles, consisting of a number 
of steps, the combining of which, to produce the desired result, may well have been the joint 
achievement of two or more minds."; and Ouincey Minine Co. v. Krause 151 F. 1012 (CCA 6th 
Cir. 1907), per Lurton, Circuit Judge, at page 1017, "In describing their invention, the 
specifications include as one element of their device 'a descending conduit or passage, E, leading 
out through one side of the mortar.' .. It is next said that the evidence tends to show that this idea 
of placing the outlet inside of the mortar was the thought of but one of the patentees, and therefore 
could not be the subject of a joint patent. If a claim covered but a single idea, it would be difficult 
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claim which defines an invention of the "single idea type" must be a sole invention and that, 
therefore, there cannot be joint inventorship, citing Ouincey Mining Co. v. Krause et 01. 
and the Welsbach case.7° However, as has been correctly pointed out, depending on the 
circumstances, even a "single idea" type of invention could be the result of joint 
inventorship.71 
2.3.3. Contributions Not Constituting Joint Inventorship 
2.3.3.a. Doctrine of employee improvement 
It is not all suggestions made by one person to another which will entitle the person making 
the suggestions to be considered as a joint inventor. A distinction has to be made between 
whether the suggestions are subordinate suggestions which merely provides an alternative 
method of carrying out the invention in practice, albeit more efficiently, and one which is 
critical to the actual working of the invention.12 
The UK case of Allen v. Rawson,73 was concerned with whether a person who had 
contributed in some way to the fmal form of the invention could be regarded as a joint 
inventor. At first instance ErIe J. observed to the jury that "if a person has discovered an 
70 
71 
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to conceive how it could be patented by two; but, when a claim covers a series of steps or a 
number of elements in a combination, the invention may well be joint, though some of the steps 
or some of the elements may have come as the thought of but one. Such is the invention here 
patented, and it would not be fatal to this patent if the fact is that Krause, Sr., gave birth to the 
best thought connected with a combination claim, which covers more than the place of the location 
of the discharge outlet. This distinction is drawn in Welsbach Licht Co. v. Cosmopolitan 
Incandescent Li~ht Co., 104 Fed. 83, 86." 
See footnote 69 for citations. 
Kirby, P., "The Claim-by-Claim Approach", Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents, Vol. LXXXIll, Session 1964-65, page C69, at page C79. As was rightly pointed out by a 
participant, Mr C. W. MorIe, at page BI44-145, "Mr Kirby gives as an example of the "single 
idea" the Welsbach case of dipping the mantle in paraffin. On the face of it that seems to be a 
single idea, but one man may have said, "If we dip it in something it may be all right," am 
another may have said, "Yes, and I think paraffin will do." We can state that it is a single idea only 
if we know the circumstances in which the invention took place. In reply, Kirby conceded, at page 
B 153, that this was often more dependent on the circumstances that gave rise to the invention, 
rather than being something inherent in the inventive idea itself. Contra the illogic of allowing the 
mental act of one brain to be credited to more than one body mentioned in Phillips, J. and Firth, 
A., Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, 2nd Ed., Butterwortbs, London 1990, at page 57. 
See, for example, Allen y. Rawson 135 ER 656 (1845). See also, Smith's Patent (1905) 22 RPC 
57, per Buckley J., at page 61, adopting the approach in Allen y. Rawson, "Now beyond that, 
supposing that Smith did make ... in the course of the elaboration of this tJ:Ung some trifling 
suggestions from time to time, as to what should be done by way of altenng the model am 
working out the conception which Youlten had in mind, is he entitled to that? ... Even if Smith 
did take some small part in making some suggestions as to the way of carrying this out, those R 
not matters which entitle him to take out a patent in respect of them. It is quite clear from all the 
materials in the case that Y oulten was the moving spirit, the dominant person. Y oulten p-epared 
the draft specification .... He was the person who was conceiving the idea, and presenting the idra 
which was only worlced out through the instrumentality of Smith."; Goddio agJ Rennie's 
AP»Jicatiop [1996] RPC 141 (Court of Session), per Lord Cullen, at pages 178-180. 
AlleP y. Rawsop 135 ER 656 (I84S), at pages 659-663. For the facts, see footnote 15. 
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improved principle, and employs engineers, or agents, or other persons, to assist him in 
carrying out that principle, and they, in the course of the experiments arising from that 
employment, make valuable discoveries accessory to the main principle, and tending to 
carry that out in a better manner, such improvements are the property of the inventor of the 
original improved principle, and may be embodied in his patent; and, if so embodied, the 
patent is not avoided by evidence that the agent or servant made the suggestion of that 
subordinate improvement of the primary and improved principle. "74 On appeal, the Court 
decided unanimously in favour of the patentee. The substance of the judgement is that when 
the conception of the invention is complete without the improvements suggested, which 
merely enables the conception of the inventor to be more easily carried into effect, the 
inventor has the right to adopt them without having to join the persons suggesting the 
improvements as joint inventors.7 5 
This doctrine was reiterated in the US case of A~awam Woolen Co. v. Jordan,76 where the 
Supreme Court, relying on Allen v. Rawson held that an employee engaged in experiments 
to perfect another's concept does not become a co-inventor even if he suggests an 
improvement, unless the improvement is so significant as to amount to "a complete 
invention" in and of itself. The above two cases thus stand for the proposition that a person 
can not be regarded as a joint inventor merely because he makes a suggestion included in 
74 
75 
76 
Allen v. Rawson 26 LondJ 269 (1845), at page 283. 
Allen v. Rawson 135 ER 656 (1845), per Tindal C,J., at pages 665-7, "The real question is, 
whether or not the improvements suggested by Shaw and Milner were of such a serious and 
important character as to preclude their adoption by Williams as parts of his invention .... The 
patentee, in his specification, after describing the double or compound revolving apron, thus refers 
to that which is called Shaw's suggestion... This is, obviously, a mere matter of convenience 
suggested to and adopted by the inventor. It would be difficult to define how far the suggestions of 
a workman employed in the construction of a machine are to be considered as distinct inventions 
by him, so as to avoid a patent incorporating them taken out by his employer. Each case must 
depend upon its own merits. But, when we see that the principle and object of the invention are 
complete without it, I think it is too much that a suggestion of a workman, employed in the 
course of the experiments, of something calculated more easily to carry into effect the conceptions 
of the inventor, should render the whole patent void." The other judges agreed that the 
improvements of Shaw and Milner were subordinate to the main principle of William's invention 
and that Williams had the right to adopt and embody them in his own specification. See Maule I. 
and Cresswell I., at page 666. 
The facts at issue in A&awam Woolen Co. v. Jordan (1868) 74 US (7 Wall.) 583, were not 
dissimilar from those in Allen v. Rawson. Goulding, the original patentee, had devised apparatus 
which enabled a spinning jenny to receive filament in the fonn of continuous roving from a 
succession of carding machines. Previously the filament had been fonned into short rolls which had 
been spliced using a machine called a billy. Goulding eliminated the billy and used rotating tubes 
to condense and draw off filaments from the carding machines. Winslow, an employee, was alleged 
to have introduced certain spools or bobbins for winding the roving instead of the cans from which 
the roving was fonner1y spun. Goulding accepted the ammgement as a useful auxiliary part of the 
invention once a traverser (not suggested by Winslow) had been atded to enable the spool to be 
evenly wound with the roving. The Supreme Court agreed with a submission that although the 
arrangement pmportedly suggested by Winslow was valuable and aided in the accomplishment of 
the desired result, it could not be regarded as such a material part of the invention desaibed in the 
subsequent patent as to confer any right upon the party who made the suggestion to claim to be the 
inventor, or a joint inventor, of the improvement. See Mr Justice Clifford in 74 US 583, at pages 
602-603, and 606. 
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the subject of some sub-claims, but only if he is in part responsible for the main principle of 
the invention. 
In Duplex Envelope Co. Inc. v. Denominational Envelope Co. et aI. ,77 the court declared a 
patent invalid because one of the inventors named in the granted patent was not considered 
a joint inventor, he having only contributed a very general suggestion that some sort of 
device should be used to prevent overrunning when the machine was running at high 
speed. There was no further suggestion as to how this could be carried out in practice. This 
seems to conflict with the principle discussed earlier that conceptual contribution is an 
indication of a joint inventorship, as long as the other elements are present. However, an 
analysis of the case shows that the court was making an overly broad general statement of 
the principle involved. The finding of facts adopted by the judge shows that the complete 
general inventive concept had already been achieved by the sole inventor before the 
suggestion was made. The finding of a sole invention would, therefore, conform with the 
principle in Allen v. Rawson and A~awam. 7 8 
2.3.3.b. Presentin~ problem to inventor 
It may happen that one person tells another that he would like to have an invention to 
achieve some result, or that a certain line of inquiry should be undertaken. If the second 
person, based on that prompting, then fmds the solution to obtain that result, the invention 
will be deemed to be made by a sole inventor, the second person, and not the result of joint 
inventorship between the first and second person. This was neatly illustrated in the case of 
Marshall and Naylor's Patent, 79 where a petition was issued to revoke a patent granted to 
the person who had asked another person to invent a device which could perform a certain 
result. The invention was conceived without any conceptual contribution from the person 
making the request. The patent was ordered to be revoked on the ground that the workman 
was the inventor. A similar situation was present in Jackson's Patent. 80 The petition to 
77 Dyplex Envelope Co. Inc. v. Denominational Envelope Co. et al, 27 USPQ 325 (CCA 4th Cir. 
1935), per Soper, Circuit Judge, at page 332. 
78 Dyplex Enyelope Co. Inc. y. Denominational Envelope Co. et al, 27 USPQ 325 (CCA 4th Cir. 
1935), per Soper, Circuit Judge, at page 329. 
79 Marshall and Naylor's Patent (1900) 17 RPC 553. Walsh presented a petition for revocation of a 
patent granted to Marshall and Naylor on the ground that he was the first and true inventor, and 
they had obtained the grant in fraud of his rights. Walsh was a workman in the employment of a 
company of which Marshall and Naylor were directors. Marshall had asked Walsh to invent a tap 
which would "' give hot, warm or cold water as required. Walsh worked up the invention, made the 
drawings and models, and perfected the tap in all details. Marshall paid him 10 pounds for overtime 
work on the models. See Farwell J., at page 555, "I am clear in this case that all that happened as 
far as regards Mr Marshall was that he came "' with the idea that he would like to have some 
invention, not even specifying if it was to be a valve - some contrivance or invention - by which 
water should be heated by steam. The whole of the merit of the invention was due to that very 
intelligent individual I have seen in the box. I have not the least doubt it is his invention from the 
fIrSt to the last The result is I must make the Order ... to revoke." 
80 JacksoD's PateDt (1905) 22 RPC 384, per Farwell J., at page 387, "Mr Brock ... said this: 'I asked 
only to have the crinkled paper made ... The method of producing the paper was his business, not 
85 
revoke was refused on the evidence showing that the applicant, Brock, had merely 
communicated to Jackson, the named inventor, the possibility of producing something 
having certain desired features. How that effect was to be achieved was left entirely up to 
Jackson without any further ideas from Brock. The same approach is shown in the United 
States cases. In The Garrett Corporation v. United States,81 the court held that one who 
merely suggests an idea of a result to be accomplished, rather than the means of 
accomplishing it, is not a joint inventor. 82 
The above rule is subject to one exception, however. This is where to identify the problem 
requires an inventive step, or to put it in another way, the perception of a problem 
contributes to the required inventive step for the purposes of patentability. In this special 
situation, the means of answering the problem once posed are obvious to a man skilled in 
the art.83 This was, in fact, the line adopted by defence counsel in Elias v. Grovesend 
Tinplate Co.84 The defence failed merely because the court held that if that was the case, 
81 
82 
83 
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mine. I made no suggestion as to that. I said if he succeeded in making the paper and uniting it 
with cloth it would be a very valuable combination.' This is the alleged communication of the 
invention. Then as to the interview of the 16th February, in cross-examination all that he 
suggested was that the adhesive should be put on the cloth and not on the paper. The result seems 
to me to be this - that the buyer of a large fIrm (Brock) goes with his father-in law, who is engaged 
in the paper-making trade, to see a paper maker, and they tell him what they want; and it is said 
that, because they tell him what they want, they have therefore communicated to him a valuable 
invention. The fact that there was nothing there that Mr Brock at the time thought he had invented 
is perfectly apparently from his own letter of the 18th May." See also Ralston's Patent (1909) 26 
RPC 313, where the person who had presented a problem to another to solve was held not to be 
the inventor in the absence of any evidence that indicated that he had contributed in any other way 
to the conception of the solution. 
The Garrett Corporation v. United States 162 USPQ 569 (US Ct CIs 1969), per Davis, 
Commissioner, at page 573. 
See also Solyex Corp. v. Freeman et aI. 199 USPQ 797 (W.D. Virginia, 1976), per Turk, Chief 
District Judge, at page 799. 
BoeinK/Spoiler device T225/84, 1986] 5 EPOR 263, Technical Board of Appeal - Reasons for the 
decisions 8.2., "As a consequence, none of the cited documents gives any indication of a way in 
which the problem would be solved and, more importantly, the perception of the problem has to be 
considered as being the main contribution of the inventive merits of the solution claimed." 8.4., 
"As soon as the solution has been exposed, it falls within the normal considerations of the man 
skilled in the art to arrange and set the logic control means in order to obtain that a predetermined 
roll command signal produces a predetermined roll response and the detail of the means for 
obtaining this result do not need to be introduced in the main claim". See also Timely Products 
CO[p. et aI. v. Arron. et aI. 187 USPQ 257 (CA 2nd Cir. 1975), per Conner, District Judge, at 
page 261. "This is one of the not infrequent cases where the inventor's real contribution lies in 
visualising a desirable result. which once perceived, is easily realised. There may be cases where 
the perception of a desirable and easily achievable goal raises the overa1llevel of ingenuity required 
above the statutory minimum. but this is clearly not one of them."; and Plantronics. Inc. y. 
Roanwell CO[p. 187 USPQ 489 (S.D. NY 1975) per Conner. District Judge. at page 502. "Of 
course. it does not negate patentable invention merely to establish that a desirable goal. once 
perceived. could have been reached by the exercise of routine skill. Patentable ingenuity may be 
involved in the perception of the goal .... " 
Elias y. Gmyesend Tinplate Co. (1890) 7 RPC 455, Master of the Roll. Court of Appeal, at page 
465. "Mr Terrell said ingeniously, ... 'Yes. but then directly Elias has told him his idea. after it has 
come into his head. it follows. as a matter of course. the machine must be what it is.' But that is 
fatal to his first point. He is out of one pot into another. so to speak. That is fatal to him. because 
that shows then that there was not invention - that his idea was a mere adapting of the machine to 
the new idea. The argument against the second point is fatal to the first. 1berefore he is in that 
unfortunate dilemmL" 
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then the invention would not be patentable for obviousness. However, the perception of a 
problem can only contribute to inventive step for the purposes of patentability if the 
problem is of a technical nature.85 
2.3.3.c. Merely followin~ the instruction of someone else 
Similarly, a person who merely follows the instruction of another in performing 
experiments and collating the results, without more, cannot be regarded as a joint inventor. 
Since invention lies in the conception of an idea, persons involved in such mechanical tasks 
obviously cannot be said to be involved in the act of inventing. In Standard Motor Co.' s 
Patent, 86 the claim by the petitioner for revocation, Hirst, that he was in fact the fIrst and 
true inventor was rejected on a fInding that Hirst had merely been following the instructions 
given to him in designing the mechanism. Other cases where the inventor was held to be the 
man contributing the idea, rather than the man who put it into practice, are Smith's Patent 
and Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallin~ton, Weston & Co.87 A similar approach on this issue 
can be seen in the United States.88 The same applies in the case of a person who IS 
involved in overseeing the research directed to be conducted by another. 89 
85 
86 
87 
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See Essweinl Automatic prommmer T 579/88, [1991] EPOR 120, Technical Board of Appea1-
Reasons for the decision 3.1.1, "Solving a problem of an abstract, commercial or recreational 
nature has no immediate influence on the progress of technology and it is significant that the 
invention mentioned in Article 52(2) EPC constitute the solution to such problems, whose 
fonnulation may nonetheless require the exercise of an inventive step. It is therefore clear from 
these provisions that the European legislator intended that the problem to be solved be of a 
technical nature ". 
Standard Motor Coo's Patent (1957) RPC 326, per Wynn-Parry J., at page 330, "I find as a fact 
that between them [Grinham and Turner] they were the inventors, and that the petitioner had in his 
own mind exaggerated the work which he did in the matter, so that he has become quite 
immovably persuaded that he was the author of the invention. I am satisfied that there is no 
evidence on which I could act to find that he was the author of any subsidiary part of the 
combination such as the use of a gear box with a top cover. In my view, he acted from first to last 
in carrying out instructions given to him." See also Norwood's Patent (1895) 12 RPC 214, per 
Stirling J., at pages 226-227, on a similar point. 
Smith's Patent (1905) 22 RPC 57, and Sirdar Rubber Co. v. Wallin~ton, Weston & Co. (1905) 
22 RPC 257. Kurtz y. Spence (1888) 5 RPC 161, however, seems to be an anomaly. After 
holding that one Esilmann, a chemist, in the employ of Messrs. Spence, had contributed ideas 
leading to the discovery, the court relied on agency principle to hold that the two inventors named, 
Peter and Francis Spence, were correctly designated as inventors - see Kekewich J., at page 181, '1 
have no doubt that many stages in the discovery were due to Mr Esilmann alone. To adopt the 
language of another science, he may be styled the inventor inveniens and likewise the inventor sine 
qua non. For all purposes, except that of being the frrst and true inventor, he was the agent of his 
employers. His labours were theirs, he worked in their laboratory and with their materials, as well 
as with their assistance, and the benefits of his discovery morally and legally, belonged to them. 
Am I bound to hold that the agency stopped short of making his employers really the first and true 
inventors of this process which he in conjunction with them and for their benefit discovered? I 
know of no authority compelling me to do this, and, in the absence of authority, principle is in 
favour of a different conclusion. Messrs. Peter Spence and Francis Spence declared in the usual way 
that they were the first and true inventors. I have no doubt that they did so honestly, and in my 
judgement they were right." . .. . . 
This is an odd decision and cannot be correct 10 pnnclple. No other authontles could be found 
whereby the agency principle can be used to credit the employer with the mental conception of his 
employee. 
See, on this point. Mueller Brass Co. y. Reedio,lndustries 176 USPQ 361 (B.D. Pa. 1972), per 
Newcomer, District Judge, at page 372. "On the one hand, it is reasonably clear that a person who 
87 
2.3.3.d. Persons involved in the mechanical implementation of the final conception 
Similarly, being asked to further refine and construct a mechanical device to implement the 
conception will not qualify that person to be a joint inventor. The patent system is designed 
to protect invention and encourage inventors, not to give exclusive rights to a person with 
mere mechanical or design skills. In Alto Company v. Fish Manufacturing Co. ,90 the 
defendants alleged in defence that the patent was invalid because Schmidt, the patentee 
named in the patent, did not invent its subject matter, the real inventor being one Harrison. 
In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Forman determined that the issue was whether Harrison 
was paid to invent a machine to solve a particular problem, or to further refme and adjust a 
cluster-roll slicing machine already at a certain stage of development. Though it was not 
disputed that Harrison contributed important refmements to the slicing machine mechanism, 
such refinements were of the type that a qualified engineer and designer, such as Harrison 
claimed to be, could reasonably be expected to carry out. The fact that Harrison's 
contribution made the machine commercially practicable, however, by no means established 
him as the inventor. Quoting the principle enunciated in Agawam Company v. Jordan,91 he 
held that it was clear that Harrison was called in when Schmidt's progress in developing a 
cluster-roll slicing machine had reached that plateau requiring a good mechanical engineer. 
It was also clear that he was not called in and asked, without prior experimentation by 
Schmidt, to produce a machine which would slice buns in clusters. Therefore, Schmidt was 
rightly named as the sole inventor. In Magnus Harmonica Corp. v. Lapin Products. Inc., 
the court expressly held that an inventor may employ a mechanic to assist him in applying 
his conceptions without making him a co-inventor.92 
has merely followed instructions of another in performing experiments is not a co-inventor of the 
object to which those experiments are directed ... " 
89 Solyex Com. y. Freeman et al. 199 USPQ 797 (W.D. Virginia, 1976), per Turk, Chief District 
Judge, at page 799, "King engaged Spindletop to work on th~ project, and ~eter Werth, a ~h 
scientist, was assigned the project ... His ~ork [Werth's] consisted ~f prod~cmg threads o~ different 
flexibility and tensile strength and havmg these tested. ... King testified that he mstructed 
personnel at Spindletop to test the threads prod~ced b~ Werth an~ he then reported t? Werth o~ ~ 
results. ... Unquestionably the present rec<rd IS readily s~sceptlble of the ~onc1uslOn that. King s 
contribution to the WerthlKing patent was the conception of a general Idea and oversight of 
Werth's progress. It is clear that such a contribution may be insufficient to constitute inventorship. 
(citations omitted}." 
90 Alto CompanY y. Fish Manufacturin& Co., 116 USPQ 331 (D.NJ. 1957), aft'd per curiam 116 
USPQ 306 (CA 3rd Cir. 1958), per Forman, Chief Judge, at page 334. 
91 Al1wam CompanY y. JmIan 74 US 583 (US Sup. Ct 1868), at page 602 . 
92 MalPus Harmopica Com. y. LAPin Products. Ipc. 98 USPQ 94 (SO N.Y. 1953), per Conger, 
District Judge, at page 99, "Much of the defendant's argument under this phase has little merit. For 
example, that Magnus is not the inventor of the m~uld but rather Hugg, the mc:chanic ~ 
employed, is .... I do not thi~ any?ne will d~ny ~t an mvento~ may em~loy a mechanic to asSiSt 
him in applying his conceptions WIthout making him even a co-mventor. 
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2.3.4. A Proposed Defmition 
From a synthesis of the above three definitions and the discussion thereto, it may be 
possible to formulate a tighter defmition of joint inventorship as : 
"An invention shall be deemed to be jointly invented when two or more persons 
collaborated, either expressly or impliedly, to devise the patented invention, and through 
their mutual consultation and suggestions, contribute towards the complete inventive 
concept. An invention shall still be deemed to be a joint invention even though (1) the 
persons involved do not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each does not 
make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each does not make an equal 
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent. "93 
2.3.5. Effect of Misjoinder and Non-joinder 
Because the statutory scheme in the United States patent system requires that a patent 
should only be applied for by the inventor, the fact that a non-inventor has been joined in 
the application (a misjoinder) will result in any patent granted being declared void. 
Similarly, where one or more of several inventors have not been joined in the application (a 
non-joinder) the same avoidance of the issued patent will result. To alleviate the harshness 
of this rule, there are statutory provisions for corrections of errors leading to either a 
misjoinder or non-joinder.94 
93 The above definition would have the advantage of consistency with the Malaysian and UK statutory 
definition of work of joint authorship of copyright works. See, for example, Section 10(1), CDPA 
1988, UK, where a "work of joint authorship" is defined as "as a work produced by the 
collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from 
the contribution of the other author or authors." Under section 3, Copyright Act 1987, Act 332, 
Malaysia, "work of joint authorship" means "a work produced by the collaboration of two or more 
authors in which the contribution of each author is not separable from the contribution of the other 
author or authors." Note: The definition of joint authorship given in the Copyright Act 1956, UK, 
section 11(2), is the same except that "separate" is used instead of "distinct". Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright, 13th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991, page 153, note 1, observe that 
the word "distinct" was in fact used in the equivalent provision of the 1911 Act - s.I6(3), and that 
the dictionary definition of "distinct" is "separate". The concept of joint authorship in copyright 
law is best enunciated in Naima lkptuUa v. Orient Lonwmn Ltd & ors [1989] FSR 598 (H. Ct 
Delhi), per Mr Justice Kirpal, at pages 605-610. At page 608, the Judge said, "It would follow 
from the aforesaid that if two persons collaborate with each other and, with a common design, 
produce a literary work then they should be reganJed as joint authors", and at 609, "To me it 
appears that if there is intellectual contribution by two or more persons, pursuant to a pre-con~ 
joint design, to the composition of a literary work then those persons have to be regarded as J010t 
authors." See also, Stuart y. Barrett & Ors [1994] EMLR 448, per Thomas Morison, QC, sitting 
as Deputy H. Ct Judge, at pages 462-463. See generally, Copinger ~ Skone James on 
Copyright, 13th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991, at para. 7.2; Laddie, H., Prescott. P., 
Vitoria. M., The Modem Law of Copyright and Designs, 2nd Ed. Butterworths, London, 1995, at 
para. 11.22; Kbaw, L.T., Copyright Law of Malaysia. Butterworths, Malaysia. 1994, at para. 
5.1.1. 
94 See 35 USC section 116 (correction of error in naming inventor in patent application) and section 
256 (correction of error in naming inventor in granted patent). For the problems associated with the 
correction of errors for misjoinder or non-joinder, see Roth, D.A., and Luecke, J.E., "1be 
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In Malaysia, misjoinder will not be a ground for invalidation of the patent. This is because 
by virtue of section 18( 1) any person may make an application for a patent, either alone or 
jointly with another. There is no requirement that an inventor or all inventors must join in 
the application. Therefore, as long as the patent, or the right to apply for a patent, is owned 
by the rightful owner, the fact of misjoinder will be irrelevant. 
In the case of non-joinder, the Act merely provides in section 22 that where the right to 
obtain a patent is owned jointly, the patent may only be applied for jointly. Section 18(3) 
provides that where two or more persons have jointly made an invention, the right to a 
patent shall belong to them jointly. Breach of section 22 is not expressly made a ground for 
invalidation. If all the joint inventors have assigned the right to apply for a patent or a 
granted patent to a third party, or in an employment situation when the invention of the 
employees is deemed to belong to the employer, the fact of non-joinder in the initial 
application would not seem to be a ground for invalidation.95 This means that under the 
Malaysian scheme, a defendant is not able to rely on a purely technical defence of non-
joinder per se.96 
However, it is submitted that non-joinder will be fatal to Validity of the patent where it 
results in an inventor being deprived of the ownership (in this case, co-ownership) of the 
patent. Section 56(2)(d), which provides that the patent may be invalidated on the ground 
that the right to the patent does not belong to the person to whom the patent was granted, 
may be applicable in this situation. If the patent has not been granted to all the rightful 
owners, then it does not belong wholly to those who were granted it. It would appear from 
95 
96 
Misjoinder and Non-joinder Pitfalls," (1967) 49 JPOS 219. See also generally, Chisum, D.S., 
Patents, Matthew Bender, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, para. 2.04. 
See section 56(2)( d) and the proviso to section 56(2A) of the Act, and Chapter 7 - Exceptions, 
Limitations and Loss of Rights, para. 7.4.1. Note that unlike in the US, where the fact that the 
patent has been granted to a person who is not the inventor is a ground for a patent being declared 
void, it is different in the Malaysian context, where the ground is that the right to the patent does 
not belong to the person to whom the patent was granted. 
For the problems arising should this technical defence be allowed, see Bowtell, P.L., "The True 
and First Inventor", Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. LXXVI, Session 
1957-58, page C75, where he discusses the problems of identifying the proper inventors in the 
light of present day collaborative research. He is of the opinion that in some cases the invention 
could not be attributed to named individuals. In view of this it would be unrealistic and unfair to 
place upon the employer, who was beneficially entitled to the patent rights, the burden of 
nominating individual employee inventors, especially as there may be a risk of invalidity in the 
event of an inaccuracy or mistake. He suggests that it would be fairer to adopt the concept of a 
"corporate inventor" with reference to inventions arising out of the general developmental activities 
of a company rather than the personal initiative and work of one or more individuals. However. it 
has to be noted that his suggestion was made with reference to the situation under the 1949 Patents 
Act of the United Kingdom where it was a ground for revocation that a patent was obtained on a 
false suggestion or representation (section 32(j». Such a ground is no more available under the 
Patents Act, 1977. In Carter's Application (1932) 49 RPC 403, it was held that an application to 
which the true and flfSt inventor was not a party was void, and that the irregularity could not be 
cured by amendment, since an application in which the true and first inventor was not made a party 
was not an application within the statute - see the decision of the Assistant-Comptroller at page 
404. However. this was a decision under the Patents and Designs Act. 1907. Under section 1(1) of 
this statute, an application could only be made by a person claiming to be the true and first 
inventor, either alone or jointly with another person. 
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the provision that any aggrieved person is entitled to have a patent invalidated on this 
ground, not merely the person deprived of the initial ownership.97 If the patent, although 
not initially granted to the rightful persons, is then subsequently reassigned to all the 
rightful owners, this ground for invalidation would then be removed.98 This ground of 
invalidation, may, however, cause injustice because of the difficulty of determining the 
proper inventors where joint inventorship is involved. It is submitted that a fairer solution 
would be to allow such a ground, where joint inventorship is involved, to be used only by 
a non-joined inventor, and only in an entitlement proceedings under section 19. 
If there is a non-joinder leading to an inventor being deprived of his right as a joint owner, 
the deprived inventor should have the possibility of applying to the Registrar or Court for 
an order to assign the patent to all the persons previously granted the patent, together with 
the name of the inventor omitted. There is no specific provision in the Act to cover this 
eventuality. Section 19, mentioned earlier, does not seem to apply directly, being concerned 
with unlawful derivation of the essential element of the invention from the rightful owner. It 
is difficult to see how a non-joined inventor who has a claim for joint ownership of a patent 
can fit his claim under this section, since he may have collaborated in the conception of the 
invention but may not be able to identify a particular specific element which was contributed 
by him. A way out of this difficulty would be to add to the power of the court under section 
19 to enable it to deal with the question of entitlement to a patent application or patent in the 
case of joint inventorship and to give it the necessary power to give effect to the 
determination. 99 
A further addition to the Act may also be desirable to enable an inventor who has not been 
named as such in the application to apply to the court for a declaration that he is the inventor 
or one of the inventors. This will be particularly relevant in an employee invention which 
belongs to the employer. In this situation, the omitted employee will not be disputing 
ownership of the patent, he is interested in the statutory compensation available to him as an 
inventor. Under the Act as presently constituted, such an avenue is not available. It is 
proposed that a section similar to section 13 of the 1977 Patents Act be incorporated. 
97 Contrast the position under section 72(1)(b) of the 1977 UK Patents Act, which provides that the 
court or the comptroller may revoke a patent on the application of any person on the grounds, inter 
alia, that the patent was granted to a person who was not entitled to be granted that patent. 
However, by virtue of subsection (2) of that section, the application may only be made by a person 
found by the court or the comptroller, on a reference under section 37, to be entitled to be granted 
that patent. See Dolphin Showers Ltd and Bruetop v, farmiloe and Ors [1989] FSR I, per Aldous 
I., at pages 5-6. 
98 See section 56(2A) of the Act. 
99 To do justice between the parties and to ensure that a reasonable opportunity is given for the patent 
to be exploited should there be a demand for it, the power could be used to ~r ~at certain claims 
be deleted and that the non-joined inventor be allowed to file a new applicatIon for the deleted 
matters. Alternatively, the application is allowed to proceed, or the patent remains in the names of 
the original applicants, but subject to the non-joined inventor being given certain rights under the 
patent. For an idea of how the power may be exercised under the UK provisions, see Goddip gi 
Rep Die's J\mIliqtion [1996] RPC 141. 
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2.3.6. Must All the Claims Have the Same Inventive Entity? 
This issue has not been the subject of any judicial opinion in the United Kingdom. 1 00 
However, in Goddin and Rennie's Application, despite a fmding by the court that two of 
the claims in the patent application were devised by only one of the two named inventors, 
there was no mention in the decision of the possibility that this might result in the invalidity 
of the patent. Instead, an order was made that the patent should be granted in the name of 
one of the inventors, subject to the condition that the inventor who was responsible for 
these two claims be given an irrevocable exclusive licence with power to sub-licence under 
these two claims. 1 OlIn the United States two divergent approaches can be discerned. One 
view is that in an application or patent containing more than one claims, each claim must be 
the product of the same inventive entity.1 02 Failure to ensure that this is so may result in 
invalidity of the patent. On the other hand there are courts which refuse to follow this 
approach on the ground that there is no rule of law or practice that joint invention means 
that all claims in inventions must have the same inventive entity. Therefore, the fact that not 
all the joint inventors have combined their efforts as to each claim in the patent will not 
invalidate the patent if "no person was misled to his detriment; no undeserved priority date 
was obtained; the integrity of the processes of the Patent Office has not been compromised; 
and the ultimate resolution by the Patent Office as to the issuance of the patent in question is 
no more advantageous to the applicant than if the applicant had filed separate patents. In 
short, the 'error,' if any, is too technical and immaterial, as well as innocent, to warrant 
invalidating an otherwise valid patent." 1 03 In SmithKline Diagnostics. Inc. v. Helena Labs. 
Qm2., Judge Nies held that the "all claims" rule was not uniformly accepted as "the 
substantive law" before the 1984 Act and refused to hold that the patent in issue was invalid 
merely on that ground alone. 1 04 
In 1984, section 116 of USC 35 was amended. The amendments essentially repudiate the 
"all claims" rule. The section now provides that inventors may apply for a patent jointly 
100 Kirby, P., "The Claim-by-Claim Approach", Transactions of the Chartered Institute o~ P~tent 
Agents, Vol. LXXXIII, Session 1964-65, page C69, at p~ge C7~, argues. that every claIm 10 a 
patent should have the same inventorship as every other claIm ~d If th.e claImS are found not all to 
have identical inventorship, they should not appear together 10 a smgle patent. However, the 
authority he cites are all American cases and, as is discussed later, this is particularly important in 
the American context. 
101 Goddin and Rennie's AIlplication [1996] RPC 141 (Court of Session), per Lml Cullen, at pages 
172, 180-181. 
102 See, for example, Riyal Mfa. Co. y. Dazey P[oducls Co. 177 USPQ. 432 (W .D. Mo .. 1973), per 
Becker, Chief Judge, at page 439, applying DeLaski & 'I1lrcmP Carcular Woyen Tue Co. y. 
WilHam R. 'Ibroj!p & Sons Co. 218 F. 458, 464 (D.NJ. 1914), affirmed 226 F. 941, 947 (CA 
3rd. 1915).; 10 re Sarett 140 USPQ 474 (CCPA 1964), per Judge Rich, at page 479, footnote 7. 
See generally, Chisum, D.S., Patents, Matthew Bender, Vol. 1, chapter 2. 
103 See SAD Industri AD y. Bepdix Com. 199 USPQ 95 (B.D. Va. 1978), per Bryan, District Judge, 
at pages 104-105. 
104 SmitbKHoe Djapostics. Inc. y. Helena Labs. Coil). 8 USPQ2d 1468 (CAFC 1988), per Nics, 
Circuit Judge, at pages 1476-1477. 
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even though each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the 
patent. IOS 
The Malaysian Act is silent on this point, as is the 1977 Act of the United Kingdom. 
However, from the earlier analysis of the issues of misjoinder and non-joinder, it would 
seem that in most cases, no injustice is done when the same inventive entity is not involved 
in every claim of a patent. This is particularly so in the case of a joint invention made by 
employees, which under the Act, belongs to the employer. 
It is submitted that the same applies even in a non-employment situation where a particular 
claim or claims may be the result of an inventive entity which is different from the entity 
involved in the rest of the claims. If the various inventors have agreed to apply for the 
patent in their joint names, whether or not with the knowledge that some of the claims may 
be made by different inventive entities when compared with the rest of the claims, it has to 
be assumed that the various parties have agreed among themselves as to the right which this 
separate inventive entity should have in relation to the whole patent, taking into 
consideration the relative value of the contribution by this entity to the whole value of the 
patent. No harm is occasioned and it will not lead to a need to file separate application for 
the particular claim or claims in question. I 06 
It is only when one of the person in this separate inventive entity has not been joined in the 
patent application that it becomes problematic. This is because by virtue of his status as an 
inventor, he has the right to a patent, either solely if he is the sole inventor, or otherwise 
jointly with the other inventors. In the absence of any agreement, the only remedy would 
seem to be to seek invalidation of the patent under section 56(2)(b). By virtue of section 
56(3), the court in such a proceeding need not declare the whole patent invalid. It has the 
power to declare that only certain claims or parts of a claim are invalid. Hence, in the above 
example, the court may declare the part of the claim or claims alleged to be made by a 
separate inventive entity invalid. However, this may not be the desire, or to the advantage 
of that inventive entity. The proposed addition to section 19, discussed in para. 2.3.5., 
lOS See Appendix for the amendment See also Peame, J.F., "Must Each Inventor Named in a Joint 
Patent Application Have Made an Inventive Contribution to Each of the Claims Thereon", (1976) 
JPOS 205. For analyses of the effectiveness of the amendments, see, Carsten, D.W., "Joint 
Inventorship Under 35 USC 116", (1991) JPTOS 617; and Fasse, W.F., "The Muddy Metaphysics 
of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning up after the 1984 Amendments to 35 USC s. 116", 26 Intellectual 
Property L. Rev. 1994, 83. 
106 In this connection it is relevant to note the comments of Judge Rich in In re Sarett 140 USPQ 474 
(CCPA 1964), at page 479, footnote 7, "It should be clear that the patent could not legally contain 
a claim to Sarett's sole invention under existing law because it would not have been the invention 
of the joint patentees. This rule of law forces the filing of distinct applications in many situations 
resembling that before us and creates complexities and delays which could be avoided under a less 
rigid statute. " 
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supra, would enable the court in this situation to order a division of the claim or claims and 
a grant of a new patent to the separate inventive entity. 1 07 
2.4. Nature of Patents and Patent Rights 
There is no attempt at definition in the Act as to the nature of a patent.} 08 Similarly, while 
there are provisions pertaining to jointly owned patent, there is no indication as to how it is 
to be held by the co-owners or the amount of their respective shares. 109 The only previous 
Malaysian patent statute which had any mention of the nature of a patent was The 
Inventions Enactment, 1914, of the former Federated Malay States. Even then, reference to 
it was made indirectly .110 There was no mention in that Enactment of the type of holding 
held by the co-owners. However, it would seem from the words of the last part of section 
37 of this Enactment, "if any such person dies, his interest in the grant shall devolve on his 
legal representative", that the grant is held by them as tenants in common. This part of the 
provision seemed to have followed and was identical to that of section 37(1) of the 1907 
UK Act. The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, 1951 of Malaya, the Patents 
Ordinance, 1927 of Sarawak, and the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 
1937 of Sabah, the three patent legislation for the component territories of Malaysia prior to 
the 1983 Act, provided that the holder of a certificate of registration was conferred with the 
same rights and privileges similar in all respect to those conferred in the United 
107 
108 
109 
110 
See. for example. Viziball Ltd's Av.plication [1988] RPC 213 (entitlement proceedings under 
section 8 of the 1977 Act). where Whitford J .• at page 220. after finding that one of the claims in 
the application in suit (claim 10) was conceived wholly by the applicant. ordered that he be at 
liberty to have the subject matter of that claim excluded from the application. and that he be 
allowed to file a patent application for the subject matter of claim 10, such application having the 
original filing date of the application in suit. 
The definitions found in the statutes of the other jurisdictions are not very helpful either. In section 
13. Patents Act 1990. Australia, there is a mere allusion to it in section 13(2). which states that 
the exclusive rights given by a patent are personal property and are capable of assignment and of 
devolution by law. Section 30(1) of the 1977 Act provides that "Any patent or application for a 
patent is personal property (without being a thing in action) ... ". Section 261 of the United States 
statute simply provides that "Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property". 
A jointly owned patent can be held in two ways. by the owners holding it as joint tenants or as 
tenants in common. Before there can be a joint tenancy. the four unities must be present 'There 
must be unity of possession (each co-owner is as much entitled to possession of any part of the 
property as the other), unity of interest (the owners hold but ?ne es~te). unity of title (each of the 
holder must claim his title under the same document) and UOlty of time (the mterest of each owner 
must arise at the same time). In the case of tenancy in common, only unity of possession is 
required. Where property is held as a joint tenancy, on the death of one co-owner. his interest in the 
property vests in the surviving co-owner or owners. In the case of a tenancy in common, the share 
of the deceased vests in his personal representative. See generally, Burn, B.H .• Cheshire and Burn's 
Modem Law of Real Property. 15th Ed., Butterworths, London. 1994, at pages 213-243, am 
Tyler, B.L.G., and Palmer, N.B .• Crossley Vaines' Personal Property, 5th Ed., Butterworths, 
London. 1973. Chapter 5. 
See section 50(iii) of this Enactment which states. " ... Provided that any equities in respect of the 
grant may be enforced in like manner as in respect of any other moveable property" 
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Kid 1111' ng om. t IS arguable then that by 1949 at least, co-owners held their shares equally 
as tenants in common since this was statutorily provided by the 1949 Act of the United 
Kingdom,112 As far as the nature of the patent right is concerned, after the 1st of June, 
1978, when the Patents Act 1977 of the United Kingdom came into force, it would seem 
that a patent right is regarded in Malaysia as a form of personal property, but without being 
a chose in action. 1 13 
The Act refers to the owners as joint owners, but it is not clear whether the patent is to be 
held by them as joint owners as usually understood, i.e., as opposed to tenants in common, 
or loosely in the sense of co-owned property. There is nothing in the certificate of grant 
indicating one way or the other that the jointly owned patent is to be held in a certain way. 
Neither are there any words of severance in the certificate of grant. There is no positive 
indication in the Act which may show an intention that the co-owners are to hold as tenants 
in common and not as joint tenants. It is submitted, however, that the fact that the Act 
permits an owner separately to assign his share in the patent without the consent of the 
other co-owners might indicate that the intention of Parliament is that the shares are to be 
held in common. 
Since it is not clear from the present Act what the nature of the right granted by a patent is, 
or how it is meant to be held by the co-owners, would it be feasible to fall back on the 
common law position to assist in defining these rights? At common law there is wide 
acceptance that patent is a kind of property, but there is no complete agreement on what 
kind of property it is, except that it is a kind of personal property, and in the cases, various 
terms have been ascribed to it. 1 14 As to what is the interest initially held by the co-owners 
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By virtue of section 6, section 3 and section 8 respectively. For the background to these statutes, 
see Chapter 1. 
Under the 1949 and the 1977 Acts, it is expressly provided that each of the co-owners shall be 
entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent. See section 54 of the 1949 Act and section 36(1) 
of the 1977 Act. 
Section 30(1) of the 1977 Act provides that "Any patent or application for a patent is personal 
property (without being a thing in action) ... " Terrell on the Law of Patents 13th Ed., 1982, states 
at page 252, that now that it is specifically provided that a patent is not a chose in action it must 
be doubtful whether the proposition stated in British Mutosco.pe and Biomdt Co. v Homer. 
(1901) 18 RPC 177, that a patentee's right, being merely that of preventing others from working 
his invention, was a chose in action, and was incapable of seizure under a writ of fieri facias, is 
still correct. According to C.I.P.A Guide to the Patents Act, 3rd edition, at page 256, subsection 
(1) reverses the position at common law under which "existing patents" were regarded as choses (or 
things) in action. For that reason the formerly granted "Le~rs Patents" could not be se~ in 
execution of a writ of fieri !aciDs <British Mutoscope and BIOwaph Co. y Homer). but this may 
now be possible. 
See, for example, the following attempts at defining it: Buckley L.J., in Edwards &: Co. y. Pjcard 
[1909] 2 K.B. 903, at pages 909-910, "A patent has been described as an incorporeal chattel. I am 
not sure what legal qualities are involved in that description. The legal qualities of a patent are, not 
that it confers upon the patentee a right to manufacture, for that he could do without a patent, but 
that it gives him a monopoly in the manufacture. It creates in him a right of action to prevent any 
one else manufacturing. It creates in him a right to bring an action for infringement with resultant 
remedy by way of injunction, or damages, or both. This right is a legal right."; Vaughan Williams 
L.J .• in &lward1 &: Co. y. Pjgml [1909] 2 K.B. 903. at 90S, "Now, wbat is the right of the 
patentee? It is a chose in action, ... and entirely distinct from the right of property in a chattel 
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on the granting of the patent, the authorities are divided on this point. National Society for 
the Distribution of Electricib' by Secondary Generators v. Gibbs l15 contains a reasoned 
opinion on the very issue of the type of holding held by the co-owners. There a patent was 
jointly held by Gibbs and Gaulard who agreed to assign it to the plaintiffs. Gaulard died 
before the patent was assigned. In an action by the plaintiffs, Gaulard's administratrix 
argued that she was not a proper party to the action. The plaintiffs argued that the words of 
the grant did not of themselves suggested joint ownership and if anything, they suggested 
that the owners were tenants in common. Further, it was argued that a tenancy in common 
was the logical conclusion and joint ownership was an unjust conclusion. This being so, 
and the patent being a most unusual type of personal property, the law as to the more 
conventional personal property should not be applied to patents. The court, however, held 
that as the right or privilege granted by letters patent was for all purposes regarded as 
property, and the grant was to two persons, their executors, administrators, and assigns, 
only a joint interest was created. Therefore, Gibbs took the whole interest by survivorship, 
and Gaulard's administratrix was not a proper party to the action. 
In contrast to this, it has been consistently held in the United States that joint owners held 
the patent as tenants in commons. Judge Seaman in Drake v. Hall declared that "the rule is 
elementary that each of these patentees was vested with an undivided half interest therein, 
created under it; and the patentee's right under the patent, being a chose in action, cannot be taken 
under a fi.fa., or levari facias, since it has no locality, and therefore cannot be found upon the 
premises."; Farwell, J, in British Mutoscope and BioWlph Co. v. Homer (1901) 18 RPC 177, at 
pages 179-180, "Now a patent right is a privilege granted by the Crown ... and is described ... as 
an incorporeal chattel. I should be disposed to classify it myself as a chose in action; which has 
been defined to be a right to be asserted, or property reducible into possession either by action at 
law or suit in equity... I refer to the common form of a patent ... Now this grant necessarily 
confers a right to bring an action to restrain infringement and to recover damages. At any rate, it is 
not a chose in possession. But a chose in action cannot be found upon the demised premises; it has 
no locality, and is incapable of manual seizure, and this is borne out by the fact that for this reason 
choses in action could not at common law be taken in execution under a writ of fi fa. ... or of 
levari facias. "; Yose y. Sinl:er (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 226, at 230, "A patent right is a chattel 
interest."; per Justice Gray in Watennan y. MacKenzie 138 U.S. 252, at 260; 34 L. Ed. 923 at 927 
(US Sup. Ct 1891), "A patent right is incorporeal property, not susceptible of actual delivery or 
possession". See also the interesting article by Brodhurst, S., "Is Copyright a Chose in Action?" 
(1894) 11 LQR 64, where he notes that the various kinds of property classified as choses in action 
"are so different in their nature and legal incidents, that care must be taken not to be misled by 
giving them all a common name which conceals their differences" (quoting Lindley L.I., in 
Colonial Bank y. Wbinney 30 Ch. D. 284). He cautions that an attempt to identify the division of 
property into choses in action and choses in possession, with the division into things corporeal and 
things incorporeal could only lead to confusion. Therefore, copyrights and patent rights, if they 
must be classed as property at all, should be classed under the head of property in constructive 
possession. Cyprian Williams, T, "Property, Things in Action and Copyright", (1895) 11 LQR 
223, however, disagrees with him and maintains that if copyrights and patents were to be 
classified. they should be classified as choses in action rather than choses in possession, the right 
being to a duty of forbearance, enforceable only by action. It ~s surpriSing that after the. 1977 Act 
when a patent has been specifically declared not to be a chose 10 acbon. some authors still refer to 
it as a chose in action. See for example, Lawson, F.H. and Rudden, B .• The Law of Property, 2nd 
Ed. 1982, Clarendon Press. Oxford. at page 33 and Bridge, M., Personal Property Law, Blackstone 
Press Limited. London. 1993. at page 4. 
11 S National Society for the Distributiop of Electricity by SecondaJy Generators y. Gibbs [1899] 2 Ch. 
289, p,r Cozens-Hardy J., at pages 299-300. 
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creating the relation between them of co-tenants for all benefits of the grant, so that each 
became entitled to use thereof without accountability to the other co-tenant. " 116 
It is clear from the above that there is no consistent approach as to the nature of patent 
rights. For the sake of clarity, there should be an express provision as to the nature of such 
rights in the Act. A clarification of the nature of patent rights and the type of holding is 
important because in the case of co-ownership taking the form of a joint tenancy, the 
ownership rights of a joint tenant descend on death to the other joint tenant(s). In contrast to 
this right of survivorship, each tenant in common, while sharing possession of the whole, 
owns only his share of the whole, which on death goes to his next of kin. This will also 
facilitate dealing in the patent rights. Further, leaving the nature of the rights to be 
determined by common law principles may result in even more uncertainties. 1 17 As has 
long been recognised by the courts grappling with this issue, patent rights are special in 
nature and it is not desirable nor proper to define them by reference to other types of 
personal property. Such a comparison will not be productive. So the solution is to provide 
a statutory definition of the property in a patent, listing the attributes that are possessed, 
instead of leaving it to the courts to grapple with the problem of deciding on its nature and 
the dealings which it can be applied to. It is well to take heed of the comments of Lindley 
LJ. in Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 118 where he said, "Though debts, money in the funds, 
shares in companies, copyright and patents are all incorporeal personal property, they are 
so different in their nature and legal incidents, that care must be taken not to be misled by 
giving them all a common name which conceals their difference. We all know that our law 
has not been put into a very scientific shape, and there is often considerable difficulty in 
determining in what sense a particular expression, such as 'chose in action', is used." 
It is, therefore, proposed that a provision be added to the Act defIning the nature of patent 
rights. In framing a statutory definition of the nature of patent rights, it is also desirable to 
provide for the patents of a judgement debtor to be subject to the ordinary process of 
116 Qrake v, Hall 220 F. 905 (CCA, 7th Cir. 1914), per Seaman, Circuit Judge, at page 906. See also 
Talbot et aJ. V. Quaker-State Oil RefinipK Company 41 USPQ 1 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1939), per 
Kirkpatrick. District Judge, at page 2. "Property in patents, however, is of a peculiar character and, 
while the theory of separate and distinct undivided interest is preserved, there is actually a mu~h 
closer interrelationship between the rights of co-owners and a much nearer approach to substanual 
identity of interests than with tangibles or ordinary choses in action."; McDuffee v· HestoPville. 
M. & F. Pass. Ky. Co. 162 F. 36 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1908); 23 US 719; 56 L. Ed. 629 (1911) 
certiorari denied. per Buffington, Circuit Judge. at page 38, "Patents ~ personal pr~perty ... and ... 
[t]he privileges granted by letters patent are plainly an instance of an lDCOrporeal kind of personal 
property. which. as personalty. in the absence of context to the c.ontrary. would go to the executor 
or administrator in trust for the next of kin. De La Yerane MacblQe Co, v, Featherstope. 147 U.S. 
209. 222. 37 L. Ed. 138." 
117 For an interesting account of the problems of applying traditional property law concepts to 
intellectual property transactions. see Anderson. M .• "Applying Traditional Property Law to 
Intellectual Property Transactions." [1995] 5 EIPR 236. 
118 Colopial Bapk y. WhiPE (1885) 30 Ch.D 261. per Lindley LJ .• at page 284. 
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execution.119 A right should be given to the receiver to sue for infringement if the owner 
refuses to sue and also to work the patent if the patent has not been worked or to conclude 
licence contracts if necessary. As pointed out in the dissenting judgement of Fletcher 
Moulton L.J.,120 not giving such a right would cause injustice when a judgement debtor is 
determined not to pay his judgement debt. Notice can be given to the Registrar of Patents 
for such impediment to the patents to be made known to the public. 
2.5. Common Law Rights of Co-owners 
The relationship of co-owners of a patent is not a relationship between partners. The mere 
fact of the co-owners holding property in common does not make them partners. 121 This is 
in line with the statutory rules for the determination of whether a partnership exists between 
co-owners of property. The mere fact of common ownership of property or the sharing of 
gross profits from a co-owned property in itself does not constitute a partnership.122 
Therefore, the rights of duties between co-owners of a patent will have to be sought 
elsewhere than in the rules relating to partnership. I 23 
The theory underlying patent rights is important since it gives rise to several common law 
rules regulating the rights of co-owners inter se in the absence of agreement, which rights 
have now mainly been codified in patent statutes. Two theories about the nature of patent 
rights have been enunciated by the courts in the various jurisdictions, the "exclusion" 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Contrast the judgement in Edwards & Co. v. Picard [1909] 2 K.B. 903. where an application for 
the appointment of a receiver. by way of execution. of all rents. profits. and moneys receivable in 
respect of the defendant's interest in the patents was rejected - per Vaughan Williams L.J .• at pages 
905-906. and per Buckley L.l. pages 909-911. 
EdWards & Co. y. Picard [1909] 2 K.B. 903. per Fletcher Moulton L.J .• at pages 906-908. 
See. for example. the following comments: Vose v. Sin&er 4 Allen (Mass.) 226. 230. "It is not 
and cannot be contended that these parties are co-partners; but the idea of mutual contribution for 
profits and losses would require even more than co-partnership. Nothing short of the relation of 
stockholders in a joint-stock company would meet the exigencies of parties whose interests may be 
thus transferred and subdivided."; Pitts v. Hall 19 F. Cas. 758 (CC NO N.Y .• 1854). per Hall. 
District Judge at page 760. "In the case of joint patentees. where no agreement of co-partnership 
exists. the relation of copartners certainly does not result from their connection as joint patentees; 
and. when one joint owner of a patent transfers his undivided interest to a stranger. the assignee 
does not become the partner of his co-proprietor. In both cases. the parties interested in the patent 
are simply ioint owners. or tenants in common. of the rights and property secured by the patent; 
and their rights, powers. and duties, as respects each other. must be substantially those of the joint 
owners of a chattel.; and Drake y. Hall 220 F. 905 (CCA 7th Cir. 1914). per Seaman. Circuit 
Judge, at page 906, "Under such grant the rule is elementary that each of these patentees was vested 
with an undivided half interest therein. creating the relation between them of co-tenants for all 
benefits of the grant. so that each became entitled to use thereof without accountability to the other 
co-tenant. No relation of co-partnership is involved in such ownership. " 
See section 4, Partnership Act 1961 (Revised 1974), Malaysia. As to the rules on ascertaining the 
existence of a partnership and the rights and duties between partners inter set see generally, rAnson 
Banks, R.C., Lindley &: Banks on Partnership, 17th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell. London, 1995, 
Chapter 5 and Part 4 respectively. 
As to the possibility that a patent owned by a partner. that is used in a ~ership may, give the 
other partner a licence to use the patent afta" the expuy of the partnership, see KeDDY s Patent 
Button-HoldiDI Co, Ltd V, Sommerville" Iptw,yshc; (1878) 38 LT (NS) 878. 
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theory, and what, for want of a better term, can be tenned the "whole unit" theory. Under 
the "exclusion" theory, a patent is viewed as a right to exclude others from the right to 
make, use and sell the patented invention. It is only by virtue of a patent grant that the 
grantee has the right to prevent others from exploiting the invention. The grant does not 
give a positive right to the use of the invention. Such a right already exists at common law. 
Because of this right of exclusion, one co-owner can not exclude other co-owners from the 
use of the patent. This is because the grant allows the grantee to exclude others but not 
another co-owner. Therefore, each co-owner has the right to use the patent for his own 
benefit. 124 Under the "whole unit" theory, however, the grant of the patent is regarded as a 
grant to the patentees jointly and not to each one of them severally. Therefore, the 
enjoyment of the rights under the patent could only be exercised by all the patentees jointly. 
This would mean that any exercise of the rights without the full consent of all the owners, 
for example, by the grant of a licence by one owner, would give the other owners a right of 
action against him.12S However, the "whole unit" theory has not found favour with the 
courts in the United States,126 and it does not seem to have been canvassed before the 
124 
125 
126 
See Mathers v. Green LR 1 Ch. App. 29 (1865), per Lord Cranworth L.C., at page 33, "The 
letters patent grant to the three, their executors, administrators, and assigns, that they and every of 
them by themselves, their servants and agent, or such others as they may agree with, and on no 
others, shall, for the term of fourteen years, use, exercise, and vend the said invention. The rights 
conferred is a right to exclude all the world other than the grantees from using the invention. But 
there is no exclusion in the letters patent of anyone of the patentees. The inability of anyone of 
the patentees to use the invention, if any such inability exits, must be sought elsewhere than in 
the letters patent. But there is no principle, in the absence of contract, which can prevent any 
persons not prohibited by statute from using any invention whatever." In the United States, see, 
for example, Talbot et aI. v. Quaker-State Qil Refinin& Company 41 USPQ 1 (CCA 3rd Cir. 
1939), per Kirkpatrick, District Judge, at pages 2-3, "In its essence all that the Government confers 
by the patent is the right to exclude others from making , using or vending the invention (Crown 
Die and Tool Co. y. Nye Tool and Machine Works 261 US 24, 35 (US Sup. Ct 1922), and as to 
this essential attribute of the property each joint owner is in a very real sense at the mercy of the 
other. Each of them may use or license others to use the invention without the consent of his 
fellows, and without responsibility to such fellows for the profits arising from such use or 
licence." 
See Pitts y. Hall 19 F. Cas. 758 (CC NO N.Y. 1854), per Hall, District Judge, at page 761. 
See, for example, Lalance & Grosjean Mfi. Co. v. National Enamellioe & Stampine Co. 108 F. 
77 (CC S.D.N.Y. 1901), per Coxe, District Judge, at pages 77-78, "The complainant contends ... 
[flirst, that the St. Louis Company could not convey to the defendant the right to make, use and 
vend without the consent of the complainant; ... The first of these propositions has never been 
directly passed upon by the Supreme Court, but the overwhelming weight of authority in this 
country and in England is against the view asserted by the complainant. ~ b~t one autho~ty 
is cited in its support, Pitts V. Hall, 3 Blatchf. 201, Fed. Cas. No. 11,193, decided ID 1854, which 
has never, so far as the court has been able to ascertain, been followed in a carefully considered 
case. It is not thought that the learned judge ... intended to express a definitive opinion upon the 
question now under discussion. He considered the question an open one, but disposed of the motion 
upon other reasoning, which, at that stage of the litigation, ap~ to be unanswerable: ~ 
authorities supporting the defendant's contention are too numerous to Cite, but the argument ID Its 
support will be found sufficiently stated in the follo~ing: (citation omitted) .:. See, also, the recent 
and well-considered case of Blaclded&e y. Maoufactunne Co. 108 Fed. 71. It IS thought that a rule 
so generally recognised will not be disturbed, but in any view it is too finnly establis~ and has 
been enforced for too long a period to be disregarded by this court." The case of Hemn, y. OM 
Consumer's AssociatioQ 9 F. 556 (CC E.D. Missouri 1878), which purported to distinguish fini 
y, Hall. seems to lend support to the "whole unit" theory - see Treat, District Judge, at pages 55~ 
SS7 where he held that even though the defendant co-owner had, by virtue of the joint ownership. 
the 'right to use the patent, but. he had no righ~ more ~an a stranger, to in~n~ the same. 
1berefore, the claim by the plaintiff co-owner for his proportion of the damages for IDfringement of 
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United Kingdom courts. Therefore, the weight of authority is in favour of the "exclusion" 
theory, with all its implications as will be discussed below. However, it is interesting to 
note here that even though both patent and copyrights are exclusive rights, and even though 
the use by one co-owner might devalue the rights, whether it be patent or copyright, yet the 
courts have evolved different rules regarding the right to exploit them without the consent 
of the other co-owners for copyrights. 1 27 
Vose v. Singer128 contains the most defmitive statement of the relation between co-owners. 
The parties to that suit were the half owners of a patent. In considering whether the 
defendants should account to the plaintiffs for a share of profits made from the sales of the 
patented article, the court rejected as unsatisfactory the analogies supposed to be found in 
the joint ownership of real estate and the various species of personal property. Although a 
tenancy in common or part ownership in it is much like a tenancy in common or part 
ownership of other personal property, the use of a patent right is different from the use of 
any other property, and, therefore, it is not safe to follow the rules adopted in regard to the 
mutual liabilities of part owners of other types of personal property. The part owners must 
be regarded as having interests which are distinct and separate in their nature, though they 
are derived from the same contract, and having such interests, with the right to use them 
separately, they cannot for any legal use of them incur any obligation to each other. None 
of the co-owner has the right to control or exercise any supervision over the action of the 
other co-owner. 
127 
128 
their common patent was allowed. However, this is a strange decision, containing, as such, a 
contradiction in terms, and was rightly criticised in Bell & Howell Co. y. Bliss 262 F. 131 (CCA 
7th Cir. 1919), at page 136 as "not at all persuasive" and "difficult to comprehend". 
See the contrasting approach of the court under copyright law. In Cescinsky v. Routled&e and 
Sons. Ltd [1916] 2 KB 325, the court held that notwithstanding that the defendants were part 
owners of the copyright in the plaintiffs book, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to 
restrain the defendants from infringing that copyright - per Rowlatt J., at pages 329-330, "But it is 
contended that the defendants as co-owners are entitled to use the property subject to accounting to 
the plaintiff in some way not easy to a~ply in respect of part o.f the profits. I. think ~s con~nti~n 
is negatived by the words of the Copynght Act, 1911. By section 2, subsectlon (1), Copynght 10 
a work shall be deemed to be infringed by any person who. without the consent of the owner of the 
copyright, does anything the sole right to do which is by this Act conferred 0!l the .o~er of the 
copyright' .... Therefore, a reproduction without the ~o~sent of all the owners IS an I~ngemen.t, 
and I do not see why one co-owner is not as much within the statute as a stranger. I think that this 
was really laid down by Sir George Jessel in Powell y. fIrad (1879) 12 Ch.D .. 686: upon 
practically identical words in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15. Apart, however, from the statute, If this were 
not so, a part owner would be at the mercy of his co-o~n~rs. each of whom, and they might ~ ~y 
number, might issue as many, as large, and as cheap editlons as he chose, thus ~ompletely rwrung 
the value of the copyright In my opinion, the old common law rule as to the nght of a co-owner 
to use the common property has no appli~a~?n to such. a pro~ as. a ~op~ght. It see~ to" me 
that a sole right of reproducing, though diVISible as to title, mIght be IndiVISible as to exercise. 
yose y. Sjn&C3' (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 226, at page 230. Note that this conclusion was arrived at 
despite the recognition that one part owner may so exploit the patent as to appropriate the whole 
value of the patent to himself, or to render it valueless, for the court also recognised the possibility 
that his exploitation of it may, on the other hand greatly enhance the value of the whole patent. 
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By the time of the 1907 Act of the United Kingdom, there was a provision regulating in 
some measures the rights of co-owners. I 29 However, except for the Inventions Enactment, 
1914 of the Federated Malay States, I 30 none of the other Malaysian patent enactments prior 
to the 1983 Act provided for the allocation of right between co-owners. The Registration of 
United Kingdom Patents Act, 1951, and its predecessors, merely provided that the rights 
conferred by a certificate of registration were privileges and rights similar in all respects to 
those conferred by the issue of the patent in the United Kingdom. 1 3 1 
Therefore, in theory, three different sets of rights applied to regulate the rights between 
joint owners of patents issued before the coming into force of the 1983 Act in 1986. The 
first would be the common law rights as enunciated by the courts and the second those 
statutorily laid down by virtue of section 54 of the Patents Act, 1949, and lastly, those 
provided under section 36 of the 1977 Act of the United Kingdom. However, the 
provisions of the 1949 and the 1977 Acts are similar, and are substantially statutory 
enactment of the common law rights. I32 Therefore, to fully appreciate the rights of co-
owners before and after the 1983 Act comes into force and to determine whether any 
changes should be made, the common law rights need to be examined. 
2.5.1. Common Law Right to Sue Separately 
Flowing from the "exclusion" theory and the theory that each co-owner holds his share 
separate and distinct from the other co-owners, the courts have held that one owner can 
institute an infringement suit against infringers without the consent of, or the need to join, 
the other co-owners. In Sheehan v. Great Eastern Railway Co. ,133 the plaintiff sued the 
defendants for an account of profit made by them, and for royalties alleged to be due from 
them for the use of a patent taken out by the plaintiff. The defendants objected that the 
plaintiff could not sue alone and that he ought to have made his co-owners parties to the 
action. The court held, however, that a person interested in a patent was entitled to sue, 
129 Patents and Designs Act 1907, United Kingdom, section 37(1) which provided that subject to any 
contract to the contrary, each co-owner was entitled to use the invention for his own profit, 
without accounting to the others, but was not entitled to grant a licence without their consent. 
130 The Inventions Enactment, Law No. 19, 1914, Federated Malay States. Section 37 - Subject to the 
express terms of the grant, where after the commencement of this Enactment, a grant is made to 
two or more persons jointly, each of such persons shall, subject to any contract to the contrary, be 
entitled to use the invention for his own profit without accounting to the others but shall not be 
entitled to grant a licence without their consent, and, if any such person dies, his interest in the 
grant shall devolve on his legal representative. This provision is in all respect similar to the 
provision of section 37( 1) of the Patents and Designs Act 1907, of the United Kingdom. 
131 See Chapter I - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.4. 
132 For the provisions of section 36 of the Patents Act 1977, see Appendix. 
133 Sheehan y. Oreat Ba§fCm RaHway Co. (1880-1881) 16 Ch. D. 59, per Malin, V.C., at pages 62-
63, relying on Mr Justice Lindley's book on Partnership (4th Ed., Vol. I, pp 68,69), Dept y. 
Turpin 2 J. & H. 139 (trade marks case). 
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without making his co-owners parties to the action.l 34 In Turner v. Bowman,135 the 
plaintiff, one of two co-owners of a patent, was able to proceed in his infringement suit 
without any objection, although an inquiry as to damages was ordered to be stood over in 
order that all the co-owners could be before the court. On the other hand, in the earlier case 
of Smith v. The London & North Western Railway Co. ,136 the court held that where two 
persons were tenants in common of a patent, and if one of the co-owner died, actions for 
infringements committed in the deceased's lifetime survived to the surviving co-owner, 
since the right of action was a joint one. It may be assumed that after Sheehan, this case is 
no more good law. 
The opposite approach, however, seems to be adopted in the United States. The rationale 
for it is explained in Willingham. et al, v. Lawton. et al, ,137 where the principal issue was 
whether the owner of a two-thirds undivided interest in a patent could maintain an action for 
infringement without the voluntary joinder of the other co-owner. The court gave three 
reasons for the rule that all co-owners should be joined in a patent infringement suit, i. e. , 
the interest of a co-owner in being able to licence third-parties under his or her patent 
without harassing suits by other co-owners; the interest of a co-owner in avoiding the 
estoppel effect of a judgement declaring the patent invalid in which he or she did not 
participate; and the interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple suits concerning 
infringement of the same patent. The court, however, held that co-owners could, by 
contract, waive their rights to be joined as co-plaintiffs. As to the right to recover damages, 
it would appear that each co-owner is only entitled to recover damages in proportion to the 
share of the patent owned by him.I38 
134 Note that for the defendants, it was argued that it was stated in the claim that the plaintiff lui 
parted with shares in the patent to several persons, and the utmost claim that he had amounted to 
no more than one-sixth of the patent, the other five-sixth of the patent having been parted with. If 
the plaintiff now succeeded in obtaining any royalties for the use of his invention, they would not 
belong to him, but to others as well, who would be obliged to take proceedings to recover the 
amount of the shares due to them, and if the plaintiff should not succeed in getting a decree, then 
the owners of the other five-sixth would be able to proceed against the defendants. They were, 
therefore, liable to be harassed by other persons who were not before the court. Hence, they argued 
that the action was not properly constituted, and that all the persons interested in the patent ought 
to be made parties. 
135 Turner y. Bowman (1924) 42 RPC 29, per Astbury J., at page 41. 
136 Smith y. The London & North Western Railway Co. (1853) Macr 203, at 207 (6 HPC 926, at 
930), per Lord Campbell, "The right of action could not be split in half by the representatives of 
Willey and Smith. The rule is this, that although their interest in the corpus of the property is 
separate, yet the cause of action in respect of it is joint and survives to the survivor." 
137 WiJJiOKham. et al, y. Lawton. et al, 194 USPQ 249 (CA 6th Cir. 1977), per Phillips, Chief 
Judge, at pages 252-253. 
138 However, in Smith y. The LondoP & North Western Railway Co. (1853) Macr 203; 6 HPC 926, 
the court held that where two persons were tenants in common of a patent assigned to them, and if 
one of the co-owner died, actions for infringements committed in the deceased's lifetime survived to 
the surviving co-owner., who was entitled at law to recover the whole damage. See Lord Campbell. 
Macr 203. at 207 (6 HPC 926, at 930). 
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2.5.2. Common Law Right to Assign 
There does not seem to be any reported case in the United Kingdom concerning the right of 
a co-owner to assign his share of the patent without the consent of the other co-owners. 
Most of the cases reported seem to have proceeded on the assumption that such a right did 
exist.139 Dunnicliff & anor v. Mallet 140 seems to be the fIrst case where the issue of 
whether it was possible to assign a part of the patent arose. However, it has to be noted that 
the issue there was not whether a co-owner could assign a part of his share of a jointly held 
patent, but whether a sole owner could assign a part of the patent held by him. The court 
held that the partial assignment was valid and that an assignee of a separate and distinct part 
of a patent was entitled to sue for an infringement of such part, without joining in such 
action persons who were interested only in the other part of the patent. Similarly, Walton v. 
Lavater141 is also concerned with the question of the divisibility of a patent originally held 
by a sole owner. The defendant, the patentee, assigned a moiety of the patent to the plaintiff 
at one time, and the remaining moiety to a third person at another time. The plaintiff, having 
afterwards acquired, by assignment, such remaining moiety, was held entitled to sue the 
defendant for a subsequent infringement without giving him previous notice of such last 
assignment. 
The nearest case to the issue at hand is the case of Horsley & Knighton's Patent,142 where 
it was held that neither of two joint patentees was entitled to cause to be made in the register 
of proprietors any entry which purported to affect or prejudice the rights of the other. There 
was no discussion on whether an assignment by one co-owner of his own share without 
the consent of the others was valid, although it seems implicit in the decision that such an 
assignment was valid. 
The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1883, of the United Kingdom for the fIrst time 
provided that a patentee may assign his patent for any place in or part of the United 
Kingdom, or Isle of Man, as effectually as if the patent were originally granted to extend to 
139 See, for example, Hall v. Conder (1857) 140 ER 318, and Sheehan v. Great Eastern RaHway Co. 
(1880-1881) 16 Ch. D. 59. 
140 Dunnic1iff &. anor y. Mallet 29 L.l.C.P 70 (1859), per Earle C.l., at pages 73-74. However, as 
observed by Terrell, T. and Terrell, C., The Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for 
Invention, 8th Ed., Edited by lones, I.R., Sweet &. Maxwell, London, 1934, at page 274, this case 
was decided in the days before patents were limited to single inventions where it was not 
uncommon for distinct portions of the patent rights to be assigned, i.e., the monopoly with respect 
to one or more of several inventions covered by the patent, and in such a case the assignee could 
grant licence as to, and sue in respect of, his part of the patent without reference to the owner of 
the other part - citing Dunnicliff &. anor y. Mallet 29 L.I.C.P 70 (1859). In fact, it would seem 
that it was only in 1949 when unity of invention was made a statutory requirement - see section 
4(4), Patents Act, 1949, United Kingdom. 
141 Walton y. LaY'," 29 L.l.C.P. 275 (1860), per Earle C.I., at page 278, relying on Dunnjcliff &. 
IDOf y, Mallet 29 L.I.C.P 70 (1859). Keating J., at page 279, and Byles J., at page 280, deliwzed 
concurring opinions. 
142 Hopley &. KniabtQP's Patent (1869) 8 L.R. Eq. 47S, see Lord Romilly M.R., at page 477. 
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that place or part only.l43 However, there was no reference made to part assignment of the 
whole right, nor as regards whether co-owners could assign their shares in the patent 
without consent. 
Pitts v. Hall is the fIrst case in the United States where this point was raised. The court 
ventured an opinion, which was expressly not intended to be definitive, that it was not 
possible for a co-owner to dispose of his share of the co-owned patent without the consent 
of the others)44 However, it is now settled that a share of the patent can be assigned 
without permission. For example, in Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enamelling 
& Stamping Co. ,145 a patent which was originally granted to one Hubert Claus was 
assigned to the complainant plaintiff and the St. Louis Stamping Company, each holding a 
half interest in the patent. The St. Louis Stamping Company later assigned its half interest 
to some other parties who duly assigned it to the defendant. When sued for infringement, 
the defendant asserted its right to use the patent by virtue of its half interest in the patent. 
The plaintiff contended that the assignment to the defendant was invalid since the 
assignment was made without its consent. This contention was, however, rejected by the 
court, holding that the overwhelming authority was that such consent was not required. 
Similarly, in the Canadian case of Forget v. Specialty Tools of Canada Inc. ,146 the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the co-owner of a patent may assign his 
whole interest in the patent without the concurrence of any other co-owner. However, the 
interest of the co-owner can not be subdivided into two or more parts, nor may it be 
licensed without the concurrence of all the owners of the patent. This is because the 
subdivision of an interest in the patent by a co-owner can lead to unfair results and chaotic 
situations. Further, if one co-owner is entitled to license a patent the situation would be that 
a number of licences could be created thereby destroying the value of the patent of his co-
owners. The court distinguished the case of Marchand v. PeloQuin,147 on the ground that 
the case could have been decided under the alternative ground of contract law. 
143 Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, section 36. A similar provision was present in the 
proviso to section 14 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907, United Kingdom and the proviso to 
section 21(1) of the Patents Act, 1949. However, this provision is absent in the 1977 Acts. For 
the difficulties in the application of this section see Carpmael, W., "On the 36th Section of the 
Patents Act, 1883", Transactions of the Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. ill, Session 1884-5, page 
175. 
144 Pitts y. Hall 19 F. Cas. 758 (CC NO New York, 1854), per Hall, District Judge, at page 760. The 
judge expressly cautioned that since the issue had not been discussed by any writers or in any 
reported case, his reflection on it was to be without prejudice should he later felt inclined to a 
different opinion. 
14S Lalance & Qro§jean Mfa. Co. y. National Enamelline & Stampioe Co. 108 F. 77 (CC S.D. New 
York, 1901), per Coxe, District Judge, at page 77. 
146 Poteet y. SpecialLY Tools of Can"'" Inc. [1993] 48 CPR (3d) 323 (Sup. Ct of British Columbia), 
per Rowan J., at pages 638-642, applying Mathers y. Green LR 1 Ch, App. 29 (1865) and ~ 
y. Roi"S (1893) 10 RPC 245 (HL). 
147 Marclumd y. PelOQuin [1978] 45 CPR (2d) 48 (Quebec Court of Appeal). The headnote of the C3e 
is in English but the report is in French. From the headnote it would appear that the opinion of the 
court was that a patent confened a negative right in the sense that it conferred a right to exclude 
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2.5.3. Common Law Right to Exploit 
Under the common law, each co-owner has the right to exploit the patent for his own use 
without the consent of the other co-owners. This was so held in Mathers v. Green, 148 
where on appeal, the decision by the Master of the Rolls declaring that the plaintiff was 
entitled to an equal share of the profits derived by the defendant joint owner was overruled. 
Lord Cranworth L.C. held that in the absence of any contractual provisions to the contrary, 
the defendant had the right to exploit the patented invention without having to account for 
the profits to the other co-owner . This was because the rights conferred by a patent was a 
right to exclude all the world other than the grantees from using the invention. However, 
there was no exclusion in the letters patent of anyone of the patentees.149 The principle 
enunciated in Mathers v. Green was approved and followed by the House of Lords in 
Steers v. Rogers,150 where the court stressed that a patent, unlike other chattels, was 
merely a right to exclude others from using it without the consent of the owner. However, 
even though a co-owner can exploit the patent without consent, he must do it personally or 
through an agent and not through an independent contractor. This principle was laid down 
in the case of Howard & Bullough v. Tweedales & Smalley. 151 
others from the area of the patent. Therefore, co-owners had rights which would normally be 
exercised together or at least for their joint benefit. The court disapproved of the English cases of 
Mathers v. Green LR 1 Ch. App. 29 (1865) and Steers v. ROl'ers (1893) 10 RPC 245 (HL) to the 
effect that the practical consideration of these cases was that any other conclusion would permit one 
patentee to prevent the use of the invention altogether, or in the alternative to risk his skill and 
capital on terms of being accountable for profits without having to share losses. Such 
consideration did not apply now because if one patentee refused to permit use of the invention, the 
other could get a compulsory licence as an interested person. The court further held that the result 
of the British cases would lead to serious inconvenience because if one patentee could give 
everybody a right to use the patented invention, he could sabotage the exclusivity of his co-owners. 
The court then noted that in Britain the case law has been overturned by statute. 
With respect, it is submitted that the Court in Marchand v. PelOQuin seems to have come to an 
incorrect reading of the British cases. The statutory provisions mentioned by the court above are in 
fact enactment of the common law position. Further, there was already a provision for compulsory 
licences under section 22 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883. 
148 Mathers y. Green (1865) LR 1 Ch. App. 29. A patent was granted in the joint names of the 
plaintiff and the two defendants. The defendants used the patent independently of the plaintiff. 1be 
plaintiff contended that the intention, at the time of taking out the patent, was that the three 
grantees should have a joint interest therein. Sir John Romilly M.R., at frrst instance, held that the 
patent was the joint property of the plaintiff and the defendants and that he was entitled to an equal 
share of the profits of the manufacture attributable to the invention, as well as to an equal share of 
the royalties arising from a licence alleged to have been granted. Therefore, the plaintiff was 
entitled to an account of his share of the profit derived from the defendants' use of the patent. 
149 Mathers y. Green LR 1 Ch. App. 29 (1865), per Lord Cranworth L.C., at pages 33-34. 
ISO Steers y. Ro&efS (1893) 10 RPC 245 (HL), per the Lord Chancellor at page 251. Lord Halsbury, 
Lord Macnaghten and Lord Shand concurred. Unlike Mathers v. Green, Steers y. RQ&ers involved a 
situation where the patent was not initially granted in the joint names of the plaintiff am 
defendant. The defendant became ajoint owner by a subsequent assignment. However, the House of 
Lords held that this made no difference to the duty of the joint owner who worked the patent. He 
did not have a duty to account to the other joint owner. See also Wapshare Tube Co .. Ltd y. HYde 
Imperial Rubber Co. Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 374 (CA), per Collins LJ., at page 378, applying the 
rule that a co-owner could work the patent without the consent of the other co-owners. 
1 S I Howard" Bullou&h y, Iweedales" Smalley (1895) 12 RPC 519. Note that the case was argued 
essentially on the true construction of the terms of an agreement whereby the assignor of two 
patents reserved to himself the right to work them personally. However, this case has been used as 
authority that the right to use is confined to the co-owner or his agent. The reason for this is best 
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The law on this aspect of the right of a co-owner is similar in the US. In Vose v. Singer, 152 
the court held that since the co-owners must be regarded as having interests which are 
distinct and separate in their nature, "they cannot for any legal use of them incur any 
obligation to each other." In Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co. ,153 the court held that 
one co-owner has the right to exploit the invention without the consent of the others, 
stressing the unfairness to the enterprising co-owner if it were to be otherwise. The only 
case where the court held that one co-owner could be sued for infringement by another co-
owner is the case of Herring v. Gas Consumer's Association. 154 However this case has 
been criticised and regarded as not persuasive in Bell & Howell Co. v. Bliss. 155 
Therefore, it is accepted that co-owners are free to use and exploit the patent without the 
consent of the other co-owners, unless the patent had been vested in a trustee in trust for 
them. In that case, the beneficiaries can not now freely exploit the patent. To hold otherwise 
would be to nullify the purpose of the trust, which is to "preserve the joint property and to 
prevent its practical destruction by co-owners". I 56 
2.5.4. Common Law Duty to Account 
There is also no duty on the part of one co-owner to account to the other owners for any 
gains derived from his use of a jointly held patent. This was held to be so in Mathers v. 
given by Chitty J., at page 528, "But I point out that the distinction between the servant am 
agents and the independent contractor is not one of mere words, or one merely of law, but it is one 
of very great importance, having regard to the nature of these contracts. A man who only ... 
employs his own servants and agents, risking his own capital and the like, in the manufacture of 
the patented articles, stands in a very different position from the man who can, either through 
himself or his friends, get others to assist him and bring them in as independent contractors. I 
think, as I have said, the object of the proviso was to confer rights personal to ST, and ST, acting 
within them, can bring whatever capital he himself has (it may be partially borrowed money) fm-
the purpose of making, but making by himself, or his agents or servants, the articles in question. 
But if he can go to other persons and get them, however large the firm may be, to manufacture for 
him, that I conceive to be a very different state of things; and, therefore, this distinction, which 
might at first to some minds seem to be a rather subtle one and rather a refinement of law, is ... 
one of very great importance to the parties." 
152 vose y. SinKer (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 226, at page 230. 
153 Relying on the UK cases of Mathers y. Green and Steers y. R0&ml. and the US case of Vase y. 
Sio&er, see BJDGkJed&e y. Weir & Crai& Mfa· Co. 108 F. 71 (CCA 7th Cir. 1901), per Woods, 
Circuit Judge, at page 73. For similar decisions, see Clum v. BreWQ' 5 F. Cas. 1097 (CC D. 
Mass. 1855), per Curtis, Circuit Justice, at page 1103; AapinwaU Mfa· Co. y. Gill 32 F. 697 
(CC D. New Jersey, 1887), per Bradley J., at page 702; I)rake y. Hall 220 F. 905 (CCA 7th Cir. 
1914), per Seaman, Circuit Judge, at page 906; Central Brass & Stampin& Co. y. Stuber 220 F. 
909 (CCA 7th Cir. 1915), per Kohlsaat, Circuit Judge at pages 911-912; Bell & Howell Co. y. 
BliH 262 F. 131 (CCA 7th Cir. 1919), at page 136. 
154 Herrin, y. Gas Consumer's Association 9 F. SS6 (CC B.D. Missouri, 1878), see Treat, D.J., at 
pages SS6-SS8. 
1S5 Bell c\ Howell Co. v. Bliy 262 F. 131 (CCA 7th Cir. 1919). 
156 See MpDuffm y. H_ooyillCt Mt c\ F. Pass. BY. Co. 162 F. 36 (CCA 31d Cir. 19(8). per 
Buffington. Circuit Judp, at pages 38-39; cert. denied, 23 U.S. 719; 56 L. Ed. 629 (1911). 
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Green, 157 where besides declaring that one joint owner could exploit the invention without 
the permission of the others, the court also rejected the contention that if the joint right of 
the patentees was conceded, the only mode of making it effectual was to give them a joint 
interest in the profits. Lord Cranworth held that in the absence of any contractual provisions 
to the contrary, the defendant had the right to exploit the patented invention without having 
to account for the profits to the other co-owners. The above principle as regards the non-
obligation to account to the other owners was adopted by the House of Lords in Steers v. 
Rogers. 158 
In an early case in the United States, it was tentatively stated that one co-owner may have to 
account to the others for any profit derived from use of the patent. However, the statement 
was made obiter and the judge was at pain to stress that it was a mere speculation. 1S9 The 
contrary rule has now been fmnly established. 160 It is pertinent to note that the reason 
given for denying the other co-owner a right to a share of the profits derived by one co-
owner was that it would result in one co-owner having to risk his skill and capital and the 
other co-owner the right to a share of the profits without a corresponding duty to contribute 
towards any risk. 161 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
Mathers v. Green LR 1 Ch, App. 29 (1865). 
Steers v. Ro~ers (1893) 10 RPC 245 (HL), at page 251, per Lord Herschell L.C., "In the case of 
Mathers v. Green '"~ it was held that where a patent for an invention is granted to two or more 
persons, each one of them may use the invention without the consent of the others, and if he so 
uses it is not bound to account to the others for any share of the profits which he makes by its use. 
'"~ Now, '"~ counsel for the appellant maintained '"~ that that decision was not good law; but it 
appears to me to be both good law and good sense when the nature of patent rights is regarded. . .. 
What the letters patent confer is the right to exclude others from manufacturing in a particular way 
and using a particular invention. When that is borne in mind it appears to me '"~ very clear that it 
would be impossible to hold, under these circumstances, that where there are several patentees, 
either of them, if he uses the patent, can be called upon by the others to pay to them a portion of 
the profits which he makes by that manufacture, because they are all of them entitled, or perhaps 
any of them entitled, to prevent the rest of the world from using it." 
ASpinwall Mf&. Co. v. Gill 32 P. 697 (CC D. New Jersey, 1887), per Justice Bradley, at page 
702; appeal dismissed with cost, 40 US 669; 35 L. Ed. 597 (1891). 
See, for example, Vose v. SinW (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 226, 230, and Blackled&e v. Weir & 
Crai~ MU. Co. 108 P. 71 (CCA 7th Cir. 1901), per Woods, Circuit Judge, "The use of an 
invention by one of co-owners or by his licensees is not the exercise of the entire monopoly 
conferred by the patent. That can be effected only by the joint or concurrent action of all owners. 
The separate action of anyone owner or of his licensees can be an exercise or use only of his 
individual right, which, though exclusive of all besides, is not exclusive of the other patentees, 
their assignees or licensees. On principle, therefore, there can be no accountability on the part of a 
part owner of an invention to other owners for profits made by the exercise of his individual right, 
whether it be by engaging in the manufacture and sale, or by granting to others licenses, or by 
assigning interests in the patent. His use of the invention in any lawful way is not an 
appropriation of anything which belongs to another. The separate rights of the other owners remain 
unaffected. They are equally free to use the invention in all legitimate ways for their individual 
profit. Each is entitled to the fruits of his endeavours, taking no risk and expecting no reward from 
enterprises in which he does not choose to join. " 
See Mathers y. Green (1865) LR 1 Ch, App. 29, per Lord Cranworth, at page 34, "Is there any 
implied contract where two or more persons jointly obtain letters patent that no one of them shall 
use the invention without the consent of the others, or if he does, that he shall use it for their joint 
benefit? I can discover no principle for such a doctrine. It would enable one of two patentees either 
to prevent the use of the invention altogether, or else to compel the other patentee to risk his skill 
and capital in the use of the invention on the terms of being accountable for half the profit, if 
profit should be made, without being able to calIon his co-patentee for contribution if there should 
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2.5.5. Common Law Right to License 
In Horsley & Knighton's Patent, 162 one of two co-owners purported to assign by deed his 
share and interest in a patent, and by the same deed purported to release him from all claims 
by both the co-owners in respect of the patent. This deed was entered verbatim on the 
register. The court allowed an application by the other co-owner to have the entry 
expunged, as one co-owner could not dispose of the right of the other. From the opinion, it 
would seem that a valid licence could only be granted by the acts of both co-owners. 
However, the Court of Appeal in Wapshare Tube Co., Ltd v. Hyde Imperial Rubber Co. 
Ltd163 seemed to have implied that such a consent from all co-owners was not necessary. 
The common law position in the United Kingdom is thus unclear. However, it is submitted 
that the reasoning of the court in Horsley is more in consonance with the principle of 
licensing, which is not a transfer of patent rights, but merely an agreement not to sue the 
licensee in respect of activities which fall within the licence. The licensor, by the licence, 
gives up his right to sue for infringement. However, this agreement does not bind the other 
co-owner, who, therefore, still retains the right to sue the alleged licensee. Further, as 
argued by Westell, for the law to be consistent, it has to follow that either both co-owners 
must sue and the licence of one will bind both; or one co-owner may sue in which case a 
licence from all co-owners would be required. 164 This is in accord with the accepted rule in 
be loss."; see also vose y. Sim~er (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 226, at page 230, "It is difficult to see 
how an equitable right of contribution can exist among any of them, unless it includes all the 
parties interested and extends through the whole term of the patent right; and if there be a claim for 
contribution of profits, there should also be a correlative claim for losses, and an obligation upon 
each party to use due diligence in making his interest profitable. It is not and cannot be contended 
that these parties are co-partners; but the idea of mutual contribution for profits and losses would 
require even more than co-partnership. Nothing short of the relation of stockholders in a joint-stock 
company would meet the exigencies of parties whose interests may be thus transferred and 
subdivided. But even as between the original parties, as there was no mutual obligation to 
contribute for losses, or to use any diligence to make the property profitable, and as each party was 
at liberty to buy, use, and sell machines at his pleasure, and to sell his moiety of the right, or 
fractional parts of it, we think no obligation arose out of the part ownership, as being legally or 
equitably incident to it, to make contribution of profits .... If the defendants have realised any profit 
in the manner alleged, it has been by investing capital in the purchase of machines, and the use of 
skill and labour in selling them; and they have taken the risk of losses." 
162 Horsley & KniKhton's Patent (1869) 8 L.R. Eq. 475, per Lord Romilly M.R., at page 477, ''Here 
is a patent granted to two persons, and therefore either of them may use it, but neither can dispose 
of the right of the other .... Again, suppose a patent is vested in two persons who are both using 
it, and a man infringes the patent, upon which they both complain, and a large sum of money is 
paid to one of them by the infringer to be allowed to make use of the patent, is it meant to be said 
that he can immediately release all the rights which the other person may have for the injury he has 
sustained by reason of the user of the patent?" This case was cited by Terrell as authority that one 
co-owner cannot grant a licence without the consent of his co-owner - Terrell, T. and Terrell, C., 
The Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for Invention, 8th Ed., at page 276. 
163 Wapsbare Tube Co .. Ltd y. Hyde Imperial Rubber Co. Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 374 (CA). However, it 
has to be noted that this expression of the law was obiter, since the court had come to a conclusion 
that the defendants could not be sued as their claim to a legal title to a part share of the patent bad 
been made out - see Collins LJ., at pages 377-378. 
164 See Westell, R.L., "Co-ownership of Patents", (1966) Patent & Trademark Institute of Canada, 
Report of Proceedings 151, at page 159. 
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personal property where in the basic case of Wilkinson v. Hay garth , 165 the judge held that 
one of two co-owners of a chattel could sue, giving as his reason that "otherwise the license 
of one would bind both". 
It is interesting to note that, although purporting to follow United Kingdom precedents, and 
hence showing consistency with respect to the other rights of a co-owner, with regards to 
the right to licence, the United States courts have shown a divergence from the United 
Kingdom precedents. In Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co. ,166 the court, although 
relying on the UK cases of Mathers v. Green and Steers v. Rogers, and also the United 
States case ofVose v. Singer, held that one co-owner has the right to license the invention 
without the consent of the others. 
2.6. The Statutory Rights of Co-owners 
Under the common law, joint owners and owners in common of a patent may act 
independently of each other just as if each owns the patent solely. They are not liable to 
each other for an accounting for use of the invention, or in the United States, for royalties 
or profits received from licensing activities. These common law rules have now been 
enacted in the United Kingdom and the United States as statutory rights in the absence of 
agreement. 167 
165 
166 
167 
Wilkinson v. Haygarth (1847) 12 QB 85; 116 ER 1085, at page 1090, per Lord Denman C.J. 
BlackledJW y. Weir & Craig Mf&. Co. 108 F. 71 (CCA 7th Cir. 1901), per Woods, Circuit Judge 
at pages 75-77, "There is ... no ground for the distinction insisted upon between profits derived 
directly from the manufacture, use, and sale of the patented article by the owner and profits derived 
by him from the sale of licenses. It is conceded that the part owner of an invention may sell his 
title or interest as a whole or in parts without being accountable to another owner for any portion 
of the consideration received. But it is clear that he might part with his entire title or interest by 
granting a license or licenses in terms which should forbid further licenses and further use by 
himself of the invention." 
See also the earlier case of Clum v. Brewer 5 F. Cas. 1097 (CC D. Mass. 1855). per Curtis. 
Circuit Justice. at page 1103. "One tenant in common has as good right to use. and to license third 
persons to use the thing patented. as the other tenant in common has. Neither can come into a 
court of equity and assert a superior equity. unless it has been created by some contract modifying 
the rights which belong to them. as tenants in common.". Similar decisions were reached by the 
court in Central Brass & StamPiD& Co. y. Stuber 220 F. 909 (CCA 7th Cir. 1915); PAke y. Hall. 
220 Fed. 905 (CCA 7th Cir. 1914). per KohIsaat, Circuit Judge at pages 911-912. "As owner of a 
one-half interest in the patent. appellant had no standing to restrain appellees from manufacturing 
under their ownership of the other one-half thereof. or from authorising others to do so."; AhczrIcm 
HosietY Mills Co. v. Kaufman 96 USPQ 133 (D.N.Y 1953). following Talbot v. QUlk« Stilte 
Oil Refipery 41 USPQ 1 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1939). per Leibell. District Judge. at page 143. "Although 
it is true that Kayser, as an owner of an undivided interest in the patent, had the right to issue 
licences on its own volition and without the consent of the other defendants... the fact remains 
that there was an explicit authorisation from both Standard and Kaufman to act in their behalf in 
Kayser's licensing activities." See also Bepdjx Ayiatiop Com· v· KutY 84 USPQ 189 (D.N.Y. 
19S0),~r Byers, District Judge, at pages 192-193, where he reviewed the cases. 
See section 36, Patents Act 1977, UK and section 262 of US Code. TItle 3S, Patents. 
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With the coming into force of the Act in 1986, the provisions therein enacted now govern. 
The statutory provisions of the Act regulating the rights and obligations of joint owners of 
patents follow in all respect that found in the WIPO Model Law.l 68 There is no obvious 
reason why the status quo prior to the Act was not adopted, other than the possibility that 
the framers of the Act chose to adopt the WIPO model without realising the differences. 
Under section 40 of the Act, joint owners of a patent application or patent may, separately, 
assign or transmit their rights in the patent application or patent, exploit the patented 
invention and take action against any person exploiting the patented invention without their 
consent, but may only jointly withdraw the patent application, surrender the patent or 
conclude a licence contract. The statutory rules, however, only apply in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary between the joint applicants or owners. Despite these provisions, 
there are still area of uncertainties and gaps that need to be addressed and catered for. 
2.6.1. StatutOlY Ri~ht to Assi~n or Transmit Ri~hts Separately 
The Act gives the right to assign or transmit the rights in the patent separately. Therefore, 
no consent of the other co-owners is required. This is in contrast to the statutory rights 
under the 1977 Act of the United Kingdom, where consent of all the co-owners is required 
before a share of the patent could be assigned. 169 It is interesting to note that the 
opportunity was not taken to adopt the alternative scheme suggested by the WIPO Model 
Law, whereby a right of pre-emption is given to the other co-owners if one owner wishes 
to sell his share in the patent. 17 0 
It is also unclear from the provision whether a co-owner can assign a portion only of his 
share in the patent. 
2.6.2. StatutoQ' Ri~ht to Exploit Separately 
The statutory right to use a jointly held patent is similar to that provided by s. 36(2) of the 
Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom, which gives a co-owner the right to exploit the 
patented invention without the consent of the others. However, it has to be noted that the 
rights of free use of the invention provided by the United Kingdom Act are confined 
(unless otherwise agreed) to the co-owner and his agent, it does not permit a co-owner to 
employ an independent contractor to exploit it.171 There is no mention in the Act of the 
168 See s. 141. WIPO Model Law. and commentary thereto. at page 91. 
169 See s. 36(3), Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom, in Appendix. 
170 See WIPO Commentary - page 91, para. d. 
171 See Howard" BuUou&h y. TweedaIes " Smalley (1895) 12 RPC 519. For the facts and the 
decision, see footnote 151. 
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right to exploit the patent through the vehicle of an agency. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that by virtue of agency principles, the right to exploit the patent separately can be construed 
as including the right to exploit through an agent, since the acts of the agent are the act of 
the principal. However, the right to exploit separately does not extend to having the patent 
exploited by a sub-contractor nor to a partner of the co-owner, and he cannot form a 
company to exploit the invention on his behalf. It is specifically provided that the statutory 
right to exploit the patent without the consent of the other co-owners can be overridden by 
agreement. So, if there is an agreement whereby one co-owner is to be responsible for the 
commercial exploitation of the patent, with the net profits from sales or licensing to be 
divided equally, the construction of the agreement may oust the right to exploit it personally 
without having to account for any profits. 172 
It is not clear from the Act whether there is a duty to account to the other co-owners for any 
profit derived from individual exploitation by a co-owner. The Act is silent on this, unlike 
the provision of the United Kingdom equivalent, where the duty to account is specifically 
excluded. However, it would seem that having given the co-owners a right to separate 
exploitation of the patented invention without any conditions imposed, there may not be a 
need to account. 
2.6.3. Statut01), Right to Sue Separately 
Under the Act, one of several co-owners may sue separately. There is again a difference in 
the right to sue when compared with the UK Act. Under section 66(2) of the 1977 Act of 
the United Kingdom, one of two or more joint proprietors of a patent may bring an action 
for infringement of the patent without the concurrence of the others. However, the other co-
owners must be made parties to the proceedings, either as plaintiffs or nominal defendants. 
2.6.4. Statut0O' Restrictions on the Rights of Co-owners 
In Malaysia the only statutory restrictions of the right of a co-owner are that he cannot 
withdraw the patent application, surrender the patent or conclude a licence contract without 
the consent of the other co-owners. Since there is no express requirement that the consent 
should be in any form, it would appear that the consent of the other co-owners could be 
either expressed, antecedent to, or contemporaneous with, the alleged grant of the licence, 
or implied. The defence of acquiescence could also be relied upon. 173 This provision is 
172 See, for example, YOYDI y. Wilson (1955) 72 RPC 351. 
173 See Whitc;lvmd & Poole Ltd y. Sir James Fanner & Sons. LId (1918) 35 RPC 241, where it was 
held that the consent could be either expressed, antecedent to, or contemporaneous with, the alleged 
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very similar to the United Kingdom provision except that the co-owner there is also not 
entitled to mortgage without the consent of the other co-owners. 
2.6.5. The Weaknesses of the Statutory Provisions 
It has long been recognised by the courts that "joint owners are at the mercy of each 
other" .174 In an ideal world, the co-owners would have arrived at an amicable agreement 
regarding their respective rights, interests and duties in their joint patent even before the 
patent is granted or obtained. But in the real world, it is not inconceivable that people 
involved in applying jointly for patents would initially be more interested in, and concerned 
with, matters directly connected with the grant of the patent. They may not be aware of, or 
appreciate, the features and incidents connected with joint ownership and, therefore, would 
initially not realise the importance of the need to make provisions regulating the rights and 
relationship between themselves. This will be more so in the case of non-corporate owners. 
Even the presence of an agreement may not result in a fair allocation of rights and 
obligations, as for example, in a case where one of the joint owner is in a very strong 
financial position. In that case the weaker party may just have to accept whatever is offered. 
It is admitted that it is impossible to frame a set of statutory rules that could achieve 
complete justice between co-owners, and that it should be up to the joint owners to make 
contractual provisions governing their relationship, rights and duties. However, through 
ignorance, this may not have been done. Although there are express statutory provisions 
regulating the rights and obligations of owners of jointly held patents, as has been shown 
and will further be demonstrated, there are still a lot of uncertainties and the possibilities of 
avoidance of the restrictions on the rights of the individual co-owners. It is submitted that 
anything which tends to the establishment of greater certainty and the removal of 
uncertainty will be beneficial, not only to the joint owners, but also to the general public. 
This will also give the weaker party a viable alternative. If he is offered an unequal or unfair 
bargain by the stronger party, he can refuse to accept it and fall back on the statutory 
provisions which would govern in the absence of contract. Therefore, the statute should try 
to provide fall-back provisions which aim to achieve, as far as possible, a fair degree of 
balance between all the conflicting rights and interests of the owners. 
2.6.5.a. Uncertainty as to proportion of share 
There is no provision in the Act which deals with the delineation of the shares of the 
different owners. The Act merely assumes that the joint owners have agreed on the share 
grant of the licence, or implied. The defence of acquiescence could also be relied upon - see Eve J., 
at pages 244 - 245. 
174 See, for example, Phillips, Chief Judge, at page 252, in WiUinlbam. C' rio v, Lawton, C' ri, 194 
USPQ 249 (CA 6th Cir. 1977). 
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each is supposed to own. It is true that with the right to exploit the patented invention 
without the consent of the other owners being statutorily given, the exact amount of share 
each owner is deemed to own is immaterial, since an owner of a 1 % share, in principle, has 
the same right and opportunity of exploiting the patent as much as the owner of 99% of the 
patent. However, the allocation of shares to the different owners will be important in the 
case of a sale of the patent, receipt from royalties from licensing, or when it comes to the 
question of division of compensation received from the Government for use of the patent 
under section 84 of the Act or under a compulsory licence granted under Part X of the Act. 
In such situations, it would seem that the joint owners will be entitled to a share of the 
proceeds in proportion to the amount of shares that they own in the patent. It will also be 
relevant when damages or account of profits have been awarded in an infringement action, 
as each co-owner is presumed to be entitled only to claim for damages in proportion to his 
share of the patent. It might also be important in determining the proportion of the renewal 
fees that each has to contribute. 
It is submitted that in the absence of a contrary intention, it is only fair that each of the initial 
co-owners should be entitled to an equal share of the patent rights, regardless of their 
respective contributions, provided always that each of the claimants can satisfy the test to 
qualify as a joint inventor .175 Although this principle may be implicit, for the clarification 
of doubts it would be preferable to have it expressed. Therefore, in the interest of certainty, 
the Act should provide that in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, joint owners 
are deemed to hold the patent in equal shares.176 
2.6.5.b. Unrestricted ri~ht to assi~n may be destructive 
Under the Act, a joint owner may separately assign his share in a patent application or 
patent without the consent of the others. There is no mention of whether the share that he is 
allowed to assign is only the whole of his share or whether he can subdivide it into small 
175 See comments of Tollerfield, Assistant Comptroller in Florey's Patent [1962] RPC 186, at page 
193, "As a general proposition, I should have thought that whatever their several contributions 
may have been, the members of a team pursuing different aspects of a research project under the 
direction of a team leader should. in any event, be entitled to an equal share in any benefit resulting 
from what must inevitably be regarded as a joint effort. The fact that one member of the team was 
fortunate enough to be allotted a line of investigation which led eventually to an important 
discovery ought not. in my view. to entitle him to a bigger share of the proceeds that other 
members of the team whose contributions in other directions. however ingenious. may not have 
been so fruitful." 
176 By virtue of section 36( 1) of the UK Patents Act 1977. it is provided that. unless ~therwise agreed, 
where a patent is granted to two or more person. each of them shall be entitled to an .equal 
undivided share in the patent. In Florey's Patent [1962] RPC 186. Mr Tollerfield, AsSiStant 
Comptroller. held at page 188, that the effect of the equivalent provision in section 54(1) of the 
1949 Act means that in the event of a joint assignment of the patent, each co-patentee assigns in 
effect, his own equal share. 1berefore, each must be entitled to an equal share in any benefits 
accruing from the assignment, failing agreement to the contrary. See also Patchett's Patent [1963] 
RPC 90, per Lloyd-Jacob J., at page 98. where it was held that prima faci~ this provision enti~~ a 
co-owner to receive some part of any payment made pursuant to section 46(3), the proViSIon 
regulating Crown use. 
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lots and dispose of them to as many different people as he wishes, thus giving more 
persons the right to exploit the patent. It has been recognised that such a possibility could 
bring about the complete devaluation of the patent. l77 Merges and Locke, 17 8 in arguing 
against the present United States rule allowing co-owners unrestricted right to license and 
assign their full interest, or any portion of it, apply the doctrine of the "tragedy of the 
commons", ftrst applied to co-ownership of patents by Robinson. 179 They argue that such 
rights could lead to abuse in the exercise of the rights by greedy co-owners at the direct 
expense of the other co-owners, and should not be allowed. The unrestricted right to assign 
could also lead to fraud where a patent owner splits up his shares into various small units 
and sells them to members of the public who think that they are purchasing something of 
value. 180 If a part owner could split up and dispose of his share of the rights in this way ad 
infinitum, it could also result, as will be illustrated later, in the total nullification of the 
provision that all joint owners must consent before a licence contract is concluded. 
One possible solution may be to provide expressly that any assignment of a part owner's 
share is restricted to the assignment of his whole interest. However, this may not solve the 
particular problem at hand. Even allowing that a joint owner can only dispose of his whole 
share in the patent, there is still the possibility of a loophole, even though he abides strictly 
by this proposed statutory rule. He could, instead, assign his whole share to several 
persons who are interested in exploiting the patent. Each of these persons, being now part 
owner, could exploit the invention, again reducing the value of the whole patent as regards 
the remaining original owners. Despite assertions by the Courts in the United States that 
each co-owner could do whatever he wishes with his own share of the patent, since this 
would not deprive the other owners of their right to enjoy it, it is submitted that the 
argument of Westell,181 that since the essence of a patent right is to prevent others from 
177 In ForKet y. Specialty Tools of Canada Inc. [1993] 48 CPR (3d) 323 (Sup. Ct British Columbia), 
the court held that the interest of the co-owner could not be subdivided into two or more parts nor 
may it be licensed without the concurrence of all the owners of the patent. This was because the 
subdivision of an interest in the patent by a co-owner could lead to unfair results and chaotic 
situations. Further if one co-owner was entitled to license a patent the situation would be that a 
number of licences could be created thereby destroying the value of the patent of his co-owners -
per Rowan J., at pages 638-642. 
178 See Merges, R.P., Locke, L.A., "Co-ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View" 
[1990] JPTOS, June, 586, at pages 592-595. 
179 Robinson, W.C., The Law of Patents, Vol. 2, Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, 1890, at para. 796. 
180 This possibility is not as fanciful as it sounds. According to Berle, A.K., De Camp, L.S., 
Inventions and Their Management, 1 st Ed., 2nd Impression, International Textbook Company, 
Pennsylvania, 1940, at pages 353-354, some years prior to date, the selling of part interests in 
patents amounted to a "racket" in the United States. Part interests sold in a single patent 
sometimes ran into thousands. The practice was to take a cash payment of any amount the seller 
could get and the balance in a note or a series of notes. According to the authors, great publicity 
was given to these fraudulent though unpunishable practices, and several states enacted laws to curb 
them. As a result, notes given in some states were not enforceable. Other states required that such a 
note give notice on its face that it was given for that purpose. One state required the notice to be 
written or printed in red ink. In other states it was illegal to accept such a note. 
181 Westell, R.L., "Co-ownership of Patents", (1966) Patent & Trademark Institute of Canada, Report 
of Proceedings 151, at page 159. 
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exploiting it, such a right will be destroyed if each co-owner could split up and assign his 
shares among all potential major users of the invention, should be heeded. 
It may also be questioned whether the right to assign without the consent of the others will 
be fair to the remaining co-owners. Should a part owner, by his unilateral action, bring 
about a situation where his other joint owners have foisted upon them a new joint owner 
whom they may not desire? To give an example,182 supposing A. and B. were joint 
owners. A. might be quite happy for B. to work the invention in competition with him, but 
he might not if B. were to assign to C., who might be a large corporation. The huge 
manufacturing capacity of the corporation might swamp A.'s. 
One possible solution is to adopt the approach under the Australian and the United 
Kingdom statute, whereby a co-owner is not allowed to assign his share in the patent 
without the consent of the others.l 83 Another alternative solution to the above problem may 
be to give the other co-owners a right of fIrst refusal whenever a joint owner wishes to part 
with his share of the patent, giving them a right to purchase the share of the selling co-
owner at the price contracted for with a third party.184 Only on a refusal to exercise that 
right can he sell to the third party.I8S A combined approach which is preferred may be to 
give a right of fIrst refusal to the other co-owners. If they refuse or is not in a position to 
exercise this right, then they have the right to nominate the name of another person to 
purchase the relevant shares. Failing this, the owner who intends to dispose of his shares is 
free to dispose of it to whoever he wishes. 
2.6.5.c. Exercise of ri~hts may result in unegual enjoyment 
Giving each co-owner the right to exploit the patented invention without the consent of the 
others has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it may seem unfair that one 
of several co-owners can exploit the patented invention without the need to account to the 
others, especially when the person exploiting it is in a better fmancial position to exploit it 
effectively whereas the other owner may not have the required fInancial resources to do 
182 See Owen, C.M., "On Certain Features of Joint Proprietorship in Patents", Transactions of the 
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. vm (1889-90), page 157, at page 198. 
183 See section 16(1)(c), Patents Act 1990, Australia, and section 36(3), Patents Act 1977, UK. 
184 This in fact, is an alternative rule proposed in the WIPO Model Law. See page 91, paragraph d, 
WIPO Model Law. 
185 This is the solution adopted in France and Spain, see section 42(1)(e), Patent Law, France (WIPO 
Laws and Treaties, Industrial Property, June 1991) and section 72«2)(a), Law No. 1111986 on 
Patents, Spain (WIPO Laws and Treaties, Industrial Property, July/August 1986). Under these 
provisions, a joint owner wishing to dispose of his share in the patent has the duty to notify the 
other co-owners of the intended disposal, giving them a right of pre-emption for a period of two 
(Spain) or three (France) months from the date of notification to exercise this right In fact, the 
Spanish system goes even further than the French. If a co-owner had disposed of his share in the 
patent without giving the joint owners a right of pre-emption, the other joint owners can exercise 
the right of "prior purchase" within one month from the date of recording of the assignment in the 
Patent Register. This means that the other co-owners can follow the share in the hands of a third 
party and insist on a transfer back of the shares to them. 
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SO.186 One example comes to mind, for example, when one applicant for the patent is a 
poor inventor and the other is a capitalist. In this situation, the impoverished owner is not 
able to reap the fruit of his invention, while the other owner cannot be prevented from 
working the invention for his own exclusive interest without having to account to the 
inventor. 
On the other hand, the converse is also true, i.e., if one joint owner can not use the 
invention without the consent of the other, then one part owner will have the power to 
prevent the use of the invention altogether. Alternatively, he is able to compel the other co-
owner to risk his skill and capital in the exploitation of the invention on the condition of 
being accountable to him for a share of the profit, if any, without his being able to call upon 
him for contribution if there should be a loss.187 
France has a system whereby each co-owner has the right to work the invention for his 
own benefit, subject to equitably compensating the other joint owners who do not 
personally work the invention or who have not granted a licence.188 Merges and Locke,189 
in fact demonstrated, by their game theory model, that where a non-working co-owner can 
"free-ride" on the efforts of the other co-owners, this would act as a disincentive to any of 
the co-owners working the patent, leading ultimately to the detriment of society, which has 
an interest in seeing patented technology developed. 
Fairness, however, demands that before a co-owner can insist on a share of the profits, he 
should be willing to shoulder a part, not only of the investment capital, but also to bear any 
risk of possible losses too. One possible solution may be to statutorily provide that all co-
owners should be liable to contribute to the expenses and losses in any exploitation by any 
of the co-owners. However, this will not be practical nor fair, compelling, as it is, 
186 One of the argument of the plaintiff in Mathers v. Green (1865) LR 1 Ch. App. 29 was that if 
there was no duty to account, a joint-inventor, like the plaintiff, who was not a manufacturer, 
would have no opportunity of gaining any advantage from the patent. The court, however, preferred 
the contrary argument that giving such a right would be unjust to a person who had invested his 
own capital in the venture. The same point was raised by Rantzen, MJ., "Co-Patentees", 
Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. LIV, (1935-36), page 145 at page 
150. He argues that in view of the social justification for patents, the practical result of leaving co-
owners each with an independent right to use was to leave their respective benefits very largely 
dependent upon their relative financial and commercial position and that this was inequitable arxl 
probably undesirable in the public interest. 
187 In fact, this was the justification used by Lord Cranworth in Mathers v. Green (1865) LR 1 Ch. 
App. 29, at pages 33-34, when he ruled that one co-owner could use the invention without the need 
for consent or account to the others. 
188 See section 42(1)(a), Patent Law, France (WIPO Laws and Treaties, Industrial Property, June 
1991). In the absence of agreement between the parties, such compensation shall be fixed by the 
Court. Under section 72«2)(b), Law No. 1111986 on Patents, Spain (WIPO Laws and Tn:aties. 
Industrial Property, July/August 1986), a co-owner of a patent in Spain may work the invention 
following notification to the other joint owners. There is no mention of any compensation. 
189 See Merges, R.P .• Locke. L.A., "Co-ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View" 
[1990] JPTOS. June. 586. at pages 596-597. 
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participation in ventures which may not be desired by some of the co-owners, in effect 
creating a partnership situation without the presence of any agreement. 
Another possible solution will be to provide by statute that the non-exploiting co-owner 
should be given an opportunity to participate to any extent within his means. However, this 
solution will be undesirable if it leads to a partnership. Because of the unlimited nature of a 
partner's liability in any loss suffered by the partnership business, this will be particularly 
unacceptable to a co-owner with limited means. A more viable possibility is to incorporate a 
limited company wherein the co-owners can invest in the shares according to his means. 
Because of the limited liability of members in a registered company, this will be attractive to 
co-owners with limited means. The co-owner's share in the profit from exploitation of the 
patented invention will of course, depend on the amount of shares he invests in the 
company. If he refuses the opportunity, then the other owner need not account to him 
If this is not a viable alternative, then the statutory status quo will have to be maintained. 
Each is then entitled to the fruits of his endeavours, taking no risk and expecting no reward 
from enterprises in which he does not choose to join. The more able co-owner should not 
be expected to be responsible for, or shoulder the burden arising from the impecunity or 
otherwise of his co-owners. 
2.6.5.d. Gettin~ around the restrictions on licensin~ 
It has been noted by Gill190 that this restriction can be overcome by the simple device of 
assigning a portion of his share in the patent to the intended licensee. The assignee of the 
share would then be in a position to work the patent without having to account for the 
profits to any of the other co-owners by virtue of his right as a joint owner. This would 
mean that the non-assigning party will be the ultimate loser, since the assignor would have 
received some payment for the part assignment. To illustrate, assume that one of two joint 
owners, A., holding 50% of the share in the patent, wishes to grant a licence to a third 
party, C. The other joint owner, B., refuses to give his consent. A. then transfers 10% of 
his 50% share in the patent to the third party. C., being now the owner of 5% owner of the 
whole patent, may work the patent without having to account to any of the other owners. 
A. gets a return in the form of the purchase price from C. B., however, gets nothing, 
although it is clear from the Act that it is intended that he is given the right to share in any 
income derived from licences jointly granted. Since, however, no licence was granted but a 
pure assignment or transfer of A.'s rights, B. gets nothing. It would appear, therefore, that 
there is a loophole in the Act 
190 Gill, H.A., "The Rigbts of Co-owners of Letters Patent", Transactions of the Cbartered Institute of 
Patent Agents, Vol. XLI (1922-23), page 134, at page 140. See also Potter, E., "Joint Patentees", 
Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. LXII (1944-45), page 138, at 143, 
who is of the opinion that such a practice would defeat the provisions in the statute and would be 
contrary to their intention. 
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2.6.5.e. Multiplicity of actions 
One co-owner can presently initiate an infringement suit against a third party without the 
need for the consent of the other co-owners. Phillips, Chief Judge, ga\'e three primary 
interests protected by the requirement that all co-owners must join in a patent infringement 
suit. 191 In the Malaysian context, two of these reasons are gratefully adopted, i.e., the 
interest of a co-owner in avoiding the estoppel effect of a judgement, in which he or she did 
not participate, declaring the patent invalid; and the interest of a defendant in avoiding 
multiple suits concerning infringement of the same patent. It is submitted that these two 
reasons demonstrate why the present provision allowing a co-owner to institute legal 
proceedings without the consent of all the other co-owners is undesirable. It is. therefore, 
proposed that the Act should be amended to make all interested persons parties to the suit, 
either as plaintiffs or as notional defendants to prevent multiplicity of actions. 192 
2.6.5.f. Deadlock in agreement 
As presently constituted, the Act does not contain any mechanism to resolve disagreement 
between the co-owners with regard to granting of licences. This would mean that when the 
co-owners are unable to come to an agreement, no licences can be granted. If there is any 
attempt to licence third parties without the consent of all the co-owners, proceedings can be 
brought against the third party for infringement of the patent. The patent will lie 
unexploited, to the detriment of the parties and the interest of society as a whole. Some 
times the inability to reach an agreement may arise from genuine objections to certain terms 
of the proposed agreement. However, there may also be situation when one co-owner 
"holds out" in the hope of getting a bigger share of the profit than he actually deserves. 
Therefore, a provision along the line of section 17 of the Australian Patents Act 1990 
should be added to the present Act empowering the court to give directions to co-owners 
when they are unable to come to any agreement. 
191 Willjo~ham, et al. v. Lawton. et al. 194 USPQ 249 (CA 6th Cir. 1977). Sec text accompanying 
footnote 137. 
192 See Section 66(2) of the Patents Act 1977, UK. which has such a provision. 
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2.7. Rights of Employee Inventors 1 93 
The basic rule is that the right to a patent or a utility innovation belongs to the inventor.194 
There are, however, two situations in which the owner will not be the inventor. Section 
20( 1) provides that in the absence of any contrary agreement in the contract of employment 
or for the execution of work, the rights to a patent made in the performance of such contract 
or in the execution of such work shall be deemed to pass to the employer or the person who 
commissioned the work. The second situation, laid down in section 20(2), is where the 
employee, though not required to engage in any inventive activity in his contract of 
employment, makes an invention in the field of activities of his employer. This provision is 
again subject to a contrary agreement between the parties and also that the employee must 
have used data or means placed at his disposal by his employer. 195 The statutory rules as to 
allocation of patent ownership between employers and employees also apply to government 
employees. 196 
For the purposes of the analysis of these provisions, the terms "service" and 
"commissioned" inventions for the section 20(1) category, "dependent" inventions for the 
section 20(2) category, and "free" inventions for inventions not covered by the earlier two 
categories, are adopted. 
2.7.1. "Service" Invention and "Commissioned" Invention 
From the provision of section 20(1), it would seem that the basic division of workers 
working under a contract of service and contract for services197 is not adopted as far as 
allocation of the rights to inventions are concerned in a situation where one person performs 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
The discussion on the rights of an employee inventor under the Act only focuses on the statutory 
rights. Therefore, the respective rights and obligations of the employer and employ~ unde~, as well 
as the legal status of, suggestions scheme for employees are beyond the scope of this thesIs. For a 
discussion of the problems associated with such schemes, see, Segel, J.N., "Master and Servant -
Rights to Inventions of Employees - Suggestion Boxes - Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland", 
Wisconsin Law Review 1203 (1973). See also Prout v. British Gas pIc & anor [1992] FSR 478. 
See para. 2.1., supra. 
These statutory provisions for allocating the rights to an employee i~vention between ~ 
employer and employee are in pari materia with sections 64 to 66 of the Sn Lankan Act. The Sn 
Lankan Act, in turn, follows section 120 (1)(a) and (2) of the WIPO Model Law. It has to be no~ 
that alternative A, instead of alternative B of section 120(2) is the scheme chosen for the MalaYSian 
and Sri Lankan statutes. 
See section 21 of the Act. 
The term "contract of employment" has usually been treated by the courts as synonymous with a 
contract of service, in contradistinction to the term "contract for services" which applies to the case 
of independent contractors see, for example, EmplOYment Provident Fund B<ad V. M.S. Ally " 
Co, lid [1975] 2 MU 89; Insbs;ape Mall,Vsia Ho1dinKs Bbd v, R,B. Gray " anor [1985] 2 MU 
297; Kuala Lumpur Fund Bbd v.I. Bastian Leo " apar [1988] 2 MU 526; and Mjlap Auto Sdp 
8M V. WonK Seh YOIl [1994] 2 MU 135. 
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work for another. In both situations, the rights to a patent made in the performance of such 
contract or in the execution of such work do not belong to the inventor. 
2.7.l.a. "Service" invention 
The Act does not lay down any defmition of a contract of employment. A defmition of 
employer and employee is, however, given in the Act. An "employer", in relation to an 
employee, "means the person by whom the employee is or was employed", and 
"employee" means "a person who works or has worked under a contract of employment, or 
who is in employment under, or for the purpose of, any individual or organisation." 198 
Therefore, the task is to determine whether the inventor is working under a contract of 
employment. 
Several tests have been devised by the courts to help determined whether a person is 
deemed to be an employee or not. 199 Initially, the test used was the "control" test. If the 
employer has a right to hire and fire, and right to control how, when and where the work is 
being done, this would tend to indicate that the person subject to such control is an 
employee of the person exercising the control. However, the "control" test was found to be 
difficult to apply in the case of skilled and specialist workers. Therefore, the "organisation" 
or "integration" test was suggested by Lord Denning in Stevenson Jordan and Harrison v, 
MacDonald & Evans Ltd. 2oO He said that a factor that was common to all employees, 
whether they were skilled or unskilled, was that they were employed as part of the business 
and their work was done as an integral part of the business. The latest test is a pragmatic 
one, known as the "economic reality" or "mixed" test. Essentially, the question to be asked 
is whether the person doing the work is in business on his own account or not.201 If he is, 
then he is performing a contract for services and is not an employee. The test of "economic 
reality" in relation to the concept of employment has been approved by the Privy Council in 
Lee Tins Sang v. Chung Chi-Keung. 202 
198 
199 
200 
201 
202 
See section 3 - Interpretation, of the Act. 
For a fuller discussion, see Selwyn, N., Law of Employment, 8th Ed. Butterworths, London, 
1993, Chapter 2 - The nature of a contract of employment. 
Stevenson Jordan and Harrison v, MacDonald & Evaps Ltd (1952) 1 lLR 101, at page 111. 
See Market Investieations Ltd v. Minister of Social Security (1969) 2 WLR 1, per Cooke J., at 
page 8. A more elaborate analysis can be found in Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd v· Minister of 
Pensions (1968) 1 All ER 433, at 439, per MacKenna J., in which a contract of service was 
defined as having three pre-conditions: (a) the employee agrees to provide his ow~ w~rk ~ skill 
for the employer's service in exchange for wages; (b) he agrees, expressly. o.r by .lDlpli~ation, ~at 
he will be subject to the employer's control; and (c) there are no other provIsions Inconsistent With 
it being a contract of employment. 
Lee Tine Sane v. ChunK Chi-Keune [1990] IeR 409. Both the "control" test and the "integration" 
test were adopted by the Malaysian Federal Court in Employment Providept Fuod Board v· M.S. 
AUy & Co. IJd [1975] 2 MU 89. The Supreme Court in Kuala Lumpur Fund Bbd v· J. Bastian 
Leo & anor [1988] 2 MU 526, referred to both these test but held that in the circumstances of the 
case under appeal, the preferred test to apply was the "control" test - see Wan Suleiman S.C,J., at 
pages 527-529. From the opinion, there is no reason to doubt that in the proper circumstances, the 
"economic reality" test will not be applied. 
120 
An employment relationship can exist even though there is no fonnal written contract. 
Further, even if there is a written contract, the exact duties are seldom laid down. So the 
whole circumstances of the employment situation need to be considered to be able to 
determine the work which is deemed to be within the performance of the contract of 
employment. 203 It has also to be noted that, just because the inventor is an employee, it 
does not automatically mean that every invention made by him will belong to the employer. 
The circumstances and terms of the contract of employment need to be considered. For 
example, in Vokes Ltd v. Heather,204 the claim by the plaintiff employer to the beneficial 
ownership of patents made by the defendant employee while in the plaintiffs service was 
rejected. On the proper construction of the employment contract, the court held that his 
duties were mainly in an advisory capacity to supervise and help the plaintiff develop and 
exploit the patents which they had earlier purchased from him. 
In the case of "service" inventions, the statutory provision seems to be merely declaratory 
of the common law position, now replaced in the United Kingdom by section 39(1)(a) of 
the Patents Act 1977.205 However, unlike the United Kingdom provision where "normal 
duties" and "duties specifically assigned to him" are mentioned, there is no hint as to the 
type of activities which could fall under section 20( 1) of the Act, which merely mentions 
"invention made in the performance of such contract of employment" or "in the execution of 
such work". It would appear that both categories of activities envisaged under the United 
203 
204 
205 
On this point, see generally, Chandler, A., Holland, J., Infonnation: Protection, Ownership mxI 
Rights, Blackstone Press Ltd, 1993, at pages 121-123. 
Vokes Ltd v. Heather (1945) 62 RPC 135 (CA), see Lord Greene M.R., at pages 140-141, mxI 
Morton L.J., at page 142. 
There are varying opinions on whether the statutory provisions in section 39 of the 1977 Act are 
merely declaratory of the common law. For example, Cornish, W.R., Intellectual Property, 2nd 
Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1989, at page 179, is of the opinion that section 39 essentially in effect 
codifies the common law principles which determine whether employee or employer is initially 
entitled to an invention. But he notes in footnote 23 that in Harris's Patent, however, Falconer J. 
refused to accept that this statutory provision necessarily embodied the common law. Again, he 
opines that the statutory provision is a "pretty close approximation" of the common law in 
"Rights in Employees' Inventions - The United Kingdom Position", (1990) 21 IIC 298, at page 
300. Chandler, A., Holland, ]" Infonnation: Protection, Ownership and Rights, Blackstone Press 
Ltd, 1993, at page 118, describe the statutory effects as "not dissimilar" to the pre-1977 position. 
However, the C.I.P.A. Guide to the Patents Act, 3rd Ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 1990, at page 306, 
states that "The introductory phrase of section 39(1) simply sweeps away any rule evolved under 
the common law before June 1, 1978 (Harris's Patent [1985] RPC 19). This renders precedents 
decided under the common law of dubious assistance", and at page 309, "Precedents decided under 
the fonner common law principles should be treated with considerable caution. This is partly ... 
because these cases were generally concerned to determine, as a first step, whether the invention 
was made 'in the course of employment'. It is submitted that this phrase has a wider meaning than 
the 'duties of an employee"'. Reid, B.C., A Practical Guide to Patent Law, 2nd Ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1993, states at page 124, "The new law enshrine statutorily in section 39(1) and (2) the 
broad pre-existing distinction as between inventions made by skilled employees (or those in 
fiduciary position) and those made by the unskilled, although it is over-simplistic to regard the new 
merely as a codification of the former common law in this respect." 
Note that there is no equivalent provision in the Malaysian Act of section 39(l)(b) of the Patents 
Act, 1977, which applies when the employee has a special obligation to further the interests of his 
employer's undertaking, as for example, when he owes a duty of fidelity or a fiduciary duty to his 
employer - see WortbioltoQ PumPinl Epline Co. y. Moore (1903) 20 RPC 41; Ho.p Extract 
Company Ltd y. Horst (1919) 36 RPC 177 and Fipe Iodustrial Cmnmodities Ltd y. Powlipi 
(1954) 71 RPC 253 and Ie Harris' Patept (1985) RPC 19. 
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Kingdom provisions may fall within section 20(1).206 Further, read together with section 
20(2), it would appear that section 20( 1) envisages a situation where the employee is 
employed to invent or at least to solve problems relating to the business of his employer, 
the British Syphon v. Homewood situation,207 or where he had been commissioned to 
carry out some work which involves the possibilities of some inventive solutions being 
created.208 In this respect, it may be that the Malaysian provision is quite similar to the 
United Kingdom provision, which requires that "the circumstances in either case were such 
that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his 
duties" . 209 
In fact, in many of the cases decided under the common law, there was this emphasis on 
the possibility of some invention being created, or the duty to solve some problem or 
engage in some innovative or inventive activity. For example, in British Reinforced 
Concrete v. Lind, 210 a company engaged in reinforced concrete work entrusted, through a 
chief engineer in charge of the Drawing Office, a draughtsman or assistant engineer, Lind, 
with the preparation of designs for lining of headings in a certain colliery. In the absence of 
personal experience of similar underground work, and of reliable data as to the earth 
pressure at the particular colliery, he was unable to prepare a satisfactory design, and 
suggested that he should visit the colliery. With the information acquired on his visit, he 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
In Greater Glasgow Health Board's Al1l1lication [1996] RPC 207, at page 223, Jacob J., held that 
"work made in the course of employment" is much the same as the "normal duties" plus "specially 
assigned duties" of section 39(1) of the 1977 Act. For the problems associated with "specially 
assigned duties", see Bercusson, B., "The Contract of Employment and Contracting Out - The UK 
Patents Act 1977", [1980] EIPR 257, at page 258. 
British S)!phon y. Homewood [1956] RPC 225. See the speech of Roxburgh J., at pages 228 ard 
230, "He was employed to give the plaintiffs technical advice in relation to the design or 
development of anything connected with any part of the plaintiffs' business. No particular problem 
had been put before him, but, if, and as often has, any problem of that kind was put before him, it 
was his duty to be ready to tender his advice and to assist in any matter of design or development. 
He was, as I put it during the argument, standing by, and paid to stand by, in that respect," and at 
page 231, "that seems to me to be reasoning which, in the absence of authority, makes it right ard 
proper for me to decide that this invention ... if made during a time during which the chief 
technician is standing by under the terms of his employment, must be held to be in equity the 
property of the employer." 
This in fact seems to be the situation envisaged under the WIPO Model Law. See Commentary on 
the Model Law, at page 65, where "service" invention is referred to one made under a contract of 
employment for the performance of research work (emphasis added). 
Perkins, D.C.L., Molyneux, P.A., "Rights of Employee Inventors in the United Kingdom under 
the Patents Act 1977", Industrial Property Law, 1979, 353, at page 354, state that this particular 
provision of the UK Act seemed to be aimed at those employees who. are categorised as tx:ing 
"employed to invent". See also Cornish, W.R., "Employees' Inventions - The New Uruted 
Kingdom Law", [1978] EIPR October, 4, for the same view. 
British Reinforced Concrete y. Lind (1917) 34 RPC 101, per Eve J., at page 109, "I must regard 
also the particular circumstances and the particular piece of work entrusted to him, out of which 
this invention grew. Now, the nett result is that after his visit of the 9th of November to the 
colliery he was employed by the plaintiff company to design, if he could, a form of lining which 
could comply with and meet the four specific and essential requirements enumerated in his report. 
In my opinion, from that moment the terms of his employment imposed upon him an obligation 
to place at the disposal of, and treat as the property of, the company the best design which be 
could, by the exercise of his industry, skill, ingenuity, and inventive ability, produce for the 
purpose of complying with the essential conditions of the work on which he was employed." 
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made a report stating the essential conditions, and prepared some designs, none of which 
complied with all of those conditions, but one of the designs was considered by the chief 
engineer to be feasible. Lind then informed the chief engineer that he had made an invention 
of a method of construction that would enable compliance with all the conditions. 
Immediately after, Lind applied for a patent for that invention, and informed the company 
of it. The company sought a declaration that Lind held the patent subsequently granted to 
him as trustee for the company. The defendant contended that he had been engaged to 
perform the duties ordinarily performed by a draughtsman or assistant engineer, not to 
make invention. It was held that after the visit of the defendant to the colliery, the terms of 
his employment imposed upon him an obligation to produce, by the exercise of his 
industry, skill, ingenuity and inventive ability, the best design he could, complying with the 
essential conditions of the work. Therefore, he was declared to be a trustee for the plaintiff 
as to the patent. 
The same approach was also shown in Adamson v. Kenworthy.211 The defendant, a 
draughtsman employed by the plaintiffs, was instructed by them to design an unlubricated 
crane brake, a branch of work upon which the defendant had not been directly engaged. 
The design was finally produced and was patented in the defendant's name. The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant was a trustee for them of his interest in the patent. The defendant 
alleged that the successful feature of the resilient disc had been evolved solely by him 
outside the scope of his duties and claimed to be entitled to the beneficial interest in the 
patent. The court held that it was the duty of a draughtsman when instructed by his 
employer to prepare a design, to use such skill and inventive faculty as he might possess in 
order to produce the best possible design within his ability, and that in this case the 
defendant evolved the invention which was the subject of the patent as a result of 
instruction given to him by the plaintiff and in the discharge of his duty. The patent was 
ordered to be assigned to the plaintiff. 
In fact, in Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Scorah,212 the court went even further. The 
defendant was employed by the plaintiffs under a service agreement as an assistant chemist. 
The defendant communicated to the plaintiffs during his employment the subject matter of 
an invention and suggested that they patent it. However, this suggestion was not accepted 
by the Board and they did nothing whatever at the time to patent, or protect in any way, the 
211 Adamson y. KenworthY (1932) 49 RPC 57, per Farwell J., at page 68, citing (amongst others) the 
case of British Reinforced Concrete EniUneerin& Co. Ltd v lind (1917) 34 RPC 101. 
Note: Adamson y. KenwonilY was applied by the House of Lords in Stirlin& y. Patchett (1955) 
AC 534, at 544, per Viscount Simonds. See also Edisonia Ltd y. Forse (1908) 25 RPC 546, per 
Warrington J., at page 551, "The conclusions to which I have come on the facts is, that ~ 
defendant was expressly or impliedly, from the time he became the manager of that moulding 
department. directed to do the best he could with the view of improving the mode of sale and 
manufacture of these cylinders. ... I think that he must be taken to have been placed under the 
obligation of using the utmost skill and knowledge and inventive powers to p"Oduce in the 
business of the company the best possible cylinder and in the most economical way." 
212 Triplex SafeLY Glass Co. y. Scorah (1938) 55 RPC 21, per Farwell J., at pages 28-29. 
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discovery. After his employment had been tenninated, he developed this discovery for use 
in his own business and some two years after his employment had been tenninated applied 
for a patent in respect of "An Improved Adhesive". The plaintiff commenced an action, 
inter alia, for a declaration that the patent was held in trust for the plaintiffs. The defendant 
argued that after a lapse of about three years and despite the prior communication to them of 
the invention the company had made no previous attempt to utilise the invention. Therefore, 
it was inequitable for them now to insist on their right. The court, however, held that once a 
person was put into the position of a trustee, he could not avoid the obligation attached 
thereto unless the beneficiaries released him, either expressly or impliedly. The defendant 
was, and remained, a trustee of the invention which he made while in the plaintiffs' 
employ, and was, therefore, bound to assign the patent subsequently obtained in respect of 
it to the plaintiffs. 
In contrast to the above, the court refused to hold that the employee was obliged to assign 
his invention to the employer in Selz (Charles) Ltd's Application. 213 The employee in that 
case was employed as a general manager of one of the plaintiffs lampshade manufacturing 
factories. The business of the plaintiff consisted in covering wire frames with various 
textile materials, none of which were manufactured by them. While visiting a packaging 
exhibition with a view to selecting packaging materials for his company, he saw an 
exhibition of spray-plastic packaging, and conceived the idea that such process might be 
employed to produce articles for display, and more particularly advertising signs, although 
it might also be employed in making lampshades. Together with two co-applicants, he 
applied for a patent for a development of such process. The court held that there was 
nothing in the obligations which the employee had assumed, or in his duty to his employer, 
213 Selz (Charles) Ltd's Application (1954) 71 RPC 158, per Lloyd-Jacob J., at page 165, "I do not 
think that it is suggested ... that Mr Warren-Smith was at any time directed to apply his mind for 
the purpose of devising an invention or anything in the nature of an invention." See also Mellor y. 
William Beardmore & Co. Ltd (1927) 44 RPC 175, per Lord Ormidale, at page 191, "[T]he mere 
existence of a contract of service in no way disqualifies a servant from taking out a patent in his 
own name and entirely for his own benefit - and that notwithstanding that he had used his 
employers' time and materials to aid him in completing his invention - unless he has become 
bound by some agreement, either express or implied, to communicate the benefit of his invention 
to those in whose employment he is."; per Lord Anderson, at page 199, "He was not employed ... 
to invent, and therefore he is entitled to be paid for his invention by the use of which the defeIKIec 
have profited." In the Canadian case of Spiroll y. Putti (1976) 64 DLR (3d) 280 (Sup. Ct British 
Columbia), Putti was employed to render efficiently operational a machine for making precast 
concrete slabs. While carrying out this work he conceived improvements and the judge found that, 
as nothing relating to the design of the machine or its improvement was contemplated by Putti or 
his employer when he took up his duties, he was not a trustee to his employer in respect of the 
invention. McKenzie J., at pages 291-292 (after reviewing the United Kingdom cases), said, "But 
there is one crucial and significant difference between all of those cases and the present one, and I 
think it is a determinative difference. In all the cases referred to the employee was engaged because 
of his innovative capacities who in the ordinary course of his duties as an innovator creates 
something new or different ... I take this to mean that a court must first find what the employee is 
engaged to do and, if he invents something while performing that function, it belongs to the 
employer. If he is employed to design, then it would be a 'normal incident' of his contract of 
employment that he should do so and that the result of his ingenuity should belong to his 
employer. I read all of the cases discussed so far to have that message in common. In none of them 
do I find the notion that the mere fact of employment ipso facto obligates the employee to deliver 
up his invention to his employer. II 
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which rendered it improper for him to retain as against them his interest in his invention, 
since it was not part of his duty to be engaged in any inventive activity. 
Re Harris' Patent 214 is the ftrst case to come before the United Kingdom court on the 
interpretation of section 39( 1) of the Patents Act 1977. In holding that the invention 
belonged to the employee, the court stressed that the invention was not made in the course 
of the employee's normal duties, nor was it made in circumstances such that an invention 
might reasonably be expected to have resulted from his carrying out his normal duties. In 
fact, in the Patent Office, the hearing officer decided that the patent belonged to the 
employee since he was not employed to design or invent and did not have a special 
obligation to further the employer's interest. It would seem, therefore, that the approach is 
still the same. 
Therefore, despite the seemingly wide coverage of the section, it is submitted that it should 
not be so construed. Inventions made by an employee in the performance of his contract of 
employment should only be deemed to belong to the employer when the employee is 
"employed to invent" or where he has been assigned speciftc duties outside his normal 
duties which involve problem solving. The earlier argument in favour of this construction is 
further supported by the wording of the proviso to section 20( 1), relating to the payment of 
equitable remuneration, which begins with, "Provided that where the invention acquires an 
economic value much greater that the parties could reasonably have foreseen at the time of 
concluding the contract of employment ... ". This implies that for the section to come into 
play, the employee should have been engaged in such a capacity where he is expected to 
apply his inventive faculty, and not merely his manual abilities, in the performance of his 
duties. 
214 Re Harris' Patent (1985) RPC 19. The patent in suit related to a slide valve for controlling flow of 
material such as coal dust through a duct. Harris made the invention while he was manager of the 
Wey valve department of Reiss Engineering who were licensees of a Swiss company, S. Harris' 
primary duty was to sell Wey valves and to use his specialist knowledge of such valves to deal 
with problems experienced by Reiss Engineering's customers. Reiss Engineering had no research 
laboratory, however. and never undertook any creative design activity; any major problem was 
refelred to S. for solution. Harris applied for the patent in January 1979, and Reiss Engineering 
filed a reference under section 8 of the Patents Act 1977 alleging that the invention belonged to 
them by reason of s.39(1). In the Patent Office. the hearing officer decided that the patent belonged 
to Harris, holding that he was not employed to design or invent and did not have a special 
obligation to further R's interest. On appeal to the Patents Court, it was held, inter alia, that 
because R never took it upon themselves to solve design problems in the valves, it could not have 
been part of Harris' normal duties to provide solutions to such problems. His duty was to report 
them for transmission to S., for S.'s consideration and solution. 1be invention was, therefore, not 
made in the course of Harris' normal duties. See pages 28-29, also, per Falconer J., at page 37. See 
also Staena Limitod's Patents [1996] RPC 183, per Dr Ferdinando in the Patent Office, at pages 
198-200. 
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2.7.l.b. "Commissioned" invention 
There should not be any problem in determining whether a person is working under a 
contract for execution of work, or a commission,215 the other branch of section 20( 1) of 
the Act. Although there is no defmition of the term "contract for the execution of work" it 
would seem that this will fall under the traditional description of a contract for services. 
When a person works for another, if the circumstance is not such that it is a contract of 
employment, then it would have to be a contract for the execution of work. In other words, 
the person working would be regarded as an independent contractor. The rule that an 
invention made in the performance of a contract for the execution of work belongs to the 
person commissioning the work is not usually found in the patent laws of other 
jurisdictions, except possibly those systems adopting the WIPO mode1.216 
Just as in the frrst subsection of section 20, a strict reading of the second subsection would 
lead to the conclusion that any invention arising from the execution of work will belong to 
the commissioner. However, it is submitted that not all inventions arising from a 
commission will belong to the person commissioning the work. Whether such 
"commissioned" invention belongs to the person who commissions the work depends on 
the nature of the work contracted for. Take, for example, the case of a commission 
whereby the contractor is awarded the work of servicing and keeping in working order the 
machinery of a particular company. If, during the contractual period, the commissioned 
worker made an invention related to the machinery under his care, and arising from the 
experience which he derived from the commission, could it be said that the legislature 
envisaged that the invention should belong to the person who commissioned the work? It is 
submitted that such is not the intention. The provision relating to commissioned inventions 
being placed together with service inventions in section 20( 1) would imply that the 
requirement that before a service invention can be deemed to belong to the employer, the 
employee must be employed to work in an inventive capacity, will apply equally to 
commission contracts.217 Hence it is only when the commissioned worker is 
commissioned to conduct research works which may result in an invention that any 
inventions made will belong to the person commissioning the work. An example would be 
when a frrm engages the service of an independent contractor or consultant to conduct 
21S For ease of discussion, the term "commission" will be used when referring to a contract for the 
execution of work, and the term "commissioned worker" will be used to refer to the person who 
has been asked to execute such work. 
216 See, for example, the provision of section 66(1) of the Sri Lankan Act. However, i~ suc~ a 
situation, to make business sense, it is usually an implied term of the contract that any lDvention 
arising from the commission would belong to the person commissioning the work - see, fm-
example, Qnddio and Rennie's Application [1996] RPC 141 (Court of Session), per Lord Cullen, 
at pages 178-180. 
217 This view is also supported by the statement in the Commentary to the WIPO Model Law. In 
explaining section 120(1)(a) relating to "service" and "commissioned" work. the Commentary 
refers to "the performance of research work" when explaining the nature of such contracts - see page 
65 of the WIPO Model Law. 
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research in a certain area of study which is of interest to the fmn. To put it another way, the 
activities of the person commissioning the work have to be taken into consideration. Is he a 
user of the product or a manufacturer? If he is involved in manufacturing activities, then he 
might have a legitimate claim to the inventions created by the commissioned worker. 
2.7.2. "Dependent" Invention 
In the case of a "dependent" inventions, section 20(2) provides that "Where an employee 
whose contract of employment does not require him to engage in any inventive activity 
makes, in the field of activities of his employer, an invention using data or means placed at 
his disposal by his employer, the right to the patent for such invention shall be deemed to 
accrue to the employer, in the absence or any provision to the contrary in the contract of 
employment." From the provision, it is clear that the duties undertaken by the employee 
under his employment contract do not envisage any inventive ability or activity. Therefore, 
any invention envisaged would have to be devised by the employee outside his normal or 
assigned duties. Before the provision applies, however, all the conditions stated in the 
section must be present, i.e., the invention made must be within the "field of activities of 
his employer", and the employee must have made use of "data or means placed at his 
disposal by his employer". 218 
It is not clear whether the "activities" mentioned include only those engaged in by the 
employer at the time the employee is taken into service or if it applies to all activities that the 
employer might be involved in the future, i.e., after the invention was made. It is submitted 
that the activities must be restricted to activities of the employer, at the latest, at the time 
when the employee conceives the invention. Further, it is not clear whether the field of 
activities referred to is restricted to the particular branch or division where the employee is 
working, or to all sort of diverse activities engaged in by the employer in all their branches 
or divisions. The question might also arise when the invention relates only to a field of 
activity engaged in by a subsidiary company of the employer. It is submitted that it should 
be construed to apply only to the present field of activities in the particular branch where the 
employee is attached to.219 
218 The concept of the "dependent" invention seems to be quite ~imilar to ~~t. of the "experience" 
invention. i.e .• one which is essentially based upon the expenence or actIVItIes of the employer. 
provided under section 4(2)(2) of the German Act on Employees' Invention. 1957, as amended in 
1994. 
219 In fact, according to Rausing. F.. "The Swedish Law of Employees' Inventions" in Phillips. J. 
(Ed.), Employees' Inventions. A Comparative Study, Fernsway Publication. 1981, at page 99, 
under The Act on the Right to Employee's Inventions (1949:345. as last amended 1980:171) of 
Sweden, only the field within which the inventor is employed shall be regarded as the one 
concerned in the Act 
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The second condition which must be fulfIlled is that the employee, in making the invention, 
uses data and means placed at his disposal by his employer. The word "data" would include 
infonnation gained only because of the placement of the inventor in the particular work 
environment. Confidential information would fall within this category. Possibly other 
information which is not strictly confIdential may be included. For example, where the 
employer is placed in the complaints department, he would be in possession of information 
relating to the defects and shortcomings of a particular product, which he would otherwise 
not be in possession of.220 It is not clear whether it applies also to special knowledge or 
expertise gained by the employee while in employment. "Means" presumably includes the 
use of equipment and machinery of the employer, materials, and possibly even the use of 
other workers in the employment of the employer. 
If this provision is to provide a fair balance between the interest of the employer in being 
able to claim ownership of inventions in situations where the employee is not employed to 
exercise his inventive ability, and the interest of the inventor in being able to claim 
ownership of his own invention, it is hoped that the court will construe it in a narrow 
manner. It is submitted that a narrow approach is the only way to prevent it being applied 
unduly unfairly against the interest of the employee. If the provision is not restrictively 
interpreted, it would seem that if the situation in Harris's Patent 221 were to occur in 
Malaysia, the decision might be different. This is because the invention could be deemed to 
be made using data, i.e., information gained by Harris from his employment, placed at his 
disposal by the employer. There is no mention in the provision as to whether the invention 
needs to be made during the employer's time or whether it applies also to inventions made 
outside office hours, as long as use is made of the employer's data or means placed at his 
disposal. The second condition, i.e., that it is in the field of activities of the employer will 
also be satisfied. This argues for the contention that section 20(2) should be restrictively 
construed.222 
220 
221 
222 
This was the situation that occurred in Harris's Patent [1985] RPC 19. 
Harris's Patent [1985] RPC 19. 
The alternative provided by the WIPO Model Law is that such invention shall be deemed to belong 
to the employee, unless within a period of four months after the date at which the employer 
receives notification of the invention from the employee, the employer notifies the employee of 
his interest in the invention. In such case, the invention shall be deemed to have belonged to the 
employer from the beginning. This alternative is partly based on sections 4(2) and 8 of the ~ 
Act on Employees' Invention, 1957, as amended in 1994, and section 5 of the Act on the .Right to 
Employee's Inventions (1949:345, as last amended 1980:171) of Sweden. ~~wever, this WIPO 
alternative is unsatisfactory because it does not incorporate other related provIsIons of ~e German 
model, which are intended to protect the interests of the employee. See, for ~xampl~, ~ections. 6 and 
7 of the German Act, which envisage the possibility of the employer making a hmlted claIm, as 
opposed to an unlimited claim, to the invention. The latter means that full ownership. righ.ts in the 
invention are claimed, whereas in the former, the employer takes only a non-excluslve bcence to 
use the invention in his business. The employee has the right to apply for a patent and to grant 
non-exclusive licences to third persons, including the employer's competitors. For the German 
approach, see, Phillips, J. (Ed.), Employees' Inventions, A Comparative Study, Femsway 
Publication, 1981, chapter 7, and the following articles: Davis-Ferid, H., "The Employed Inventor 
under United Kingdom and German Law", [1981] 4 EIPR 102; Pakuscher, E.K., "Rewards for 
Employee Inventors in the Federal Republic of Germany", [1991] 11 EIPR 318; [1981] 12 BIPR 
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The Act provides that when these conditions are satisfied, the invention belongs absolutely 
to the employer. There is no attempt to cater for the possibility that the invention may have 
many possible applications, over and above the possible use by the employer in their 
present field of activity. The argument that the scope of the invention went beyond the 
solution of the particular problem that the employers were keen to solve, and therefore, the 
right in the invention should be divided out between the employer and the employee was 
pleaded in Barnet Instruments Ltd v. Overton. 223 The court, although agreeing that the 
invention covered things in which the employer had no interest or concern, held that this 
fact was immaterial. Further, the judge ruled that it would be impossible for the rights in the 
patent to be divided out, giving beneficial ownership to the employer according to the needs 
of the employer, while the beneficial ownership of the rest would go to the employee.224 
Although there is a provision for equitable remuneration for the employee under this 
subsection, it is submitted that the statutory provision regulating "dependent" invention 
goes too far in favour of the employer. Admittedly, the employer should in some way 
benefit from a "dependent" invention, since the employee has made use of the data and 
means available to him through the employment. On the other hand, it has to be 
remembered that the employee is not employed to engage in inventive activity. The 
invention was due to his own initiative. The difficulties envisaged in the construction of 
section 20(2) and the apparent unfairness to the employee could be overcome by the 
adoption of a modified "shop right" doctrine as applied by the United States courts. 
Basically the shop right doctrine provides that an employee who uses his employer's 
facilities, time or resources to make an invention must allow his employer a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free, non-transferable licence to make use of the invention. The ownership of the 
invention, however, belongs to the employee.225 
343; and Schade, H., "Employees' Inventions - Law and Practice in the Federal Republic of 
Gennany" , Industrial Property, September 1972, 249; Schadi, P., "Gennan Law Relating to 
Service Inventions, Inventions of Employees, and the Determination of Remuneration am 
Compensation", Industrial Property Law, 1979, 169. It is interesting to note that the Nicholson 
Report (Intellectual Property and Innovation, Cmnd. 9117, HMSO, London, 1983), at paras. 5.29-
5.31, recommends that employee inventors be given the rights to take title in their inventions 
which were not being exploited by their employer. However, this recommendation was not 
accepted by the UK Government - see Intellectual Property and Innovation, White paper, Cmnd. 
9712, HMSO, London, 1986, at paras. 4.21-4.32. 
223 Barnet Instruments Ud v. Overton (1949) 66 RPC 315. See Romer J., at page 323. 
224 Note that the now repealed section 56(2) of the Patents Act 1949 of the United Kingdom attempted 
to give the court a discretion to apportion the benefits of a patent between employer and employee 
in certain situation where it was unclear whether the invention should belong to the employer or 
employee. However, the provision had been rendered nugatory by the court's co.nstructio~ of the 
section - see Patchett v. SterliO& Eo&ioeerlo& Co. Ltd (1955) 72 RPC 50, per Viscount Simonds, 
at page 57. See also the comments of Cornish, W.R., "Rights in Employees' Inventions - The 
United Kingdom Position", (1990) 21 IIC 298, at page 300. For the genesis of this section, see 
Phillips, I., Hoolahan, M.J., Employee's Invention in the United Kingdom, ESC Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford, 1982, at pages 46-47. 
225 See, generally, Chisum, D.S., Patents, Matthew Bender, Vol. 6, chapter 22. See also the 
interesting article by Moms, C.R., "Patent Rights in an Employee's invention: The American 
Shop Right Rule and the English View", (1959) 75 LQR 483, where he also discusses the Bamet 
case and argues that it would not be impossible for the English courts to adopt the shop right rule 
as a matter of common law. 
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However, the shop right doctrine could be modified to provide a fairer balance between the 
employer and employee.226 While the employee is given the right to the ownership of the 
patent, the employer, in return shall have an exclusive licence to use or exploit the invention 
in whatever way he wishes, as long as the exploitation or use is within the employer's 
present field of activities. The terms of the licence, in the absence of agreement, will be set 
by the court. The employee will have the sole discretion as to what he wishes to do with the 
invention in so far as it is unrelated to the field of activities of the employer. In this way, the 
employer will not have to fear that licences will be granted to his competitors in his field of 
activities.227 The employee will also be able to enjoy the benefit of his invention in areas 
which are not in competition with his employer, for example, by granting licences. 
To ensure that the employer would have the opportunity to take up the exclusive licence, 
there should be a provision for notification of the invention by the employee. Only on the 
employer's failure to accept the offer of an exclusive licence after a fixed period will the 
employee be free to exploit it or offer it to others. At the same time, it should be expressly 
provided in the Act that despite the right to ownership of the dependent invention, the 
employee is still subject to any duty of confidentiality owed to his employer. 
2.7.3. "Free" Invention 
In the case of a "free" invention, that is when the invention is neither a "service" invention 
nor a "dependant" invention, the invention will belong to the employee inventor. There is 
no specific provision providing for such a situation.228 However this proposition is derived 
from the general provision of section 18(2) which provides that subject to section 19, the 
rights to a patent shall belong to the inventor. therefore, it is only when the invention is 
made in the specific situations laid down in section 20(1) and (2) that it will be deemed to 
belong to the employer. Inventions outside these two situations remain the property of the 
employee. This follows the situation at common law.229 
226 For a critique of the "shop right" doctrine, see Koenig, G.K., "The Shop Right - Time for 
Limitation", (1967) 49 IPOS 658. See also, Stedman, I.e., "The Employed Inventor, The Public 
Interest, and Horse and Buggy Law in the Space Age", Patent Law Review, 1970, 207, am 
Neumeyer, F., The Employed Inventor in the United States: R&D Policies, Law, and Practice, The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971, at pages 42-43. In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that the patent law of South Korea appears to elevate the shop right doctrine to make it 
applicable to service inventions. However, this seemingly favourable position of an emplo~ee 
inventor is taken away by the possibility of contractual provisions to the contrary - see section 
39(1) and (3), Patent Law, 1990, Republic of South Korea. 
227 Witness the justifiable unhappiness of the employer in Electrolux v. Hilde (1977) FSR 312, 
where the employee's invention was offered to its rivals. See Whitford I .• at pages 325. and 329-
330. 
228 Unlike the 1977 Act of the UK. which provides in section 39(2) that any other invention made by 
an employee shall, as between him and the employer, be deemed to belong to the employee. 
229 In fact, the early Bnglish cases indicate a strong bias in favour of the employee concerning 
employers' claims to the exclusive benefit to all employees' inventions. See, for example, B10Jam 
y. Blw (1825) 171 BR 1316, ~r Bayley J., at page 1320. "In the case of Hill y. Thompsop 8 
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2.7.4. Equitable Remuneration 
The Malaysian provision for compensation for "service" and "commission" inventions is 
laid down in the proviso to section 20(1). This provides that where the invention acquires 
an economic value much greater than the parties could reasonably have foreseen, the 
inventor shall be entitled to equitable remuneration. In the absence of agreement, the 
amount of remuneration may be fixed by the court. The only condition to be satisfied before 
an employee is entitled to equitable remuneration in the case of a "service" and a 
"commissioned" invention is that the invention should have acquired an economic value 
greater than the parties could reasonably have foreseen. 23o Thus there is no requirement 
that the court should come to a finding that the invention should be of "outstanding benefit" 
to the employer.231 Once a higher than expected economic benefit has been derived by the 
employer, the court is bound to grant equitable remuneration. It is significant to note that 
the mere existence of a benefit arising from the invention would not entitle the employee or 
commissioned worker to an equitable remuneration. It is only when the benefit is over and 
above what could reasonably have been foreseen by the parties that the remuneration 
scheme comes into play. This is fair, since the purpose of engaging the employee in the 
situation under consideration is to seek improvements and savings in the employer's 
business. In other words, the employee is employed to create or come out with solutions to 
benefit the employer. In return for this, the employee gets the benefit of his salary, 
improved employment prospects, or other perks. Therefore, it is only when higher than 
expected benefits are brought about by the employee's efforts that he should be additionally 
rewarded, and be entitled to receive something more, and over and above his usual 
Taunt. 395, it is laid down, that if a servant makes an improvement, his master is not entitled to 
take out a patent for it. "; Heald's Awlication for Patents (1891) 8 RPC 429, per the Solicitor-
General, at page 430, "... there is no doubt in my mind ... that it was as the servant of the 
company, and in the desire to serve the interests of that company, that Heald made the 
improvements ... in question. But then I have to deal with the proposition upon which Mr Graham 
has challenged his opponent to quote an authority - the proposition that an improvement made by a 
servant is the property of his employer, so as to entitle the employer to take out a patent for it, or 
to prevent the servant from taking out a patent for it. I am not aware of any authority which lays 
down that the invention of a servant, even made in the employer's time, and with the use of the 
employer's material, and at the expense of the employer, thereby becomes the property of the 
employer, so as to prevent the person employed from taking out a patent for it." (Note - despite the 
accepted finding that Heald made the invention during the company's time and at the company's 
expense, the invention was held to belong to the employee); and Marshall and Naylor's Patent 
(1900) 17 RPC 553, per Farwell J., at page 555, "It is laid down in Mr Frost's book: 'In the 
absence of a special contract the invention of a servant, even though made in the employer's time 
and with the use of the employer's materials and at the expense of the employer, does not become 
the property of the employer so as to justify him in opposing the grant of a patent for the 
invention to the servant who is the proper patentee." 
230 There is no definition of "economic value". However, it would appear that benefits in the form of 
outright sale of the invention, royalties from licensing, savings in manufacturing costs, the 
deterrent effect of the patent on competitors and increased sales would be included. See, fix' 
example, the comments of Aldous J., in Memco-Med Ltd's Patent [1992] RPC 403, at page 413, 
and the hearing officer, Dr Ferdinando, in British Steel PLC's Patent [1992] RPC 117, at 123. 
231 Unlike the UK scheme which requires "that the patent is ... of outstanding benefit" to the employer 
- s. 40(1). There the court is forced to think in terms of superlatives in assessing the benefit of the 
patent to the employers, see British Steel PLC's Patept [1992] RPC 117. at 122, per the hearing 
officer Dr Ferdinando; Aldous J., in Memco-Med Ltd's Patept [1992] RPC 403, at 414. 
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remuneration. It remains to be seen, however, how the court would construe "higher than 
expected" benefits.232 Another related question is whether the benefit is to be assessed 
from the view point of the employer's whole commercial organisation, or only from the 
unit, division or site to which the employee is attached.233 It is submitted that the reference 
in the proviso to the expected economic value foreseen at the time of making the contract of 
employment is a strong indication that the benefit accruing to the employer should be 
assessed primarily at the level of the immediate undertaking to which the employee is 
attached. However, there may be problems if the invention is used elsewhere other than on 
the site where the employee is attached. Therefore, in fairness to the employee, the primary 
rule should be applied flexibly when the circumstances justify it, and benefits from other 
sites taken into account. 234 
There is no mention that a patent must have been granted for the invention before the right 
to claim equitable remuneration accrues.235 From this it can be argued that the 
compensation provision is meant to apply regardless of whether a patent has been granted 
for it. However, it would appear that the statutory scheme under consideration here is not 
meant to reward any innovative ideas which benefit the employer. Even though the 
invention need not be patented to entitle the employer to receive the statutory reward, it has 
still to reach the level of being a patentable invention under the Act.236 This can be deduced 
from the provisions of section 20(1) and (2) where reference is made to "the rights to a 
patent for an invention" in both the subsections. This is a fairer scheme than that in the UK 
Act, as it allows an inventor to claim remuneration even though the employer may decide 
not to patent the invention, as, for example, when the employer decides, for business 
232 For the problems associated with identifying and quantifying the benefits accruing to the employer 
under the UK scheme, see Chandler, P.A., "Employees' Invention: Outstanding Compensation?" 
(1992) JBL 600. 
233 Under the UK scheme, in determining outstanding benefit, section 40(1) focuses on the "size arxl 
nature of the employer's undertaking". The issue of how this "undertaking" is to be identified arose 
in British Steel PLC's Patent [1992] RPC 117, where the patent was only used at the South 
Teesside works. The hearing officer, Dr Ferdinando, at page 122, ruled that, as no cogent argument 
was forthcoming as to why the word "undertaking" should be construed as applying simply to this 
site, he should have regard to the "undivided totality of the British Steel operation". Howe~er, he 
did not rule out the possibility that in appropriate circumstances, and when supported by eVIdence 
to justify such an interpretation, the proper "undertaking" to be ~onsidered might ~ .c.onstituted by 
a particular sector or site of the employer's total organisatIOn. Such a poSSIbIlity was also 
envisaged by Aldous J., in Memco-Med Ltd's Patent [1992] RPC 403, at 414. Chandler, P.A:, 
"Employees' Invention: Outstanding Compensation?" (1992) JBL 600, at page 606, regards this 
approach as "fair and logical". 
234 See the alternative argument put forward by Chandler, P.A:, "Employees'. Inv~ntion: ?utstanding 
Compensation?" (1992) JBL 600, at page 606, on the question of how to Identify the employer's 
undertaking" under section 40(1) of the UK Act 
235 cf the 1977 Act of the UK, s. 40(1), " ... the employee has made an invention belonging to the 
employer for which a patent has been granted." 
236 Section 11 of the Act provides that an invention is patentable if it is new, involves an. inventive 
step and is industrially applicable, see Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the MalaYSian Patent 
System, para. 1.5.4. 
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reasons, to keep the invention as a trade secret. Further, it is the invention which needs to 
acquire an economic value higher than expected, not the patent. 237 
No guidance is provided in the Act of the factors to be taken into account in deciding the 
amount of the equitable remuneration to be awarded to the eligible employee or 
commissioned worker. It is submitted that the factors listed in section 41 (4) of the 1977 Act 
of the United Kingdom could provide useful guidance. The factors listed in that section 
include the employee's duties, remuneration and other advantages from his employment; 
the effort and skill of others who give advice and assistance; and the employer's 
contribution, by the provision of advice, facilities and other assistance, the provision of 
opportunities, and managerial and commercial skill and activities. 238 
In the case of a "dependent" invention, the proviso to s.20(2) provides that the employee 
shall be entitled to equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement between the 
parties, may be fixed by the Court. Unlike the provision for "service" and "commissioned" 
inventions, entitlement to equitable remuneration is not conditioned upon the invention 
acquiring a greater value than was reasonably foreseen, since in a section 20(2) situation, 
no invention is expected in the first place. Hence a lesser benefit, or even any benefit would 
suffice to entitle the employee to the statutory remuneration. Further, in determining the 
amount of equitable remuneration for a "dependent" invention, the court has to take into 
account the emoluments of the employee, the economic value of the invention and any 
benefit derived from it by the employer.239 No further guidance is given in the Act as to the 
how the proper remuneration is to be calculated nor how it is to be distributed. However, 
from the German experience, it would seem that the method most commonly used in 
determining the value of the invention is the licensing analogy system. Under this method, 
the type of licence contract that might be concluded in similar circumstances is determined, 
and a royalty rate that would be customary for comparable licence agreement is arrived at. 
Since the employee is employed by the employer, is working with materials and facilities 
provided by the employer, and is not exposed to the costs and risk during the development 
of the invention, he will get a lower rate than the market rate - a market rate minus system. 
Another system of calculation is to calculate the measurable benefit of the invention to the 
237 Thus the court is spared any arguments regarding whether it is the patent or the invention which 
gives the benefit to the employer. See the argument in Memco-Med Ltd's Patent [1992] RPC 403, 
the Patent Court, per Aldous J., at pages 416-417, on the construction of the United Kingdom 
provision. 
238 The statutory factors used in assessing the amount of reasonable compensation ~ .~e German 
law include the commercial utility of the invention, the position and responSIbIlity of the 
employee in the employer's business, and the extent to which the employer contributes to the 
invention - section 9, Act of Employees' Inventions, 1957, as last amended 10 1994, Germany. For 
an account of the rules for determining the compensation to be paid to the employee inventor in 
Germany, see Laude, K. E., "The Compensation for Employee Invention in Germany", (1962) 44 
JPOS 772, and Schmied-Kowarzik. V., "Employee Inventions Under German Law", (1972) 54 
JPOS 807. See also further references in footnote 240 infra. 
239 See proviso to section 20(2) of the Act 
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employer. Out of this, a portion is given to the employee, either in a lump sum or by way 
of periodic payment. However, such a method is more difficult to assess in practice.24o 
There is no mention in the section regarding the time period within which a person entitled 
to equitable remuneration can apply for such payment. Further, under the present scheme, it 
does not seem possible for a person entitled, or the employer, to apply for an award to be 
increased or varied. In the interest of certainty, and to enable adjustments to be made 
regarding payments because of later circumstances, suitable amendments should be made to 
the Act. 
2.7.5. Contracting Out 
Section 20(3) of the Act provides that the rights conferred on the inventor under subsection 
(1) and (2) shall not be restricted by contract. 241 Presumably the purpose of this provision 
is to ensure that any attempts by the employer to curtail or diminish the right of the 
employee or commissioned worker to apply for equitable remuneration will not be 
enforceable, since these are the only rights prescribed in section 20( 1) and (2) to the 
inventors. However, it does not go far enough. It would appear that if the employer were to 
insert in the contract of employment that any invention made during the period of 
employment would be deemed to belong to the employer, whether the invention be a 
"service", "dependent", or "free" invention, such a clause would fall outside the prohibition 
of section 20(3). The contractual allocation of rights in a "service" or "dependent" invention 
to the employer would not fall foul of section 20(3), since such rights have already been 
statutorily allocated. The appropriation of "free" invention by the employer would also not 
fall foul of this subsection, since "free" invention is not covered by section 20(1) and (2), 
and therefore, outside the ambit of section 20. It is, therefore, proposed that the reference in 
the subsection to section 20(1) and (2) be removed to prevent a restrictive reading of 
subsection (3). 
240 For more detailed discussions of these methods, see Davis-Ferid, H., "The Employed Inventor 
under United Kingdom and German Law", [1981] 4 EIPR 102, at 104-105; Schade, H., 
"Employees' Inventions - Law and Practice in the Federal Republic of Germany", Industrial 
Property, September 1972, 249, at 252-253; Ruster, B. (Ed.), World Intellectual Property 
Guidebook, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Switzerland, Matthew Bender, 1991, at Ger 2-
152-153; Phillips, J. (Ed.), Employees' Inventions, A Comparative Study, Femsway Publication, 
1981, at pages 193-200. 
241 Even under the common law, the doctrine of restraint of trade has already been applied by the courts 
to strike down unfair widely defined clauses obligating an employee to assign all inventions nate 
during the duration of the employment, however and wherever made, to the employer. See., for 
example, Electrolux y. Hudson (1977) FSR 312, per Whitford J., at pages 321-324, and Ioplex 
Safety Glass Co. y. Scarab (1938) 55 RPC 21, per Farwell J., at pages 27-28, where the express 
term of the contract was held to be too wide to be enforceable. Note too that under section 28 of 
the Malaysian Contracts Act, 1950, "every agreement by which anyone is restrained from 
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void." See generally, 
Chandler, A., Holland, J., Information: Protection, Ownership and Rights, Blackstone Press Ltd, 
1993, Chapter 2, Restraint of Trade. 
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2.8 . Proposals for Change 
The discussions and analyses of the relevant provIsIOns of the Act regarding joint 
invention, joint ownership and employees' invention, show that there are weaknesses in the 
present provisions. The Act should be amended to make it more workable and to enable a 
fairer balance between all interested parties. This involves revisions of four sections. 
sections 18 to 20, and section 40. In relation to section 18, a new subsection (1 A) needs to 
be added to define the attributes of a patent or patent application. It is proposed that 
subsection (2) of section 18 be amended to make the section subject to section 20 and not 
section 19. Further, a new subsection (2A) is incorporated. This subsection will expressly 
provide that where there is an assignment or transfer of the rights to a patent, then such 
rights shall now belong to the assignee or successor in title. A definition of joint 
inventorship is provided in the new subsection (3A), whereas a new subsection (5) 
specifies that the inventor or inventors have the right to be mentioned in a patent 
application. Provision is also made under this subsection to provide for the judicial 
resolution of inventorship disputes. In relation to ownership disputes, provisions are 
proposed to give express powers to the court to deal with them, and to make suitable orders 
in settlement of the disputes. These are dealt with in section 19 by the addition of two new 
subsections. The proposals regarding dependent inventions are dealt with under the 
amended subsection (2) of section 20. The amended subsection (3) and new subsections 
(4) and (5) of section 20 seek to clarify the provisions regarding avoidance of the statutory 
provisions by contract, the right to apply for, and also to vary an order for remuneration. 
The proposed formulation regarding the rights of joint owners are laid down in the 
proposed amendments to section 40 and a new section 40A. 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are 
set out in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Exclusive Rights 
3. Introduction 
The various statutory rights granted to a patentee under the Act are considered in this 
Chapter. Section 36 of the Act provides that the owner of the patent shall have the exclusive 
rights to exploit the patented invention, to assign or transmit the patent, and to conclude 
licence contracts.1 The main focus is on the exploitation rights and infringement of such 
rights. The other exclusive rights, i.e., the right to assign and transmit, and the right to 
licence, are only dealt with in outline here for the sake of completeness. More detailed 
consideration of these two rights, especially the various controls, exceptions, and 
limitations to these rights are dealt with in other chapters. 2 
The different heads of the exploitation rights are examined to determine the scope of the 
exploitation rights, and the activities which would lead to an infringement of the patent. In 
the analysis of infringement, only acts of direct infringement are discussed here. The issues 
of indirect or contributory infringement are dealt with in Chapter 4, as is the question of 
joint tortfeasance. Again reliance is placed mainly on the judicial precedents of the United 
Kingdom courts, and the judicial decisions of the other Commonwealth courts which have 
also traditionally relied on the UK cases. Where relevant, reference is also made to US 
cases.3 
In the analysis of the United Kingdom case law, reference to the old law or common law 
position refers to the law prior to the Patents Act 1977 of the United Kingdom (the 1977 
Act). This is because prior to the enactment of the 1977 Act, there was no statutory 
definition of infringement, nor were there any statutory provisions laying down the 
exclusive rights attributed to the patent owner. The rights were derived from the form of 
These rights are similar to the rights provided in section 134(1)(ii) and (iii) of the WIPO Model 
Law. In fact. section 36(1) to (3) is modelled upon the provisions of section 81(1) to (3) of the 
Code Of Intellectual Property Act [No. 52 of 1979. as amended by the Code of Intellectual 
Property (Amendment) Act, No. 30 of 1980, and the Code of Intellectual Property (Amendment) 
Act. No.2 of 1983]. Sri Lanka (the Sri Lankan Act). The only difference is the absence of the 
equivalent of section 36(4) of the Malaysian Act in the Sri Lankan model (reversal of burden of 
proof). Note that the WIPO Model Law also does not contain a provision on the reversal of the 
burden of proof. 
2 See Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights. and Chapter 
7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights. 
3 In fact, the exclusive rights granted to the patent owner in these countries are substantially the 
same and worded in similar fashion. For the US provisions. see section 271(a) USC Title 35 -
Patents. United States in Appendix. See generally Chisum. Vol. 4, Chapter 16, on the law of 
infringement in the United States. 
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patent as judicially construed.4 These rights, as construed by the courts, were part of the 
law of Malaysia prior to the coming into force of the Act. 5 Although section 60 of the 1977 
Act was also deemed to be a part of the law relating to the patent owner's rights in Malaysia 
prior to the coming into force of the Malaysian Act,6 reference is only made to cases 
4 
5 
6 
For an examp~e ~f the form of patent, see Patents Act 1949, Fourth Schedule. By the grant, the 
patent owner IS gIven the exclusIve right to "make, use, exercise and vend the said invention". The 
word "vend" has been equated with "sell" - see Badische Anilin und Soda-Fabrik v. Hickson (1906) 
23 RPC 433 (HL), per Lord Loreburn L.c., at page 437, " ... He admitted that merely to make a 
contract of sale would not be "vending" or, to use a word in sense equivalent and in use more 
familiar, selling", and Domco Industries Ltd v. Mannington Mills. Inc. et al. 29 CPR (3d) 481 
(1990), per Iacobucci C.J., of the Federal Court of Appeal, Canada, at page 490. 
The exclusive rights of the patent owner in the other Commonwealth countries are either based on 
similar form of patent, or are worded in similar terms in the statutory provisions. 
In New Zealand, the traditional terminology is reproduced in the Third Schedule to the Patents 
Regulations 1954 (S.R. 19541211), Form A. Canada - see section 46 of the Patent Act 1935, c. 
32, s. 1 (Canada) which specifies the rights conferred on a patentee using similar words, i.e., " ... 
grant to the patentee and his legal representatives for the term herein mentioned, from the granting 
of the same, the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending 
to others to be used the said invention ... "; the current section 42 of the Patent Act, RSC 1985, c. 
P-4, is in similar terms. Australia - section 69, Patents Act 1952 (Cth) provides " ... the effect of a 
patent is to grant to the patentee the exclusive right, by himself, his agent and licensees, during the 
term of the patent, to make, use, exercise and vend the invention in such manner as he thinks fit, 
so that he shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention 
during the term of the patent." Under the Patents Act 1990, there is again no provision relating to 
infringement. The extent of the patentee's rights is determined from the provision of section 13, 
and Schedule 1 - definition of "exploit". In South Africa, section 45(1), Patents Act 57 of 1978, 
provides that the effect of a patent is to grant to the patentee "the right to exclude others from 
making, using, exercising or disposing of the invention, so that he shall have and enjoy the whole 
profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention". So it is not surprising that recourse is 
made to a large extent to United Kingdom law from which the words were derived. 
On the rights conferred by registration in Hong Kong under a similar ordinance, Registration of 
United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, Cap. 42, Hong Kong, see Smith. Kline & French 
Laboratories v. Attorney General [1966] FSR 254 (Sup. Ct Hong Kong), per Rigby J .• at pages 
257-258, "Section 6 of that Ordinance ... does no more than extend to the patent holder, by virtue 
of his certificate of registration, the same protective rights in Hong Kong as he already held in the 
United Kingdom ... In my judgement it does not more than extend to Hong Kong the rights and 
privileges given to the holder of a patent issued in the United Kingdom as if the words "the colony 
of Hong Kong" had been included in the original letters patent."; per Huggins J., at page 263, "I 
find nothing in section 6 of the Ordinance which by necessary implication applies any part of the 
statute law of England to the Colony. Within the Colony the certificate of registration ... confers 
merely such privileges and rights as, against a subject. are granted by letters patent at common 
law, those privileges and rights being subject to the conditions and provisions of statutes in force 
in the Colony." 
See, for example, Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v. Salim (Malaysia) Sdn BhI [1989] 2 
MU 380, per George J., at page 382, "In my judgement the purport of the Malaysian Act 
generally and the effect of s. 6 of the Malaysian Act in particular is to confer on the patentee, upon 
registration of his patent in West Malaysia, rights and privileges as if the patent has been. granted 
in West Malaysia and in respect of West Malaysia. Section 6O(1)(a) of the UK Act when mvoked 
in West Malaysia ... should be read with the words 'United Kingdom' therein read as 'States of 
Malaya'. The tenor of the Malaysian Act read as a whole makes this obvious." See also the 
following Hong Kong cases - Improver Corp, v. Raymond Industrial Ltd [1991] FSR 233 (CA 
Hong Kong), per Penlington J.A., at page 239, "While the position is not entirely clear and 
legislation is undoubtedly required to remove any doub~ ... when the matter ~e ~fm:e Mayo J. 
he took the view that the Patents Act 1977 was in force 10 Hong Kong, and regIstration 10 England 
gave protection in Hong Kong by virtue of the Registration of Patents Ordinance, Cap. 42. This 
has not been disputed by either party to the litigation and we are satisfied that he was correct to so 
hold."; National Research Development Com. V. The WeJlcome Foundation lid [1991] FSR 663 
(Patents Court), pt!r Aldous J. t at pages 668-669, "In 1987, it seems that the courts. in Ho~g Kong 
were not certain whether after the passing of the 1977 Act the holder of a patent registered In Hong 
Kong before the 1977 Act came into force enjoyed the original rights and PJ"!vileges obtained upon 
registration or those contained in the 1977 Act ... However, Mayo J., In Impmvfl' Cotp. v. 
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decided under the 1977 Act where they help in the construction of the equivalent provisions 
in the present Malaysian Act. Even though not all the old cases may be directly applicable 
now in view of statutory changes in the Act, analysis of these cases is productive to 
understand the concerns of the judges and how they construed the old provisions to provide 
proper safeguards for the patentee. This analysis and evaluation of the Act aim to detennine 
whether the protection for the patentee is satisfactory or needs to be adjusted. 
3.1. Exploitation Rights 
The Act defines the extent of the "exploitation" rights granted for both a product patent and 
a process patent. Unlike the provisions of the United Kingdom Act, which has only an 
infringement section, the Malaysian Act expressly specifies the exclusive rights of 
exploitation, and refers back to these rights in the section on infringement. However, there 
does not seem to be any practical significance in this. 
In the case of a product patent, the right of exploitation means the right to make, import, 
offer for sale, sell or use the product,7 and the right to stock such product for the purpose 
of offering for sale, selling or using.8 In this context, the difference between a product 
claim and a product-by-process claim needs to be distinguished. A product claim results in 
protection of a new article or substance independent of its manner of preparation, and 
extends to all possible uses of that product. Therefore, even though a method of preparation 
is specified in the specification, protection granted to the product is not restricted to the 
product made by this particular method of preparation. 9 In the case of a product-by-process 
7 
8 
9 
RAymond Industrial Ltd [1988] 1 HKLR 5, held that the rights and privileges were those available 
to a U.K. patentee, namely the rights and privileges contained in the 1977 Act which fBI 
superseded the 1949 Act. ... I believe that Mayo J. was correct. It is correct that the Patents Act 
1977 had not been extended to Hong Kong, but Hong Kong patentees have the same rights am 
privileges as if the patent had been granted in the United Kingdom with an extension to Hong 
Kong. Under the 1949 Act, the rights and privileges in the main came form the Letters Patent. 
After the 1977 Act came into force, it became necessary to look to the 1977 Act to ascertain the 
extent and nature of the United Kingdom patent rights and privileges. A Hong Kong patentee has 
the same rights and privileges and the 1977 Act must be consulted to ascertain their nature arvi 
extent." 
See section 36(3)(a)(i) of the Act. 
See section 36(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. The definition of exploitation rights is in pari materia with that 
provided in section 135(2)(a) and (b) of the WIPO Model Law. 
See, for example~ Adhesive pty MountinS Co. Ltd v. IIJPl) & Co. (1910) 27 RPC 341, at pages 
352- 353, per Parker J.; The Wel1come FOUndatiOn Ltd v. Disc;pbarm Ltd & ors [1993] FSR 433, 
per Judge Ford in the Patents County Court, at pages 439-440, para. 2.9.; Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals InC, & agor v. H.N. Norton & Co. IJd [1996] RPC 76 (HL), per Lord Hoffmann, 
at page 82. See also "Fupaicjde" (1971) 2 nc 85, at 86 (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany) and "TriOlape" 
(1972) 3 nc 226, at 236 (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany); and Ladas, S.P., Patents, ~~ ani 
Related Rights, National and International Protection, Vol. 1, Harvard Uruverslty Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975, at para. 231, page 392. It would appear from the decision of 
"Sypthelabo" (paris Court of Appeals) 25 nc 266 (1994), at page 270, that although the holder of 
a product patent is entitled to prevent the exploitation of a new use that is the subject matter of a 
different dependent patent, he cannot himself exploit the new use without the consent of the holder 
of the patent ...... ted for tbis new use. This is because the right to this dependent invention belongs 
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claim, a distinction has to be made between a claim which is framed "a product obtainable 
by ... (the process)," and one which is framed "product obtained by ... (the process)".IO In 
the frrst case the process described serves only as an example. This form of claim is used 
where the product is new, and hence the patentee could claim the new product per se, but 
could not describe it by the usual structural or chemical parameters. He is thus forced to 
describe it by the process of producing it. Therefore, protection is not confmed to the 
product made by the particular method described. This is use of the term "product-by-
process" in the strict sense of the term. The second use of the term "product-by-process" is 
when it is used in a loose sense to refer to a known product made by a particular new 
process. In the second case, protection is conferred on the product prepared in a given 
specified way and not when obtained by different methods of preparation. The frrst type of 
claim is regarded as a true product claim, whereas the second type is actually a limited 
product claim. So there is a need to distinguish between the strict use and a loose use of the 
term "product-by-process", because different protection arises in relation to the way the 
term is used. 
There is some uncertainty as to whether a product-by-process claim in the loose sense could 
ever be made. There has been no reported case specifically discussing the legality or 
allowability of such product-by-process claims in the United Kingdom, and the cases 
wherein references were made to them seem to be in conflict. ll It has, however, been 
suggested to be the proper course to take if the patentee desires to ensure adequate 
protection for a process patent. 12 No guidance could be derived from either the Malaysian 
10 
11 
12 
to the holder of the second patent, despite the latter's dependence on the fIrst patent. 
See generally, Percy, K., "'Obtainable By' Claims in the Patenting of Natural Products", CIPA, 
February 1992, 218. See also, infra, text accompanying footnotes 179-181. 
For example, Judge Ford in The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v. Discpbarm Ltd & ors [1993] FSR 
433, seems to accept that such a form of claim is possible - see pages 439-440, at para 2.9. See 
also the submission by the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents that sale or use of the direct 
product of a patented process should always be an infringement and that if this was clearly 
stipulated in the law, the existing uncertainty would be removed and there would not be the need 
for separate "product by process" claims (Memorandum of Evidence to the Committee to Examine 
the Patent System and Patent Law (The Banks Committee) submitted by the Chartered Institute of 
Patent Agents. (Reproduced in Transactions of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, Vol. 
LXXXVI, Session 1967-68, at D 39-40).; and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. & anor v. H.N. 
Norton & Cg. Ltd [1996] RPC 76 (HL), per Lord Hoffmann, at page 83, "In this case, the 
respondent would have no objection to a claim to the synthesisation of the acid metabolite or to 
the product in isolation. The only respect in which they say it is not new is when made by 
terfenadine as part of the human body. It may be possible for Merrell Dow to amend the 
specifIcation to exclude manufacture in this manner and form. In ordering the patent to be revoked, 
Aldous J. granted a stay pending an application to amend". But contrast - Beecham Group Ltd y. 
Bristoll"hgratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (HL), per Lord Diplock, at 199, "The monopoly granted 
by a patent is limited territorially to the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man and the corresponding 
prohibition is limited to acts done within those territorial limits. The wide words of the grant IDl 
prohibition were, however, treated as entitling the patentee to prohibit the obtaining from am.l 
and selling in this country an article manufactured abroad by a patented process, even thoug~ the 
article was of a kind that was not new and consequently of itself could not be, and was not, claimed 
as an invention in the specifIcation." 
See, for example, CIPA Guide, 4th Ed., at paras. 14.24 and 14.26, which states that the approach 
taken by the BPO is that product-by-process claims are allowable only if the product is novel per 
se and if the product cannot be satistictcwily defined by reference to its composition, structure m 
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Patents Regulations or the UK Patent Rules, since both are silent on this point. It would 
seem that the preponderance of opinion is that such claims are acceptable in the United 
Kingdom even if the product claimed is not novel. 13 
Under the Act, a known product for a fIrst medical use (a purpose-bound product claim) 
can be claimed. 14 The exclusive rights are only with respect to the use of the product for the 
medical use. Where a process patent is involved, "exploitation" means the right to use the 
process and to commercially exploit any products obtained directly by means of the 
process. IS The exclusive rights granted to a patent for a new use of a known product are 
confIned to the new use. In certain situations where a new use patent is granted despite the 
fact that the new use arises from an inherent, although unknown property of the known 
product, problem may arise regarding the question of whether there is an infringement of 
the use patent by a person who is merely using the known product for a known use. 16 
These exploitation rights are compatible with our obligations under international 
Conventions and Agreements. 17 Once a patent is granted, the owner is able to prevent 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
some other testable parameters. The Guide, however, submits that in contrast, under UK law, 
novelty can be conferred by a process feature included in a product claim. However, no authority is 
cited. See also Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 
4407, at para. 297. 
Note that the situation is different in other jurisdictions. In IFF/Claim Cate~ories, the Technical 
Bow of Appeal of the EPO held that product by process claims were only allowable where the 
product itself was patentable and could not properly be defined in any other way. It could not be 
allowed for a product if that was known or obvious in the light of the state of the art. The fact that 
existing practice of a single Member State, i.e., the United Kingdom, allowed such claims did not 
in itself control the interpretation and application by the EPO of the Articles and Rules of the 
European Patent Convention. In the Board's opinion, "product-by-process" claims could only be 
used as a manner of claiming structurally undefinable product inventions - IFFIClaim Cate&ories 
T150/82 [1979-85] EPOR Vol. C 629, see Reasons for the decision, paras. 7 to 11. See also, 
Triox8Oe (1972) 3 IIC 226, at 236 (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany). A similar approach is adopted in the 
United States - see Dickman, M.H. "Product-by-process claims in the US Patent Practice", 28 
IDEA 59, The Journal of Law and Technology, (1987-88), who reviews the position under US law 
of the allow ability of a "product-by-process" claim. See also Mirabel, E.P., "Product-by-Process 
Claims: A Practical Perspective", 68 JPTOS 3 (1986). Note that the principle that a product which 
can not be identified by normal parameters can be identified or claimed by the process by which it 
is produced is not limited to chemical inventions. In certain cases, a product can also be identified 
by means of the device used for its production. Although exceptional, such a claim is permitted 
where there is no other way of describing the product. See, for example, "Colour Picture Tubes". 
In re N.Y. Phillips (1980) 11 IIC 236 (Decision of the Fed. Sup. Ct Germany). 
See section 14(4) of the Act. 
See section 36(3)(b) of the Act. 
See Merrell Dow Phaonaceuticals Inc. & 800T y. H.N. Norton & Co. lid [1996] RPC 76 (HL), 
per Lord Hoffmann, at page 92, til think it is fair to say that, in the United Kingdom at least, this 
aspect of the Enlarged Board's decision [in MobillFriction reducin& additive Decision G02I88 
[1990] EPOR 73] has been criticised on the ground that a patent for an old product used in ~ old 
way for a new purpose makes it difficult to apply the traditional United Kingdom doctnne of 
infringement. Liability for infringement is, as I have said, absolute. It ~ upon whether. the 
act in question falls within the claims and pays no attention to the alleged mfringer's state of ~nd. 
But this doctrine may be difficult to apply for a patent for the use of a known substance ID a 
known way for a new purpose. How does one tell whether the person putting the ~~ve into ~s 
engine is legitimately using it to inhibit rust or infringing by using it to reduce friction? In this 
appeal, however, we are not concerned with this aspect of the case. tI 
See TRIPS A.Jreement - MTNIFA fi-A1C, Part fi, Section 5: Patents, Article 28, Section I, IIId 
Paris Convention, Article ~r. See also Alternative B of Article 19, of the proposed Patent 
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anyone from exploiting the same invention for a duration of 15 years after the date of its 
grant. 18 
3.2. Infringement of Rights 
The exclusive rights conferred on a patentee by section 36 are backed up by section 58, 
which provides that the performance of any of the activities reserved for the patent owner 
under section 36 would amount to an infringement of the patentee's exclusive rights. 19 A 
patent will be infringed if any person, other than the owner, without his agreement, exploits 
his exclusive right. The owner of the patent has the right to institute court proceedings 
against any person who has infringed or is infringing his patent. He also has the right to 
sue to prevent a threatened or imminent infringement. 20 This right to sue is subject to the 
limitation period of five years from the act of infringement, after which time the action is 
statute-barred.21 
There is no mention in the section that the infringer has to be proved to have the requisite 
intention to infringe or that he has the necessary knowledge regarding the patent status of 
the invention which he is alleged to have infringed. Therefore, a person can be liable for 
infringing a patent without the need to prove these elements. This is in line with the 
common law position, where innocence of the infringer is not a defence to an infringement 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Law Treaty (see Introductory Chapter, footnote 11, for further references to the Patent Law Treaty). 
See section 35. Under section 35(1) of the Act, the patent will expire fifteen years after the date of 
its grant, provided that action is taken to pay the required renewal fees - see section 35(2) and (3). 
By virtue of section 31(2) and (4), the patent is deemed to be granted on the date that the Registrar 
issues to the applicant a certificate of grant of the patent, and the patent is recorded in the Register. 
Note that under Article 33 of the GATT-TRIPS Agreement, the term of protection shall not em 
before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date. In this respect, 
therefore, the Act would have to be amended to increase the term of protection. 
The provisions on infringement is in pari materia with those found in section 160 of the WIPO 
Model Law. The Sri Lankan Act does not contain any specific provision on infringement When 
read together with the provisions on the exclusive rights, they are substantially similar in 
substance to the provisions on direct infringement in the 1977 Act of the United Kingdom (section 
6O(1)(a) to (c) of the Patents Act 1977), and other Commonwealth jurisdictions - see footnote 4. 
See generally, Terrell, 14th Ed., paras. 6.09 and 6.89., and CIPA Guide to the Patents Acts, 4th 
Ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995 at paras. 60.01-60.25 for infringement under the United 
Kingdom law. For the law on infringement in general in the other countries, see, Lahore, J., et al., 
Intellectual Property in Australia - Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Law, Vol. I, Butterworths, 
Sydney, 1994. Chapter 7. and Ricketson. S .• The Law of Intellectual Property. The Law Book Co. 
Ltd. 1984. Chapter 50; Hughes, R.T .• Woodley. 1.H .• Hughes and Woodley on Patents, 
Butterworths, 1995, at paras. 26-39 and Fox. H.O., The Canadian Law and Practice Relating to 
Letters Patent for Inventions. 4th Ed .• The Carswell Company Limited, Toronto, 1969. for the 
Canadian law; Brown. A .• & Grant, A .• The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1989, at paras. 6.68-6.74; Burrell. T.D .• Burrell - South African Patent 
Law and Practice. 2nd Ed. Butterworth, Durban. 1986 - Chapter 5. See generally. Ladas. S.P .• 
Patents. Trademarks. and Related Rights. National and International Protection, Vol. 1, Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1975. at para. 231, page 392. 
See infra. para. 3.3., for Imminent Infringement 
See section 59 of the Act. For proceedings by co-owners. see Chapter 2 - Ownership of Patent 
Rights I",.r S.t at para. 2.6.3. 
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proceedings.22 Even an accidental infringement is actionable.23 This is similar to the law on 
infringement in the countries considered. Nevertheless, proof of an intention to infringe, 
apart from actual infringement, may justify an injunction to restrain infringement. On the 
other hand, an intention to infringe, without an act amounting to infringement, is not an 
actionable wrong.24 The scale of the infringing activities is also immaterial. For instance, 
sale of a very few articles, even though of trivial value, is sufficient to ground an action for 
infringement if the right of the patentee is put in issue.25 
Unlike the UK scheme, it is not possible to rely on innocence as a defence against a claim 
for damages or an order for an account of profits.26 It is not known why such a form of 
relief is not provided under the Act, except for the fact that such a provision is also absent 
in the WIPO Model Law and the Sri Lankan Act. It is submitted that a similar provision is 
even more necessary in a developing country like Malaysia. As compared with their 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
See for example, TWeedale v. Ashworth (1890) 7 RPC 426, per Chitty J., at 432, "Infringement 
depends on what the alleged infringer has done ... It may be rightly said that they had no intention 
to infringe but on the question of infringement, intention, or the absence of intention, is not 
materia1."; British Motor Syndicate Ltd & ors v. John Taylor & Sons Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 723 
(CA), per Lord Alverstone L.C.J., at page 728, "They then took proceedings against the 
defendants, who are innocent in this sense, that they were ignorant of the patent rights, and in that 
sense innocent purchasers of infringing articles from Messrs. Richter & Green. I need scarcely say 
that ignorance is no defence, assuming that breaches of the patent rights are proved."; DunlQP 
Pneumatic lyre Co. v. British & Colonial Motor Car Co. & anor (1901) 18 RPC 313 (King's 
Bench Division), per Lord Alverstone L.C.J., at page 316, "Of course no ignorance would be any 
defence."; Saccharine CQl:p. v. Reitmeyer (1900) 17 RPC 606, per Cozens-Hardy J., at page 612, 
"This is not an action based upon a charge of fraud or conspiracy. It is an action for infringement 
of a patent, as to which scienter is immaterial."; Merrell DQw Pharmaceuticals Inc, & aoor v. H.N. 
Norton & Co. & aoor [1996] RPC 76 (HL), per Lord Hoffmann, at page 92, "Liability for 
infringement is, as I have said, absolute. It depends upon whether the act in question falls within 
the claims and pays no attention to the alleged infringer's state of mind." 
RC(ymes-Cole y. Elite Hosiexy Co. Ltd [1965] RPC 102 (CA), per Diplock L.J., at page 117, "If 
this patent were valid, as the judge held, then I should have been inclined to hold that the plaintiff 
could establish infringement even though the tucks in the infringing stockings were accidental. But 
... I do not think that he was right in holding, as he did, that this patent was valid". 
See, for example, DunlQP Pneumatic lyre Co. v. David MQseles & SQns Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 53, 
per Swinfen-Eady J., at page 60; (1904) 21 RPC 274, per Vaughan Williams L.J., at pages 278-
279. 
See, for example, Cole y. Sagyi (1888) 5 RPC 489, per Kekewich J., at page 493, "It is ... 
admitted that the defendants have sold some two or three toys not substantially different from that 
which is manufactured and sold by the plaintiff, and alleged to be covered by his patent; and, 
therefore, there is no question eo. of infringement. The sale of two or three toys is a small matter. 
although. of course. enough to give ground for the action; but beyond that. I find in the defence 
what I construe as a distinct allegation by the defendants, that they have the right to use the alleged 
patented invention; in other words. to manufacture and sell. the toys in questi~~ ... : there~ore I ~ve 
the plaintiff's right distinctively challenged. and that raIses above the triVIalIty which ~I~ht 
otherwise have been in it by reason of the small sale of only two or three toys, worth eo. a shilling 
or so apiece." See also Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu Electronics. Inc .. et al, 122 USPQ 554 (CA 
9th Cir. 1959). per Bames. Circuit Judge, at 558 - manufacture of one machine by an infringer is 
sufficient to make manufacturer liable. s'l too is one sale sufficient to make seller liable. 
See section 62(1) of the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom (formerly section 59(1), Patents Act 
1949). See also section 123, Patents Act 1990. Australia, and section 69( 1), Patents Act 1994. 
Singapore. Note that a similar defence is also provided ~ section 4, Uni~ Kingdo~ Designs 
(Protection) Act 1949 (Revised 1978), Act 214, MalaYSIa, whereby the registeral propnetor of a 
design is not entitled to recover any damages in respect of any infringement of copyright in a 
design from any defendant who proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware nor t.l 
any reasonable means of making himself aware of the existence of the registration of the design. 
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counterparts in the developed countries, entrepreneurs, especially the small manufacturers 
and retailers, are less sophisticated and "patent-conscious",27 and may not be in a position 
easily to determine whether the products they are dealing in are prohibited by the existence 
of a patent. Being injuncted from further dealings with such products is drastic enough 
without their being exposed to liability for damages or account of profits. Where a 
manufacturer copies a product without carrying out the necessary investigation, it is fair that 
he should be made to bear all the consequences that go with a fmding of patent 
infringement.28 However, when a product is not copied, or where a retailer is not in a 
position, or lacks reasonable means, to carry out the necessary investigation, it would 
appear harsh that he should be doubly punished. Hence it is proposed that a similar 
provision should be added to the Act to protect innocent infringers from the excessive 
consequence of their acts.29 In view of the difficulties experienced in the construction of the 
UK section,30 it is recommended that the more simply worded Australian provisions be 
adopted. Some modifications will, however, have to be made to clarify its intended 
application. The first is to clarify that the defence is applicable during the period when 
innocence could be established, despite the fact that there is still infringing activity after 
such a period.31 Further, a new subsection is added to the Australian model to prevent the 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
See Reid, B.C., A Practical Guide to Patent Law, 2nd Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, at page 109. 
See comments of Graham J. in Lancer Boss Ltd y. Henley Forklift Co. Ltd [1975] RPC 307, at 
page 317, and the Privy Council in Khawam & Co. y. Chellaram & Sons <Ni~ria) Ltd [1964] 
RPC 337, at page 344 .. 
As rightly pointed out in the CIPA Guide, 4th Ed., at page 571, a company with a research and 
development department, or its own in-house patent department, would seem rarely to be able to 
take advantage of the provision because of the presumption that such departments ought to take 
steps to become aware of patents in their field of interest. However, this defence is of value to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. See also Benmax y. Austin Motor Co .. Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 
143; (1953) 70 RPC 284, per Lloyd-Jacob J., at page 157, where the fact that a copy of the 
"Patent Journal" and two volumes of the official abridgements of specifications which included the 
specification of the patent in suit were in the defendant company's reference library resulted in their 
being unable to prove affirmatively that they were unaware or that they bad no reasonable ground 
for supposing that the patent existed. 
See generally, CIPA Guide,4th Ed., at para. 62.03, Terrell on the Law of Patents, 14th Ed., at 
paras. 12.240-12.241, and Vitoria, M., et al., Encyclopaedia of United Kingdom and European 
Patent Law, Sweet & Maxwell, Vol. 1, 1996, at para. 10.128. For a review of the history of the 
section, and its present application, see Lancer Boss Ltd y. Henley Forklift Co, Ltd [1975] RPC 
307, per Graham J., at pages 314-319. 
In relation to the application of section 59(1) of the Patents Act 1949 of the UK (which was 
framed in similar terms to section 62(1) of the present UK Act, except for the non-inclusion of 
relief for account of profits), Lloyd-Jacob J., in Benmax y. Austin Motor Co .. Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 
143, at page 156, said that after having continued to infringe after having knowledge of the patent 
in suit, the defendant could not rely on the section because, "the protection it affords to an innocent 
infringer is absolute. It secures him against an order in ~e ~.awardi~g ~~ t~ a 
successful patentee. It is not in terms directed to the diviSIOn of a continwng penod of mfringmg 
use between a state of ignorance and a state of knowledge of the plaintiffs rights ... a defendant 
who seeks to avail himself of the protection affirded by section 59( 1) must plead and prove a 
complete ignorance of the existence of the patent monopoly d~ng the period. in . which the 
wrongful acts were being done." It is submitted that such a ~onstruction of the section I~ ~ ~ 
it ineffectual since the purpose of the section is to permit the defendant to escape liability In 
respect of any period of ignorance of the patent monopoly. See, however, Lancer Boss Ltd y. 
Henley Forklift Co. lid [1975] RPC 307, at page 317, where Graham J. seemed ~ to divide 
the period of infringement, although on the facts, it was held that the defendants were not entitled 
to rely on the defence. 
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application of the rule of constructive knowledge arising from the mere fact of the patent 
being recorded in the Register. 
3.2. 1 . Product Claims 
The various exclusive rights of making, selling, offering for sale, using, importing, or 
stocking the product are now examined in depth in relation to product claims. These rights 
are listed in the disjunctive form by the use of "or" in the section. Therefore, anyone of the 
infringing acts without the other will constitute infringement. For example, the making of a 
patented product in itself, even without use or sale will constitute an infringement.32 
3.2.1.a. Making 
This is a word commonly used in most patent statutes, and therefore, should not cause 
much difficulty in construction. "Making" in the context of patent infringement would mean 
manufacturing the patented article.33 Under the old law, "make" was construed as "making 
the whole article",34 and there is no reason why this should not still be the rule. Further, 
where the making of an article requires a number of operative steps, then "making" occurs 
when the final step is carried out to result in the completed article.35 From the case law 
decided by the UK courts, it would also apply to the making of all the constituent parts of a 
patented product for sale in kit form, so that they may be put together by the purchaser.36 
However, beyond this specific situation, the UK and other Commonwealth courts have not 
32 In relation to similarly worded provisions of the US Patents Act, see, for example, Justice Story in 
Whittemore v. Cutter 29 F. Cas. 1120, at 1121 (CC D. Mass. 1813), "The legislature intends to 
make every one of the enumerated acts a substantive ground of action." See also Roche Products. 
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co .. Inc. 221 USPQ 937 (CAFC 1984), per Nichols, Senior Circuit 
Judge, at page 939, "It is beyond argument that performance of anyone of the three enumerated 
activities is patent infringement It is well-established, in particular, that the use of a patented 
invention, without either manufacture or sale, is actionable ... Thus the patentee does not need to 
have any evidence of damage or lost sales to bring an infringement action."; and Neff Instrument 
Corp. y. Cohu Electronics. Inc" et al. 122 USPQ 554 (CA 9th Cir. 1959), per Bames, Circuit 
Judge, at page 558 - mere manufacture, without sale, is sufficient to create infringement. 
33 See, for example, British Motor Syndicate Ltd & ors v. John Taylor & Sons Ltd (1900) 1 Ch. D. 
577, at 581, per Stirling 1. " ... the defendants in this case did not make the invention if by that, as 
seems to be the proper interpretation, is meant manufacturing the patented article." See also ~ 
& Cie v. Q'Donne1l229 US 1,57 L. Ed. 1041, at page 1044 (US Sup. Ct 1913), per Justice Day. 
"The right to make can scarcely be made plainer by definition, and embraces the construction of the 
things invented." 
34 See, The American Flan~e and Manufacturin~ Co. Inc. v. Bernard van Leer (1948) 65 RPC 305. 
per Sellers 1.. at pages 320-321. 
35 Sykes y. Howarth (1879) 12 Ch.D 826, per Fry 1., at pages 832-833. 
36 See, for example. United Telephone Co, v. Dale (1884) 25 Ch.D. 778, at 782. per Pearson J., aOO 
Rotocrop International v, Genbourne [1982] FSR 241, at 259. See also Windsurfin~ International 
Inc & anor v. Petit & anor (1983-1985) 3 IPR 449 (Sup. Cl of New South Wales), per Waddell J., 
at pages 456-459, holding that the sale of an unassembled sailboard in ~it form infring~ the ri~ht 
given by s. 69 of the Patents Act 1952 (Australia) because of the ordmary course which vending 
the invention took. 
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been willing to extend patent protection under the common law to prevent the manufacture 
and supply of constituent parts which could be used in infringement of the patent.37 
As long as the "making" of the patented product is within jurisdiction, the act would 
amount to an infringing act, whether the products so manufactured are destined for sale 
within jurisdiction or in a foreign country.38 Even the making of the patented article with 
intent to sell after the expiration of the patent is an infringement. 39 The main issue then, in 
the context of infringement by "making", is whether the manufactured article falls within 
the scope of the patent claim or claims.4o However, if the product as initially made by the 
defendant does not fall within the scope of the patentee's claims, then there is no liability on 
the part of the defendant, even though it may later have been adjusted or modified to fall 
within the claims by a third party.41 Further, in relation to "making", a distinction has to be 
made between "repair" and "reconstruction".42 
3.2.l.b. Sellin~ 
The equivalent term used in the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom is "dispose of'. There 
thus appears to be a significant difference between the UK and the Malaysian provision.43 
While the word "dispose"44 is wide enough to encompass "selling" and "leasing",4S the 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
In particular, the problems associated with the legality of making and supplying unassembled 
constituent parts for export markets, see for example, Deepsouth Packine Co, Inc, v' The Laitram 
Corporation 406 US 518; 173 USPQ 769 (US Sup, Ct 1972), per Mr Justice White, at pages 771-
774. This, and related problems, including infringement by supply of essential means, are addressed 
in Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights. 
See Lyon v. Qnddmrl (1894) 11 RPC 113, where despite the grant of an injunction against him to 
refrain from infringing the plaintiffs patent, the defendant manufactured and sold an infringing 
machine for shipment to Shanghai. The court held that there was a breach of the injunction - see 
Mathew J., at page 115. A similar approach is adopted in the United States. See, for example, 
Ketchum HaryesterCo. V. Johnson Harvester 8 F. 586 (CC N.D.N.Y. 1881), per Blatchford C.J., 
at pages 586-587, where the court awarded damages as to devices made in the United States but sold 
abroad. 
See, for example, Crossley V. The Derby Gas Lieht Co. (1834) 4 L.J. Ch. 25, Lord Brougham 
L.C., at page 26, and the US case of UndelWood Typewriter Co. v. Elliott-Fisher Co. 156 F. 588 
(CC SD N.Y. 1907), per Holt, District Judge, at page 590. 
See infra, in para. 3.5., Determining the Scope of the Patent. 
See Non-Drip Measure Co. Ltd v. Stranms Ltd (1942) 59 RPC 1 (CA), per MacKinnon L.I., at 
pages 24-25. See also the United States case of Knieht v. Gayit 14 Fed. Cas. 765 (CC ED Penn. 
1846), per Kane J., at pages 768-769, " ... if the machine, as made by the defendant, was not an 
infraction of the plaintiffs patent, the alteration of it by a third party will not make the defendant 
liable for an infraction to which he was not a party. " 
This aspect is discussed in Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights, para. 7.3. 
The term used in Article 2S of the Community Patent Convention is "putting on the market". 
The dictionary meaning of "to dispose of' is "to deal with definitely; to get rid of; to .get done 
with finish' or to make over by way of sale or bargain, sell." - The Shorter Oxford Engbsh, Vol. 
1, 3rd Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. Terrell, 14th Ed., at pages 176-177, i~ of the opi~ion 
that "dispose of', although in its widest sense could cover any los~ of. phYSical po~on, 
including destruction, when construed with the provisions of the CPC In Dllnd, has to he: limited 
to a D8ITOwer meaning of covering only "loss of physical possessio~ by ~ that 
possession to an~ in ~ course of trade,. fm: e~ample, by way of sale . According to Terrell, 
under this construction, lending would be an mfriDglDg act. 
""IDM y. PC' c PlCk'ajo.'aI [1982] FSR 406 (Patents Court), ,.r Falconer I., at page 413. It 
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nonnal meaning of the word "selling" does not include commercial transactions such as 
leasing and hiring. Under the Interpretation Act, the word "sell" is defmed to include 
exchange, barter, offer for sale and expose for sale.46 Even under this extended meaning, it 
is arguable that "leasing" would not be encompassed within the exclusive rights. Since all 
the listed activities in this definition involve a transfer, or future transfer, of ownership by 
one party to another, the application of the ejusdem generis rule of construction would 
preclude "leasing" being included in this class. Hence in this respect the exclusive rights of 
the patentee in Malaysia may be narrower, and there could be a lacuna in the law. 
If the manufacturer were to sell the manufactured product, then he would also be caught 
under the head of infringement, to sell. This head would be applicable whether or not the 
product is manufactured within the jurisdiction, as long as there is a sale within jurisdiction. 
Further, the mere fact of selling within the jurisdiction is an infringement, whether it is for 
use in the country or for export.47 
Several hypothetical situations are envisaged to assist in the analysis of the possible scope 
of this right. Situation 1 involves the convergence of all the three necessary ingredients in 
the transaction, i.e., the seller, buyer and the infringing product, within jurisdiction. In 
situation 2, both the seller and buyer are within the jurisdiction, but the product is outside 
the jurisdiction. Situation 3 envisages only the buyer being within jurisdiction, the seller 
and the goods are outside jurisdiction. In situation 4, the seller alone is outside 
jurisdiction, while and the buyer and the product are inside jurisdiction. Situation 5 
envisages the buyer being outside jurisdiction, whereas the seller and the product are within 
jurisdiction, while in situation 6, only the seller is within jurisdiction while the product 
and the buyer are outside jurisdiction. In situation 7, only the product is within 
jurisdiction, while both the buyer and seller are outside the jurisdiction. Finally, m 
situation 8, there is a convergence of all the ingredients outside the jurisdiction. 
The relevant decided cases are now analysed to determine whether a test could be devised to 
assist in determining whether a particular transaction will amount to a patent infringement 
under this head. In Saccharine Corp. v. Reitmeyer & Co. ,48 both the parties to the contract 
were resident within the jurisdiction The particulars of breaches alleged, inter alia, 
infringement of the patent by the importation into the country by the defendants of certain 
would also appear that "lending" would not amount to an i~fri~ging act Undel- ~e law in the 
United Kingdom prior to the 1977 Act, lending was not an mfringement - see Unrted Telephone 
Co. Ltd y. Hemy & Co. (1885) 2 RPC 11 (Ch. Div.), per Bacon V.C., at page 12, and also the 
statement of MacKinnon L.J., in Non-Drip Measure Co. Ltd y. Stran&ers lid (1942) 59 RPC 1 
(CA), at page 25. 
46 See section 3, Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Consolidated and Revised, 1989) Act .388, 
Malaysia - "sell" includes exchange, barter, offer for sale and expose for sale. See also, infra, 
footnotes 78 and 79, and accompanying text 
47 See I..yon y. GMtrd (1894) 11 RPC 113, footnote 38, supra. 
48 SF". Crup. y. Boitrncyer" Co. (1900) 17 RPC 606,,.r Cozens-Hardy J., at page 611. 
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quantities of saccharin. The defendants contended that they had only contracted to deliver 
the saccharin at certain foreign ports, and had in fact delivered them there, and were not 
responsible for its importation. The court held that the mere entering into contracts in the 
country for sale by them to a company in England of such saccharin made abroad to be 
delivered at foreign ports did not constitute infringement. Further, the knowledge of the 
defendants as to the destination of the saccharin was immaterial. This approach was 
approved of by the House of Lords in Badische Anilin und Soda-Fabrik v. Hickson, which 
also involved a sale contract made within jurisdiction for the infringing product to be 
delivered outside the jurisdiction. The Court held that such a transaction was not a 
"vending" of the patented product, since to constitute an infringement, the delivery of the 
infringing products had to be made within the country.49 In the above Badische Anilin 
case, the plaintiffs also argued that since the property in the goods passed at the time the 
contract was made, the defendant should be deemed to have infringed within jurisdiction. 
This contention was dismissed, inter alia, on the grounds that it was not material to 
consider whether or when the property in the goods passed to the purchaser, since the 
goods were manufactured and situated abroad, and were not brought into the country by the 
seller. 5 0 
In Badische Anilin und Soda-Fabrik v. Johnson,S1 a trader in England ordered infringing 
goods from the defendant in Switzerland to be sent by post to England. The defendant 
addressed the goods to the trader in England and delivered them to the Swiss Post Office, 
by whom they were forwarded to England. The House of Lords held that since the contract 
of sale was completed by the delivery to the Post Office in Switzerland, and since the Post 
Office was the agent of the buyer and not of the vendor, the patentee had no right of action 
against the vendor for an infringement of the patent. 52 A similar decision was also reached 
in KiJman v I peL Packa~in~ Ltd,S3 a case decided under the 1977 Act. The frrst 
defendants (peL) obtained two allegedly infringing fliters from the second defendants 
(Be), a US corporation with no place of business in the UK. Both filters were sold and 
delivered in Massachusetts f.o.b the US shipping point against previous payment of the 
purchase price and were consigned by air to England. peL paid the freight and charges. 
There was uncontested evidence that by US law, the sale f.o.b in Massachusetts divested 
Be of title, and that on delivery to the shipping point they lost both actual and constructive 
possession of the filter. In an action against PCL for infringement, leave was obtained to 
49 Badjsche Anitin und Soda-FOOk y. Hickson (1906) 23 RPC 433 (HL). See Lord Loreburn L.C., 
at pages 436-437, and Lord Davey, at page 437. A similar approach is adopted in Canada. See, f<r 
example, Domco Industries Ltd y. Mannin&ton Mills. Inc. et ale 23 CPR (3d) 96 (1989); 29 CPR 
(3d) 481 (1990), per Iacobucci C.J., of the Federal Court of Appeal, Canada, at pages 489-496. 
SO Badim Anitio und Soda-Fabrik y. Hickson (1906) 23 RPC 433 (HL), per Lml Davey, at page 
438, and Lord James, at page 438. 
SI BedjgboAnjljn upd Soda-Fabrik y. Johnson (1897) 14 RPC 919 (HL). 
S2 Bwljgbo AnUjn upd Soda-Fabrik y. Johnson (1897) 14 RPC 919 (HL), per Lord Halsbury L.C., at 
pages 927-929. See also, Seg;barine Corp. y. RUneyer (1900) 17 RPC 606. 
S3 g,lroy y. PeL PERlina 1M [1982] FSR 406 (Patents Court). 
147 
serve Be out of jurisdiction, relying, inter alia, on the commission of torts within the 
jurisdiction, i.e. offering to dispose or disposing of infringing articles, offering for use in 
the UK. Be applied to set aside the writ and service as against them. It was held. following 
"-
the Badische Anilin case, that Be had sold the futers in the USA and accordingly had no 
further rights in them of which they could "dispose" in the UK.54 The same approach is 
adopted in the United States.55 In contrast, in Morton-Norwich Products Inc. v. Intercen 
Ltd,56 the court held the overseas defendants guilty on the ground that they still retained 
constructive possession of the infringing goods in the United Kingdom. 
Based on the decided cases, and the purpose of the provision, it is possible to formulate a 
general principle to apply in the determination of whether the alleged infringer's activity 
amounts to "selling" a patented product in Malaysia. Since the whole purpose of selling 
something is to transfer the ownership or title in the goods sold to the buyer,57 it would 
appear that the transfer of property has to be an essential element in the transaction. 
However, it is submitted that, as a general rule, as long as there is a contract to sell, i.e., 
the intention is that the property will eventually pass to the buyer, it is immaterial for the 
purpose of determining whether there is infringement by selling, that property has passed, 
or that delivery has taken place. If an "offer to sell", being an inchoate sale, is an infringing 
act, this should equally be so where there is a subsisting contract to sell, even though title 
has not passed. The question of transfer of title is only relevant where the issue is whether 
the seller has any rights or property in the goods which he can sell within jurisdiction. 
Therefore, if the infringing goods are outside jurisdiction, the issue of whether there has 
been a transfer of property is crucial. This is because, if the title in the goods has passed to 
the buyer outside jurisdiction, there is nothing that the seller can "sell" to the buyer within 
jurisdiction. The infringing transaction has occurred outside the jurisdiction. There cannot, 
therefore, be an infringement. Likewise, where the goods are originally physically outside 
the jurisdiction, if delivery takes place outside the jurisdiction, there can be no infringement 
even if property has passed at the time the contract was made within jurisdiction. However, 
to this must be added the rider that even if the transfer and delivery take place outside 
54 Kalman y. PCL Packa~in~ Ltd [1982] FSR 406 (Patents Court), per Falconer J., at pages 413-
414. 
55 See, for example, Minnesota Minin~ & Manufacturini: Co. v. International Plastic COW. 72 
USPQ 97 (CA 7th Cir. 1947), per Sparks, Circuit Judge, at page 102, "Where a dealer solicits an 
order for goods in one state and forwards it to a manufacturer at its home office in another state and 
the goods are shipped direct by the manufacturer, the sale is considered as having been made in the 
latter state and does not constitute an infringement of a patent in the former state."; W.S. Tyler 
Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. 236 US 723 (US Sup. Ct 1915), per Justice McReynolds. at page 
724, "The circumstances attending only one sale appear in the record, and this was .negotiated by 
the purchaser in order that it might afford the basis for a suit. Guerin received and t.orwarded, and 
his principal accepted, the order for goods, which were thereafter manu~actured ~d shipped .... to the 
purchaser in New York City. This sale was consummated at St. LOUIS, and did not constitute an 
infringement of appellant's patent within the district where suit was brought". 
56 Morton-Norwich Products Inc. v. Intercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501, per Graham 1.. at pages 518-519. 
57 The Shorter Oxford English. Vol. I, 3rd Ed .. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. meaning no. 3 - to 
give up or hand over (something) to another person for money (or somethin.g that is reckoned as 
money); esp. to dispose of (merchandise, possessions. etc.) to a buyer for a pnce, to vcnd. 
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jurisdiction, the seller may still be liable as long as he still retains some form of control or 
possession, whether actual or constructive, over the goods within jurisdiction. 
Therefore, it is submitted that where the subject matter of the transaction, the corpus, is 
physically present within the jurisdiction right from the beginning, an infringement arises 
whenever there is any contract to sell it. Where, however, the infringing product is initially 
outside the jurisdiction, the test is different. In this case, an infringement takes place under 
this head only when there is a transfer of property to the buyer when the goods are brought 
into the jurisdiction. If the property in the goods passes outside the jurisdiction, there 
cannot be an infringement, unless the seller still retains some control or possession, actual 
or constructive, over the goods. 
Based on the "corpus" test derived from the above cases, the situations envisaged above 
can now be addressed. Situation 1, which involves the convergence of all the three 
necessary ingredients in the transaction, the seller, buyer and the infringing product, within 
jurisdiction would result in an infringing activity. This, it is submitted, is so even if 
delivery and transfer have not taken place. Situation 2, which involves the "corpus" 
being outside the jurisdiction, while both the buyer and seller are within jurisdiction, would 
not result in an infringing act committed within the jurisdiction.58 Situation 3, where only 
the buyer is within jurisdiction, will also not involve an infringement.59 In the second and 
third situations, however, there would be an infringing act if the seller had retained title or 
possession when the infringing product enters the jurisdiction.6o The result in situation 
4, where the seller alone is outside jurisdiction, while and the buyer and the product are 
inside jurisdiction, should also amount to an infringement regardless of whether there is a 
transfer of title within or without jurisdiction. The result should be similar in situation 5, 
where, even though the buyer is outside jurisdiction, the seller and the product are within 
jurisdiction. In the fourth and fifth situations, there is the physical presence of the product 
at the beginning of the transaction, i.e., the "corpus" is within jurisdiction. To hold that 
there is no infringement unless there is proof of the transfer of title within jurisdiction will 
be to place a premium upon technicalities. Situation 6 should not give rise to any 
infringement. Since only the seller is within jurisdiction while the product and the buyer are 
outside jurisdiction, the seller could not be said to be selling within jurisdiction, even if the 
transfer of property takes place within jurisdiction. Situation 7 presents a difficult 
situation. However, it is submitted that under the "corpus" test, the transaction should be an 
infringing act since the contract is meant to have effect, and involves a subject matter within 
the jurisdiction. Such a construction is, therefore, justifiable. Finally, in situation 8, the 
'8 See Saccharine Cmp. y. Reitmeyer & Co. (1900) 17 RPC 606. footnote 48. and Badim Apjlin 
upd Soda-Fabrik y. Hicksop (1906) 23 RPC 433 (HL). footnote 49. supra. 
S9 See BadiA Apiljp upd Soda-fahrik y. Johpsop (1897) 14 RPC 919 (HL). footnote 52, ... 
KaJmM y. PCL Paclgaaiol ltd [1982] FSR 406 (patents Court). footnote 54. supra. 
60 See Monop-Norwich Products Ips. y. Jntc;n;ep IJd [1978] RPC SOl. footnote 56. supra. 
149 
convergence of all the ingredients abroad means that the activity does not take place within 
jurisdiction, and is, therefore, out of the patent owner's control. 
3.2.1.c. Offerin& for sale 
Since offering for sale is made a separate head of exclusive right, and hence an infringing 
act, the mere offer, without the need to prove a subsequent sale arising from the offer, is an 
infringement. An old case decided in the late nineteenth century may give an indication as to 
the approach of the courts when dealing with infringement by "offering to sell" an allegedly 
infringing product. In Gwynne v. Dtysdale, the patentee of certain type of swivelling 
pumps, sued the defenders for infringing his patent. The alleged infringements consisted of 
the sale of certain pumps and offers to execute orders for swivelling pumps in response to 
applications by persons interested. The court held that the defenders had not infringed 
because the pumps which they had sold were not swivelling pumps at all. With regard to 
their offers to execute orders for swivelling pumps, as the offers were general offers, and 
there was no proof that the defenders intended to supply pumps according to the description 
in the specification, the general presumption of innocence must be applied.61 Hence when 
the allegation is that the defendant has It offered to sell It infringing products, there should be 
credible evidence that the offer is to sell products that would infringe a patent. In fact, but 
for the fact that it has been made a specific head of infringement, such a situation would fall 
to be dealt with under imminent infringement.62 
It would also appear that in the case of an offer to sell infringing products, not only must 
the offer to sell be made within jurisdiction, but the goods offered to be sold must also be 
within the jurisdiction. Although both Saccharine Com. v. Reitmeyer & Co. and Badische 
AnUin und Soda-Fabrik v. Hickson involved an actual sale, the ratio in the cases would 
apply equally to offer to sell.63 Since the purpose of the patent system is to grant the 
patentee certain exclusive rights within the granting country, it is only interference with his 
economic exploitation of the patent within the country which is actionable.64 In the case of 
an offer to sell a patented product, the approach of the court has been that there has to be a 
physical presence of the infringing goods within the jurisdiction before any liability could 
arise. For example, in Kalman v. peL Packa&in& Ltd, a case decided under the 1977 
United Kingdom Act, Falconer J. held that the expression "offers to dispose of' must be 
read as meaning, "offers in the United Kingdom to dispose of the product in the United 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Gwynne y. Dasdale (1885) 2 RPC 160 (Court of Session, Scotland), per Lord Mclaren, at pages 
164-165. 
See infra, at para. 3.3. 
See footnotes 48 and 49, supra. 
See Badjgbe Anjlin und Soda-Fabrik y. Hickson (1906) 23 RPC 433 (JR.), per Lord Davey, at 
pages 437-438, "I am of opinion that the exclusive right of "vending the invention" in the 
statutory fonn of patent must be construed consistently with the language of the Statute of 
Monopolics, and with regard to the general purpose of the patent, to give the inventor the full 
benefit of his invention in this country." 
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Kingdom".6s This decision has been criticised by Benyamini, who submits that an 
"offering" made within jurisdiction, for whatever purposes, by a foreign manufacturer, to 
supply a patented product abroad for use within jurisdiction would constitute an 
infringement under the CPC and the UK law.66 This contention is, however, based on the 
wording of Article 25(a) of the CPC, whereby the word "offer" is not qualified by other 
words. Unlike the provision of the CPC, the Malaysian provision uses the expression 
"offer for sale". Therefore, attractive as Benyamini's view is, it is submitted that the present 
provision of the act prevents such a "purposive" construction. 
However, while the logic of the UK approach may be beyond criticism, the problem with it 
is that it leaves free overseas "mail-order" suppliers to conduct their business without 
exposing themselves to infringement actions.67 The foreign supplier would place 
advertisements within jurisdiction offering to supply patented products to private users 
from overseas. It would be a condition of the contract that the legal act of sale is to take 
place overseas, and the property in the goods ordered is to be transferred to the buyer at the 
time of acceptance. Since there is no disposal of the supplier's property within jurisdiction, 
they are beyond the control of the patentee. If this sort of business is carried out in a 
systematic and habitual manner, the patentee's rights would be subverted without any 
possible redress, either against the overseas suppliers or against the private consumers. 
There is no indication that this is a problem yet, but it may be that if such practices become 
widespread, legislative measures would have to be taken to control them. One possible 
solution would be to amend the Act to include, as an infringement, the act of "offering for 
use", and to expand the meaning of "offer".68 
3.2.1.c.(i). Advertisement and exhibition: offer to supply post expity 
A related question is whether the mere advertising or exhibiting of infringing goods would 
amount to an infringement under the Act. The decisions under the old law are not 
6S Kalmao y. PCL Packa&,in& Ltd [1982) FSR 406 (patents Court). per Falconer J .• at pages 417-
418. See also, Domeo Industries Ltd y. Mapoin&ton Mills. Ioc. et al, 23 CPR (3d) 96 (1989). pe 
Strayer I., at pages 100-101. "Just as in the Badjscbe case the defendant Mannington was through 
its employees soliciting orders from Canadian distributors but for purchase in and delivery ~ 
In my view this cannot amount to offering for sale in Canada as the sale was to take place 10 the 
United States. and if it is offering in Canada for sale elsewhere that activity does not per se amount 
to infringement in Canada.". and Domeo Industries Ltd V. MapniollOO MjUs. loc. et al, 29 CPR 
(3d) 481 (1990). per Iacobucci C.I., of the Federal Court of Appeal, Canada, at page 491. 
66 See Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Community, nc Studies Vol 13. VCH, 
Weinheim, 1993, at pages 114-118. and 254-255. Cornish. W.R., Intellectual Property, 2~ Ed. 
Sweet cl Maxwell, London. 1989. at page 165. fn 42, is of the view that the approach IS too 
restrictive and may have to be reviewed. The Kalman decision was criticised by Buder, I., "Letters 
to the Editor", 12 CIPA 317, April 1983, and 13 CIPA 105. December 1983, who notes that .. 
construed, it would appear that there is a deficiency in the law. 
67 This was the scenario painted by Butler, J., "Letters to the Editor". 12 CIPA 317, April 1983, 
when he criticised the K"men decision. 
68 As to this, see Infra, footnote 79 and accompanying text 
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conclusive on this point. The Court of Appeal in British Motor Syndicate Ltd & ors v. John 
Taylor & Sons Ltd decided that the possession of an infringing article, accompanied by 
exposure for sale, even without any proof of any actual sale, was actionable 
infringement.69 However, in No-Fume Ltd v. Frank Pitchford & Co. Ltd,70 the court held 
that advertisement for sale, unaccompanied by exposure for sale of any infringing article 
did not constitute infringement by vending. Even though it was proved that there was an 
"offer by advertisement", there was no proof of actual sale. The court distinguished the 
situation in British Motor Syndicate Ltd & ors v. John Taylor & Sons Ltd, which involved 
the actual possession of an infringing article, accompanied by exposure for sale. The case at 
hand was a "mere paper offer for sale" of an article. However, it has to be noted that the 
court had concluded on the facts that the defendants' product did not fall within the 
plaintiffs' claims, therefore, the articles, if actually sold, would not have been an 
infringement of the plaintiffs' patent. In view of this, the opinions relating to the 
advertisements could be regarded as obiter. However, it could be argued that the conduct 
could constitute a threat to infringe and therefore, actionable under the section on imminent 
infringement. 71 
Dunlo,p Pneumatic Tyre CQ. Ltd v. Actien Gesellschaft fur Motor. etc., Co. has been cited 
as the authority for the proposition that use of a patented device will be an infringement 
where it consists of use for exhibition.72 However, that case was argued on the issue of 
whether the service of the writ should be set aside on the ground that the defendants were a 
foreign corporation resident out of jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued and served. 
So the case is not a strong authority for the proposition suggested. In fact, the courts in the 
United States have consistently held that the mere advertisement or display of infringing 
products does not amount to a patent infringement, since it could neither be considered as 
selling nor using the patented invention. It is only when there has been a demonstration of 
the product that it would amount to an infringing use.13 However, it is worth noting that 
69 British Motor Syndicate Ltd & ors v. John Taylor & Sons Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 723 (CA). per Lad 
Alverstone L.C.J., at page 729. and per Vaughan Williams L.J .• at page 731. 
70 No-Fume Ltd y. frank Pitchford & Co. Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231. Note: the court had already held 
that the defendants' ashtrays did not infringe since they did not give the same result as the 
plaintiffs', see Lord Hanworth M.R., at page 242. Romer L.J.. at page 247. and especially 
Maugham L.J., at pages 251-252. 
71 This, in fact, was alluded to by Maugham L.J .• at page 252. in No-Fume Ltd y. Frank Pitchford & 
Co. Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231. His Lordship held that such a threat would justify an injunction. 
following Adair y. YOUDi L.R. 12 Ch.D. 13. However, the plaintiffs did not assert this point. 
72 DunlOJ) PneumaW: IYR Co. Ltd y. Actien Gesellscbaft fur Motor. etc .. Co. (1902) 19 RPC 46 
(CA), cited by Fox, H.O., Canadian Patent Law and Practice. Vol. 1. 3rd Ed. The Carswell 
Company, Ltd, 1948. at page 719. 
73 See, for example, KolPI»'ooau;h Co. y. Casco Products Com. 145 USPQ 1 (CA 7th Cir. 1965), 
per Swygert, Circuit Judge, at pages 4-5; Lip a-Temco-Voulht. Inc· y. Kolisman IpstrumeDt Com 
152 USPQ (CA 2nd Cir. 1967), per Medina, Circuit Judge, at page 451. See also Moliparo It 4. 
y. Sow Radio CmporatiQD 206 USPQ 901 (B.D.N.Y. 1979), per Bartels, District Judge. at paps 
904-905, and cases OD "use" in pan. 3.2.1.d. 
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there was no express provision making an "offer to sell" an infringing act in the US patent 
statute until the patent statute was amended recently.74 
When the question of advertisement came up for decision in the United Kingdom under the 
Patents Act 1977, it was answered in the affIrmative in the case of Gerber Gannent 
Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Ltd & anor. 75 Two issues were involved in this case, 
the frrst was whether an advertisement for sale would amount to an infringement. The 
second was with regard to pre-expiry negotiations to supply patented products after the 
patent in issue had expired. The frrst issue turned on whether an advertisement or any 
negotiation without a fIrm offer, amounted to an "offer to dispose of' within the meaning of 
section 6O(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. Jacob J. preferred to approach 
the construction of section 60 purposively. On that ground he declined to adopt the 
distinction between an invitation to treat and an offer under normal contract law, and instead 
held that "a party who approaches potential customers individually or by advertisement 
saying he is willing to supply a machine, terms to be agreed, is offering it or putting it on 
the market. If that is to happen during the life of the patent he infringes." Therefore, the 
advertisement to supply the infringing product was an infringement. However, with regard 
to the negotiation to supply the products after the patent had expired, the matter stood on 
different ground. In principle, it was not a disturbance of the monopoly and could not be 
regarded as "offering a product which is the subject-matter of the patent," since the product 
offered was off patent.76 
It has to be noted that Justice Jacob was able to come to the conclusion that an 
advertisement could fall under the prohibition of "offering to dispose of' because of the 
provision of section 130(7) which enables him to refer to the provision of the Community 
Patent Convention and consider the act as "putting on the market". Interestingly, the judges 
in No-Fume Ud v. Frank Pitchford & Co. Ltd referred to the offending advertisement 
issued by the defendant as an "offer by advertisement" and an "offer for sale".77 It is 
unclear whether this results from looseness of expression, or that the judges regarded such 
activities, if accompanied by an exposure for sale, as an offer to sell, contrary to the 
accepted technical contractual sense. It is uncertain whether the Malaysian court will 
construe "offer" in this wide, popular sense. Nevertheless, it is submitted that such a 
purposive construction is partially possible in the Malaysian context. This could be derived 
from the extended meaning of "sell" in the Interpretation Act which is defmed as including 
74 
7S 
76 
77 
Pub. L. 103-564. s. 533(a). which expanded the definition of infringement to include offers to sell 
patented inventions and importation into the US .• became effective as of Jan. 1. 1996. 
Gerber Oannent TecbnolQIY Ipc. y. Lectra Systems Ltd & anor [1995] RPC 383. 
Gerber Garmept TechnolQIY Ipc. y. Lectra Systems Ltd & anor [1995] RPC 383. per Jacob J .• at 
pages 411-412. See also USC 35. section 271(i). which provides that an "offer for sale" or an 
"offer to sell" by a person other than the patentee is that in which the sale will occur before the 
expiration of the term of the patent 
See supra, text accompanying footnote 70. 
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exchange, barter, offer for sale and expose for sale.18 Hence, any "exposure for sale" 
would fall within the defInition of "sell" and thus encompass an "offer to sell". However, 
there would still be a problem if there has been no "exposure for sale". One solution would 
be to add a definition of "offer" in the defInition section to include "advertisement for 
supply" .79 
3.2.1.d. Using 
This head of infringement can be used against one who has neither made nor sold an 
infringing product, but has bought it for use. For example, he may have bought an 
infringing machine from overseas, or from an infringing manufacturer. If he then uses it, 
for example, to manufacture other articles, he would be "using" the patented invention. It 
would also appear that for there to be an infringement, there need not be any permanence 
about the use. A use in transit would amount to infringement just as much as a continual 
use within jurisdiction. 80 
The term "use" is of wide signification, and could, for example, be extended to mean any 
use of the patented product for commercial gain, including, for example, selling or 
transporting the product. It was present in the old form of patent. Hence the case law 
developed under the old United Kingdom patent statute is examined to determined the scope 
of the infringing act under this head. In Betts v. Neilson,81 the patent was for making 
metallic capsules of lead and tin compressed together, which were used in covering the 
corks of bottles. The defendants had purchased capsules, made according to the patented 
process, from a foreign manufacturer, and in Scotland,82 put these capsules upon their beer 
bottles, which were then sent to their agents in England, for transhipment and exportation. 
There was no evidence that the beer was sold in England for consumption there. The 
defendants denied infringement on, inter alia, the grounds that the capsule used by them 
were manufactured abroad, and that bottles of beer were covered with them in Scotland, 
which bottled beers were sent through England for exportation only, and consequently that 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
See footnote 46. 
This would avoid the difficulty found in PartrldKe v. Crittenden [1968] 2 AIl ER 421, where an 
advertisement in newspaper was held to be only an invitation to treat and not an offer for sale. In 
fact, to overcome the problems created by the above case, and also cases such as Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain y. Boots Casb Chemist (Southern) Ltd [1952] 2 AIl ER 456, affinned 
[1953] 1 All ER 482 (goods exposed for sale on shelves did not amount to an offer), and Fisher y. 
~ [1960] 3 AIl ER 731 (exhibition of flick knives in a shop window was not an "offering for 
sale"), section 6 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK) provides that "A person exposing goods 
for supply or having goods in his possession for supply shall be deemed to offer to supply them". 
A similar provision is found in section 8 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1972, Act 87, Malaysia. 
See Neilson y. Betts (1871-72) L.R. 5 m... I, p~r Lord Westbury, at page 10. 
Betts y. Neilson (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 429; (1871-72) L.R. 5 m... 1. 
At that time, the patent did not extend beyond England, Wales, and the town of Berwick-upon-
Tweed. Hence it was not effective in Scotland, see Neilson y. Bet1s (1871-72) L.R. S m... I, per 
Lord Westbury, at page 9. 
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there was no user of the plaintiffs patented material in England. Wood V.C. granted an 
injunction. On appeal, it was held that it was "the employment of the machine or article for 
the purpose for which it was designed which constituted its active use. "83 The House of 
Lords, following similar line of reasoning, held that as long as the capsules were 
performing their purpose during the whole time, i.e., to protect the ale and beer in the 
bottle, and as long as the goods remained within jurisdiction, there was a continued user of 
the patented process.84 
In Adair v . Young, an action was brought against the master of an English ship to restrain 
him from using pumps which were in infringement of the plaintiffs letters patent. Even 
though it had not been shown that they had been worked in British waters, the Court of 
Appeal held that the injunction was rightly granted on the ground that the defendant, being 
in command of a ship exclusively fitted up with such pumps, was intending to use the 
patented invention.85 The same approach was accepted in an obiter statement in Nobel's 
E2ij>losives v. Jones. Scott & Co.86 The question of whether there was user of the patented 
invention was also raised in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. British & Colonial Motor Car 
Co. & anor, where Lord Chief Justice Alverstone followed the approach he adopted in the 
British Motor Syndicate case.87 
In line with the above approach, it should follow that a commercial use of the patented 
invention by way of demonstration, would amount to an infringing use, since by the 
demonstration, the person so doing is getting the benefit of the patented invention. Thus, it 
was held to be so in Molins and Molins Machine Co. Ltd v. Industrial Machine Co. Ltd. 88 
In most of the cases mentioned above, the courts seemed to have confmed the meaning of 
the word "use" to mean using the patented article for the purpose for which it was patented 
- the narrow sense. However, in other cases, the courts had not been constrained to limit it 
to its narrow sense, and where found necessary, were not above extending the meaning of 
"use" to enable a wider net to be cast in order to enjoin defendants from continuing with 
83 
84 
8S 
86 
87 
88 
Betts V. Neilson (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 429, per Lord Chelmsford L.C., at pages 437-439. 
See Neilson V. Betts (1871-72) L.R. 5 m. l,perLord Westbury, at pages 9-11, Lord Colonsay, at 
pages 22-25, Lord Cairns, at page 25, Lord Hatherley L.C., at pages 25-27, and Lord Chelmsford, 
at page 27. 
Adajr V. YoUD& (1879) LR 12 ChD 13, per Cotton L.J., at page 19, "It appears from the master's 
own statement of defence that these pumps were the only pumps on board. He had the ship in 
British waters fitted up with these pumps ready for use, and if any accident had ~ned to the 
ship they would have been actually used within British waters. I therefore am of OPlDIO~ that the 
master must be considered as intending the use them within British waters, and that on this ground 
the injunction oUght to be sustained". See also Brett L.J., at page 20. 
Nobel's ExPlosives V. Jones. Scott &: Co. (1881) 17 L.R. Ch.D. 721 (CA), per James L.J., at 
pages 741-742. 
DUOIOJ) Pneumatic Iyre Co. X. British &: ColoOial Motor Car Co. &: anor (1901) 18 RPC 313 
(King's Bench Division), per Lord Alverstone L.C.J., at pages 515-516. 
MoUDs and Molios Machjpe Co. Ltd x. Ipdustrial Machipe Co. IJrl (1937) 54 RPC 94, at 108, per 
Farwell J. 
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activities which were deemed to be a trespass on the exclusive monopoly of the patentee. In 
fact in Gibson & Campbell v. Brand, the court held that the defendant who had sold an 
article made according to a patented process was guilty of infringement since such sale may 
be considered as a use of the invention.89 
The most obvious area for the court to apply this extension was with regard to the 
importation of infringing goods. Under the old law, the act of importation was not 
expressly mentioned in the form of patent. Nevertheless, the courts were willing to 
construe the word "use" to encompass the importation of infringing articles into the 
jurisdiction. In Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health, it was held that "where an 
importer imports into the country articles made abroad, but in accordance with a British 
patent, for the purpose of distributing and selling them in this county, he ... is using and 
exercising the patent, and he thereby infringes the patent the moment he introduces them 
into this country."90 The importer in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Harris 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd & ors who had, inter alia, imported patented drugs for export to 
Nigeria, was also held liable for infringement. The court held that possession with the 
intention of using the articles for trade purposes and for securing a profit amounted to 
infringement whether the proposed dealing was with a customer in the country or abroad.91 
The authorities were reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Smith Kline Corp. v. D.D.S.A. 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd, and the position with regard to use summarised thus: that unlicensed 
possession by a merchant in the United Kingdom of patented goods for purposes of 
supplying customers wherever they may be, constitutes infringement.92 
This broad approach is understandable when it is noted that all these cases were decided at a 
time when there was no specific provision laying down the exclusive rights of the patentee. 
In considering whether the rights of the patentee had been infringed, reference had to be 
made to the form of patent. The word "import" was neither specifically mentioned in the 
granting part nor the prohibitory part of the form of patent.93 In the desire to ensure that the 
patentee's rights were not circumvented by a strict interpretation of the words and phrases 
used in the form of patent, the court extended the meaning of "use" whenever the 
circumstances of the case dictated that fairness to the patentee demanded such an extension. 
So the courts had held that if "there was acquisition and possession of these articles for 
trade purposes with the intention of using them in trade", "such an acquisition and such a 
89 
90 
91 
93 
Gibson & CampbelI v. Brand G 211 (1842), also reported in Hayward's Patent Cases, V ot. 3 768. 
at page 769, per Tindal C.J. 
P1izer Corporation v. Ministry of Health [1965] RPC 261. per Lord Upjohn, at page 310. Sec also 
Lord Wilberforcc. at page 320, "So importing and selling is 'using' the invention." 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Harris Phannaceuticals Ltd & OTS [1977] FSR 200, per 
Whitford J., at pages 205-207. 
Smith Kline Corp. v. D.D.S.A. Pharmaceuti(als Ltd [1978] FSR 109 (CA). per Buckley L.J .. at 
page Ill. 
Sec supra. footnotc 4. 
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possession of an article, whatever it nature may be", was a user.94 The acts of the 
importers were regarded as diverting profits from the patentee because "they were deriving 
an advantage from the invention, which otherwise would have fallen to the patentee".95 
However, due to the lack of an existing label to pin it on, there was, therefore, the need for 
the extension of the meaning of "use". 
Hence two contrasting approaches were used by the courts to suit different situations. 
Where there was innocent possession, transport or storage of a patented article, the court 
did not hold it to be a use and hence did not amount to an infringement unless the "article 
itself was, when it was applied in a particular way, at the very time it was in use, serving 
the purpose for which it was patented".96 Where, however, the possession was coupled 
with an intention to use the article for trade purposes, for example, the unlicensed 
possession by a merchant of patented good for the purposes of supplying customers, this 
was held to be infringement. 
In contrast to the UK jurisdiction, the position pertaining to infringement by the "use of the 
patented invention" seems to be different and more restricted in the United States. A hint of 
the approach is given in the statement of the Supreme Court in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell 
that "the right to use is a comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to 
put into service any given invention. "97 The phrase "put into service any given invention" 
implies that "use" is to be applied in the narrow context, i.e., for the purpose of utilising the 
teaching of the patent. The lower courts seem to have followed suit and have applied the 
term "use" restrictively, and as confined to situations where there has been a benefit derived 
from the invention itself, as opposed to any use of the patented invention for a commercial 
gain. The decided cases show the courts' unwillingness to apply it beyond its normal 
meaning of using the invention in the sense of "getting the benefit of the invention" per se, 
or for the purpose of utilising the teaching of the patent. 
The court in Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co., where the allegation of infringement was 
that samples of the infringing products were displayed by the defendant's agent at the 
agent's office in the district of New York, held that the display of samples did not disclose 
any act of infringement.98 In contrast, in Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Hemphill Co., the fact 
that the infringing machine for knitting stockings was at the defendant's New York office 
94 See, for example, British Motor Syndicate Ltd v. Taylor (1900) 17 RPC 723, per Vaughan-
Williams L.J., at page 732. 
95 Pfizer Corporation V. Minist[y of Health [1965] RPC 261, per Lord Wilberforce, at pages 320-
321. 
96 Badische Anilin und SQda-Fabrik v. Johnson (1897) 14 RPC 919 (HL). per Lord Halsbury L.e., at 
page 929. 
97 Bayer & Cie v, Q'Donnell 229 US 1; 57 L. Ed. 1041 (US Sup. Ct 1913), at page 1044. per 
Justice Day. 
98 Hoe~~er v, F.H. Lawson & Co. 35 F.2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), per Judge Caffey, at page 222. 
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and was operated with a fair degree of continuity, to demonstrate its advantages to 
prospective buyers, the stockings made on it being distributed as samples, was held 
sufficient to constitute an infringing use within the district. The court distinguished 
Hoe~~er v. Lawson, since the use in the case at hand was much more than the mere 
exhibition of an alleged infringing article.99 The approach of the court in Scott & Williams 
was followed in Patent Tube Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co., where the court held that the 
distribution of patented device to potential customers for advertising purposes amounted to 
an infringing use despite the fact that they were not distributed for sale or any monetary 
compensation. This was on the basis that "[t]he distribution of the patented device only for 
advertising purposes and without actual monetary compensation ... creates no exception to 
the general rule that use of the patented device is forbidden. To hold so would be permitting 
the doing of something indirectly which is forbidden to be done directly. It is common 
knowledge that it is an important medium for the obtaining of business. Therefore, what 
appears to be an innocuous use of a patented device becomes at some point a substantial 
source of business. " • 00 
The District Judge in Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. reviewed the above three cases 
and also several older cases and concluded that the mere display of infringing article was 
not an act of infringement, since there was no evidence that the alleged infringing machine 
was ever demonstrated in the District. Therefore, a distinction was made between mere 
display of the infringing article and a demonstration of that article which would amount to a 
use .• o I The same lenient attitude is shown towards the mere advertising of an infringing 
product. I 02 That a sales demonstration would amount to an infringing use was also applied 
by the court in Grinnell Corporation v. The American Monorail Co. et al. 103 A similar 
approach was adopted in Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Products Corp., the Court of 
Appeal stressing the fact that the record showed that the irons were not operated for 
demonstration purposes and, therefore, these acts were not illegal "uses" of the device. I 04 
99 Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Hemphill Co. 10 USPQ 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), per Patterson, District 
Judge, at page 105. 
100 Patent Tube CoW. v. Bristol-Myers Co. 39 USPQ 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), per Mandelbaum, 
District Judge, at page 524. 
101 Marlatt v. Mer~enthaler Linotype Co. 73 USPQ 336 (S.D. Calif. 1947), per Weinberger, District 
Judge, at pages 340-342. 
102 See, for example, Lin~-Temco-Vou~ht. Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Co~ 1~2. USPQ (C~ ?nd 
Cir. 1967), per Medina, Circuit Judge, at page 451. where the court, after dlsmlsslDg the pl~ntlffs 
argument of infringing use. added that there was no actual .sale proved, and the mere. advertIsem~nt 
of device was not itself patent infringement. See also MolInarO et aI. v. Sonar RadIO CQrporauon 
206 USPQ 901 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), per Bartels. District Judge, at pages 904-905. 
103 Grinnell Corporation v. The Americao Monorail Co. eC aI. 158 USPQ 129 (D.C.S.C. 1967), per 
Hemphill, District Judge, at page 136. 
104 Knapp-Monan.:h Co. v. Casco Products Corp. 145 USPQ 1 (CA 7th Cir. 1965), per Swygert. 
Circuit Judge, at pages 4-5. 
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Further, adopting an approach similar to that applied in the United Kingdom, the US courts 
have held that keeping a patented device as a "back-up", ready for use as and when 
necessary, even though no actual use was proved, amounted to an infringement. I 05 
From an analysis of the US cases, to constitute infringing use, the defendant must have 
made use of the patented invention in the narrow sense of deriving some advantage from 
the invention and not in the wider sense of gaining any commercial benefit from it by 
dealing with the patented products. Under this analysis, it is clear that an advertising 
demonstration will amount to an infringing use, since the process of demonstrating the 
product will invariably involve carrying out and deriving a benefit of the invention. In 
contrast, a mere advertisement or exhibition of the patented product without more, will not. 
The exhibited product is merely allowed to be seen in its passive mode. There IS no 
opportunity for anyone to witness or derive any benefit of the patented invention. 
The question now is which approach should be adopted by the Malaysian court. The wider 
approach will enable the court to provide more protection for the patentee. The various 
activities that are not specifically enumerated under the statutory provisions could be caught 
under the extended coverage of "use". One example will be the leasing or hiring of a 
patented equipment. If the lessor or hirer does not make, sell, import, or stock for such 
purposes, the infringing equipment, it would seem that no action could be taken against him 
for infringement of the patent. Neither could any action be taken against the lessee or user if 
the use falls under the exception of non-industrial or commercial use. It is inconceivable 
that Parliament does not intend that these activities of the lessor or hirer should be regarded 
as infringing acts. Such a situation would result in the exclusive right to sell a hollow right, 
because it could be circumvented by the simple device of leasing instead of outright sale. I 06 
It is submitted that the better approach would be to construe the word "use" in the wider 
sense to cover situations not covered by "make", "sell", "import" or "stock". This approach 
will not be in conflict with the ordinary grammatical meanings of the word "use".1 07 It is 
105 See Olsson v. United States 37 USPQ 767 (Ct CIs 1938), cert. denied 41 USPQ 799 (1939) where 
the Court of Claims held the United States liable under 28 USC, section 1498 for infringing 
howitzers kept ready for use in case of war - per Littleton, Judge, at page 769. See also Hu~hes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States 215 USPQ 787 (Ct CIs Trial Div. 1982), affrrmed, 219 USPQ 473 
(CAFC 1983), per Colaianni, Trial Judge, at page 814, "Use of a system as a ba~kup mode ~r. to 
provide an extra measure of safety is "use" within the meaning of 28 USC, section 1498, cltmg 
Olsson v. United States 37 USPQ 767 (Ct CIs 1938)." 
I 06 It should be noted that the situation envisaged above would not pose any problem under the United 
Kingdom provisions which made use of the word "disposing" instead of "selling". In Kalman v, 
PCL Packa~in~ Ltd [1982] FSR 406, at pages 412-413, Falconer J. discussed the possible 
meanings to be attached to the word "dispose" and was of the view that it could embrace other 
forms of marketing a product, such as leasin~. 
107 The ordinary grammatical meaning of the verb "use" means "to put into practice or o~ration; to 
carry into action or effect" - meaning no. 1,6. However. it also means "to employ (an artIcle. e~c.), 
esp. for a profitable end; to tum to account" - meaning no. II, 2. See The Shorter Oxford EnglIsh, 
Vol. I, 3rd Ed., Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. 
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also pertinent to note that the US provision is framed differently from the Malaysian 
provision. The expression used in the US provision refers to "uses ... any patented 
invention", while the Malaysian provision uses the expression "using the product". Hence 
there is a significant difference in the extent to which the word "use" could be construed. 
Both utilising the patented product for whatever trade purposes with the intention of using 
the articles in trade, and for the purpose of utilising the teaching of the patent, could equally 
fall under the description of "using the product". However, it is more difficult to stretch the 
expression "using the patented invention" beyond the activity or purpose of utilising the 
teaching of the patent. 1 08 
Giving it a wide meaning is justified to give the patentee his just reward. Since it is 
uncertain whether the Malaysian courts will construe it purposively, the best solution is to 
add a definition of "use" to encompass hire, lease or any other use of the patented product 
for the purpose of, or in relation to, trading in that product, but does not include the activity 
of a mere carrier, warehousemen, customs agent, or others in similar capacity. 
3.2.1.d.(i). Use: Re~latOJ.y purpose 
In the course of complying with regulatory procedures to obtain a product licence for 
certain substances, the applicant may have to deal with patented products. In doing this he 
may be exposed to two possible allegations of infringement, i.e., the use of data arising 
from tests carried out for the purpose of applying for a product licence, and the use of the 
product to carry out the tests. These issues have been addressed in the United Kingdom in 
The llIUohn Co. v. Kerfoot & Co. Ltd. 109 The plaintiffs, proprietors of a patent relating to 
a phannaceutical, triazolam, alleged that the defendants had infringed the patent by having 
applied to the regulatory authority (the DHSS) for product licences (under the Medicine Act 
1968) for triazolam or formulation thereof which had been imported. It was contended that 
for an application to be made to permit any form of manufacture in the UK, data arising 
from tests that had been performed in the UK on the patented compound, or on 
formulations incorporating the patented compound, would have to be submitted to the 
DHSS. This would mean that if an application for a product licence had been made, 
triazolam would have been imported into the UK. This importation would itself amount to 
an infringement. The plaintiffs also argued that any use of triazolam whether imported or 
manufactured in the UK for any purpose, and in particular for the purpose of obtaining a 
product licence, would infringe either or both the product patent or the intermediate patent. 
They further alleged (in paragraph 4(b) of the particulars) that the patent had been infringed 
by the supply, to the DHSS, of product data relating to triazolam which had been generated 
108 Note, however, that Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Community, ne Studies 
Vol 13, VCH, Weinheim, 1993, at page 122, is of the opinion that the expression "use of the 
invention" is broader than that of "using the product". 
109 The Ugiobn Co. v' WOOl &. Co, I Jd [1988] FSR 1, p~r Whitford J., at page 2, 
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by testing either in England or abroad without the plaintiffs' licence. The defendants applied 
to strike out the statement of claim as not disclosing any reasonable cause of action or 
alternatively under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. It was held that the matters pleaded 
under paragraph 4(b) of the particulars of infringement would be struck out as disclosing 
no reasonable cause of action and that the remainder of the pleading should be struck out 
under the court's inherent jurisdiction. Despite the plaintiffs' attempt to argue for the 
extension of the meaning of "use", the court held that section 60(1)(a) is directed to 
commercial use, therefore, an application to regulatory authorities to sell a product in the 
UK, even though accompanied by data relating to the patented product, is not "use" of the 
product in the UK. I I 0 
However, if samples of patented products are imported without the licence of the patentee 
for the purposes of satisfying regulatory authority with a view to obtaining marketing 
permission, such an import would amount to an infringement of the patent. In the New 
Zealand case of Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd & anor v. Douilas 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd, the defendant imported into the New Zealand a sample of cimetidine 
and submitted it to the Department of Health, the relevant regulatory authority under the 
Medicines Act 1951, with a view to procuring permission to market the drug in New 
Zealand. The Court of Appeal held that to send an embodiment of an invention to a 
government authority for approval was a use of the invention and moreover use for 
commercial advantage, even though it might not yet have resulted in any commercial 
advantage. I 11 In contrast to the case of The Upjohn Co. v. Kerfoot & Co. Ltd, there was 
direct physical use of the subject matter of the patent itself. I 12 
110 
111 
112 
The lilliohn Co. y. Kerfoot & Co. Ltd [1988] FSR 1, per Whitford J., at pages 6-8. See also the 
South African case of Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical [1988] FSR 57 (Sup. Ct South Africa), 
where it was held the data generated by the field trials were not "anything involving infringement" 
within section 65(3) of the Patents Act 1978, and so could not be the subject-matter of a delivery 
up order - per Harms 1., at pages 63-64. 
Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd & anor v. Oou&las Phannaceuticals Ltd [1991] FSR 522 
(CA N.Z.), per Cooke, P., at page 524, "The issue reduces to whether the importation of a sample 
and its submission to a regulatory authority, with a view to procuring permission to market, 
although there is no intention to market until the patent protection expires, is a use of the 
invention within the language and spirit of the words of the grant In my opinion, as a matter of 
the ordinary use of language, whether now or (one would suppose) in earlier centuries, to send an 
embodiment of the invention to a government authority for approval is plainly a use of it Without 
doubt, too, Douglas acted for the commercial advantage or springboard of being ready to launch 
into the market when the patent expired. This seems to me an infringement of both the letter am 
spirit of the grant. Indeed, whenever obtained, statutory marketing approval is ~ form of licence am 
primafacie has commercial value."; per Hardie Boys J., at page 527-529. Rebance was p~ on 
Pfizer CotPoration y. Ministo' of Health [1965] AC 512, Monsanto Co. y. Stauffer ChemiCal Co. 
[1985] RPC 515, and the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, in 
Roche Products. Inc. y. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Ipc. 733 F.2d 858; 221 USPQ 937 (CAFC 
1984). For a commentary on this case, see Brown, B., "Patent Infringement by Importation of 
Drug Samples to Obtain Marketing Approval: Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v. 
Attorney-General" [1992] 1 EIPR 20. 
Note that some countries have now enacted special provisions to exempt from infringement actions 
certain activities relating to the manufacture, use, sale, etc. of patented products in connection with 
the development and submission of information required for regulatory purposes. See, for example, 
section 55.2, Patent Act, Canada, RSC 1985, c. P-4, and section 271(e), USC nde 35 - Patents, 
United States. Therefore, IS far IS the United States is concerned, the rule in Roche Prgducts. Ipc. 
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3.2.l.e. Stocking 
Although the dictionary meaning of stocking is also capable of wide import. and could even 
extend to keeping the patented product for whatever reasons, in the context of the Act, it 
should not cause any problem of interpretation because of its juxtaposition with, or 
qualification by, the phrase "right to stock such product for the purpose of offering for sale, 
selling or using". Hence it is clear that the prohibited act is confined to the patented 
products being in the possession of a trader, who is stocking them for commercial 
purposes, specifically, for the purposes of sale or use, for example, the use of patented 
substances in a manufacturing process in a factory .113 
A good illustration of a person stocking patented articles for use can be found in the case of 
McDonald & anor v. Graham. The evidence clearly showed that the defendants had been 
keeping patented promotional cards in stock for the purpose of his business in order to 
make use of them as and when it would be beneficial for him to do so. The defendant 
argued that he had done nothing which would constitute infringement under section 60 of 
the 1977 Act. Although he had kept certain promotional cards, it was submitted that he was 
keeping them privately and for purposes which were not commercial. The court held that 
since he supplied unlicensed samples of the patented product kept by him to various people 
for the purpose of advancing his business in "Flip-cards", there was a commercial use and 
therefore, an infringement. 1 14 
The potential coverage of the term "keeping, whether for disposal or otherwise" in the 1977 
United Kingdom statute has given rise to a number of cases involving the question of 
whether an innocent carrier or warehouseman could be liable for patent infringement. The 
question first arose in Smith. Kline & French v. Harbottle, 115 where British Airways were 
alleged to have infringed the plaintiffs' patent by keeping a product covered by that patent in 
their capacity as warehousemen. Oliver J. held that having regard to section 130(7) and the 
words of the C.P.C., the word "keeping" did not extend to the activities of mere 
warehousemen and carriers such as British Airways, since the word "keeps" in the 1977 
Act connoted a keeping in some capacity and for a purpose other than that of a mere 
custodian or warehouseman. He, therefore, favoured construing the term in the sense of 
y. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. 733 F.2d 858; 221 USPQ 937 (CAFC 1984) is now statutorily 
overruled. See generally, Chisum, V o\. 4, Chapter 16, at para. 16.03[ 1]. 
I 13 In this respect it is much clearer and narrower than the equivalent provision in the United Kingdom 
statute which is phrased "keeps the product whether for disposal or otherwise", and closer to the 
CPC. Article 25(a), which provides that a Community patent confers the right to prevent others 
"from making. offering, putting on the market or using a product ... or importing or stocking the 
product for these purposes." 
II-t McDonald & anor v. Graham [1994] RPC 407 (CA), per Ralph Gibson LJ., at pages 430-431. 
I 15 Smith. Kline & French y. Harbottle [1980J RPC 363. 
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"keeping in stock", although as this was an interlocutory injunction application, he 
expressly declined to arrive at a definitive interpretation. I 16 
Under the phraseology used in the Malaysian provision, it is clear that such activities would 
not be regarded as an infringing act. By no stretch of the imagination could they be deemed 
to be stocking the products for the purpose of making, using or selling them. I I? 
3.2.1.f. Importin~ 
The exclusive right to import the patented product has been part of the law for a long time. 
Although not expressly provided in the form of patent, the courts have construed the form 
of patent to include such a right. I 18 In view of the specific inclusion of "importing" as part 
of the exclusive rights and also as constituting a head of infringement, there is no need to 
derive such a right by way of "using and exercising" the patent. Like the other infringing 
acts, the act of importing is an infringement in itself, without being tied to, or conditioned 
upon, other activities. 119 However, from the scheme of the Act, it is obvious that 
importation, to be an act of infringement, must be for the purposes of trade. Hence, the 
intention of the importer is important in determining whether the act is an infringing act. 
This is because of the various exceptions relating to infringement provided by the Act. 120 
For example, the importer may be merely importing the patented article for his own 
personal use. It is only when the import is for commercial purposes that it would amount to 
infringement. I 21 
3.2.1.f.(i). Importation for exportation 
A more difficult question is whether importation of infringing products for export 
purposes, with no intention that any of the imported products would ever be sold or used 
within jurisdiction, would amount to an infringement. 
Under the old law, such an act was deemed to be a "user" of the patented invention which 
constituted an infringement of the patent rights. In The United Iele.phone Co. v' 
116 Smith. Kline" French y. Harbottle [1980] RPe 363, per Oliver J., at pages 371-374. See also 
Kalman y. PeL PackaKinl Ltd [1982] FSR 406 (Patents Court), per Falconer J., at pages 415-
418, following Smith. Kline & French Laboratories Ltd y. R.D. Harbottle <Mercantile) Ltd & ors 
[1980] RPC 363, on the issue of liability of a carrier. 
117 The potential liabilities of these people for patent infringement under other heads of infringement 
is further discussed in para. 3.2.1.g., infra· 
118 See the discussion on the meaning of "use" in para. 3.2.1.d., supra. 
119 Under section 3, Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Consolidated and Revised, 1989) Act 388, 
Malaysia, "import" is defined to mean "import into Malaysia". 
120 See Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights, para. 7.1.1. 
121 See comments of Cooke, P., in Smith KUne " fmnch I,ehgptgrig 1M " anor y. 000" 
PbmnllGOlltica.' 1M [1991] FSR 522 {CA New Zealand}, at page 524. 
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Shm:ples, 122 the court held that where the defendant had imported patented instruments for 
exportation, the act constituted an infringement of the plaintiffs patent rights, on the 
ground that such an activity amounted to a user which would be infringement of the patent. 
In British Thomson-Houston Co. Ltd v. Charlesworth Peebles & Co. ,123 the respondents 
admitted infringing the patent in suit by importing infringing lamps from Holland and 
selling them in Scotland. However, they resisted the part of the interdict sought by the 
complainers against the respondents' exporting lamps made in infringement of the patent. 
They contended that they had an unlimited right to export any lamps that might be imported 
into the United Kingdom on the ground that exportation per se did not constitute 
infringement. This contention was rejected and the interdict sought, inter alia, to prevent the 
respondents from exporting the infringing lamps was upheld. Similarly, in Hoffmann-La 
Roche & Co. AG v. Harris Pharmaceuticals Ltd & ors, 124 the defendant company had, 
inter alia, imported patented drugs for export to Nigeria. It was held that possession with 
the intention of using the articles for trade purposes and for securing a profit amounted to 
infringement whether the proposed dealing was with a customer in this country or abroad. 
The defendants in Smith Kline Corp. v. D.D.S.A. Pharmaceuticals Ltd125 tried another line 
of argument against infringement by contending that their activities, the importation of 
infringing drugs for the purpose of exporting to Nigeria did not occasion any loss to the 
plaintiffs, therefore, there was no infringement. This contention was rejected by the trial 
judge and the Court of Appeal, which held that it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff in a 
case of patent infringement to show that he had suffered commercial loss. There was 
122 The; Unired Iele;phone; Co. v. Sharples (1885) 2 RPC 28 (Ch.D), per Kay J., at page 31, "It is 
admitted by Counsel for the defendant that if a man buys an instrument which he knows would, if 
made, sold or used in this country, be an infringement of a patent in this country, if he buy~ it 
abroad, imports it into this country, had it in his possession, and sells it, although to a foreIgn 
customer, that would be a user which would be an infringement of the patent. I confess, as at 
present advised, I should have very little hesitation in saying that that would be so." 
123 British Thpmson-Houstop Co. Ltd v. Charle;sworth Peeble;s & Co. (1922) 39 RPC 399, in the 
Court of Session in Scotland, Outer House, before Lord Blackburn; Inner House, First Division, 
before The Lord President, Lord MacKenzie, Lord Skerrington and Lord Cullen - per The Lad 
President, at pages 404-405, and Lord MacKenzie, at page 405. 
124 Hoffmanp-La Roche & Co. AG v. Harris Pharmaceuticals Ltd & ors [1977] FSR 200, per 
Whitford 1., at pages 205-207, citing, inter alia, Pfiw Cotporatiop V. Mipistry of Health [1965] 
RPC 261, British ThOOlson-Hpuston Co. Ltd v. Charlesworth Peebles & Co. (19~2) 39 RPC 
399, The United Telephope Co. v. Sbatples (1885) 2 RPC 28 (Ch.D), Mortop-NorwJCh Products 
Inc. v. Intercen lJd [1978] RPC 501; [1976] FSR 513, and British Mptor SYndjcate Ltd v. Taylor 
(1900) 17 RPC 723 for the proposition. See also the copyright case of Mattei Inc. V. Tonka 
Cmporatiop [1992] FSR 28 (H. Ct, Hong Kong), per Deputy J~dge, Andrew Li. at page 40. ~ 
it was held that "the word 'import' in section 5(2) of the Copynght Act 195~. UK. should.be gIVe~ 
its ordinary meaning. It simply means bringing into ~on.g Kon.g. That belDg SO. ~go lD tranSIt 
such as the dolls here was imported into Hong Kong WIthin section 5(2). It ~ay be different where 
cargo came into Hong Kong involuntarily. for ex~ple. as a result of hijack ~r poor weather 
conditions. But here it came into Hong Kong for a deliberate reason. It had to tranSIt though Hong 
Kong since, for political reasons. vessels cannot sail direct from China to Taiwan. " 
12S Smith Kline Com. v. P.D.S.A. Pharmaceuticals IJd [1978] FSR 109 (CA). per Buckley L.J .• at 
pages 111-112. See also Smith. Kline & frencch v: ~e. [1980] ~ 363: where,. ho~e~er. 
the defendant. Harbottle. admitted infringement by Importing Into the Umted KinJClom Infrinpng 
drop meant for export to Nigeria. 
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infringement if his monopoly had been infringed and he was entitled to a remedy in respect 
of that. 
It would seem that the importation of patented products for the purpose of export would 
still amount to an infringement by importation under the Act. Because of the physical 
presence of the infringing products within jurisdiction, such an act would seem to fall 
within the prohibition of section 58. The exclusive right to import is not qualified in any 
way, so mere importation for whatever purposes, unless the importer could rely on the 
various exceptions provided by the Act, would amount to an infringement. This should not 
be viewed as an undue extension of the patentee's rights, since there is nothing to prevent 
third parties from selling in another country where there is no patent protecting the 
particular product, provided the infringing product does not enter the jurisdiction where 
patent protection is conferred. 
3.2.1.g. Liability of "indifferent participants" 
In transactions involving patented articles, persons, other than the direct and contributory 
infringers, may unwittingly be involved in activities related to the infringing act. For 
example, in the course of its business activities, a carrier may be involved in the 
transportation and storage of infringing products entrusted to them for carriage. For the 
carrier or forwarding agent, the character of the goods being transported or forwarded is 
irrelevant to them. They are totally indifferent as regards whether the goods passing 
through their hands possess any inventive features, and are, therefore, more valuable. 
These participants are involved in the transactions, whether for the purpose of transmitting 
them to the persons to whom they are consigned, or in other ways dealing with the goods 
which pass through their hands, in the course of their normal duties. 
Would such activities of the "indifferent participants" amount to patent infringement? Under 
the old law, the position is best summed up by Whitford J. in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. 
AG v. Harris Phannaceuticals Ltd & ors, where he said, "where a man is doing no more 
than transporting a patented article from one place to another he gets nothing out of the 
transaction arising out of the merits to be found in the patented product. He is really doing 
nothing which in any way could be described as making use of the invention. He himself 
does not in any way detract from the patentee securing the full benefit of the invention, but 
with somebody who is carrying on a trade and who is making a profit, the position is quite 
different. "126 
126 Hoffmann-La Rocbe &; Co. AG y. Hagis Pbapnaceuticals Ltd &; ors [1977] FSR 200, per 
Whitford J., at page 207. It is true that the question of whether the mere transport .of ~ patented 
article from one place to another within the country would be a user and amount to Infringement, 
was initially subject to some doubts under the old law. In Washburn and Locn Mapufacturipa Co. 
y. Omard StcaJDsbjp Co. (1889) 6 RPC 398, at 403, Stirling J. held that it was proper to bring an 
action apinat carriers, even though innocent, to restrain them from dealing with or disposing of 
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Similarly an infringement action was held not to lie against the defendants who had acted as 
Custom House agents for the foreign manufacturing firm, in getting the goods landed and 
stored in the country since they were not the importers, and their dealing with the infringing 
articles involved no ownership or control over them. Such an activity could not be regarded 
as "making, vending, or using the patented invention. 127 
The position of other participants involved in some other ways with the infringing goods 
was also dealt with in a similar way. In Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise 
Commissioners, the proprietors of a patent for the drug Furazolidone were anxious to 
discover the identity of persons importing the drug in alleged infringement of the patent. 
They brought an action against the Commissioners of Customs and Excise claiming, inter 
alia, an order that they should give to the plaintiffs the names and addresses of the 
importers in question together with inspection of all relevant documents The plaintiffs also 
sought declarations that the Commissioners had infringed and caused or enabled the 
importers to infringe and that they were under a duty to impose forfeiture of all unlicensed 
Furazolidone in their possession, custody or control. It was held that the Commissioners 
were not guilty of infringement. They did not have possession of the imported goods, but 
only collected duty on those goods, and the charging of such duty did not make them 
participators in infringement. 128 
A similar approach seems to be adopted by the United States courts. Before a person could 
be liable for carrying out an infringing use of the patented invention, it would appear, from 
the case of Douglas v. United States, that the defendant must have played an active role 
instead of being a passive observer in the use of the patented invention. Since the 
defendant's role in Douglas was merely that of providing the facilities and observing the 
demonstration, the court held that the defendant was not guilty of committing an infringing 
use. 129 This distinction between an active and a passive role may explain the decision in 
Brennan v. Mr Hanger. Inc. et aI. The defendant, Mr Hanger, had a booth at a trade show 
where the infringing hanger bars made by Sal Grinding were displayed under a placard 
bearing the name of Sal Grinding, and the Mr Hanger personnel manning the booth were 
127 
128 
129 
infringing articles. However, it has to be noted that it was the practice then to sue carriers or others 
having control of the goods so as to obtain the names of the infringers. In view of Hoffmann-La 
Roche & Co. AG v I Harris Pharmaceuticals Ltd & ors, and especially Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. 
Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] RPC 101 (HL), that decision may not be good law 
since there is now available an action for discovery against an innocent person who has facilitated 
the commission of a wrongdoing by another. 
See Nobel's Explosiyes v, Jones. Scott & Co. (1881) 17 L.R. Ch.D. 721, per James L.J., at 
pages 738-743. 
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1972] RPC 743 (CA). per Lord 
Denning M.R., at page 764. See also Buckley L.J., at pages 767-768, and Roskill L.J., ~t pages 
773-774, in similar vein. Note that on appeal to the House of Lords, the allegatIOns of 
infringement were not pursued and the action fell to be treated as a pure action for discovery, sec 
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] RPC 101 (HL). 
Dou~las v, United States 181 USPQ 170 (Ct CIs 1974), per Cooper, Trial Judge, at page 176, 
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authorised to receive orders on behalf on Sal Grinding, although there was no evidence any 
such orders were actually received. Mr Hanger was charged with infringement because of 
its assistance to Sal Grinding in the sales of the latter's hanger bars. The court held that 
there could be no active inducement of infringement unless infringement actually resulted. 
Following Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Products Corp., the court held that the mere 
display of the hanger bars would not constitute an infringing "use". The court concluded 
that infringement by Mr Hanger had not been established. 130 
It is submitted that this approach could and should be adopted in Malaysia. 
3.2.1.h. Products obtained from patented machine 
Unlike the case of a product obtained by means of a patented process, where specific 
provision is laid down to extend patent protection to it, there is no mention of patent 
protection for products made by means of a product patent, for example, a patented 
machine. 
Several cases decided in the United Kingdom prior to the 1977 Act seem to indicate that the 
products obtained by the use of a patented machine would be deemed infringing products 
and could be prevented from being sold in, or imported into, the country. In Townsend v. 
Haworth, the court said, in relation to the prohibitions relating to a patented invention, "he 
is prohibited from making, using, or vending the prohibited articles, and that, of course, 
includes in the case of machinery the product ... of the machinery which is the subject of 
the patent. It is that which is produced by the patent." 131 A similar approach is seen in The 
Cartsbum Sugar Refining Co. v. Sharp & Sharp,132 although on the facts the court held 
that the apparatus claim for producing sugar cubes was not infringed by the respondents 
who sold cubes made by a similar machine since it was not proved to be an infringing 
machine. The patents in The United Horse Shoe & Nail Co. Ltd v. Stewart & Co. related to 
machinery for making nails. The pursuers sued for infringement of these patents by reason 
of the sale of imported nails made by machines using the invention in Sweden. The House 
of Lords held that the sale of goods manufactured without licence by patented machinery 
was, and must, be treated as an infringement of the patentees' rights. As to the defenders' 
submission that the pursuers were only entitled to nominal damages, because the main 
portions of the machines by which their nails were made were not covered by the patents 
130 Brennan v. Mr Han~er. Inc. el aI. 203 USPQ 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). per Conner, District Judge. at 
pages 700-701. Note that Mr Hanger was merely the owner of the booth in which the. infringing 
hangers made by Sal Grinder were displayed. In this sense. Mr Hanger could be conSIdered as a 
passive or "indifferent participant" as in Dou~las y. United Slates 181 USPQ 170 (Ct Cis 1974). 
131 Townsend v. Haworth (1875) 48 L.1. Ch. 770n. per Jessel M.R .. at 772n. 
132 The Cartsburn Su~ar Refinin~ Co. v. Shaw & Shaw (1884) 1 RPC 181 (Court of Session, 
Scotland), per Lord Kinnear. at page 186. 
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admitted to be infringed, the court held that that factor was irrelevant. 13 3 Such an extension 
of the rights of the owner of a product patent seems to be accepted by the House of Lords 
in Beecham Group Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd. 134 
The above cases were, however, decided at a time where no express exclusive rights were 
laid down in the patent statutes. The courts, therefore, relied on the form of patent which 
could be construed very widely. It is unlikely that the same would apply in the United 
Kingdom under the 1977 Act, as well as the Malaysian Act. It is submitted that products of 
patented apparatus or machine would not be subject to the patentee's control. Unlike the 
situation with regard to products obtained by means of a patented process, no special 
provisions are provided to cater for products obtained by means of apparatus or machine 
protected by a patent. Therefore, it is arguable that protection for the by -products of a 
product patent is meant to be excluded. 135 
3.2.2. Process Patents 
In the case of a process patent, the first exclusive right granted to the owner is the right to 
use the process. "Use" in relation to a process patent would presumably be construed in the 
same way as "use" in relation to a product patent. 136 
The second right is in respect of a product obtained directly by means· of the patented 
process. The exclusive rights granted by a process patent are also extended to such 
products. 137 Under the Act, therefore, it will also be a patent infringement to exploit 
without authority a product obtained directly by means of the patented process. H the 
infringer is using the infringing process to manufacture the relevant product, there will not 
be a problem of stopping the activity. However, problems will arise when the infringing 
133 The United Horse Shoe & Nail Co. Ltd v. Stewart & Co. (1888) 5 RPC 260 (lfi...). per The Lad 
Chancellor, at page 264; Lord Watson. at page 267; and Lord Macnaghten. at page 268. 
134 Bcecbw GrouP Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (lfi...). per Lord Diplock, at page 
201. 
135 This view is in accord with the views expressed in Terrell. 14th Ed .• at para. 6.27. and the CIPA 
Guide. 4th Ed .• at page 506. although it is conceded in the CIPA Guide that this may be arguable. 
citing Haslam. Haslam. R.F., "Letters to the Editor" (1982-83) 12 CIPA 319. argues that based on 
the reported cases on "use" and the meaning the courts had given to this tenn. which is s~ifically 
mentioned in section 60 as infringing. a case could be made on infringement as regards this form of 
activity. His arguments are based on the following grounds, including the fact that Oliver J., in 
SKF v. Harbottle went direcdy to the CPC to find out what section 60 might mean. He says that 
Article 2S CPC gives the proprietor the right to prevent third parties not having his consent from 
"using a product which is the subject matter of the patent" [n?t. as in section 60, ."where ~ 
invention is a product"] and be concludes that it would be very difficult to exclude ~ IDlportation 
such as the one under consideration from the meaning of the words. However. It needs to be 
pointed out that, contrary to his view. it is difficult to see how the description, "using a product 
which is the subject matter of the patent" can refer to anything other than the patented product 
136 See ,upra. para. 3.2.1.eI. for discussion of "use" in relation to a patented product 
137 See section 36(3)(b) of tile Act 
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process is used abroad in a country where there is no patent protection. In such a case. 
there is no possibility of suing under the head of "using". Further, if there is no patent 
protection for the product, there will again be no possible cause of action against the 
importer of the product. Therefore, this provision will mainly be of use in situations where 
there is no claim to the product as such, and where the process is carried out abroad and a 
product from that process is imported into the jurisdiction of the court. 
In relation to a product obtained directly by means of the patented process, the terms 
"make", "import", "offer for sale", "sell", "use" or "stock" will also be similarly 
construed. 138 Therefore, this part of the chapter focuses on the meaning of "product 
obtained directly" by means of a patented process. Before liability can be established, two 
conditions need to be fulfilled. The first is that the impugned product must be the result of 
the sequential steps of the patented process, and the second is that it be "directly obtained" 
by means of that process. In analysing the second condition, the situation prior to the Act is 
analysed before examining the law under the present provision. 
3.2.2.a. Statutory presumption 
For the benefit of the patentee, there is a statutory presumption which reverses the burden 
of proof where infringement of a process patent is involved. If the patent has been granted 
in respect of a process for obtaining a product, the same product produced by a person 
other than the owner of the patent or his licensee shall, unless the contrary is proved, be 
taken in any infringement proceedings to have been obtained by that process. 139 There is, 
therefore, a presumption of infringement in such a situation. 140 The presumption applies 
only when the invention is for a process for obtaining a product. Where other process 
patents are involved, as for example, where a process patent relates to a method of use, or 
other processes which bring about a particular result, but do not result in a product being 
obtained, the burden of proof would still lie on the plaintiff. 
The effect of the Malaysian provision is significantly different from the normal equivalent 
provisions found in countries adopting this reversal of the burden of proof. In these 
jurisdictions, the presumption applies only if the patent relates to a process for 
manufacturing a new product. 14 I The Malaysian provision is not limited to a new product, 
138 
139 
140 
141 
Refer supra, para. 3.2.1. for discussion on the import of these rights. 
See section 36(4) of the Act. 
For the history and purpose of this reversal of the burden of proof, see generally, Lacla,;. S. P .. 
Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights, National and International Protection. Vol. I, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975, at para. 231. 
See, for example, the equivalent provision in section 100 of the UK Patents Act 1977, in 
Appendix, and the similar optional provision suggested in section 161 bis of the WlPO Model 
Law. See also similar provisions in section 55(1), Patent Act. RSC 1985, c. P-4. Canada, sectIon 
139(3), Patent Law 1980, Germany, Article 35 of the Community P~tent Con\'ent\O~. Note. 
however, that section 121 A of the Patents Act 1990, Australia. and sectIon 295, USC TItle 35 -
Patents. United States. are worded to similar effect as the Malaysian proVIsion. 
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but applies in any case where there is a patent relating to a process for making any product, 
whether old or new. 
The need for a reversal of the burden of proof arose at a time when some countries did not 
provide patent protection for inventions relating to chemical compounds. 142 Therefore, the 
only form of protection available to an inventor who had discovered a new chemical 
compound was a patent for the process of obtaining the new compound, and not the 
compound per se. In such a situation, or in a situation where the patented process was the 
only known way to product the product, since the compound was a new compound, it was 
thought fair to shift the burden to the allegedly infringing manufacturer to prove that the 
compound was produced by a different process. However, the owner of a subsequent 
patent for another process for making the same compound was not entitled to rely on this 
presumption of infringement, for the reason that the compound was now not regarded as a 
new compound. 
Where a country, like Malaysia, permits the grant of a patent for a chemical compound per 
se, such a reversal of the burden of proof would appear to be redundant. This is because a 
product patent for the compound covers every method of manufacture of the compound and 
every form which comes within the description in the claim.l 43 Even in the case where a 
new product can not be described by normal parameters and hence the patentee has to rely 
on a process-by-product claim, the patent is regarded as a product per se claim. 144 Hence if 
an unlicensed person were to make the same compound, there would be an infringement of 
the product patent, regardless of the process used. There is no need for reliance on the 
presumption that the product was made by means of the same process. Therefore, it is 
surprising that the provision is still present in the statutes of countries providing product 
patent protection for chemical compounds.145 However, despite its redundancy and 
irrelevance, its presence in the statute book does not occasion any undue burden on 
competitors, as in practice it would not be relied upon. 
142 
143 
144 
145 
I am grateful to His Honour. Judge Ford. for his helpful discussion on this point. For example. in 
1919, the Patents and Designs Act. 1907. of the United Kingdom was amended to prevent the 
hitherto patentable new chemical substances. from being protected by a product per se claim. 1be 
new section 38A of the amended Act permitted only a claim to the product when made by a 
particular process. The statutory reversal of the burden of proof was provided for the first time in 
the new section. This provision was repealed when the Patents Act 1949. United Kingdom was 
enacted, with the consequent restoration of protection for chemical substances per se. The provision 
on the reversal of the burden of proof is, however, reinstated by section 100 of the 1977 Act. 
Protection for chemical substances per se was first introduced in Germany in 1968. in Italy, no 
patents were allowed for pharmaceutical inventions from 1939 to 1978. See generally, Grubb, 
P.W .• Patents for Chemists. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1982. at pages 41 to 46, for a fuller list of 
countries not providing protection for chemical compounds. 
See supra, para. 3.2. - Infringement of Rights. 
For further discussion on product-by-process claims, see infra, para. 3.3.2.e. 
In fact, when referring to section 100 of the 1977 Act of the United Kingdom, the CIP A Guide. 
4th Ed., comments that the section may have very little practical application except to a patent that 
includes no claim to the product ~r se. It is difficult to envisage a situation where the patentee. 
who has discovered a new product, is satisfied with claiming only the new process alone. 
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In the Malaysian context, however, the statutory presumption is not only redundant, but 
could bring about an absurd result and encourage unnecessary legal manoeuvring. Since the 
presumption is not limited to a new product, it is available to any person who owns a 
process patent for obtaining a product. If a plaintiff, the owner of a process patent for 
making a particular known product were to sue a person who owns another process patent 
for making the same product, the plaintiff could rely on this provision to impose the 
evidential burden on the defendant to prove that his product was not obtained by the 
plaintiffs process. On the other hand, if the defendant were to counterclaim for 
infringement of his process patent, he could similarly rely on the presumption to insist that 
the plaintiff proves that the plaintiffs product was not made by means of the defendant's 
process. The provision could also be abused if the owners of process patents make use of 
the provision as a device for obtaining the trade secrets and other manufacturing 
information of their rivals. Therefore, there is ground for arguing that this provision should 
be deleted from the Act. 
However, Article 34 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes an obligation on signatory countries 
to provide such a reversal of burden, which in fact appears to be a historic relic. 146 
Presumably this obligation is meant to be applicable in countries which are still not 
permitting product patents for chemical compounds to ensure proper safeguards to the 
owner of a process patent for making a new product. It might also be inserted in abundans 
cautela in case the courts of certain jurisdictions construe a product-by-process claim 
mentioned above as a process claim and not a claim to the product per se. In view of this 
obligation, it is proposed that although the provision is meaningless in the Malaysian 
context, section 36(4) of the Act be amended by the addition of the word "new", and the 
provisions of safeguard to protect the legitimate interest of a defendant in protecting his 
manufacturing and trade secrets. 
3.2.2.b. The doctrine of infriniini importation 
Under the common law, it has been long been accepted that the direct product made by a 
patented process is protected, Betts y. Neilson being the frrst case in the United Kingdom 
involving this issue,147 The plaintiffs in Elmslle v. Boursier148 sought, inter alia, an 
injunction to restrain the defendant from importing into England any tin-foil made in any 
foreign country according to the invention, or by the machinery and apparatus described in 
the plaintiffs' specification. The substance of the invention was a method of making tin-foil 
by melting and casting the metal. It was held, following Betts y. Neilson, that the activities 
146 See also Alternative B, Article 24 of the proposed Patent Law Treaty (refer footnote 17). 
147 Betts v. Neilson (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 429; (1871-72) L.R. 5 HI.. 1, per Lord Chelmsford 
L.C., L.R. 3 Ch, App. 429, at pages 437-439; per Lord Westbury, in Neilson y. Betts (1871-72) 
L.R. 5 HL 1, at pages 9-11, and per Lord Colonsay, at pages 22 to 25. For the facts, see supra, 
footnote 81 and accompaayina text. 
148 Blm,ljo y. BIl'"'iI' (1869-70) L.R. 9 Sq. 217. 
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of the defendants were a violation of the rights granted to the plaintiffs by the patent. To 
hold otherwise "would be a short mode of destroying 'every profit, benefit, commodity. 
and advantage' which a patentee could have from such a thing, if all that a man had to do 
was to get the thing made abroad, import it into this country, and then sell it in competition 
with the English patentee."149 A similar approach was taken in Wright v. Hitchcock,150 
where the court held that the defendants, who had bought and sold, by way of trade, 
articles manufactured by a process which infringed the patented process, were guilty of an 
infringement of the patent. This decision is significant because the court specifically held 
that the patent was not for the manufactured product, but for the process of manufacturing 
it. 1S1 
The Court of Appeal in Von Heyden v. Neustadt was asked to reconsider and to overrule 
the decisions of the two courts of first instance. But the judges saw no ground for 
dissenting from them, stressing that "the patent in another part expressly forbids any person 
directly or indirectly to make, use, or put in practice the invention. A person who makes, or 
procures to be made, abroad for sale in this country, and sells the product here, is surely 
indirectly making, using and putting in practice the patented invention. Any other 
construction would, in fact, in the case of any really valuable invention of a process, render 
the whole privilege granted by the Crown futile."152 This proposition, that where a patent 
had been granted in England for a new process for producing a product which was 
previously known, the importation and sale in England of this substance made abroad 
according to the patented process was an infringement of the patent, was affirmed by the 
House of Lords in Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health. 153 
3.2.2.c. The Saccharin doctrine 
In several cases decided prior to the 1977 Act, the courts have been willing to extend patent 
protection even to products which were not the direct product of a patented invention. So, 
149 Elmslie v. Boursier (1869-70) L.R. 9 Eq. 217, per Sir W.M. James V.c., at pages 222-223. 
150 Wri~ht v. Hitchcock (1869-71) L.R. 5 Ex. 37 (Court of Exchequer Chamber), per Kelly C.B., at 
pages 46-47, "If the law were otherwise, then when a man has patented an invention, the profit of 
which consists in selling articles manufactured by means of the invention, another might, by 
merely crossing the Channel, and manufacturing abroad, and selling in London for far less than the 
original price, but also at a trifle less than the price charged by the patentee, articles made by the 
patented process, wholly deprive the patentee of the benefit of his invention." M~in B., at pa~es 
47-48, Channell B., at pages 48-50, and Pigott B., at pages 50-51, delivered concumng 
judgements. 
151 Wril:ht v, Hitchcock (1869-71) L.R. 5 Ex. 37 (Court of Exchequer Chamber), per Kelly C.B .. at 
page 45. "Therefore, whether we look at the title of the patent, t~e specifi~ation, or. the ~Iaim, the 
patent is not for the article manufactured, but for the mode by whIch the artIcle descnbed IS brought 
into existence." 
152 Von Heyden v. Neustadt (1880) L.R. 14 Ch. D. 230, per James L.J., at pages 231-233. See also 
The Cartsburn SUl:ar Refininl: Co. v. Sharp & Sharp (1884) 1 RPC 181 (Court of Session. 
Scotland), per Lord Kinnear, at page 186. 
153 Pfizer Corporation v, Ministry of Health (1965) 82 RPC 261, at page 303, per Lord Evershed. 
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in Saccharin Corp. v. Anglo-Continental Chern. Works Ltd,154 the court held that there 
was infringement of the process patent for "improvement in the manufacture of toluene 
sulpho chlorides", an intermediate compound used in the manufacture of saccharin, by the 
sale of saccharin in the manufacture of which the process was used to manufacture the 
intermediate compound. The saccharin was manufactured in Switzerland using the patented 
process. The defendants imported and sold these allegedly infringing products in the United 
Kingdom. The court held that although the toluene sulpho chlorides had to be subjected to 
subsequent process to produce saccharin, the defendants, by importing saccharin, in the 
course of the production of which the patented process was used, were indirectly making 
use of the invention and had infringed. Although Buckley J. agreed that the cases of 
Elmslie v. Boursier and Von Heyden v. Neustadt did not entirely cover the point which had 
to be decided, the principles there determined it. On the principle that if the patented process 
were the last stage in the production of the article sold, the importation and sale of the 
product would plainly be an infringement, it should not, therefore, make it any less an 
infringement that the article produced and sold was manufactured by the use of the patented 
process which was subject to certain other process. By the sale of the saccharin, the 
patentee was deprived of some part of the whole profit and advantage of the invention, and 
the importer was indirectly making use of the invention. I 55 
However, Tomlin J. refused to apply the Saccharin doctrine without qualification in 
Wilderman v. F.W. Berk & Co. Ltd, which involved the importation of products 
manufactured by a patented apparatus. 156 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had 
imported two quantities of caustic potash, manufactured by a German company in an 
apparatus in which the essential features of the invention were present, and that the 
importation was an infringement. It was held, inter alia, that the importation of the article 
was not necessarily an infringement, but that the nature of the invention, and the extent to 
which its employment had played a part in the production of the article, must be considered. 
In the absence of evidence as to those matters, infringement had not been proved. IS7 
IS4 SacchArin Corp. v. An&lo-Gontinental Chern. WQrks Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 307. See also Saccharine 
Com. v. Reitmeyer (1900) 17 RPC 606, per Cozens-Hardy J., at page 611. 
ISS Saccharip CQrp. v. An&lo-CQntinental Chern. Works Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 307 (Ch. Div.), per 
Buckley J., at pages 318-319, following Elrnslie v. Boursier 1869-70) L.R, 9 Eq. 217 and Ywl 
Heydep y. Neustadt (1880) L.R. 14 Ch, D. 230. For a critique of this decision, see Lynfield, H.G., 
"Infringement in Great Britain by Importation of Transformed Products", Vol. 9 IDEA 577 (1965-
66). 
156 Wilderman v. F.W. Bert & Co. Ltd (1925) 42 RPC 79. 
157 Wilderman v' f.W. Bert & Co. L1d (1925) 42 RPC 79, per Tomlin J., at pages 87-88, "It does 
not, however ... necessarily follow that the importation of caustic potash made in those troughs 
was an infringement of the patent in suit. I have bad no. evidence of any .kind directed t~ the ~a~ 
Of effect of the invention. I am not informed by eVIdence how far, If at all, the mvenbon IS 
effectual in practice. or what its precise function in the process of electrolysis of alkaline salts. that 
is whether it relates to a mere mechanical detail of the apparatus employed or whether it is s~mething the use of which is necessary to render the working of the process practicable m 
profitable, '" It is urged on the plaintiff's ~half that, ~nce I, am satisfied that. there has been. ~ 
in connection with the manufacture of an imported article, In however an urumportant Of trifling 
respect, some apparatus or material in respect of which there is a subsisting patent, the importation 
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Relying on the Saccharin case, the plaintiffs in Beecham Group Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories 
Ltd,158 argued that that case established that the importation into the UK of a product 
manufactured abroad constituted an infringement of a UK patent for any process that had 
been used at any stage in the manufacture of the imported product. The same applied to any 
product which was either used as a starting material or fonned as an intennediate at any 
stage in the course of the manufacture of the imported product, even though the imported 
article was wholly different in composition, characteristics and usefulness from the patented 
product. The House of Lords held that the application by extension of the doctrine of 
infringing importation to the use of the claimed products in processes abroad could not be 
rejected in its entirety. However, it was categorically stated that the Saccharin doctrine must 
be applied with a rider that for an infringement, the "process must have played more than an 
unimportant or trifling part in the manufacture abroad of the product, each case depending 
on its own merits".159 
From the Beecham case, several observations may be made. The first is that the doctrine of 
infringing importation is applicable to prevent the importation of products made by means 
of a patented process, subject to the rule that the process must have played a substantial part 
in the manufacture of the product. Doubt was cast upon Buckley J.'s opinion in the 
Saccharin case that it would still be an infringement when the patented process was used 
not in the last stage but in an earlier stage of the manufacture of the imported article. 160 
However, while the principle of the Saccharin doctrine was approved no decision was 
reached on the extent thereof as the House of Lords declined to come to any frrm ruling on 
this point since it was not relevant to the decision. 161 The question left unanswered by the 
Beecham case as regards the extent to which the Saccharin doctrine is applicable for 
imported products in the manufacture of which a patented process was used is now 
academic, in view of the new provision to which attention is now directed. 
of the article manufactured is necessarily an infringement. I do not think that the cases to which I 
have been referred compel me to accept so wide a proposition, and I do not accept it." 
158 Beecham Group Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (HL). 
159 Beecham Groyp Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (HL), per Lord Simon, at pages 
203-204, citing Tomlin 1. in Wilderman v. F.W. Berk & Co. Ltd (1925) 42 RPC 79, at page 86. 
160 Beecham Group Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (HL), per Diplock, at page 200, 
"Expressed in this wide form the judgement in the Saccharin case stands in isolation." 
161 The Saccharin doctrine was adopted and applied in Singapore in Beecham Groyp Ltd v. Sime Darby 
SjnKapore Ltd & ors [1968] 1 MU 86, per Buttrose J.. at page 88, who held that the importation 
and sale of Hetacillin in Singapore was prima facie an infringement of the plaintiffs' patent under 
section 6 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance of Singapore. This decision 
was affirmed in Simc Darby SjnKapore Ltd & ors v. Beecham Group Ltd [1968] 2 MLJ 161, at 
page 164, per Wee C.1. (Fed. Ct Singapore). 
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3.2.2.d. The present law 
The situations discussed above under the doctrine of infringing importation seem to be 
covered by the tenn "product obtained directly by means of the process", and would. 
therefore, be considered an infringement under the Act. Whether the Saccharin doctrine as 
modified, represents the law as laid down in the new statutory provision depends on how 
the courts interpret the word "directly". The major difficulty lies in relation to the question 
of what is meant by a "product obtained directly by means of the process". How proximate 
to the patented process must the offending product be before it is deemed to be an 
infringing product? How far up the whole production line which involves a series of 
processes, each resulting in intennediate products, can the owner of one of the intennediate 
processes reach? 
Benyamini discusses two possible approaches to the construction of the meaning of 
"directly" in the context of the equivalent provision of Article 25(c) of the CPC, the narrow 
and literal interpretation and the broad approach.162 He agrees, inter alia, that the word 
"directly", if used in its natural and ordinary sense, should apply only to the initial and 
immediate result of practising the process, and that this provides a clear and simple test for 
infringement and hence certainty in the law. However, he favours the broad approach 
whereby the word "directly" does not necessarily import proximity in tenns of time but also 
a qualitative connection. Under this test, if the value and characteristics of the final product 
were largely determined by the use of the process or original product, then in a qualitative 
sense the final product could be regarded as being obtained directly by means of the 
patented process. Hence there has to be a determination of the part the process played in the 
manufacture of the final product, regardless of whether the physical direct product of the 
patented process is a starting or intennediate material. This approximates the approach 
under the modified Saccharin doctrine, and is, in principle, the approach adopted by the US 
legislature in 1988, when a new section 271(g) was introduced.1 63 Under the new US 
162 
163 
See Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Community, IIC Studies Vol 13, VCH, 
Weinheim, 1993, at pages 158-164. 
Section 271 of USC 35 was amended in 1988 (by The Process Patent Amendments Act 1988, 
enacted on August 23, 1988, and became effective on February 23, 1989) to provide a new 
provision extending patent protection to certain products of a patented process. See Appendix for 
the provisions of section 271 (g). Prior to the amendment, there was no patent protection available 
for the product of a patented process. The only possible remedy was for a patent owner to seek 
relief before the U.S. International Trade Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
However, the patent owner would have to prove that the importation of the product resulting from 
the process constituted an unfair practice in import trade. See generally, Stark, L.T.. "Efforts by 
Treaty, Case and Statute to Provide Holders of Process Patents Protection Against Imported Goods 
made by the Patented Process", [1960] 42 JPOS 21. and Kramer, B., "Protecting the High-Tech 
Frontiers: The Need for Stronger Process Patent Laws", [1988] 21 Akron Law Review 429. For 
further commentaries and discussions on the new provision, see Chisum, Vol. ~. Chapter 16, 
paras. 16.02.[6]; Mirabel, E.P .. "Product-by-Process Claims: A Practical Perspective", 68 JPTOS 
3 (1986); Haymond, W.B., "The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988: Solving an Old 
Problem, But Creating New Ones", [1989] Brigham Young University Law Review 567; Law, G., 
"Liability Under the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 for the Use of a Patented Process 
Outside the United States", 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 245 (1991); and Hitchcock, D.L.. Nard, C.A .. 
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provisions it is an infringement to import, sell or use within the United State a product 
which is made by a process patented in the United States. However, a product which is 
made by a patented process will not be considered to be so made after it has either been 
materially changed by subsequent processes or it has become a trivial and non-essential 
component of another product. Further, in an action for infringement of a process patent no 
remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the non-commercial use or retail sale 
of a product unless there is no adequate remedy for infringement on account of the 
importation or other use or sale of that product. 
However, the hope that the court will construe the provision broadly seems to have been 
put to rest in the United Kingdom case of Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc. & anor v. 
Warner Music Manufacturing Europe GmbH & anor. 164 This is the first case to come 
before the court where the effect of the equivalent provision in the United Kingdom Act 
was considered. The plaintiffs were the proprietors of four European patents (United 
Kingdom) relating to the production of optical discs (compact discs). The claims of the 
plaintiffs' 1649 patent were directed to a method of forming stampers. One of the claims in 
the '1493 patent related to a process of controlling the velocity of a disc during mastering. 
The defendants admitted the manufacture in Germany and the importation and sale of discs 
in the United Kingdom. For the purposes of their application to strike out the writ and 
statement of claim as disclosing no cause of action, they accepted that the plaintiffs' 
patented processes were used in their mastering process and also to produce the "father". 
However, they denied infringement on the ground that their discs were not obtained directly 
by means of the processes claimed in the plaintiffs' patents. 
Aldous 1. reviewed the case law but held that the law prior to the Patents Act 1977 was of 
historical interest only and did not throw light on the proper construction of section 60( 1)( c) 
of the 1977 Act. Since section 60 was one of the sections referred to in section 130(7) of 
the 1977 Act and was framed so as to have the same effect as the corresponding provisions 
of the EPC (Art. 64(2» and the CPC (Art. 29(c», reference was made both to the German 
and French text of Art. 64(2) of the EPC. Considering the three texts, it was held that the 
word "directly" should be given the meaning of "without intermediary". Further, guidance 
from German, Dutch, Danish, Swiss and Austrian jurisprudence indicated that in those 
jurisdictions the product, to be "directly obtained" must be the product of the claimed 
invention and not an intermediate. Since none of the defendants' products was the direct 
"The Process Patent Amendments Act: The Labyrinth", [1993] 3 Fordham Ent., Media & Intel!. 
Prop. L.F. 441; Wright, A. "Comment: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFf A) aM 
Process Patent Protection", [1994] 43 Am. U.L. Rev. 603. 
164 Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc. & anor v! Warner Music Manufacturin~ Europe GmbH & anor 
[1995] RPC 487 (Patents Court). For a comment on this case, see Russell, F., Hurdle, H., "What 
is the Direct Product of a Patented Process'.' Pioneer Electronics v. Warner Music Manufacturing" 
[1995] 5 EIPR 249. 
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product of the claimed processes but was the result of further material and important steps 
which were necessary in order to arrive at the end product, there was no infringement. It 
was stressed that a causal link, however important, was not sufficient. 165 
Given the traditional reliance of the Malaysian courts on UK precedents, it is very likely 
that the approach of Aldous J. in the Pioneer case will be followed. It would seem, 
therefore, that in the absence of any valid product-by-process claim, the patent owner is not 
able to prevent any commercial dealings with a product obtained from a patented process 
when such product is not the direct result of the patented process. The result is the same 
even though the product of the patented process constitutes an important link in the creation 
of the final product. Therefore, if the product of the patented process is an intermediate 
product which constitutes a step in the overall production operation, there is no 
infringement. However, in coming to the opinion that there was no infringement, Aldous J. 
stated that none of the defendants' products were the direct product of the claimed 
processes but were the result of further material and important steps which were necessary 
in order to arrive at the end product. Hence if there is a colourable evasion like that 
attempted in the Beecham case, where an additional step was incorporated into the process 
to form a substance which did not literally fall within the description of the product of the 
patented process, it would seem that there would still be an infringement under the Act. 166 
However, it is unlikely that under the approach the courts could go further than this. 
Construed this way, it would appear that the present statutory provision is less 
advantageous to the patentee, and has narrowed the earlier common law protection. 
3.2.2.e. Observations on protection for process patents 
In the cases decided under the old law the purpose of extending protection to products made 
by means of a patented process was to prevent the taking of the benefit of illegal use of the 
plaintiffs invention, the patent being rendered useless if protection was not granted and 
such products were allowed to flow in from abroad unimpeded.l 61 However, the court was 
165 Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc. & apor v. Warner Music Manufacturin& Europe GmbH & apor 
[1995] RPC 487, ~r Aldous 1., at pages 492-495. Note that the Court of Appeal has affirmed 
Aldous 1.'s approach - see The Times, 1011211996. It was s~ssed ~at a product does ~ot cease .to 
be a product so obtained if it was subjected to further processmg which does not cause It to lose Its 
identity, there being no such loss where it retains its essential characteristics. 
166 Wibbelmann, I., "Protection of 'Products Directly Obtained by Processes' According to Article 
64(2) EPC", [1996] 3 EIPR 174, at 176, is of similar opinion. See also The We11come 
FOundatiOn apd Hoffmann-La Roche & Cia. V. Pires & Mourato Yeanelho. Lela (Sup. Ct, 
Portupl 1979) 11 fiC 233 (1980), "... if the defendants... import trimethoprim lDIDufacIured 
abroad ICCOIding to the patented process and put it on sale in Portugal, there can be no ~ ~t 
such course of conduct infringes the exclusive rights of the patent owner .... 'The question anses 
whether an infringement also takes place if defendants first combine ~~ with ~e ~ 
substance. e.,. a placebo, and then import it into Portugal ... It would iDdeed be Incompatible With 
the law if we were to allow the clear violation of the cited provision by such indirect means, thus 
nullifyiDl the beacfi .. the plaintiff enjoys under the exclusive right accorded him. .•. II 
167 See. for exam~ per Kelly C.B., at pap 47, Martin B., at paae 47. Pigott B., at paae 51. in 
Wriab' y. HirdJcock (1869-71) L.R. 5 Ex. 37 (Ct of Exchequer Chamber); see also von tmdm v' 
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able to do so because of the wide wording of the grant which, inter alia, prohibited third 
party from either "directly or indirectly" making, using and putting in practice the patented 
invention. 168 In the absence of such widely prescribed rights, the courts would be 
restricted in the extent to which the rights granted may be stretched. 
The advantage of the strict approach is that it provides more certainty for third parties. 
There are difficulties if the patent owner is able to sue for patent infringement every time his 
patented process is used or applied, no matter how proximate or removed the final 
impugned product is to the original use of the patented process. If an intermediate product 
produced by a patented process were to be incorporated into another non-infringing article, 
or were to be used in the manufacture of other products, suppliers of these articles or 
products may be unfairly restrained in their trade. This problem has been the subject of 
concerns expressed by judges in various cases. 169 
168 
169 
Neustadt (1880) L.R. 14 Ch. D. 230, per James L.J., at pages 233, "Any other construction would 
... in the case of any really valuable invention of a process, render the whole privilege granted by 
the Crown futile. When the patent was an English patent only, an imitator would only have had to 
establish his factory on the other side of the border, and now such an imitator would only have to 
establish his factory or use the chemical process in Boulogne or Ostend, and he would effectually 
deprive the inventor of the 'whole profit, benefit, commodity, and advantage' of the invention, am 
the more valuable the invention, the more certain it would be that the prohibition in the letters 
patent would be so indirectly avoided - that is to say, evaded." 
See, for example, von He.yden y. Neustadt (1880) L.R. 14 Ch. D. 230, per James L.J., at pages 
233, "A person who makes, or procures to be made, abroad for sale in this country, and sells the 
product here, is surely indirectly making, using and putting in practice the patented invention. See 
also Beecham Group Ltd y. Bristol Laboratories Ltd [1978] RPC 153 (HL), per Lord Diplock, at 
199, "The monopoly granted by a patent is limited territorially to the United Kingdom and the Isle 
of Man and the corresponding prohibition is limited to acts done within those territorial limits. 
The wide word of the grant and prohibition were, however, treated as entitling the patentee to 
prohibit the obtaining from abroad and selling in this country an article manufactured abroad by a 
patented process, even though the article was of a kind that was not new and consequently of itself 
could not be, and was not, claimed as an invention in the specification."; and Pioneer Electronics 
Capital Inc. & anor y. Warner Music Manufacturin~ Euro.pe GmbH & anor [1995] RPC 487 
(Patents Court), per Aldous J., at page 494, "Whether or not the view expressed by the Saccharin 
case was correct was left open by the House of Lords in Beecham Groyp Ltd v. Bristol Laboratories 
Ltd. [1978] RPC 153 .... Prior to 1977 the courts had to decide whether indirect use had been made 
of a patent which is different to deciding whether a product has been obtained directly by means of 
the process. " 
See, for example, the comments of the judges in the following cases: Betts v. Neilson (1867-68) 
L.R. 3 Ch, App. 429, per Lord Chelmsford, "A variety of cases were suggested in argument, to 
show to what extravagant consequences a decision against the defendants would lead. It w~ aske:d 
whether ... if there were a patent for a particular dye, and a lady were to purchase a dress In PariS 
dyed with the patented colour, and then to wear it in this country, she would be gUilty o~ an 
infringement? ... As to the case of the patented dye upon a dress purc~ abroad and brought Into 
this country, there may be some difficulty in dealing with the case of the Ignorant use of a patented 
invention under such circumstances, but I must decline to express any opinion upon extreme cases, 
which are merely matter for ingenious speculation, and not even likely to arise in such a manner ~ 
to call for a legal decision. "; WjJdmpao y. F.W. BU & Co. J 41 (1925) 42 RPC 79, per Tombn 
J., at pages 93-94, "It is urged ee. that, once I am satisfied that there has been used in connection 
with the manufacture of an imported article, in however an unimportant or trifling respect, some 
apparatus or material in respect of which there is a subsisting patent, the importati?n of the article 
manufactured is necessarily an infringement I do not think that the cases to which I have been 
~ compel me to accept so wide a proposition, and I do not accept it. I cannot think. for 
example, that the employment of a patented cutting blowpipe or a palen~ ~er in the 
manufacture of some part of a locomotive would necessarily render the Importation of the 
locomotive an infringement"; 1ktdwn Qmyp Ltd y. Bristol laboqtories lid [1978] RPC IS3 
(HL), per Lord Simon of Glaisdale, at page 204, "I would '" rem.t that English law has always 
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A possible extension of protection to the products made by a patented process could be 
derived by relying on the provision of section 3 of the Act. This definition section provides 
that "patented product" means a product which is a patented invention or, in relation to a 
patented process, a product obtained directly by means of the process or to which the 
process has been applied.1 7o Thus where a substance or article is treated according to a 
patented process, the substance or article after such treatment is also deemed to be a 
patented product even if, qua product, it has not been altered by the treatment. However, 
although it is attractive to rely on this provision as a means of providing another layer of 
protection, it is submitted that reliance cannot be placed on this provision. Section 64 of the 
Act, relating to unauthorised claim of patent rights, is the only section in the Act where 
reference is made to the expression "patented product" .171 Hence it would seem that the 
definition in section 3 is meant to be applied only in the specific context of the criminal 
provision of section 64 and not anywhere else. In This submission is strengthened by the 
fact that section 36(3)(b)(ii) specifically mentions only "product obtained directly by means 
of the process" and the reference to "to which the process is applied" is omitted. 
It is also worth remarking that in Germany, a claim to the use of a known material in a 
specified way has been held infringed by importation of the material with instructions for 
use in the claimed way.173 The decision was said to arise from the "use" claim being 
directed to a process and the imported article being the direct product thereof, and that an 
English court would constitute a "use" claim in a similar fashion. I74 In this context, it 
needs to be mentioned that under the Act, a "process" includes an art or method. 17 5 
However, it is submitted that the provision extending protection of a process patent to a 
direct product refers to a "product obtained directly by means of the process" .176 So 
although the extended protection may be applicable when the process involves preparation 
resolutely refused to carry a legal doctrine to its logical conclusion in the face of convenience ... I 
would have thought that some formula might be devised whereby the Saccharin doctrine could be 
extended to cover, say, 6-APA playing a significant part in the manufacture of a semi-synthetic 
penicillin, but not of a wholly different product like, say, glue." In V .D. Ltd v. Boston Deep Sea 
Fishim: & Ice Co. Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 303 (Ch. D), the plaintiffs even attempted to submit that 
fish caught by the patented fishing gear would be caught by the doctrine of "infringing 
importation". However, this was testily brushed aside by the judge's comment that "Fish is not 
your invention", see at page 322. 
170 This definition is the same as that found in section 130(1) of the UK Patents Act 1977. There are 
no equivalent provisions in the Sri Lankan Act, or in the WIPO Model Law on Inventions. 
171 For the equivalent provisions in the 1977 Act, see sections 110 and 130. 
172 Note that Benyamini relies on the same definition of a "patented product" in section. 130 of the 
1977 Act, and the EPO Guidelines C III4.7b. clarifying Article 64(2) EPC (the eqUIvalent EPC 
provision to section 36(3)(b)(ii) of the Act) to argue that the protection granted to a product directly 
produced by a process should also extend to cover products tre~ted by a pat~nted process - see 
Benyamini. A., Patent Infringement in the European Commumt~. HC Stu~le~ Vol 1~. VCH, 
Weinheim. 1993. at pages 164-165. In view of what has been SaId above. It IS submitted that 
Benyamini is wrong on this point. 
173 See "Cove[in~ Sheetin~ with Slits" (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany), noted in (1991) 22 IIC 395. Reason 
3(b) of the opinion. 
174 See CIPA Guide. 4th Ed .. para 60.06. at page 506. 
175 See section 3 of the Act. 
176 See s~ction 36(3)(b)(ii) of the Act. and section 60( 1 )(c). Patents Act 1977. United Kingdom. 
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of a particular product in a certain specified way to obtain a particular result, it is submitted 
that where there is no change to the product to be used, the extended protection could not be 
relied upon. This is because it is difficult to see how that particular product could then be 
regarded as being a product obtained by means of the process, it being merely a known 
product used in a certain way to enable the patented process to be carried out. I 77 Therefore, 
if such a product is to be protected at all, it has to be under the provisions on indirect 
infringement. 
The effect of the new provision would be to place greater importance on proper claim 
drafting,178 especially the use of "product-by-process" claims.l 79 Although the protection 
conferred on a product covered by a "product-by-process" claim may in some instances be 
similar to the extended protection granted to a process patent with respect to the product 
obtained directly by means of the process,180 it may be wider in certain situations. This is 
especially so where it may be difficult to detennine in some processes what the "direct 
product" is. A process may result in more than one product and may give rise to by-
products. There would be the consequent difficulties of detennining which products are 
"direct" and which are "indirect" products of the process. If, on the other hand, the patentee 
specifies in his claim the various products that he wishes to be protected by his process 
claim, there would not be this uncertainty. 
Further, if the patentee, who has discovered an improved process in one stage of a series of 
stages involved in the whole production chain, could claim the whole overall process, then 
he is assured of greater protection for his invention. Take, for example, a hypothetical 
situation where the patentee has discovered a new process P for producing substance A, 
where A is a known intermediate material in a known 3-step process for producing a 
known final product F. Where the inventor claims the new process P, and A as obtained 
by the process P, both the process P and the product A are protected by his patent. In this 
case there is no difference in the level of protection even if he does not claim product A as 
obtained by process P, since the law grants him protection for the product obtained directly 
by means of his process P, which in this case is A. However, the provision, as construed 
in the Pioneer case, does not grant him any exclusive right over the final product F. 
Therefore, to ensure that the final product is also within his exclusive right, he needs to be 
able to claim the overall process for making product F. Admittedly, the only novelty 
177 In "Coverin~ Sheetin~ with Slits" (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany), noted (1991) 22 lIe 395, the patent. in 
issue related to a known transparent plastic film in the form of a sheet for the purpose o! covenng 
plant culture consisting, inter alia. of a number of rows of slits parallel to the long Side of the 
sheet. 
178 In fact Aldous J .. in the Pioneer case endorses the view of Dr K. Bruchhausen that if the patentee 
desires to ensure adequate protection for his invention. he needs to make use of ap~ropriate form. of 
words in his claims. see Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc. & an or v. Warner MUSIC Maoufactunn~ 
Europe GmbH & aoor [1995] RPC 487 (Patents Court). per Aldous 1.. at page 497. 
179 See supra, text accompanying footnotes 10 and II. 
180 See explanation in "Irioxaoe" ) IIC 226 (1972) (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany). at pages 236-238. 
180 
(assuming inventive step is present) in the overall process is the involvement of the new 
procedure in the manufacture of the known intermediate product. However, it is submitted 
that, in principle, the substitution of this new step in place of a previously used process in 
the overall process is enough to confer novelty and inventive step in the overall process 
which has now been modified. Having claimed this new overall process, the inventor could 
then add a claim to the fmal product produced by this new overall process, or rely on the 
statutory provision protecting the direct product of his process. Since the overall process is 
claimed, and the final product is thus protected, there is no longer the problem of protection 
even if the final product no longer contains or retains any element or trace of the 
intermediate substance. 
This form of claim is, however, applicable only in the situation where the usefulness of the 
intermediate product A is confined only to its use in making the final product F. If there are 
other uses of product A, for producing other fmal products, then to ensure complete 
protection, the patentee would have to claim all the possible overall processes for making 
these various final products. Such wide ranging claims may not be feasible, nor allowable. 
Further, there is a logical limit to the extent to which reliance could be placed on method of 
framing claims to ensure proper protection against the use of the patented process. For 
example, it is unlikely that the court will allow, in a claim to a new method for processing 
harvested com, the addition of a product claim to the com as processed by the new method, 
or in a process for catching fish, the fish caught by the process. 
Ultimately how far protection is to be extended to the direct or indirect products of patented 
processes is a line-drawing exercise based on policy decisions, which could only be dealt 
with by legislative action. The less than complete scope of protection for a process patent 
may be remedied by a more liberal allowance of product-by-process claims, if not by the 
patent office and the court, then by express statutory provision. I81 
Another possible solution is to statutorily provide that in all other cases where the imported 
product is not the direct product of a patented process, then the patent owner is entitled to 
recover from the importer, wholesaler, or retailer the value which the use of the patented 
process has imparted to the article as a whole. Although the retailer may be involved in 
181 In fact Dickman, M.H., "Product-by-process Claims in the US Patent Practice", 28 IDEA 59 
(1987-88), advocates a change in the US law to allow claims for old or obvious p~ucts made by 
patented processes to make it easier for a process patent holder to stop imports of artIcles made by 
an infringing process. On this issue, see also the interesting comments made by J~ LemIrd 
Hand, Circuit Judge, in Buono y. Yankee Maid Dress Com. 26 USPQ 57 (CCA 2nd Clf. 1935), at 
page 61, that "Conceivably it might be possible to patent a product merely as the produ~ of a 
machine or process, even though it were anticipated if made in other ways. While it. wo~d m that 
case not be infringed by anything but the product of the machine or of the process, It nught be an 
important protection to the inventor, if the machine of the process was used in another country ~ 
the product imported. Such competition effectively diminishes the market for the patented machine 
or process. That is probably not the law, though it is hard to find instances, probably because the 
Patent Office does not grant product patents in that form." 
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litigation and may have to compensate the patent owner, he has a recourse against the 
supplier or importer for breach of the implied tenns under the Sale of Goods Act, 1957.182 
By virtue of section 14 of this Act, where a purchaser of goods finds himself unable to use 
these goods because of the existence of a third party patent, he has a right of action against 
the seller for breach of the implied undertaking as to title or as to quiet possession.1 83 This 
possibility of compensation from the importer or the wholesaler will lessen the burden on 
innocent retailers. Further, to ensure that the patent owner's enforcement of his process 
patent will not cause undue interference with the trade of innocent retailers, a further 
provision could be inserted to prohibit the patent owner from applying for an injunction or 
seizure of the goods. The only remedy available to the owner is a claim for the value of the 
use of the process. It is admitted that this will raise cries of compulsory licences against the 
wishes of the patent owner. However, the choice is either a total lack of protection in the 
case of indirect products of a patented process, or a scheme which ensures that, to some 
extent, the patent owner is able to get the benefit of his invention within the jurisdiction. It 
has also to be borne in mind that the use of the patented process abroad may not invariably 
be a wilful or bad faith use. The process may be unpatentable in the jurisdiction where it is 
used, or the user may have a prior user right to use the process within the particular 
jurisdiction. 
3.3. Imminent Infringement 
In certain situations the patent owner need not prove that there is an infringement of his 
patent rights before he is entitled to commence proceedings. If he can prove that 
infringement is imminent, he is entitled to apply to the court for an injunction to prevent 
infringement. 184 This provision is just a restatement of the common law position, where a 
patentee could sustain an action for an injunction to restrain a threatened infringement of his 
patent, even if no actual infringement has taken place, provided that what is threatened to be 
done is an infringement. 18S 
Nevertheless, under the old law, before the patentee could be successful in an action for 
imminent infringement, it would appear that a sufficiently strong case of a likely 
infringement, and a possible loss to the patentee, had to be made out. In United Tele.pbone 
Co. V. London Globe etc. Co., the plaintiffs brought their action for infringement on the 
182 Sale of Goods Act, 1957, Act 382, as amended by the Sale of Goods (Amendment and Extension) 
Act 1990, Act A756, Malaysia. 
183 See Niblett y. Confectioners' Materials [1921] 3 KB 387 (CA). In Microbew's y. Yinbnrat [197~] 
RPC 19, the Court of Appeal held that a seller would be in ~ of the wm:nmty of qwet 
possession if the buyer's enjoyment of the goods was ~ubsequently dis~ albeIt by a patent 
right not existing at the date of the sale - see Lord Denmng, at page 23, Roskil1 LJ., at page 26. 
184 See section 60(2) of the Act. 
185 See, for example, frgrson VI lAO [1878] 9 Cb.D. 48, p~r Jessel M.R., at page 65. 
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ground that certain instruments were infringement of their patent. The defendants had 
bought 800 or more of such admittedly infringing articles manufactured for them in 
Antwerp and imported into England. They were kept unused in a warehouse. When sued, 
the defendants dismantled the machines by taking out the patented element, and kept the 
separate parts stored in a warehouse. The court held that an injunction should be granted 
because possession without actual use of infringing articles was a sufficient ground for an 
injunction to restrain actual use. 186 
In Pessers. Moody. Wraith & GUff. Ltd v. Newell & Co. ,187 however, the court held that 
possession of patented article without intention to use before the expiration of the patent is 
not an infringement. The defendants admitted that they had bought, and had in their 
possession, the infringing apparatus but contended that they had bought it with the intention 
of keeping it, unused, until after the expiration of the patent, and they had not used it 
beyond merely trying it. The judge held that as the defendants had not used the patented 
article during the term of the patent there was no infringement, refusing to follow United 
Telephone Co. v. London Qlobe etc. CO.188 
Despite the contradictory decisions in the above two cases, the factual situations present 
could be distinguished. In United Telephone Co. v. London Globe etc. Co., the patent was 
only five years old at the time of the infringement suit, whereas in Pessers, the patent had 
only a few months to run. 189 
Mere possession of an infringing article, without more, does not amount to an 
infringement. However, it is capable of raising a strong inference that an infringement is 
likely.190 Therefore, there is a presumption of fact that the defendants, being in possession 
of these articles, has either used them, or has them for the purpose of using them, 
especially if the possessor is in the manufacturing, wholesale or retail business. Even then, 
if the possessor can prove that despite the possession of the infringing article, he has no 
intention to use it in infringement of the patent, an injunction may not be issued. This 
possibility is illustrated in British United Shoe Machine[y Co. v. Simon CQIlier Ltd, where 
the machines were in a state in which the patented invention could not be used. Therefore, 
on the facts the defendants were able to show that there was no intention on their part to use 
186 United Telephone Co, VI London Globe etc .. Co. (1884) 1 RPC 117, per Bacon V.C., at page 
119. 
187 Pessers. Moody. Wraith & Gua. Ltd V. ~weU & Co. (1914) 31 RPC 510, disapproving United 
TeleJ)bone Co. V. London Globe etc .. Co. (1909) 1 RPC 117. 
188 Pessers l Moody. Wraith & Qua. Ltd VI Newell & Co. (1914) 31 RPC 510, per Bailhache J., at 
pages 511-512. 
189 In Pessws. Moody. Wraith & Gurr. Ltd VI Newell & Co. (1914) 31 RPC 51~, ~ defendants 
boUght the patented apparatus in April. 1914, whereas the patent was due to expue ID December, 
1914. 
190 Britiab Upjtod Shoe Macbiom eg. y. SimoD Collier IJd (1910) 27 RPC 567 (HL), per Lorebum 
L.C., at page 571, and Lord Dunedin, at page 572. 
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the infringing machine and that there was no likelihood that they would use it. 191 If such an 
innocent intention cannot be shown, or if there is a likelihood of future use of the patented 
invention, then an injunction will issue. This will especially be so when the infringing 
machine, though not presently used, is intended to be put to used as and when 
necessary .192 
3.4. Territorial Scope of Patent 
There will be an actionable tort only if the alleged infringing act takes place in Malaysia, 
i.e., patent rights are territorial in nature. 193 This situation is similar under the law prior to 
the coming into force of the Act. 194 However, several issues connected to territoriality are 
still unclear. Two aspects of this problem will be highlighted. The frrst concerns the 
question of infringement in territorial waters and airspace, the second relates to the issue of 
infringing activities aboard Malaysian registered vessels. 195 
3.4.1. Infrin~ement in Territorial Waters and Airspace 
Caldwell v. V an Vlissin~en is the earliest English case dealing with patent infringement on 
board ship. The plaintiffs were the assignees of a patent for special propellers. The 
defendants were the owners of vessels trading between Holland and England, which were 
fitted with these propellers. An injunction was granted to restrain the foreign defendants, 
while in England, from using the invention covered by the patent until they had obtained a 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
British United Shoe MachineD' Co. y. Simon Collier Ltd (1910) 27 RPC 567 (HL). See Loreburn 
L.C., at pages 571-572, and Lord Dunedin, at page 572. However, the defendants in B.S. & A. 
Robinson Ltd y. Smith & Ritchie Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 63 were not successful in their attempt to 
rely on the British United Shoe MachineD' case, since they had actually instructed their engineers 
to construct a machine that was capable of being put to infringing use. See Lord Hunter, Lord 
Ordinary, at pages 72-73. 
See, for example, Adair y. YOUO& (1879) LR 12 ChD 13, per Cotton L.J., at page 19, and Brett 
LJ., at 20. 
See section 58 of the Act, " ... an infringement of a patent shall consist of the performance of any 
act referred to in subsection (3) of section 36 in Malaysia ... " 
See, for example, Neilson y. Betts (1871-72) L.R. 5 HL 1, per Lord Westbury, at page 9; Badisghe 
y Anilin und Soda-Fabrik y. Johnsoo (1897) 14 RPC 919 (HL), Kalmap y PCL Packa&iO& Ltd 
(1982) FSR 406 (patents Court). 
Note that there is growing concern and interest in the various aspects of intellectual property rights 
in outer space. Discussion of the problems and issues involved is, however, beyond the scope of 
this thesis. For further information on this area of the law, see Mosteshar, S., Ed., Research IRl 
Invention in Outer Space - Liability and Intellectual Property Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1995; European Space Agency, European Centre for Space Law, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Space Activities - A World-WIde Perspective: Proceedings of the Workshop, 1994; 
Meyer, C.B., "Protecting Inventors' Rights Aboard an International Space Station", (1988) JPTOS 
332; Schwaab, R.L., "Patent Protection for Industrial Activity in Outer Space", Industrial Property 
Law 1976, 30; Burt, D.L., "Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and IDfringement on Global 
Computer Networks", 68 Tulane Law Review 1 (1993); Saragovitz, H.M., "The Law of 
Intellectual Property in Outer Space", 17 IDEA 86 (1975). 
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proper licence, on the principle that foreigners were in all cases subject to the laws of the 
country in which they might happen to be. Despite the defendants' argument that such a 
holding would subject foreign vessels to undue inconvenience and hardship, the court held 
that this argument resolved itself into a question of national policy, and it was for the 
legislature and not for the courts to deal with that question. 196 
In Adair v. Youn~, 197 an action was brought against the master of an English ship to 
restrain him from using pumps which infringed the plaintiffs letters patent. It was shown 
that the ship was fitted exclusively with such pumps, although they had never been worked 
in British waters. The appeal against an injunction granted to restrain him from using the 
patented invention was refused on the ground that the use of the invention on board the ship 
was an actionable infringement, therefore, an intention to use the pumps was sufficient 
ground for an injunction to restrain the infringement of the plaintiffs patent rights. 
However, it has to be noted that the judge stressed the fact that the ship was in British 
waters and that any use of the invention would have been within British waters. Further, it 
seemed to have been accepted that the pumps were used during the voyage from Buenos 
Aires, although it had never been used within British waters. 198 
From the above two cases, it would seem that infringement within the territorial waters or 
airspace, whether on board a locally or foreign registered ship is an actionable infringement 
of the patentee's rights under the common law.l 99 It is submitted that the same is also true 
under the Act. The fact that there is felt the need to insert a provisions exempting foreign 
ships temporarily in Malaysian waters and airspace points to the inference that the territorial 
waters and airspace of Malaysia is deemed to be part of the territory of Malaysia for patent 
infringement purposes. 200 
196 Caldwell y. van Vlissin&en 21 U Ch. 97 (1852), per Turner V.C., at pages 102-104. The 
opposite result was reached in the United States in Brown v. Duchesne 19 Howard 183, at 196 (US 
Sup. Ct 1856». The Caldwell case resulted in the passing of section 26 of the Patents Act 1852, 
United Kingdom, which provided an exception to patent infringement in such a situation. For an 
interesting account of this, and subsequent legislative activities in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and the adoption of Article 5terofthe Paris Convention in 1926 to exempt foreign 
ships and aircraft from patent infringement in similar situations, see, Lynfield, H.G., "Patent 
Infringement on British and American Ships", (1955) 37 JPOS 389. 
197 Adair y. YOYDa (1879) LR 12 ChD 13, per Cotton L.J., at pages 18-19, "It appears from the 
master's own statement of defence that these pumps were the only pumps on board. He had the 
ship in British waters fitted up with these pumps ready for use, and if any accident had ~ to 
the ship they would have been actually used within British waters. I therefore am of oplDlon ~ 
the master must be considered as intending the use them within British waters, and that on this 
ground the injunction ought to be sustained." See also Brett L.J., at pages 19-20. 
198 Ad'iry. YoYDa(1879)LR 12ChD 13,perBrettL.J., at page 19. 
199 Section 132(3) of the 1977 Act, UK, for the first time specifically provides that the territorial 
waters of the United Kingdom shall be treated as part of the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
the patent law. 
200 Note that under section 3 of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No.7 of 1969, 
Malaysia. the breadth of the territorial waters is dccJmd to be twelve nautical miles from the 
baseline. 
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It would also appear that patent rights would extend to certain parts of the continental shelf. 
Under the Continental Shelf Act, 1966, every act or omission which takes place on, under 
or above, or in any waters within five hundred metres of any installation or device erected 
on the continental shelf in connection with the exploration or exploitation of the continental 
shelf is deemed to take place in Malaysia. In addition every such installation or device and 
any waters within five hundred meters of such installation or device is deemed to be 
situated in Malaysia.20 1 Hence, if any infringing article or process is used on such an 
installation, there will be a patent infringement in Malaysia.202 
3.4.2. Infrin~in~ Goods on Board Locally Re&istered Vessels 
It has been seen earlier that where goods were imported into the country and stored in 
bonded warehouse for export, there is an infringement of the patent by importing the 
patented substance (under the pre-1977 law, the act amounted to an infringing use). The 
cases indicate that there is no distinction between whether the goods were landed or 
whether they remained on board the ship which brought them within the jurisdiction.203 
201 
202 
203 
See section 5(1)(a) and (b), Continental Shelf Act, 1966, Act 83, Malaysia. Under section 5(2)(b) 
of this Act, power is given to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to declare that the provisions of any 
written law shall apply with respect to the continental shelf, or any specified part of it. Similar 
power is given under section 42(1) of the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1984, Act 311, 
Malaysia. However, no such declaration has been made under anyone of these Acts. For a general 
discussion on patent protection in extraterritorial areas, see Stauder, D., "Patent Protection in 
Extraterritorial Areas (Continental Shelf, High Seas, Air Space, and Outer Space", 7 IIC 470 
(1976). 
The question of whether patent rights would also extend to the continental shelf was raised in 
Chevroo Research Co.'s Extension [1975] 1 FSR 1 (Ch. D), which involved a petition for 
extension of a patent due to inadequate remuneration. The petitioner wanted to exploit the patent 
involving a method for drilling oil in deep waters by claiming royalties from those engaged in 
drilling operations in the British Continental Shelf. The petition was rejected for various reasons. 
Of interest is that in the course of the proceedings, there were arguments as to whether or not the 
rights under the UK patent extend to grant a monopoly in respect of the exercise of the invention 
in the area of the United Kingdom sector of the Continental Shelf. The judge held that in view of 
the earlier conclusion reached, it was unnecessary for him to reach a conclusion on that point. See 
Whitford J., at page 26. Note that section 132(4) of the Patents Act 1977, UK, provides that the 
Patents Act applies to acts done in an area designated by order under section 1(7) of the Continental 
Shelf Act 1964, or specified under section 22(5) of the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982, in 
connection with any activity falling within section 23(2) of that Act, as it applies to acts done in 
the United Kingdom. 
See, for example, Betts y. Neilson (1867-68) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 429, per Lmd Chelmsford, at page 
438, "With respect to the case of the article being brought into an English port and remaining on 
board the vessel, and transhipped for exportation, if the mode of transmission adopted by the 
defendant amounts to a user of the capsule in England, I can see no distinction in principle between 
the patented article being placed in a warehouse on land, and the ship in which it is brought from 
Scotland being made the warehouse until it can be put on board another vessel for exportation." In 
the House of Lords, this distinction was mentioned, though the court declined to rule on it, see 
(1871-72) L.R. 5 HL 1, per Lmd Colonsay, at page 25, "It might be a question, if a Bavnm 
merchant shipped beer, protected by such capsules, part of a general cargo, in a vessel which 
merely called at a port in Bngland, whether while the vessel was in the English port or in the 
BnaJish waters, it would be an infringement of the patent. I do not go into that question at all." 
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However, the position is not clear with respect to infringing good stored on a locally 
registered vessel while in international waters. It seems implicit in the two cases discussed 
above204 that the use of patented inventions on board locally registered ship in international 
waters is not an infringement. In Newall v. Elliott, the court held that an apparatus patent 
was not infringed by the use of a cable laying machine on board an English vessel outside 
the three mile limit. This was because as the apparatus patent was granted for the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Island, and the Isle of Man, it was not infringed by acts done 
between Malta and Alexandria. As to the plaintiffs contention that in point of law, a British 
ship was British soil, the judge held that the doctrine could not be carried so far as to make 
anything done on board an infringement of letters patent, which were in their terms limited 
to the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.2os Similarly, in V.D. 
Ltd v. Boston Deep Sea Fishinl: & Ice Co. Ltd,206 the plaintiff sued for infringement of 
five letters patents relating to deep sea fishing gear. The alleged infringing gear were all 
fitted on board British ships using British ports. The defendants, former licensees, denied 
infringement. It was held, inter alia, that a patent does not run at sea outside the three mile 
limit and user outside such limit could not constitute an infringement. Despite the plaintiffs 
contention that British ships were part of the British Isles, the court held that this was not 
proved, and further it was precluded by Newall v. Elliott from holding this to be an 
infringement even if use outside the territorial waters was proved.207 This approach was 
also similarly followed in Canada in Marconi Wireless Telel:faph Co. v. Canadian Car & 
Foundry Co., where the court held that use on board a Canadian ship outside Canadian 
waters was no infringement and this notwithstanding the doctrine of international law that a 
vessel of a country is the territory of that country, for the monopoly is granted to cover only 
the Dominion of Canada.208 
204 Caldwell y. van VIissiOKen 21 U Ch, 97 (1852) and Adair v. YounK (1879) LR 12 ChD 13. 
20S Newall y. Elliott (1864) 10 Jurist. N.S. 954 (Court of Exchequer), see Bramwell B., at page 958, 
and Channell B., at page 959. Contrast the case of forbes v. Cochrane (1924) 2 B&C 448, 107 
ER 450, where the court held that a war ship was regarded as part of territory of the country, per 
Holroyd J., at page 464. 
206 V.D. Ltd y. Boston Dee.p Sea FishinK & Ice Co. Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 303 (Ch. D). Newall y. 
Elliott (1864) 10 Jurist. N.S. 954, followed. See Clauson J., at page 331. 
207 Contrast this position with the position adopted by the United States courts with regard to use on 
board US registered ship. See, for example, Gardner y. Howe 2 Clifford 462, at 464 (US Sup. Ct 
1865), where the court held that an American patent extended to an American vessel on the high 
seas. See also Ocean Science & Enlineerin&. Inc .. et ti. y. United States 194 USPQ 380 (US Ct 
CIs 1977), per Browne, Trial Judge, at page 385, "The ~lomm: Explorer is ~ American-owned 
vessel of United States registry. By analogy to precedents lD admiralty and mantime law, acts of a 
tortious nature committed upon such a vessel are governed by applicable United States law. Patent 
infringement, being of a tortious nature, is determined in accordance with United States patent law 
if a method claimed in a United States patent is practised aboard such a vessel or is controlled 
therefrom in whole or in part. United States patent law is applicable even though some or all of 
the acts of infringement are committed outside the political boundmies of the United States of 
America. including its tenitories, possessions and commonwealths." See also Wicker, J.C., 
"Territorial Limits of United States Patent Jurisdiction", 7 Houston Law Review 99 (1969). 
208 Mm;gnj Wim" ToIclAPb Co, y. Canedjao r. &. FoumkY Co. (1920) 61 S.C.R. 78. 
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Under the criminal law it is clear that any criminal activity committed on board a Malaysian 
registered ship or aircraft is deemed to be committed on Malaysian soil. 209 In this state of 
uncertainty, the problem is best solved by legislative action to clarify the issue, bearing in 
mind that if activity on a Malaysian registered vessel could amount to an infringement, then 
such activity could also be subject to prior user's rights.210 It needs, therefore, proper 
consideration of the various implications and desirability of the various options. 
3.5. Detennining the Scope of a Patent 
The Act provides that an infringement of the patent arises from the performance of certain 
acts by an unlicensed person in relation to a product or process falling with the scope of 
protection of the patent. Therefore, in the determination of whether an allegedly infringing 
act does in fact infringe, the scope of protection of the patent has to be ascertained. Since 
more than one claim is allowed under the Act, the inquiry as to whether there is an 
infringement would involve the question of whether any of the defendant's products or 
processes are "covered by at least one claim of the patent".211 This will require an 
examination of the specification of the patent to determine the scope of the claims. Thus in 
determining whether the defendant has infringed the patentee's patent, the claims have to be 
construed to answer the important question of whether the defendant has trespassed onto 
the plaintiffs property, i.e., whether he has infringed on the plaintiffs patents as claimed 
in his specification.212 
No problem arises if there is exact copying of the invention. The problem will surface if 
there is copying of the inventive concept with colourable variations, either by the 
introduction of a variant or variants or the discarding of certain elements in the patented 
invention. In this situation, there is a need to construe the claim or claims of the patent to 
determine whether what the alleged infringer has done would still fall within the claim. 
VariollS approaches to, or canons of construction, have been applied by the courts in the 
common law, and more specifically the UK, jurisdictions.213 These range from the literal 
approach, the "pith and marrow" doctrine, and the "Catnic" or "purposive" approach.214 
209 See, for example, section 2, Extra-Territorial Offences Act, 1976, Act 163, Malaysia. 
210 Note that the Copyright Act 1988, United Kingdom, specifically defines "United Kingdom" to 
include its territorial waters, British ships, aircraft and hovercraft, and the UK sector of the 
continental shelf if on a structure or vessel which is present there for purposes direcdy connected 
with the exploration of the seabed or subsoil or the exploitation of their natural resources - see 
sections 161 and 162. 
211 See WIPO Model Law, Commentary, at page 111. 
212 See Buckley L.J., at the Court of Appeal, in Catnic Compopeots Ltd y. Hill agJ Smith IJd [1982] 
RPC 183, at page 225. 
213 Another major approach to claim construction, as practised, for example, in the US, Germany RI 
Japan, is the doctrine of equivalents. Basi~ly. under the. ~octrine as ~lied !n th~ US, the court 
would come to a finding of infringement if three conditions are satisfied, I.e., If the allegedly 
infriqing device ''performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
obtain the same result" - see 0ravrI TUk &; Mfa Co. y. The Upde Air Ptgducts Co. 85 USPQ 
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3.5.1. The "Catnic" or "Purposive" Awroach to Construction 
The Catnic approach or "purposive" approach to construction is based on the speech of 
Lord Diplock in Catnic Components Ltd v. Hill & Smith, where his Lordship held that 
a patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely 
literal one. His Lordship then set out several questions to be asked in the application of 
this principle.2IS The Diplock questions were reformulated in Improver Corp. v. 
Remimgton Consumer Products Ltd, where Hoffmann J. suggested that "if the issue 
was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement which fell outside the 
primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or phrase in the claim ("a 
variant") was nevertheless within its language as properly interpreted, the court should 
ask itself the following three questions: 2 16 
1. Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If 
yes, the variant is outside the claim. If no, 
2. Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the 
date of publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art? If no, the variant is 
outside the claim. If yes, 
214 
21S 
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328 (US Sup. Ct 1950), per Justice Jackson, at page 330. Further discussion of this doctrine is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For a detailed study of this approach, see Takenaka, T., 
Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, IIC Studies Vol. 17, VCH, 
Weinheim, 1995. See also Rich, O.S., "Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims -
American Perspectives", 21 IIC 497 (1990). For a comment on recent development in this area, see 
Hoffman, O.M., Oliver, E., "The Doctrine of Equivalents Ooes Back to its Roots (with a View to 
the Future)", [1996] 2 EIPR 103. For a comparative analysis of the different approaches to 
construction of claims, see Bodenheimer, S.M., Beton, J., "Infringement by Equivalents in the 
United States and Europe: A Comparative Analysis", [1993] 3 EIPR 83. See also Beton, J., "Are 
International Standards for Patent Claim Interpretation Possible?" [1994] 7 EIPR 76. 
Note that Article 21 of the proposed Patent Law Treaty, which deals with the extent of protection 
and interpretation of claims, would allow for alternative tests of whether an equivalent element falls 
within the scope of the claim. Basically, the first alternative is based on the US doctrine of 
equivalents. The next alternative seems to reflect the second Catnic question (as to this see, infra, 
text accompanying footnote 216). For further references to the Patent Law Treaty, see footnote 17, 
supm. 
For a discussion of the prior approaches to the construction of claims, i.e., the literal interpretation 
of claims (textual infringement) and applying to it the "pith and marrow" doctrine or doctrine of 
equivalents, see, Cole, P., "Patent Infringement 'Pith and Marrow' A Review of UK Practice", 
[1980] 9 EIPR 289; Reid, B., "Infringement under the UK Patents Act: The New 
Commandments", [1980] 12 EIPR 393; Reid, B., "The Catnic Decision: The Construction of 
Patent Claims", [1981] 2 EIPR 56; Blanco-White, T.A., "The Catnic Case: The Test fcx' 
Infringement of a Patent", [1981] 3 EIPR 90; Cornish, W.R., & Vitoria, M., "Catnic in the 
House of Lords: A New Approach to Infringement", [1981] JBL 136; Pendleton, M., "Catnic -
Signpost to Where?", [1982] 3 EIPR 79; Walton, A., "Purposive Construction" [1984] 4 EIPR 
93; Annand, R., "Infringement of Patents - Is Catnic the Correct Approach?" 21 Anglo-American 
Law Review 39 (1992). See also Phillips and Firth, 3rd. Ed., at paras. 8.9 - 8.15. 
Catnic Components Ltd v. 8m " Smith [1982] RPC 183, per Lord Diplock, at pages 242-243. 
Improver Corp. V. RemjmatoQ COQsumer Products IJd [1990] FSR 181, per Hoffmann J" at page 
189. 
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3. Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the 
language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the 
primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the 
variant is outside the claim. 
The purposive construction of claims has been adopted by the Malaysian court in Rhone-
Poulenc AG Co. & anor v. Dikloride Herbicides Sdn Bhd & anor,217 where the judge held 
that in respect of claims in patents, a purposive interpretation should be given, relying on 
the principle enunciated in the case of Catnic Components Ltd v. Hill & Smith Ltd. 218· 219 
Adoption of the test would imply the need to go behind the claims and refer to the 
description in the specification. There is at present no statutory guidance to rely upon in the 
proper approach to adopt in the construction of the claims to assist in the determination of 
the scope of patent protection. Therefore, it would not be out of place to insert a provision 
specifying that the terms of the claim or claims shall determine the scope and extent of the 
protection afforded by the patent, however, the description and drawings may be used to 
interpret the claim or claims. 220 
217 
218 
219 
220 
Rhone-Poulenc AG Co. & anOT v. Dikloride Herbicides Sdn Bhd & anor (1988) 2 MLJ 323; 
[1988] FSR 282. The Catnic test has also been adopted in several Commonwealth countries, see, 
for example, New Zealand - Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. (No. 1) (1984) 1 NZIPR 518, 
per Eichelbaum J., at page 525, In~lis v. Mayson (1983) 3 IPR 588, at 602-604, per Prichard J. 
See generally, Brown, A., & Grant, A., The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1989, at pages 541-543. For the South African approach to purposive 
construction, see generally, Burrell, T.D., Burrell- South African Patent Law and Practice, 2nd Ed. 
Butterworth, Durban, 1986, at paras. 5.27 to 5.34. The Court of Appeal of Canada has also 
adopted the Catnic approach, see Beecham Canada Ltd v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (1982) 61 CPR 
(2d) 1, at page 10. See also the recent case of Eli Lilly and Co. & anor v. NovQpharm Ltd & anor 
[1996] RPC 1 (Fed. Ct Canada), at page 20. For an informative account of the application of the 
Catnic test in Canada, see Hitchman, V.E. and MacOdrum, D.H., "Don't Fence Me In: 
Infringement in Substance in Patent Actions", (1991) 7 CIPR 167. See also Lahore, J., et al., 
Intellectual Property in Australia - Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Law, Vol. 1, Butterworths, 
Sydney, 1994, at paras. 1.7.080-1.7.125, for the application of the Catnic principle in Australia. 
Rhone-Poulenc AG Co. & anor v. Dikloride Herbicides Sdn Bhd & anor (1988) 2 MU 323; 
[1988] FSR 282, at page 290, per Justice V.C. George in the High Court of Malaysia. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the right methodology to adopt in the determination of the parameters 
of patent infringement, see Swycher, N., "Parameters of Patent Infringement", Managing 
Intellectual Property, November 1990, page 16. 
Note that in the UK, there is at present a conflict of opinions in the Court of Appeal regarding the 
question of whether the Catnic approach is in line with the requirement of the Protocol on the 
Interpretation of Article 69. In fLG Research Ltd v. Ardon International Ltd [1993] FSR 197; 
[1995] RPC 287 (CA), Millett L.I., for the court, at pages 305-309, indicated that the Catnic 
approach may not be the right approach in view of the Protocol. However, in another Court of 
Appeal case in Kastner y. Rizla Ltd & anar [1995] RPC 585 (CA), Aldous L.I., at pages 593-594, 
together with Balcombe and Otton, UI. ruled otherwise. See also Assidornao Multipact Ltd y. 
Mf!8d Corp. [1995] RPC 321, at pages 328-337, per Aldous I. This conflict, however, should not 
make a difference to the Malaysian courts, since the Protocol is irrelevant in the Malaysian 
context. There is no reason why the present controversy in the UK, even if the House of Lords 
were to decide that Catnic is not the proper approach to adopt in the UK in view of the Protocol. 
should bring about any change to the approach. This is so especially in view of the fact that the 
Catnic approach was actually decided under the Patents Act 1949 of the United Kingdom. and the 
House of Lords was concerned with the law as it stood before the 1977 Act came into force. 
This. in fact. is present in the WIPO Model Law. in section 123(4)(a). and the Sri Lankan Act, in 
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3.6. Assi~ent or Transmission of Patent 
Besides the right to exploit the patented invention, the patent owner also has the right to 
assign or transmit a patent application or a patent. 221 The provisions on assignment and 
transmission are phrased exactly as those found in the Sri Lankan provisions.222 
3.6.1. Requirement of Writing and Recordation 
As in the Sri Lankan provisions, the Act does not specifically provide that all assignments 
should be in writing. Therefore, it would seem that as between the parties, an oral 
assignment would be binding and enforceable.223 However, before a person becoming 
entitled under such a transaction could be recorded in the Register, an assignment in writing 
and signed by or on behalf of the contracting parties has to be shown to the Registrar.224 
There is no compulsion that transactions involving an assignment or transmission should be 
recorded, although the section provides for such fact being recorded if the parties so wish. 
3.6.2. Effect of Non-Recordation 
To be effective against third parties, however, all assignment or transmission of rights must 
be recorded in the Register kept by the Registrar of Patents.225 By virtue of sections 32 to 
33A, matters entered in the Register shall be prima facie evidence of all matters required or 
221 
222 
223 
224 
225 
section 68(6). It is not clear why it is left out in the Malaysian Act. One possibility could be that, 
unlike the WIPO Model Law and the Sri Lankan Act, and also section 14 of the Patents Act 1977 
United Kingdom, whereby the fonnal requirements of application are placed in the Act itself, the 
Malaysian scheme merely provides generally in section 23 that every application for the grant of a 
patent shall comply with the regulation as may be prescribed by the Minister under the Act. More 
detailed provisions are found in the Regulation - see, for example, regulations 4 to 16, Patents 
Regulations, 1986. It may be that, having adopted this approach, the framers of the Act could not 
find a suitable place to insert this particular provision in the main body of the Act. 
See section 36(1)(b) and section 39(1) of the Act. 
See section 84 of the Sri Lankan Act. 
It would appear that consideration is not required for such a statutory assignment. See, for example, 
Hardine y. Hardine (1886) 17 QBD 442, per Wills J., at pages 444-446, and Grantham J., at pages 
446-447; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch. 104, per Sargant J., at pages 111-114; and Holt y. 
Heatherfield Trust [1942] 2 K.B 1, per Atkinson J., at pages 2-5. 
See section 39(3)(b) of the Act, and cf section 84(3)(b) of the Sri Lankan Act - unlike the WIPO 
Model Law, which provides that any assignment of a patent application or patent must be in 
writing and signed by the parties to the contract. Failure to observe this requirement shall reOOeI' 
the agreement invalid - Section 140 WIPO Model Law. See also section 30(6) of the UK Patents 
Act 1977, which similarly provides that failure to fulfil this condition will render the transaction 
void. 
See section 39(4) of the Act, and cfsection 84(4) of the Sri Lankan Act. For similar effect in the 
WIPO Model Law, see section 140(2). See also sections 32 and 33 of the UK Patents Act, 1977. 
However, as Kynric notes, these provisions, although intended to encourage registration and protect 
innocent parties. may cause problems. For the problems, possible abuse, and practical safepmIs 
to take, see Kynric Lewis, A., "Dealings With UK Patents and Know How", [1979] EIPR 217. 
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authorised by the Act to be entered therein.226 Hence copies of, or extracts from the 
Register, if certified by the Registrar, are admissible in evidence in all courts without 
further proof or production of the original. 227 
A literal reading of the provision would imply that an unrecorded transaction would not be 
effective against a person claiming under a later transaction even if he knows of the earlier 
transaction.228 Although a court applying equitable principles would be loath to give the 
later party with knowledge of an earlier transaction a superior right to the earlier party, in 
the interest of certainty and clarity, it is preferable to provide specifically against this 
eventuality . 
3.7. Ri~ht of Patent Owner to Conclude Licence Contracts 
The third right given to a patent owner under the Act is the right to conclude licence 
contracts.229 Section 41(1) of the Act defines a licence contract to mean "any contract by 
which the owner of a patent (the "licensor") grants to another person or enterprise (the 
"licensee") a licence to do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection 
(1), and subsection (3), of section 36." Three types of licences are envisaged under the Act, 
non-exclusive, sole, and exclusive.23o The provisions on licence contracts are also 
modelled along the line of the equivalent provisions of the Sri Lankan Act. 231 The 
Malaysian provisions are contained in sections 41 to 47 of the Act. 
3.7.1. Requirement of Writin~ and Recordation 
It is specifically provided that all licence contracts must be in writing and signed by or on 
behalf on the contracting parties.232 These formal requirements are the same as for 
assignment and transmission. However, the effect of non-observance of this statutory 
requirement is not provided in the Act. 233 Further, there is no provision for registration of 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
See section 32 (as substituted by section 20 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1993, Act A 863/93, 
and section 33A (1) (inserted by section 22 of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. Act A 863193). 
See section 33A(2) of the Act (Inserted by section 22. Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. Act A 
863/93). 
Contrast this with the UK provision. whereby under section 33( 1). the later party's knowledge of 
the earlier transaction will disentitle the latter party from claiming priority over the transaction. 
This right is subject to section 40 - if a patent is jointly owned, all the owners must jointly 
conclude such contracts - see Chapter 2 - Ownership of Patent Rights Inter Set para. 2.6.4. 
See section 44(1) and (2) of the Act. The possibility of sub-licensing is implicit - see infra. para. 
3.7.2. 
See sections 86 - 92 of the Sri Lankan Act. 
Section 43(1) of the Act. 
Unlike section 143( 1) of the WIPO Model Law. which provides that failure to ensure that the 
licence is in wriaDl and siped by the parties to the contract would mean that the contract is not 
valid. 
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the licence contract.234 The only specific mention of a duty to record a licence contract is 
found in section 42 relating to licences of right.235 However, reference to section 47 of the 
Act leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that licence contracts should be 
recorded in the Register.236 This omission could be explained by the fact that in both the 
WIPO Model Law and the Sri Lankan system, there is no provision for licences of right. In 
providing a section for the licences of right and making it a duty to record any concluded 
transaction entered into by virtue of section 42, the Legislature may have assumed that the 
recordation provisions also apply to other contractual licences. This belief is reinforced by 
the fact that the Malaysian licences of right provisions are actually entitled "Entry in 
Register" . 
There is a need to provide for recordation of licence contracts, or a provision providing for 
the possibility of recordation if the parties so wish. There is the possibility that innocent 
third parties may be prejudiced by the lack of record of licensed transactions. If the 
unrecorded licence granted is non-exclusive, a potential licensee may not be prejudiced, 
unless he is interested in obtaining a sole or exclusive licence, or if he is interested in 
obtaining an unencumbered assignment of the patent. On the other hand, if the granted 
licence is a sole, or exclusive licence, then a third party, for example, another licensee, may 
be prejudiced if he is not aware of this fact. Hence it is proposed that a provision be added 
to the Act to the effect that the fact that a licence contract has been concluded may be 
recorded in the Register within a certain time limit, and that no prior licences shall have 
effect against a third party who has acted to his detriment in reliance of the lack of entry in 
the Register. To encourage recordation, it is suggested that a licensee should not be entitled 
to seek damages or an account of profits in respect of any infringement occurring after the 
date of the licence transaction and before particulars of the transaction are recorded. 
3.7.2. Ri~hts of Licensee 
In absence of agreement to the contrary, the licensee has all the rights of exploitation of the 
owner, "within the whole geographical area of Malaysia, and without limitation as to time 
and through any application of the invention".237 However, unless it has been contractually 
agreed upon, the licensee may not assign the licence, or grant sub-licences.238 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
In the WIPO Model Law, it is provided that the fact that a licence contract has been concluded may 
be recorded in the Register - section 143(2), see also section 87(2) of the Sri Lankan Act. 
See infra, para. 3.8. 
Section 47 of the Act, inter alia, provides that if the Registrar is satisfied that a recmIed licence 
contract has expired or been tenninated, he should record that fact in the Register. 
See section 43(1) of the Act. For the extent of the right of the licensor to insert restrictive terms in 
the licence contract, see Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive 
Ripts, para. 6.'. 
See section 43(2) of the Act. 
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3.7.3. Right of Licensee to Sue 
In the absence of any contrary provision in the licence agreement,239 a licensee has the right 
to request the owner of the patent to institute court proceedings for any infringement of the 
240 If " ak b . . patent. no actIon IS t en y the patent owner WIthin three months from the receipt of 
the request, the licensee may institute proceedings in his own name. This right is not 
restricted to an exclusive licensee, as the Act does not restrict the category of licensee who 
is entitled to make use of this provision. Where the licensee decides to proceed on his own, 
the owner of the patent has to be notified of the licensee's intention to bring proceedings in 
his own name, and he, the owner, has the right to join in the proceedings.241 
However, the strict requirement mentioned above need not be observed if the licensee 
proves to the court that immediate action is necessary to avoid substantial damage in the 
case of imminent infringement, or to prevent continuation of any infringement. In such 
cases. the court may grant an injunction on the request of the licensee, even though the 
three months period is not up.242 
In Premier Products Co. Ltd & anor v. Zamrud Fibre Industries CM) Sdn Bhd & anor,243 
the court held that under section 59( 1) of the Act it was the owner of the patent who had the 
right to institute court proceedings for infringement. A licensee may, under section 61(2) of 
the Act, request the owner of the patent to do so. Only if the owner had refused the request 
or failed to institute the proceedings within three months from the receipt of the request, as 
provided in section 61(3) of the Act, could the licensee institute the proceedings in his own 
name. Since there was no evidence in the case that any of those steps had taken place, the 
court held that the licensee had no locus standi to sue. The court further held that a letter 
from the first plaintiff, the owner, before commencement of proceedings, authorising the 
licensee, the second plaintiff, to institute infringement proceedings was not in conformity 
with the provision of the Act. In effect, this would mean that a licensee could not institute 
proceedings and could do so only if the owner has failed to do so within three months of 
the licensee's request. This decision, if correct, is surely based on a strange reasoning. The 
section in question begins with "any licensee unless the licence contract provides that the 
provisions of this subsection do not apply or provides different provisions ... " This is wide 
239 
240 
241 
For the validity of any agreement to the contrary. see Chapter 6, para. 6.S.4.b.(ii). 
This right of a licensee extends to the beneficiary of a compulsory licen~e. see section ~ t (~)(b) of 
the Act. This provision is adopted from the WIPO Model Law, section 161 (4). This IS v~ry 
different from the UK provision, whereby under section 67 of the Patents Act 1977, the exclUSive 
licensee has the same right as the owner of the patent to bring proceedings. For compulsory 
licensing, see Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights, 
paras. 6.1 to 6.3. 
See section 61 (3) of the Act. 
See sect ion 61 (4) of the Act. 
Premier Products Co, Ltd & Mor v. Zamrud Fibre Industries (M) Sdn Bhd & aoO[ [1994] (3) AMR 
44.2324 (H. Ct Malaya). before Judge Dato Haji Abdul Malek bin Haji Ahmad, at page 2340. 
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enough to cover situations where the contract provides that the licensee shall have to right to 
institute proceedings on the authorisation of the patent owner, or where there is a variation 
of the agreement by a later consent. It may be that no evidence of such a contract, or 
variation, was brought before the court.244 If that was the case, than the decision has to be 
confined to its particular facts, and is not to be taken as having wider import. Nevertheless, 
in the interest of certainty, and to resolve possible doubt, it may be that a clarification 
should be made to the provision that a licensee has the right to institute proceedings on the 
written authorisation of the owner of the patent. To prevent multiplicity of actions, the 
owner of the patent has to be made a nominal party to the action. 
3.8. Licences of Right 
As a departure from the WIPO Model Law, and following the United Kingdom model,245 
although, as will be seen later, there are substantial differences, the Malaysian Act contains 
a provision relating to licences of right. 246 The relevant section, section 42, is vaguely titled 
"entry in the register", and put in the part of the Act relating to licence contracts. By this 
section, a patentee may apply to the Registrar for an entry to be made in the Register to the 
effect that any person may obtain a licence. 24 7 This facility is also extended to utility 
innovations. After an entry has been made in the Register any person may apply to the 
licensor through the Registrar for a licence.248 It has to be noted that under the Malaysian 
scheme, the Registrar acts as an intermediary at the initial stage, as a potential licensee has 
to apply to the patentee through the Registrar for a licence.249 It is not clear whether the 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
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There was no argument on these possibilities in the judgement. 
The licences of right scheme was first introduced in the United Kingdom statute in 1919. by virtue 
of section 2 of the 1919 Patents and Designs Act, which substituted a new section 24 for the old 
section. The new section 24 allowed a patentee to request the Comptroller to cause the patent to be 
endorsed with the words "licences of right". A new section 27 also empowered the Comptroller to 
endorse a patent with the words tllicences of right" where an abuse of the monopoly rights was 
proved. 
There are several different meanings of the phrase tllicence of righttl as used in the patent law of the 
United Kingdom. The first meaning refers to the voluntary endorsement of the patent on the 
application of the patentee. Such an endorsement has the effect that anyone interested shall be 
entitled as of right to a licence under the patent upon terms as agreed on between the parties. This 
is to be contrasted with a compulsory endorsement under the compulsory licensing provision. 
where an entry on the Register that licence are to be available as of right is requestrd by the 
applicant instead of a compulsory licence. A third meaning of the term tllicence of righttl is that 
used in relation to certain subsisting patents granted under the Patents Act 1949. "new existing 
patents", which had their term of protection extended to twenty years under the Patents Act 1977. 
For a discussion of the third type of licences of right, see Firth, A., tlUcences of Right: ''New 
Existing Patents" under the Patents Act 1977", [1986] 6 EIPR 168. Another form of licence of 
right is that imposed under section S 1 of the 1977 Act, after an adverse decision of the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission. 1be Malaysian licences of right is to be understood in the first sense. 
Section 42 (1) of the Act and Regulations 34 to 37. Although there is no mention of any 
limitation on the patentee so applying, Patents Form No. 7 requires the patentee to testify that 
"The patent owner is not precluded by contnct from ....... Iicences under the patent" 
Section 42(2) of the Ad. 
Contrast the position in the United Kingdom. when: the Comptroller is involved only where there 
is a failure to settle terms - see section 46(3Xa), Patents Act 19n, United Kingdom. 
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Registrar is also involved in the negotiation over royalty and other terms as it is not stated 
that the Registrar has power to adjudicate if the parties could not come to an agreement over 
the terms of the contract. Once a licence contract has been concluded, the Registrar has to 
be informed and the fact recorded in the Register. 250 If the parties wish, particulars of the 
concluded contract could be recorded in the Register upon payment of a fee. 251 The 
purpose of this seems to be to inform interested parties of the type of contract entered into 
and the type of exploitation involved, presumably to attract the interest of other licensees 
who may be interested in exploitation of the patent in a non-competing sphere. Where a 
licence contract is terminated, the contracting parties shall inform the Registrar of the 
termination and the Registrar shall record such termination in the Register. 252 
3.8. 1. Effect of the Provision 
Several important observations need to be made about the Malaysian provision. In the first 
place, section 42 cannot strictly be construed as a "licence of right" provision as in the 
United Kingdom sense. The section provides that an entry may be made "to the effect that 
any person may obtain a licence". The patent owner does not seem to be obliged to grant 
licences even when such an entry is made. In contrast, the United Kingdom provision 
states that an entry may be made "to the effect that licences under the patent are to be 
available as of right" .253 Further, it is there provided that "any person shall, at any time 
after the entry is made, be entitled as of right to a licence".254 Hence in the United 
Kingdom, on an entry having been made, the patent owner is obliged to grant a licence. If 
there are disputes as to the terms of the licence, the Comptroller has the power to settle 
terms.255 In contrast to this, the Malaysian section does not empower the Comptroller to 
settle terms in case of default of agreement between the parties. Hence it may be concluded 
that the purpose of the section is merely to provide a means of advertising the availability of 
licence under the patent. 
In the United Kingdom, the voluntary licence of right scheme seems to have been 
introduced with the purpose of encouraging "universal licensing" of a patented 
invention.256 In return for this, the patentee is only required to pay half the renewal fees. 
There are other advantages too. The patentee reduces the risk that he may be held at any 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
255 
256 
See section 42(3) of the Act. 
See Section 42(4) of the Act. 
See Section 42(5) of the Act. 
See section 46(1), Patents Act, 1977, United Kingdom. 
See section 460)(a) Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. 
See section 46(3)(a) Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. 
See Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental C~mmittee (Swan 
Committee), Cmnd. 6789, 1946, at para. 34. See also para. 224, Patents and DeSIgns Acts. Final 
Report of the Departmental Committee (Swan Committee), Cmnd. 7206, 1947. However. thcrl' 
was no recommendation made for its removal. 
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time to have abused his monopoly, 257 and to some small extent he advertises his invention. 
However, the Swan Committee found that the scheme had been little used, and that upon 
the grant of a licence under an endorsed patent, it was not unusual for the patentee to apply 
for cancellation of the endorsement. It concluded that "instead of encouraging universal 
licensing, [the scheme] has been used mainly to save fees on patents in whose commercial 
value the patentee has perhaps not much confidence".258 
There has been no application so far to have a patent endorsed "licences of right". Whether 
this is due to the fact that there is no interest in such a method of "advertisement"259 of the 
patent is left to speculation. It is interesting to note that there has been a proposal to repeal 
the licences of right provision of New Zealand on the ground that there is little benefit in 
retaining the system as, by subjecting his patent to such endorsement, the patentee is giving 
up exclusivity in the patents, and, therefore, it is of limited value to a potential licensee as 
there is no possibility of obtaining an exclusive licence.26o There is no similar provision in 
the Australian Patents Act 1990. 
3.8.2. Observations on Licence of Right 
In the writer's opinion, the licence of right scheme should be retained, albeit with some 
changes to make it more attractive and workable.261 It is very unlikely that the scheme 
would be of interest to foreign patentees or multi-national corporations. However, it would 
be especially useful to the small and medium enterprise owners of patents and individual 
inventors who may not have the experience or finance or expertise or even the inclination to 
undertake the exploitation of the invention. They may also not be in a position to seek out 
partners or interested parties to exploit the relevant inventions. Of special relevance may be 
2S7 See Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407 (The 
Banks Report), HMSQ, London, 1970, para. 364. 
2S8 Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental Committee (Swan 
Committee), Cmnd. 6789, 1946, at para. 34. cf - Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent 
System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407 (The Banks Report), HMSQ, London, 1970, para. 364, 
which found no criticism of the scheme. 
2S9 See generally, Phillips and Firth, Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd Ed.. Butterwortbs, 
London, 1995, at pages 83-84. It was also there pointed out that such a method of "advertisement" 
is far less efficient than relying on the employment of commercial innovation and development 
services. 
260 See, "Reforms of the Patents Act 1953, Proposed Recommendation" - Competition Policy Dl 
Business Law Division, Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, New Zealand, February 1992, 
Chapter 4, at para. 4.2.1. In contrast to this, the Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent 
System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407 (The B~ Report), HMSQ, Lo~don, 1970,. at p~ ~67 
made no recommendation to remove this provIsIon smce they had received very httle cnUClsm 
regarding it 
261 In this respect, it is interesting to note that although the United States patent. s~te cJoc:s not 
contain any provisions for licences of right, the US Pate?t Office ~ been Isswng a b~t of 
American patents for which the owners are prepared to grant hcences agaInst reasonable royalues to 
any interested person - see Meinhardt, P., Inventions Patents and Monopoly, 2nd Ed. Stevens &: 
Sons Limited. 1950. at pages 159-160. 
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the owners of utility innovations. If the scheme could encourage more use of patented 
inventions, it is to be encouraged. It could even provide an incentive to innovate, knowing 
that assistance is available. Through a lack of business sense, or an awareness of the 
prevailing commercial practices, the patentee may shy away from attempting to negotiate 
arrangements with potential investors. The Registrar, with his wider experience and 
exposure, may be most helpful here to help negotiate fair terms. To make it more attractive 
to enable it to serve its intended purpose, and because of the time in getting the necessary 
interested entrepreneurs, it might be helpful to halve the fees payable to keep the patent in 
force. However, in return for this "service", the patent owner should be obliged to give 
licences as of right. Further, a provision should be included to give specific powers to 
enable the Registrar to settle terms in the absence of agreement between the parties. 
Under the present provision, the licensor may apply to the Registrar for the cancellation of 
the entry made. However, there is no mention of the effect on existing licensees or 
applicants under the section. It is proposed that a provision, similar to section 47 of the 
Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom, be introduced. 
3 .9. Proposals for Change 
In accordance with the views expressed and observations made regarding ways whereby 
the various provisions discussed in this chapter could be improved, proposals are made to 
amend various provisions of the Act. It is proposed that two new definitions, relating to 
"offer" and "use", be added to section 3, the definition section. Section 35 is also amended 
to increase the duration of patent protection, and to provide protection for the interim period 
between the filing date and the issue of the grant. The amendments to section 36 involve the 
addition of a new paragraph to subsection (3)(b), to enable the patent owner to sue for the 
value which the use of a patented process has imparted to the article as a whole. The other 
proposed amendments to this section involve clarification to the reversal of the burden of 
proof in the case of a process patent. To encourage the recordation of assignment of 
patents, section 39(4) is amended. The proposals mentioned in the chapter relating to 
licence contracts and licences of right are laid down in the various amendments to sections 
41 and 42. The new section 58A defines the scope of protection of a patent. The 
recommended provisions to restrict the recovery of damages or account of profits for 
innocent infringement are set out in a new section 60A. Finally, proposals to the right of a 
licensee to institute infringement proceedings are dealt with by the incorporation of the new 
subsections (5) and (6) of section 61. 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are 
set out in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 4: Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect 
Exploitation of Rights 
4. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the various statutory rights granted to the patent owner, and the right to 
institute infringement proceedings against an unlicensed person who is commercially 
exploiting his exclusive rights, are analysed and evaluated. However, these provisions only 
deal with what could be called an outright or direct infringement of a patent, by person or 
persons carrying out the whole complete act of infringement. There is no express provision 
dealing with the situation where persons are involved in activities, which, taken in isolation 
may not amount to an infringing act, but which ultimately lead to an infringement, or other 
use, of a patent. For example, a person may manufacture and supply parts or other 
products, which supply enables another person to make or use the patented invention. This 
problem arises in the area of combination patents, and for process or method claims. It also 
arises in claims for new uses of a known product, or purpose-bound product claims for a 
first medical use. 1 Would a person who manufactures and sells only one, or some, but not 
all the component parts be liable as an infringer of the combination patent? Would one who 
manufactures and sells all the component parts, but in an unassembled form, be liable? 
Similarly, would a supplier of a known product covered by a new use patent be held 
accountable to the patent owner for the supply of the product to a person who puts it to 
infringing use? These activities are variously described as indirect or contributory 
infringement by some commentators.2 
2 
For a discussion of the problems of indirect exploitation with reference to "use", "use-bound" 
product claims, and the "Swiss form" of claims. see White, A.W .• "Protect the Known. Explore 
the Unknown", Managing Intellectual Property, October 1991. page 18. at pages 22-23. 
See, for example, Thomas, E.M., ''The Law of Contributory Infringement", 21 JPOS 811 (1939). 
at page 811, "Contributory infringement is defined as 'the intentional aiding of one person by 
another in the unlawful making, selling or using of the patented invention; and a contributory 
infringer is one who induces, aids or contributes to wrongful acts of another which constitutes 
infringement of a patent. The essence of contributory infringement lies in concerting with others in 
an unlawful invasion of the patentee's rights; an intent to aid is necessary; and before one may be 
held liable for contributory infringement it must appear that he has knowingly done some act 
without which the infringement would not have occurred."; Ladas, S.P., Patents, Trademarks SId 
Related Rights, National and International Protection (1975), Vol. 1, at 402, "This notion (of 
contributory infrilllement) comprises acts which do not in themselves constitute an iDfriDgement 
of a pateDt claim. but otherwise assist, contribute, procme or ~ult in i~t by 0Iben."; 
Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Commumty, DC Studies Vol 13, VCH, 
Weinheim, 1993, at page 173, "The concept of 'indirect' or 'contributory' infringement is used to 
denote a form of a prohibited activity where a person malces use of the invention without actually 
illfrinaina the patent claims himself, and facilitates dira:t infriqenaent by supplyina elemeala « 
the iaWlldon to ............ persons who clilecdy use the inWDlioa."; Banks Committee a. Ibe 
British Patent System. Cmnel. 4407 (1970), It paae 76, "... make use of, or pin some ...... 
from, a pilei"" iaventioll, to the detriment of the patentee, without ... actually iafriapnl."; 
Hoffmann, K., "Contributory or Indirect Infringement of Patents - A Review of the Legal Position 
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This chapter investigates the extent to which such fonn of activities is actionable under the 
Malaysian patent law. For convenience, the tenn "indirect exploitation" is used to refer to 
the act of a manufacturer or supplier, who by his activities, enables the direct infringer or 
fmal user to make use of the patented invention. It includes activities like supplying 
component parts of a patented combination or process without which the direct infringer or 
fmal user could not make or use the invention. In the absence of an express statutory 
provision to deal with these activities, and due to the dearth of local cases on infringement, 
guidance is sought from the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to 
examine the grounds or the basis of liability upon which actions had been taken there to 
curb such activities. As the case law from the United States had been well-developed prior 
to legislative intervention, it is instructive to refer to their cases to determine the extent to 
which their jurisprudence could usefully be adopted by the Malaysian courts. 
The fIrst part of this Chapter examines the situation prior to the 1983 Act. The second deals 
with the principles of tortious liability that have been used by the courts in various common 
law jurisdictions in relation to patent infringements. In the examination of the control of 
unauthorised indirect exploitation of a patented invention in these countries, the concept of 
joint-tortfeasance is examined. This encompasses the activities of one party, who either by 
co-operating, assisting, advising, persuading or otherwise taking part intentionally in the 
infringement or use, result in infringement of a patent by another. This concept is, 
however, dealt with only in the context of how far it could be of assistance in dealing with 
the problem of indirect exploitation. Further, examination of the case law is focused only 
on the position before legislative changes introduced specific statutory provisions for 
contributory or indirect infringement in all these jurisdictions. The extent to which the 
common law principles provide a viable and fair degree of protection against indirect 
exploitation in the Malaysian context is evaluated. Finally, the features of the proposed 
section to deal with such indirect exploitation are laid down.3 
in 13 Countries", 6 CIPA 371,374 (1977), calls it a "form of complicity"; In Dawson Chemical 
Co. y. 80hm &. HaM Co. 448 US 176, at page 188 (US Sup. Ct 1980), the court said that 
contributory infringement "exists to protect patent ~ghts fro~ subversion .~y th~ ~ho without 
directly infringing the patent themselves, engage In acts designed to facilitate Infringement by 
others."; In Windsurfioa International Inc. y. Diekow-Seaal KG 13 IIC 645, at page 647 (German 
Fed. Sup. Ct 1982), the Court explained, "Indirect patent infringement deals with a ~ge of ~ 
which, while representing a significant threat to the rights of the patent owner WIthout qmte 
constituting an accomplished infringement of the pate~t, are not covaal by. the customary 
categories of complicity and participation, because there IS usually no collaboration between the 
indirect and the direct infringer." 
3 Note that the TRIPS Agreement does not obligate a country to introduce specific provisions to deal 
with such unauthorised indirect exploitation - see Section 5, Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement 
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4. 1 . The Situation Prior to the 1983 Act 
Prior to the coming into force of the Act, the two relevant United Kingdom patent statutes 
that were "imported" into the patent law of Malaysia were the Patents Act 1949 and the 
Patents Act 1977.4 Unlike the 1949 Act, the 1977 Act contains a specific section on 
infringement, and in particular, provides remedies for certain types of indirect exploitation.s 
Since there is no specific mention of contributory infringement in the Malaysian Act, the 
question arises as to whether, and if so, the extent to which, indirect exploitation of a 
patented invention is actionable in Malaysia, both for re-registered patents that are still in 
force, and for patents registered under the Act. 
To date, there is only one reported case on contributory patent infringement in Malaysia. 
The case, Rhone-Poulenc AG Co. & anor v. Dikloride Herbicides Sdn Bhd & anor, 6 
involved, inter alia, the issue of infringement of a patent granted under the repealed 
Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act 1951 J The four patents in suit were granted 
under the Patents Act 1949 (UK). They consisted of numerous claims, including a method 
of treating rubber trees by the application of a compound called ethephon, specifically for 
stimulating the flow of latex in such trees, and certain aqueous compositions which 
included ethephon as the active ingredients to provide a formulation suitable for such use. 
By virtue of having been registered in West Malaysia under the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Act 1951, these patents enjoyed protection in West Malaysia. The 
defendants manufactured and sold a product called Latex 100E which contained ethephon 
as the active ingredient, compositions which were suitable for stimulating latex flow in 
rubber trees. The acts of infringement complained of were in respect of acts which took 
place prior to the coming into force of the Patents Act 1983. Accordingly, the relevant 
statutory provisions for the purposes of this case were those contained in the 1951 Act. 
On the question of infringement, the Judge held that by virtue of section 6 of the 1951 Act,8 
section 60 of the UK Patents Act 1977 applied mutatis mutandis. 9 The evidence showed 
that the defendants supplied similar aqueous composition of ethephon to identified 
distributors and wholesalers, and also sales by retailers to ultimate users who used them as 
latex yield stimulants. The judge held that the fact that the defendants' product had been 
proved to be suitable for the stimulation of latex yield in rubber trees tantamount to an 
infringement by the defendants of the plaintiffs' composition claim regardless of whether 
the product was in fact used or intended for use for other purposes. As to the process 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Refer to Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System. para. lA. 
See section 60(2). Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom in Appendix. 
Rhone-PouJenc AG Co. & anor v. DikJoride Herbicides Sdn Bbd & aoor (1988) 2 MLJ 323. 
For a discussion of the events which led to this 1951 Act. see Chapter 1. paras. 1.4 and 1.5. 
See Chapter I - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System. at para. 1A. 
See Appendix for provisions of Section 60 of the Patents Act 1977. United Kingdom. 
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claims, he held that there were both direct and contributory infringements of the claims. 
Since the defendants had induced the planters into committing direct infringements of these 
claims, they were liable for contributory infringement of the process claims.l 0 
It is rather unfortunate that there was no discussion as to the factors influencing the judge in 
finding that there was inducement on the part of the defendant. However, in the absence of 
any higher authority, this case has to be relied on as an authority for the proposition that 
contributory infringement, as defined in the 1977 UK Act, is justiciable, at least in respect 
of re-registered patents, for infringing activities prior to the coming into force of the 1983 
Act. The same, however, cannot be said for infringing activities related to re-registered 
patents, where the alleged infringing act takes place after 1 st October, 1986. For these 
patents, the exclusive rights under the Act will govern. I I This means that, if at all 
contributory infringement is to be actionable, it has to be based on the provisions of the Act 
and not by virtue of importation of section 60 of the 1977 Act. Therefore, it is submitted 
that this case could not be relied on as authority that contributory infringement is actionable 
for all re-registered patents or for patents granted under the present Act. If such then is the 
situation, it would mean that there appears to be a lacuna in the law which may require 
legislative actions, unless the lacuna can just as effectively be remedied by common law 
doctrines. There is no reason why the common law should not apply, since although 
section 60 of the 1977 UK Act is "repealed" by the 1983 Act, the Act does not suppress the 
common law rules. 
4.2. The Governing Principle on Infringement of a Patent 
In the determination of whether the exclusive rights of the patent owner are infringed, 
problem arises where the patent relates to a combination patent or patent for a method or 
process of getting a certain result, where the claimed invention is defined as a combination 
of elements, e.g., the components of a machine, steps in a process, or constituents of a 
composition of matters. Take the example of a combination patent. The combination may 
fall under various categories. For example, all the part involved in the making of the 
combination article may be old and taken individually, not patentable. In some cases, some 
parts may be new, but, again, taken individually, not patentable because the condition of 
inventive step may not be satisfied. In the third category, some of the parts may be new and 
patentable in themselves, while the other parts are old. In all the three categories, it is only 
the combination as a whole which is patentable because it is regarded as new and involving 
an inventive step and capable of industrial application. I2 However, in the last category 
10 Rhone-Poulenc AG Co. & anor v. Dikloride Herbicides Sdn Bhd & aoor (1988) 2 MLJ 323; 
[1988] FSR 282. at pages 288-291. per Mr Justice v.c. George. in the High Court of Malaysia. 
11 See section 89(c). Patents Act 1983. Malaysia. as amended in 1986 and 1993. 
12 The Mercoid Corporation v, Mid-Contjnentalln\'cstroeot Company e( al. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
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mentioned above, the novel parts may be protected by a separate claim or patent if they are 
in themselves patentable. Further, the components parts may consist of normal articles of 
manufacture or they could be specially adapted to fit the combination. 
In these kinds of patent, the courts, right from early times had held that there was no 
infringement unless all the elements of the combination had been taken. In other words, 
there was no doctrine of partial infringement which could be applied to give a remedy to the 
owner of a patent when only some elements of his combination were taken. One American 
commentator was of the opinion that such a doctrine of partial infringement did exist in 
England,13 and as illustration, he mentioned the case of Smith v. The London and North 
Western Railway CO.14 If this were so, then the problem associated with enforcement of 
rights in a combination patent would not have arisen, because by virtue of this doctrine, a 
person who had taken some but not all the elements of a patent article could be found to 
have partially infringed the combination patent and some relief could be obtained by the 
owner. However, a closer examination of the relevant case, and some cases prior to and 
also after that, revealed that this was not so. 
In the earlier case of Newton v. The Grand Junction Railway Co., the Lord Baron 
observed that in considering the question of infringement, all that was to be looked at was 
whether the defendant had "pirated a part of that to which the patent applied".IS In Sellers 
y. Dickinsons, the same judge, in answer to the contention that a combination patent could 
only be infringed by the use of the whole combination, held that "there may be infringement 
by using so much of a combination as is material".1 6 Similarly, in Smith v. The London 
and North Western Railway Co. ,17 the jury was directed that, though anyone was entitled 
Ct 1944), per Mr Justice Douglas, at page 25, "That result may not be obviated in the present case 
by calling the combustion stoker switch the 'heart of the invention' or the 'advance in the art'. 1be 
patent is for the combination only. Since none of the separate elements of the combination is 
claimed as the invention, none of them when dealt with separately is protected by the patent 
monopoly."; Leeds & Catlin y. Victor Talkin& Machine Co. 213 US 325 (US Sup. Ct 19(9), Mr 
Justice McKenna, at page 335, "Whether the parts are new or old, the combination is the invention 
and it is distinct from any of them." 
13 Thomas, E.M., "The Law of Contributory Infringement", 21 JPOS 811 (1939), at page 815. 
14 Smith y. The London and North Western Railway Co. 2 EL & BL 69 (1853). 
IS Newton y. The Grand Junction Railway Co. 5 Exch. 331 (1850), per Pollock C.B., at page 344. 
In the same case, Alderson B., at page 335, was of the opinion that, "where the invention consists 
partly of what is old and partly of what is new, the combination is the subject of th~ patent. 
Therefore, a person cannot infringe that part of the patent which is old, because the pubbc cannot 
be prevented from using that which they had before used in that state. If the invention consists of 
something new, and a combination of that with what is old, then, if an individual takes for his 
own and uses that which is the new part of the patent, that is an infringement of it." 
16 Sellers y. Dickinsons 5 Exch. 312 (1850), at pages 324-325, per Pollock C.B., ''The argument ... 
was that this is a patent for a combination of old and new mechanisms, and the defendant not 
having used the combination, there can be no infringement. But this is not so. 'There may be 
infringement by using so much of a combination as is material, and it would be a question for the 
jury whether that used was not substantially the same thing .... Now, suppose that had been a mere 
combination of matters entirely new as a combination, but all of them old singly, I cannot help 
thinking that if the jury bad found that the substantial parts of the combination weft used. that 
would have been an infringement of the patent." 
17 Smith y. 'The London apd Nqtb Wcstcrp RajlwlY Co. 2 EL &: BL 69 (1853). 
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to use an old contrivance, the patent protected the patentee against the use by others of any 
new and material part of the invention described, whether or not used in combination with 
what was old. In an action by the defendant for a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that the 
judge had misdirected the jury, Lord Campbell C.l., in upholding the ruling, said that 
where a patent was for a combination of several known parts, a user of any of them would 
not be an infringement of the patent but that "where there [was] an invention consisting of 
several parts, the imitation or pirating of any part of the invention" would be an 
infringement of the patent. I 8 
From the opinions expressed in the above cases there seems to be strong indication that 
partial infringement of a patent could be relied upon to make a person who had made partial 
use of a combination patent liable. However, as the later cases showed, this is not so. The 
opinions expressed have to be considered in the light of the patent law existing at that time 
when no specific claims were required to be made, a description of the subject matter 
sufficed. Hence the judge in deciding whether there was infringement, had to decide on 
what the essence of the invention was. 19 
Such an approach could be distilled from the case of Lister v. Leather, when the Court of 
Exchequer Chamber held that the use of a subordinate part only of a combination may be an 
infringement of a patent for the combination if the "parts so used be new and inventive."2o 
The effect of the judgement seems to be that in a combination patent, the taking of one or 
more component parts of the patented combination may amount to an infringement if the 
part or parts taken could of themselves be separately claimed. This is confirmed in Clarke 
v. Adie, where Lord Hatherley in the House of Lords explained Lister v. Leather thus: 
"In the case of Lister v. Leather it was decided that in an improved machine, the 
result of several combinations, the patent might be so claimed that the several 
combinations leading up to the one combination might be themselves divided into 
several parts, in which each specific combination, say A and B and C, might be 
considered as a separate integer ... and each such integer might in itself be a subject 
18 Smith v. The London and North Western Railway Co. 2 EL & BL 69 (I 853), at pages 75-76. 
19 Note: It only became obligatory after the Patent, Design and Trade Marks. Act 18.83 (UK) to 
include at least one claim in a complete specification - section 5(5). However, It was. In f~ct, held 
in 1890 in Siddell v. Vickers L.R. 15 App. Cas. 496 (1890), at pages 500, 505, that an Inventor 
could still. if he wished, adopt the old established practice of claiming ·the invention substantially 
as described' and leave it to the court to detennine the scope ofhis monopoly. The House of Lords 
also held that the enactment in section 5 of the Act of 1883. that a complete specification must end 
with a distinct statement of the invention claimed. was directory only. and when letters patent tru 
been granted. they would not be invalid because it had not been .comp~ied with. See generally. 
Davenport. N .. The United Kingdom Patent System - A Bnef HIstOry, Kenneth Mason. 
Hampshire. 1979. at page 31. 
20 Lister v. L\"athcr 8 EI & BL 1004 (1858). per William J .. at page \033. 
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of a letters patent, and also in their combination, the several inventions A and B and 
C, might produce a total which should also be a subject of letters patent. .. "21 
Hence it is clear that, despite earlier indications, there is no doctrine of partial infringement 
under the common law. Before a combination patent can be infringed, each and every 
element of the combination must be taken. Merely taking one or more of the combination 
would not, in itself, amount to an infringing act. The above principle applies to a process 
patent too. So the individual elements involved in the process are not protected unless they 
are separately protected by a patent. 22 
The same rule, that infringement of a combination patent occurs only when all the elements 
of the combination are taken, is also applied by the courts in the United States. The 
Supreme Court had to consider this question in David Prouty and John Mears v. Draper 
Ruggles et aI. 23 The plaintiffs' patent was for an improvement in the construction of a 
plough. They claimed the combination of certain parts of the plough and not for the parts 
separately. The defendant manufactured certain ploughs which were alleged to be in 
infringement of the patent. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that there was no violation 
of the patent unless it was proved that the whole combination was substantially used in the 
defendant's ploughs. The use of one or more of the parts specified in the letters patent by 
the defendant was not enough to constitute an infringement. The Supreme Court held that 
the instructions of the Circuit Court were correct. Taney C,]. laid down the principle that 
where a patent was for a combination, the use of some only of the parts which went into the 
combination would not constitute an infringement of the plaintiffs' combination patent.24 
The above principle was reiterated in two other Supreme Court decisions, Vance v. 
Campbell 25 and Fuller et aI. v. Yentzer et aI. ,26 where it was stressed that as long as one 
element of the combination was not used, there was no infringement of the patent. For there 
to be an infringement, the entire combination must be taken. In Harvey Hubbell v. General 
Electric, the Circuit Court of Appeals firmly stated that there was no such thing as partial 
infringement in US patent law.27 To this rule there appears to be no exception.28 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
27 
Clarke y. Adie (1877) 2 App. Cas. 315, per Lord Hatherley, at page 327. 
See, for example, Sarason v. Frenay (1914) 31 RPC 252. For a similar approach in Australia, see 
Walker & anor v. Alemite Corporation (1933) 49 CLR 643, per Dixon J., at pages 657-658. 
David Prouty and John Mears v. Draper Ruggles et ai. 41 US 336 (US Sup. Ct 1842). 
Dayid Prouty and John Mears v. Draper Ru~~les et ai. 41 US 336 (US Sup. Ct 1842), per Taney 
c.J., at page 339, "The patent is for a combination, ... None of the parts referred to are n~w, and 
none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination less than the whole churned as 
new, or stated to produce any given result. ... The use of any two of these parts only. or of two 
combined with a third, which is substantially different, in fonn or in the manner of its arrangement 
and connection with the other, is therefore not the thing patented. It is not the same combination if 
it substantially differs from it in any of its parts." 
Vance v. Campbell 66 US 427 (US Sup. Ct 18b::!). 
Fyller ft al. v. Yentzcr el aI. 94 US 288 (US Sup. Ct 1877). 
Harvey Hubbell y. General Electric 267 Fed. 564 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1920), per Hough, Circuit Judge, 
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4.3. The Problem Arisin~ and the Need to Find a Proper Balance 
The basic doctrine that only a complete infringement of a patent is justiciable presents a 
practical problem for the patent owner. He can not initiate actions against the manufacturers 
whose activities have enabled others, usually consumers, to make use of his patent, as for 
example by combining the various elements together to make the patented combination, or 
by using substances bought from the manufacturers to use in a patented process. In most 
situations, the ultimate users are too numerous and not worthwhile suing in terms of the 
damages that could be recovered, or in terms of the cost involved. There are also the 
practical problems of detecting and policing the patents against these people, including the 
commercial advisability of suing potential customers for patent infringement.29 Further, 
where the use of the patented invention is for private and personal use, it is specifically 
provided by the Act that such use is outside the exclusive right of the patent owner to 
contro1.30 Therefore, in practice this would often leave the patentee without a remedy and 
his patent valueless.31 
28 
29 
30 
31 
speaking for the court, at page 571, "The allegation of contributory infringement cannot be 
supported, there having been no possibility of complete infringement ... , and there is no such 
thing as partial infringement." 
McCormick y. Manny 15 Fed. Cas. 1314 (CC NO Ill. 1856), per McLean J., at page 1318, "A 
patent which claims mechanical powers or things in combination, is not infringed by using a part 
of the combination. To this rule there is no exception. If, therefore, the wooden divider of the 
defendant's machine be similar to that of the plaintiffs, there is no infringement; as the 
combination is not violated in whole but in part." 
See, for example, Ciby-Geil:y A.G (Purr's) ~plications [1977] RPC 83, at page 88, "However, 
since the compound is a known compound, the monopoly may be of little value, and the 
appellants' research and experiment little rewarded, because of the difficulty of 'policing' the 
unlicensed exercise of the discovered method of selective weed eradication. Apart from the manifest 
difficulties of policing, it would be commercially invidious to sue potential purchasers from the 
appellants (or their licensees) such as farmers and crop-spraying fIrms."; Thomas-Houston Electric 
Co. y. Ohio Brass Co. 80 Fed. Rep. 712 (CCA 6th Cir. 1897), per Judge Taft, "If this ... rule 
[i.e., the rule that when there is some concert of action between the person who does the injury am 
the person who is charged with aiding and abetting. the latter can be held liable on the principle of 
joint liability] is not to apply to trespass upon patent property, then indeed, the protection which 
is promised by the constitution and laws of the United States to inventors is a poor sham. Many of 
the most valuable patents are combinations of non-patentable elements, and the only effective 
mode of preventing infringement is by suits against those who, by furnishing the parts which 
distinguish the combination, make it possible for others to assemble and use the combination, ard 
who, by advertisement of the sale of such parts and otherwise, intentionally solicit and promote 
such invasions of the patentee's rights." See also Thomas, E.M., "The Law of Contributory 
Infringement", 21 JPOS 811 (1939), at pages 811-812. ''Where his financial responsibility is 
greater it is often more practicable to bring action against the contributory infringer than against 
the outright infringer. Often, too, the number of transactions involved in the single action may be 
many times greater and will justify the expense of bringing suit whereas the individual ultimate 
infringers may be so numerous or the damages occasioned by each infringement so small that it 
would be useless to try to enforce the patent against them."; Wiles, R., "Joint Trespasses on 
Patent Property", 26 JPOS 676 (1944), at pages 683-684, "Nobody should make parts or devices 
usable only in infringement. and the court should give relief against such practices. If they do not, 
they will be swamped with little suits against host of little infringers. Patentees prefer to ~ 
in a simple way. but they can probably make as much money by a properly ~s~ 
collection organisation, which carefully follows up small trespassers .... 'Theoretically. JOint 
participation in ttespasses on patents should create some liability. Practically to force suits against 
numerous small primary infringers, by denying this simpler remedy, would be unfair to patentees, 
and oppressive to the public." 
See Chapter 7 - Exceptions. Limitations and Loss of Rights. at para. 7.7.1. 
See for example. the comments of Mr Justice Jackson in 'Ibe Mmjgjd OgoraIioo y. Mj4-
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On the other hand, if the mere manufacture or sale of unpatented parts in a combination 
patent, or the supply of common materials used in a patented method or process were to 
entitle the patentee to sue the manufacturer or supplier, this would often mean that the 
patentee is given more protection than is warranted by the patent. He would, in effect, be 
given an unwarranted and undeserved extension of his monopoly over articles or supplies 
in common everyday use.3 2 This may not be objectionable if the articles were specially 
adapted, by reason of the shape or configuration or other properties, for use in the patented 
invention. Since the parts are novel, the restraint of such manufacture and sale does not 
deprive the public of anything it has before, therefore, they should be considered as part of 
the patentee's monopoly. On the other hand, there is the counter argument that these 
specially adapted components may be legitimately commercialised without the consent of 
the patentee, as for example, for repairs, to licensees of the patentee, or for export 
purposes, bearing in mind that patent rights can only be enforced within jurisdiction. As is 
seen later from the cases, this reluctance to extend the patentee's monopoly explains the 
courts' approach to indirect unauthorised exploitation under the common law. 
There is thus a need for a proper balancing of rights between the patentee on the one hand, 
and the public on the other. This is to ensure that a patentee's monopoly does not extend to 
unpatented products but at the same time to ensure that, through indirect exploitation by 
others, the patentee's just rewards are not impinged upon and subverted by unscrupulous 
traders who could with impunity "seek to reap what they had not sown".33 
4.4. Treatment of Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation in Selected Countries 
This part of the Chapter, therefore, focuses on the way the courts in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and the United States deal with unauthorised indirect exploitation of 
component parts or elements of a patented invention. The aim is to investigate whether the 
common law provides satisfactory rights to the patent owner to prevent such indirect 
exploitation. 
Continental Inyestment CompanY et ale 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. Ct 1944). at page 30. "If the 
patentee may not exclude competitors from making and vending strategic UDpa~nted elements such 
as the thennostat. adapted to use in the combination, the. patent syste~ !S so vulnerab~~ to 
competition as to be almost worthless. On the other hand, If be may prohibIt such competition. 
his system patent gathers up into its monopoly devices long known to the art and hence not 
themselves subject to any patent." 
32 See, for example, Jessel M.R.. in Townsend y. Haworth (1875) 48 L.J. Ch. 7700, at 772n. "It is 
an attempt to extend the patent laws beyond their purport; that such extension ought. not to be 
granted now by me, at any event for the first time." See also the comments of Mr JUStice Jackson 
in footnote 31 supra. 
33 In fact, in the United States, the contributory infringement doctrine was invoked, as stated by the 
Supreme Court in the Dawson Chemical Co. y. Rohm cl 8M:' Co. 448 US 176, 2~ US~ 385 
(US Sup Ct 1980), "to protect patent rights from subversIOn by those who WIthout directly 
infringing the patent themselves engage in acts designed to facilitate infringement by others". 
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4.4.1. United Kingdom 
Prior to the 1977 Act, there was no statutory provision governing the position of a person 
who had assisted or in some way contributed to, or facilitated another, in infringing the 
patent.34 However, as early as 1786, in the case of Bancroft v. Warder and ors, there was 
an inkling of the possible attitude of the court in resolving this type of situation. In that case 
the plaintiff had a patent for a method of dyeing by use of certain barks. The defendants 
were sued for importing a great quantity of these barks into England and supplying 
different dyers with it. The dyers had used the barks in infringement of the method claim. 
The defendants were charged with being in collusion with the dyers to defraud the plaintiff 
of the lawful benefits of his patent. They demurred that under the patent the plaintiff only 
had the exclusive right to the use of the bark in dyeing, it did not give him the exclusive 
right to import the bark. Hence the plaintiff had no title either in law or equity to a discovery 
as to whether they had imported barks or not. In overruling the demurrer, the court agreed 
that had the patent given the plaintiff the exclusive right to import the bark, it would have 
been illegal and a nullity. However, the court stressed the fact that as it was alleged in the 
bill that there was collusion between the defendants and the dyers, the allegation ought to be 
answered.35 So even in the Bancroft case, it would seem that the supply of a component 
part of a patented invention per se was not determinative. A further element was required, 
which in the present case was the allegation of collusion between the suppliers and the 
ultimate user. In other words, it would seem that to be liable for infringement by the supply 
of the bark, the defendant suppliers had to be regarded as joint infringers with the users of 
the dye. 
In the frequently quoted case of Townsend v. Haworth,36 the court expressly made this 
nexus a necessary element to find the supplier liable. The plaintiff was the owner of a patent 
relating to an invention for preserving textile materials. The claims were for the use of 
certain solutions made up from certain known compounds, among them, chloride of 
magnesium and zinc, for such purposes. The defendant company, who were manufacturers 
of chloride of zinc, was alleged to have induced persons to buy their products for the 
purpose of being used according to the patent. It was further alleged that in consideration of 
the defendant Haworth buying the products, the company would indemnify him against 
litigation in respect of infringement of the patent by reason of such purchase. In pursuance 
of the agreement, the company had sold large quantities of the substances to Haworth who 
34 The Banks Committee recommended that certain fonns of contributory infringement should be 
included in the definition of infringement. see paras. 269-273, Report of the Committee to 
Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407, HMSO. L~ndon, 1970. To bring the 
domestic law into line with the requirements of the Strasbourg ConventIOn. the Patents Act 1977 
was passed on July 29. 1977. Section 60(2) and (3) deals with contributory infringement. see 
Appendix. 
J.'i Bancroft v. Warder and ors 11 Hayward's Patent Cases 631 (1786), per Kenyon M.R., at page 632. 
36 Townsend y. Haworth (1875) 48 L.1. Ch. 770n. 
208 
had used them in infringement of the patent. The plaintiff argued that since the defendant 
company had induced and procured the infringement, and were in fact in the position of 
principals, they ought to be responsible for the infringement. In dismissing the action, 
Jessel M.R. held that the act of the company did not amount to an infringement. From the 
judgement, it would seem that the reason for the decision was that the chemical substances 
in suit were common substances and, therefore, sale to a person, even knowing that he was 
going to use it to infringe a patent, did not make the seller himself an infringer. Further, by 
analogy with a combination patent, where protection extended only to the whole 
combination and not to the separate elements which went into it, they had no right to 
complain.37 As to the contention that the defendant company should be liable as a principal, 
the court did not rule out the possibility that they might, therefore, be liable as the actual 
infringer, but as it was not made out that the company was a partner or had made Haworth 
its agent, the contention failed. On the issue of the indemnity, Jessel M.R. said that there 
were two possibilities. One was that the defendants had doubts about the validity of the 
patent. In that case, they had the right to challenge it and to give an indemnity to their 
purchasers. The second possibility was that the defendants knew that the patent was valid. 
However, this was not pleaded by the plaintiff, and in any case, the judge doubted whether 
the defendant who had so acted would have been liable as an infringer.38 Townsend v. 
Haworth has subsequently been understood as deciding that a sale of an article capable of 
innocent use with knowledge that it would or might be utilised in infringement does not by 
that fact alone make the vendor an infringer. In Sykes v. Howarth,39 the court held that if 
the person who actually carried out the infringing act was the agent of the defendant, then 
the defendant would be liable for the infringement. The judge, in reaching that conclusion, 
however, expressly stated that he was not saying anything at variance with Townsend v. 
Haworth. 40 
37 Townsend v. Haworth (1875) 48 L.1. Ch, 770n, per Jessel M.R., at 771n, "He is prohibited from 
making, using, or vending the prohibited articles ... But has anyone ever dreamt before th.is case 
that that extends to the component articles which enter into the patent? So far from that bemg the 
law, it has been decided that in cases of what they call combination patents it is only the 
combinations claimed that may not be used; the other elementary combinations may be used. '" 
The line of cases seems to me to shew conclusively that the mere making, using, or vending of the 
elements ... which afterwards enter into the combination is not prohibited by the patent and if not 
prohibited, I do not see how I am to extend the patent laws to make a new prohibition." 
38 Townsend v. Haworth (1875) 48 L.1. Ch, 770n, per Jessel M.R.. at 771n-772n. James L.J., and 
Mellish L.1 .. delivered concurring opinions. At 773n. Mellish L.1 .. said. "Selling materials for the 
purpose of infringing a patent to the man who is going to ~nfring~ it. even althoug~ the party who 
sells it knows that he is going to infringe it and indemmfies him. does n,ot ?y Itself make the 
person who sells an infringer. He must be a party with the man who so mfnnges. and actually 
infringe. I am of the opinion that the demurrer must be allowed." , 
39 Sykes \'. Howarth 12 Ch, D 826 (1879). See also. on a similar point. The Incande~\cnt Gas Ll~ht 
Co. Ltd & ors v. Bro~en (1899) 16 RPC 179. per Mr Justice Kennedy. a~ page, 184. ",It IS clear to 
me the business is being carried on by .. , the de~endant. in s~ch ~ cO,nn~ctlOn with ~~Ith as makes 
him responsiok if Smith supplies, on orders bemg sent to him. mfrIngmg mantles. 
ol() Sykes v' Howarth 12 Ch,D 826 (1879). per Fry 1.. at page 833, 
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United Telephone Company v. Dale41 seems to suggest the possibility that indirect 
exploitation could be justiciable in England. In an earlier action against the defendants to 
restrain them from infringing two patents for telephonic apparatus, an order was made 
perpetually restraining the defendants from, inter alia, manufacturing and selling any 
instruments manufactured according to the specifications of the plaintiffs' patents. In the 
present action, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were selling the said instruments 
and applied to commit the defendants for breach of the injunction granted against them. It 
was also alleged that the defendants had issued an "lllustrated Descriptive Price List of 
Electrical and Physical Apparatus", manufactured and supplied by them. Among other 
things mentioned in this list were "microphones and telephonic apparatus and materials". 
Under this head were mentioned "materials for telephonic experiments," which comprised 
all the parts, including "binding screws," and these parts when put together would form an 
instrument which when complete would have been an infringement of the plaintiffs' 
patents. It appeared that the parts could be put together quickly without any difficulty by an 
ordinary skilled workman. Mr Justice Pearson held that there was a breach of the injunction 
by the sale of the instruments. He also commented that the injunction restraining sale of a 
complete machine, the subject of a patent, was violated by sale of the component parts in 
such a way that they could easily be put together.42 The United Telephone Company case 
was accepted as correct, but distinguished, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David 
Moseley & Sons Ltd and an or on the ground that if a supplier were selling parts which 
were so manufactured as to be adapted to be put together, then he was in essence selling the 
whole of the patented machine, and was liable for infringement. This was a different 
situation from the mere sale of one or more assorted parts of a patented article.43 
Where connivance with another person to infringe a patent could be shown, however, the 
court would not be constrained in giving a remedy to the patentee, even though the articles 
sold by the different parties do not in themselves infringe the patent. This is especially so 
where the circumstances were such as to indicate very clearly that the person selling the 
elements was practically in partnership with another person who completed the 
infringement, and the real object of his business was to aid in the infringement. This was 
41 
42 
43 
United Telephone Company v. Dale (1884) 25 Ch.D. 778. 
United Telephone Company v. Dale (1884) 25 Ch.D. 778, per Person 1., at page 782, "If there 
was a patent for a knife of a particular construction, and an injunction was granted restraining a 
defendant from selling knives made according to the patent, and he was to sell the component parts. 
so that any school boy could put them together and construct the knife, surely the sale would be a 
breach of the injunction?" 
See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyrc Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (19~) 21 RPC 274~ per 
Vaughan Williams L.J., at page 280. See also E. M. Bowden's Patent Syndicate Ltd : .. WII~on 
(1903) 20 RPC 644. which involved a motion to commit the defenda~t for breach of an l.nJunctl~n 
restraining him from infringing two letters patent rela~ing to bicycle brakes by. mler alia. 
manufacturing and selling articles similar to the patented article. The defe~dant had se~t by p~st all 
the component parts of a brake which had not been put together. In granttng the motton. Swmfen-
Eady 1. said. at page 645. "It is a brake not put together, but all the c~m~onent.parts are present. It 
is not a genuine Bowden brake. There is no doubt whatever that It IS an mfnngement of the 
Bowden brake." 
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clearly illustrated in the case of The Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd v. The New 
Incandescent Mantle Co .. J. Herbert. De Tossel. and Lefroy, where the patents related to 
illuminant appliances for gas and other burners. The defendants were alleged to be selling 
fittings in the same building where someone else sold infringing mantles to be used together 
with the fittings. In fmding against the defendants, the court held that the parties involved 
"were carrying on systematically the business of infringers of the patent" .44 
The possibility that two persons could in principle be liable as joint infringers in other 
situations was, however, recognised in Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Johnson & 
Co. and Basle Chemical Works Bindschedler,45 where the concept of liability as a joint 
tortfeasor was fust broached and the plaintiff succeeded on that ground at fust instance. 
The plaintiffs were the owner of a patent for a dye. The second defendants were chemical 
manufacturers in Switzerland. The fust defendants ordered the dye from the second 
defendants in Switzerland to be sent by post to England. It was accepted that the dye would 
be an infringement if made or sold in England. The plaintiffs alleged that this transaction 
was a sale by the Basle Company of the plaintiffs' patented article in England, and, 
therefore, an infringement of the patent. 
North J. found the second defendants liable as a joint tortfeasor.46 The judgement was 
reversed on appeal. The House of Lords affmned the decision of the Court of Appeal, 
holding that the contract of sale was completed by delivery to the Post Office in 
Switzerland. Since the Post Office was the agent of the buyer and not of the vendor, the 
vendor had not made, used, exercised or vended the invention within the ambit of the 
patent. 4 7 The sole issue that was argued before both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords was the question as to where the delivery took place. It was unfortunate that the 
courts had no opportunity to address the issue of joint tortfeasance.48 
44 
4S 
46 
47 
48 
The Incandescent Gas Lillht Co. Ltd v. The New Incandescent Mantle Co.. J. Herbert. De Iossel. 
and Lefroy (1898)15 RPC 81, per Mathew J., at page 84. 
Badj§Cbe Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Johnson & Co. and Baste Chemical Works BindsclpDer 
[1897] 2 Ch. 322; ( 1897)14 RPC 405 (C.A.); affinned [1898] A.C. 200 (H.L.). See infra, text 
accompanying footnote 59, for later cases. 
See Badi. Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Johnson & Co. apd BasJe Chemical Works Bjpdw:hedler 
[1897] 2 Ch. 322, per North J., at pages 332-334, "It is clear that there was a course of dealing 
between the Basle Company and Neibergall & Goth which was.perfectly unders~ by the.latter. It 
was in accordance with this course of dealing that as soon as this parcel was receIved by Nleberga1l 
& Goth they sent it on by post to Johnson & Co. in London ... It could not ~y the effect of 
that which had already been complete, namely the joint execution of an order gJ,:en by Johnson & 
Co. to the Basle Company to place the goods in the hands of ~e post-~ffice. In order that they 
might carry them to England and deliver them here. to. The result IS that, In which ever ~rson the 
property in the goods was, they were jointly implicated in. a transac~on. the ~ffect of whic~ w~ to 
infringe the patent law of this country, and they are both liable as pnncI~s In the ~~o~. 
Dedi. Anjlin upd Soda Fabrik v. Jobnson & Co. apd Baste <JleUUcal Works BmwrJwJIer 
[1898] A.C. 200 (H.L), per Lord Halsbury L.C., at page 203, per Lord Herschell, at page 206. 
However North J.'s approach was expressly approved in MOJ1oD-Ngrwich Prpducts Ins· y. Intrm;p 
~ [1976] FSR S13 (H. Ct), per Graham J., at page S2S. 
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It appears that up to this stage, it was already accepted that the mere sale of an ordinary 
article of commerce, even with knowledge that it would be put to infringing use would not 
amount to an infringement of the patent. Something more needs to be shown, as was 
illustrated by the case of Innes v. Short and Beal,49 which dealt with the allegation of 
inducement. The patent related to an improved method of preventing corrosion and 
incrustation in steam boilers by the introduction of metallic zinc in a powdered state into 
steam boilers. The defendant sold bags of ordinary powdered zinc with directions for the 
use of the powder in boilers. They contended that they had merely sold an article which 
was well-known to the trade, and which anyone had the right to sell, since the powder itself 
was not claimed in the specification. The fact that they knew the article was to be used for 
infringing purposes did not make them infringers. Bigham J., while agreeing with the 
defendants on this point on the authority of Townsend v. Haworth, was able to distinguish 
it from the present case in that here Short had himself asked and invited the purchasers to 
use the article in such a way as to infringe the patent rights. An injunction was granted to 
"restrain the defendant from selling powdered zinc with an invitation to his purchasers to 
use it in such a way as to infringe the Plaintiffs patent". It is noteworthy that the defendant 
was restrained from inviting or inducing other people to infringe. He himself was not 
infringing the patent by merely selling powdered zinc.50 
However, the court in Adhesive DO' Mounting Co. v. Trapp & Co. expressed the opinion, 
in an obiter statement, that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Townsend v. 
Howarth, the Innes v. Short decision appeared to be of doubtful authority. 51 It is difficult 
to see why the decision in Innes v. Short should be doubted, since Townsend was on a 
different point. Russell L.J., in Ciby-Geigy A.G (Durr's) Applications, left open the 
question whether a rival manufacturer of a known substance would be entitled to sell it with 
instruction for the patented use.52 However, in C.B.S Songs Ltd & ors v. Amstrad 
Consumer Electronics PIc and Dixons Ltd, Lord Templeman referred without disapproval 
49 Innes v. Short and Beal 15 RPC 449 (1898). 
SO Inpes y. Short and Beal 5 RPC 449 (1898). In granting an injunction to restrain the sale in this 
manner, Bigham I. said, at page 452, "I think, as a matter of fact, ~at Mr Short did invite the 
persons who bought this article of commerce, powdered zinc, from hi~, and thereby led the~ to 
infringe this patent at the time that he was selling the powdered Zinc to them. That ... 15 a 
violation of the plaintiffs rights. There is no reason whatever why Mr Short should not sell 
powdered zinc, and he will not be in the wrong, though he .may know or ex~t. that the people 
who buy it from him are going to use it in such a way as will amount to an infringement of Mr 
Innes' patent rights. But he must not ask the people to use it in that way in order to induce them to 
buy his powdered zinc from him." 
SI See Adbc.siye Dty MouptiPK Co. y. 1'rapJ) & Co. (1910) 27 RPC 341, per Parker I., at page 353. 
In fact it was also submitted by Terrell and Shelley on the Law of Patents, 10th Ed., Sweet ani Maxw~ll, London, 1961, at page 138, that Ippes y. Short was in fact wrongly decided, and that 
there was no such tort as "aiding and abetting infringement". 
'2 Ciby-GoiU A.Q lDurr's) Applicatiops [1977] RPC 83 (CA), Russell L.J., at page 89. Note, 
however that Blanco White, T.A., Patents for Inventions, 4th Bd., Stevens & SODS, London, 
1974, at 3-210, held the view that IpPCS y. Short was rigbdy decided. 
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to Innes v. Short as a case where the vendor and the purchasers had a common design to 
carry out an infringing act. 53 
In the same line as Townsend v. Haworth was the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. 
David Moseley & Sons Ltd. 54 The patent was for a pneumatic tyre cover, held on to the rim 
of the wheel by wires passing through circumferential pockets in the edges of the cover. 
The defendants made and sold covers only, fitted with pockets, but without wires, and 
advertised them as "ready for wires". The defendants denied infringement and claimed that 
they were lawfully entitled to sell the cover. They further contended that intent was 
immaterial. At first instance, it was held that as the covers were not new and were not 
separately claimed (the patents being for combinations), the defendants were lawfully 
entitled to make and sell or sell the covers, since there were many other lawful use to which 
they could be put to. To hold otherwise would be to impose an undue burden on the 
defendants to ensure that the ultimate users did not infringe. Consequently, the defendants 
had not infringed.55 The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, and held, relying on 
Townsend v. Haworth, that the selling of an article intended to be used for the purpose of 
infringing a patent, did not amount to an infringement of th~ patent. It was stressed in the 
judgement that it was necessary for the purposes of constituting the vendor an infringer to 
show that he had made himself a party to the infringement, although what activities would 
constitute the vendor a party to such infringement was not discussed.56 
The question whether the case would have been decided differently had the material sold 
not been an ordinary article in common use, but specially constructed or adapted for the 
purpose of the invention, seemed to have been answered by Vaughan Williams LJ., when 
he said that the case would fail even though the plaintiffs were able to substantiate the 
proposition that the covers, as manufactured and sold by these defendants, could not be 
used for any other purpose than fitting them into the plaintiffs' tyres under one or other of 
53 C.B.S Sonis Ltd & ors v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics PIc and Dixons Ltd [1988] RPC 567 
(H.L.), per Lord Templeman, at page 607, "In Rotocrop International Ltd v. Genbourne Ltd ... 
Graham J. held ... that a rival manufacturer who made and sold infringing bins in parts with 
assembly instructions was a joint tort feasor with his customers. In that case as in Innes v. Short 
and Beal ... the vendor and the purchaser had a common design to carry out an infringing act." 
54 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 53 and 274, at pages 
278-282; [1904] I Ch. 164 and 612. 
55 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 53, per Swinfen-Eady 
J., at page 60, "They only make and sell the outer covers; they may also make inner tubes.; but no 
reference to that has been made. They are rubber manufacturers. They do not sell .the WIres, ~ 
they do not sell the rims - that they have nothing to do with; and by mere~y maki~g and selhng 
these outer covers they do not infringe either of the patents. It would be difficult, Indeed, to ~ 
from a practical point of view, if that were not so, how the defendants could c~ on theIr 
business. Selling these covers to licensees of the plaintiffs is a lawful trade; selling them for 
export is a lawful trade. but the purchasers, nevertheless, might not export them; and to make the 
defendants ... responsible for the ultimate use of the covers, so as to put upon them the ~urden. of 
ascertaining whether the purchasers intended to use, and to use them lawfully, would be ImpOSing 
upon them a hardship, which in my opinion. the law does not impose." 
56 Dynlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC. 274, per Vaughan 
Williams L.J.. at pages 278-279. Stirling L.J., and COlens-Hardy L.J. concurnng. 
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the patents.57 The reason for so holding seemed to have been answered by Cozens-Hardy 
LJ., who expressed the opinion that since the covers could be sold in a lawful trade (like 
selling to licensees, for export or for repair), to make the defendants responsible for the 
ultimate use of the covers would be to impose an undue hardship upon them.58 
The second case in England where the concept of joint tortfeasors was argued and applied 
by the court was that of Morton-Norwich Products Inc. v. Intercen Ltd. 59 The defendant, a 
Dutch corporation, sold quantities of a chemical to a group of UK companies controlled by 
one E. It was admitted that the chemical was covered by a valid patent owned by the 
plaintiff. One of the contentions of the plaintiff was that the defendant had counselled, 
procured and encouraged the English buyers to infringe the patent in the UK, and that in 
pursuance of a common design between them and the defendant, the English buyers had, in 
fact, infringed. 
It was found that the chemical had been specially formulated for the British market and 
could not be sold on the Continent; that the defendant's marketing manager took a keen 
interest in E.'s campaign to sell the chemical to the UK, and had met him frequently in the 
U.K. and in Holland; that he had encouraged E. to sell the material; and that there had been 
an intention to work together in the promotion of its sales. The court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to show that there had been a concerted design by the defendant and the 
English buyers to sell the chemical in this country, and that the defendant had been aware of 
the patent. If there was a concerted design by two persons to sell goods which in fact 
infringed a patent, then the parties who had such design and did so sell were joint 
tortfeasors and both infringed the patent, whether or not they knew that such sale would be 
an infringement. On the facts, the E. companies had sold the chemical in the UK in 
pursuance of the said common design, and the defendant was, therefore, liable as a joint 
tortfeasor, even if it had done nothing within the jurisdiction, and even if the underlying 
agreement had been made abroad.6o 
57 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 274, at page 280. 
58 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 274, at page 282. This 
obstacle was also alluded to by Swinfen-Eady 1. at first instance, see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. 
v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 53, at page 62. A similar approach was followed in 
White v. Todd Oil Burner. Ltd (1929) 46 RPC 275, per Clauson 1., at 293. In view of the 
problems identified in the cases, special provisions would ha~e. ~o be. inserted ~n any proposed 
amendments to cater for the right to engage in any such activities Without bemg subjected to 
infringement suit - see infra, para. 4.8. 
59 Morton-Norwich Products Inc. y. Iotercen Ltd [1978] RPC 501; [1976] FSR 513, at pages 519-
526 (H. Ct). per Graham 1. See footnote 45, supra, for the first case. 
60 Dictum of ScruUon L.J .• in The Koursk [1924] P. 140. at page 155; and Brook v. Bool [1928] 2 
K.B. 578. at page 586 was applied; Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Johnson [1897] 2 Ch. 
322. (1897) 14 RPC 405 explained. See Morton-Norwich Products Inc v. InterceD LId [1978] 
RPC 501; [1976] FSR 513, at page 524. per Graham J. 
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The law as to inducing and procuring infringement was considered by the Court of Appeal 
in Beleg&ing En Exploitatiemaatschap,pij Lavender v. Witten Industrial Diamonds. 61 The 
plaintiff owned a patent for diamond grit coated with metal of a specified thickness and 
embedded in a resin bond. There was no claim to metal coated diamond grit per se. The 
defendants dealt in metal coated diamond grits and it was alleged they had sold and supplied 
to certain other concerns such grit for the making of grinding tools in which the grit was 
embedded in a resin bond. The plaintiffs action was dismissed on a technical point, in that 
there were no allegations in the pleadings that the defendants procured or counselled anyone 
to do anything, nor was there any allegation that anyone had used any metal coated grits 
sold by the defendants in an infringing manner.62 However, the case is interesting in that 
from the opinion of the Court, there was an indication of the possibility of holding the 
defendant liable on the distinct tort of procurement of an infringement. 63 Further, from the 
judgement, Buckley L.J. seemed to indicate that a person would be liable as an infringer if 
he had either participated in the infringing activities or he had induced someone to infringe. 
This view seemed to be reinforced, when in the later part of his judgement, he referred to 
the idea of "indirect" infringement in relation to procuring and/or aiding others to infringe. 
In Kalman v. PCL Packa~in~ (U.K.) Ltd, the allegations against the second defendants, 
B., were that B. were joint tortfeasors with the ultimate infringer, PCL, and that they had 
procured the infringement by PCL. The learned judge rejected each of these contentions, 
and ordered that the writ and order for service should be set aside, in relation to B. On the 
fust point the learned judge regarded it as clear that at common law, B. could not be 
infringers, citing Townsend, Dunlop and Bele~~in~. After distinguishing Morton-
Norwich, Falconer J. went on to dismiss the allegations of joint tortfeasance on the ground 
that there was no evidence of concerted actions,64 and of procurement, since on the facts, it 
was PCL who had persuaded B. to sell the articles, rather than the other way round.6S 
61 Bele&einK En ExPloitatiemaatschiWPij Lavender v. Witten Industrial Diamonds [1979] FSR 59 
(CA). 
62 Bele&einK En ExploitatiemaatsclmPPij Lavender v. Witten Industrial Diamonds [1979] FSR 59 
(CA), see at page 66. At page 65, Buckley L.J .• differentiated between the facilitating of an act 
from procuring the doing of an act. Following Townsend v. Haworth and PunlOJ) y. Moseley. he 
held that mere facilitation, even with knowledge that the materials supplied would be used fer 
infringing purposes. would not amount to an infringement. 
63 Bele&ein& En Exploitatiemaatschappii Lavender v. Witten Industrial Diamonds [1979] FSR 59 
(CA), at page 66. "The plaintiffs do not only assert infringement by the defe~~. They ~so say 
that the defendants have procured, counselled and/or aided other persons to infringe. This may 
perhaps amount to an allegation of indirect infringement by the defendants them~elv~, ~ut I am 
inclined to think that it is a claim in respect of a distinct, suggested tort of procunng infringement 
by others (based upon the principle enunciated by ErIe J., in Lumley y. Qye 2 E & B 216. 231)." 
See. however. footnote 73, and accompanying text, where the Court of Appeal seems to repd 
procurement as a different way of infringing. 
64 Kalmap y, PCL Packa&in& CUKl lJd [1982] FSR 406 (patents Court). Falco~er J .• at pages 420 
and 424. In an action essentially based on infringement of copyri~t ~ ~gligence. the Court of 
Appeal in Peterson Zgchonis lJmjted apd ors V' Marfarkep Pack'lInl "'P"ted and (IS [1983~ FSR 
273. again stressed that to make a ~t a joint tortfeasor there must be an alIegatiOD of 
knowledge and a common desip - per Obver J.. at page 282. See also the tnKIe mark cue of 
CwI!'tY JJmjtc!d y. Wmor QmbH [1988] FSR 385 (Ch, Div.). where Falconer J .• at pages 394-
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The question of whether a sale of kits of parts would amount to an infringement arose in 
RotocrQP International Ltd v. Genbourne Ltd. 66 Graham J. was able to hold that the sale by 
the defendants of kits of parts with instructions to build into bins for making compost made 
them joint tortfeasors with their customers who erected and used their bins in accordance 
with the defendants' instructions and thereby infringed the plaintiffs claims for a process 
for making compost. Both had a common design within the meaning of The Koursk and 
Morton-Norwich Products v. Intercen Limited, respectively. Though there was no proof 
that the customer had directly infringed, it was a proper inference from the circumstances. 
As to the product claim, a compost bin, the court held that the defendant had directly 
infringed the product claim, since there was no practical distinction from the point of view 
of infringement between the sale of an article in parts with full instruction on how to put it 
together and a complete bin. As an alternative ground for their liability, the court held that 
they were also liable for procuring an infringement.67 
C.B.S Sonis Ltd & ors v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics PIc and Dixons Ltd,68 though 
on a copyright matter, was the first case involving the issue of joint tortfeasance and 
procurement of an infringement of intellectual property rights to reach the House of Lords. 
On the issue of inducement and joint tortfeasance, the House of Lords held that joint 
infringers were two or more persons who acted in concert with one another pursuant to a 
common design in the infringement. In the present case, there was no such common design 
since Amstrad had sold the machine, and the purchaser or other operator of the machine 
decided the purpose for which the machine should be used from time to time. Amstrad were 
also not liable for inciting or procuring breach of copyright, nor were they liable for the 
statutory tort of authorisation. However, a defendant who procured a specific infringement 
of copyright, whether by inducement, incitement or persuasion would be liable as a joint 
infringer.69 
404, held that before a person could be said to be a joint tortfeasor, he must have acted in concert 
with another person in the commission of the tort. The mere sale in the ordinary way of business 
of goods which the vendor was entitled to sell was not tortious, even though the purchaser might 
subsequently use the goods wrongly, applying Bele&&in&. Paterson and Amstrad Copsumer 
Electronics PIc y. The British Phopo&raphic Industry IJmited (1986) FSR 159 (CA). 
65 In Dow Chemical AG & anOT y. Spence Bason & Co. Ltd & anOf [1982] FSR 598, Falconer J., 
at pages 626 and 630, held that had he found the first defendants' process had infringed, he would 
have found the second defendant's conduct had amounted to an inducement and procurement of an 
infringement This was because the second defendant's activities had gone beyond mere facilitation 
and into the realm of inducement and procurement The evidence was that the second defendant tal 
persuaded the first defendant to adopt their no-gel process so as to secure the first defendant's 
custom for the 729 latex which could only be used in a no-gel process, that the second defendant 
had taught the first defendant how to operate that p~ss and ~t the secon~ defe?dant ~ provided 
technical assistance in the conduct of the necessary trials and m compounding swtable lattices. 
66 Rotocro.p International Ltd y. Genboume Ltd [1982] FSR 241. 
67 Rotocmp International Ltd y. Genboume IJd [1982] FSR 241, ~r Graham J.t at pages 258-260. 
See also Dow Chemical An & aoor y. Spence 8tYsoo & Co. Ltd & mg [1982] FSR 397 (CA)t 
at page 404, where the court stressed that it is persuading someone to do something which is a 
very important factor in the tort of procuring someone else to do an unlawful act. 
68 C.B.S SODP Ltd & 0lS yr Am3lr8d Consumer Eloctronics PIc IlPd Dixons I Jd [1988] RPC 567. 
69 CrB.S SODKs Ltd & ors yr Amstrad Consumer EIOCtronics PIc IlPd Dixons 'Id [1988] RPC 567, 
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Although the case of Unilever PLC v. Gillette (U.K.) Limited70 was involved with the 
effect of the provisions of section 60(1)(a) and (b) of the 1977 UK Patents Act (the direct 
infringement provisions), it provides a very good outline of the way in which the history of 
the concept of joint tortfeasance was developed by the courts. It shows that despite the 
enactment of the "contributory infringement" provisions of section 60(2) and (3) of the 
1977 Act, the doctrine of infringement as joint tortfeasors in a direct infringement is still 
alive and applicable in the United Kingdom. Mustill L.J. held that from the way the law has 
developed, infringement under section 60(1)(a) and (b) of the 1977 Act is applicable not 
only to the case of the person who had actually sold and imported the patented product but 
also to other situations.71 He then proceeded to trace the two-stage development of the law. 
The frrst stage arose in the general law of torts. Flowing from the cases of The Koursk and 
Brooke v. Bool. the proposition was laid down and accepted that participation in a common 
venture may cause someone to become directly liable as tortfeasor, together with the person 
who actually did the damage. The second stage concerns people who were said to have 
jointly infringed a patent. Even though a person may not have himself carried out any act 
which directly infringed, he would be held to have jointly infringed if there was a common 
design with the actual infringer. This principle was frrmly established in the light of C.B.S 
Son~s v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics. 72 He went on to say that these principles were no 
more in doubt, except as regards the relationship between indirect infringement by 
procuring and participation in a common design. However, he was inclined to the view that 
they were different ways of infringing} 3 On the facts, he found that the allegation, if true, 
per Lord Templeman, at pages 606-609, "My Lords, joint infringers are two or more persons who 
act in concert with one another pursuant to a common design in the infringement. In the present 
case there was no common design. Amstrad sold the machine and the purchaser or operator of the 
machine decided the purpose for which the machine should from time to time be used. The machine 
was capable of being used for lawful or unlawful purposes. All recording machines and many other 
machines are capable of being used for unlawful purposes but manufacturers and retailers are not 
joint infringers if purchasers chose to break the law. ... On behalf of BPI it was submitted that 
even if Amstrad had not authorised infringement and were not themselves infringers, nevertheless 
the activities of Amstrad in the sale and advertisement of Amstrad's models constitute a common 
law tort. The suggested torts were three in number, namely incitement to commit a tort, 
incitement to commit a criminal offence and negligence .... I accept that a defendant who procures a 
breach of copyright is liable jointly and severally with the infringer for the damages suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The defendant is a joint infringer; he intends and procures 
and share a common design that infringement shall take place. A defendant may procure an 
infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion. ... Gen~ral!Y. s~~, inducement, 
incitement or persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an mdivldual m~nger and t.n~st 
identifiably procure a particular infringement in order to make the defendant liable as a JOint 
infringer. " 
70 Unileyer PLC V. Gillette (U.K.) limited [1989] RPC 583 (CA), Mustill L.I., at page 602. 
71 UnileverPLC v. Gillette (U.K,) limited [1989] RPC 583 (CA), Mustill L.I., at page 602, Ralph 
Gibson and Slade L.JI. concurring. 
72 After discussing the case of TOWDsend v. Haworth (1875) 48 L.I. Ch. 770, Dunlop Pneumatic 
lyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons [1904] I Ch, 164 and 612, BWim Anjljn und Soda Fabrik 
y. HeD[)' lohnson & Co. [1897] 2 Ch, 322, 334, lones V. Short and. Beal (1898) IS RPC ~9, 
Morton-Norwich Products IOC· V. Intcrcen lat [1978] RPC SOl, Belcll10 1 etc. yymder v· WItten 
Industrial Diamonds [1979] FSR 59, Kalman v. PCL Packaaiol (U.K.) lat [1982] FSR 406, ... 
C.D.S Sonls Ltd & ors V. Amstrwl Consumer Electronics PIc and Dixons IJd [1988] RPC 567. 
73 Unileyer PLC v. Gillette (U.K,) Ljmited [1989] RPC 583 (CA~, Mustill W., at ~ 608, "I have 
set out these cases in some detail ... In truth, however, 1 believe that they do little more than 
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warranted a conclusion that there was a common design between the defendants and that 
Boston had acted in furtherance of that design.7 4 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the notion of joint tortfeasorship by participation 
in a common design is still accepted and applied by the courts. Mere supply of materials by 
a person will not make the supplier a joint tortfeasor. There must be more in their 
relationship to show that there is a "meeting of the minds" to commit an infringement. 
Though the law is reasonably clear, each case would have to be determined on its own facts 
before a conclusion could be reached as to whether there was a common design between 
them.7s 
4.4.2. Australia 
Australian patent law has, until recently, not given patentees a direct right against a person 
who sells products to people who then use those products to infringe the patent.76 The 
former statute, the Patents Act 1952, did not define what constituted an infringement of a 
patent, though the owner was given the exclusive right to make, use, exercise and vend the 
invention. 
74 
76 
illustrate how in various situations the court have applied principles which are no longer in doubt, 
save perhaps as regards the relationship between indirect infringement by procuring and by 
participation in a common design. There may still be a question whether these are distinct ways of 
infringing, or different aspect of a single way. I prefer the fonner view, although of course a 
procurement may lead to a common design, and hence qualify under both heads." Note that in ~ 
Electric Furnace Co. v. Selas Corporation of America [1987] RPC 23 (CA), a striking out action, 
Slade L.I., at page 33, seemed to be of the opinion that a defendant who had induced an 
infringement is gUilty of a different tort. See also CQpe1and-Chatterson CQ. Ltd y. HattQp arxi 
Guertip (1906) 10 Ex. C.R. 224; affd (1906) 37 S.C.R. 651. 
The factors on each side were summed up by Mustin L.I., at pages 609-610 of his judgement in 
Uoilever PLC y. Gillette (U.K.) Limited [1989] RPC 583 (CA). 
For factors relied upon by the court to indicate a common design, see Puschper y. Imn Palmer 
(ScotJMd> Ltd and anQr [1989] RPC 430 (patents Court), pages 438-439, per Aldous J. - joint 
marketing agreement between the defendants was more than a sales agreement. There was a 
common design to the extent of the second defendant assisting the first defendant to make sales by 
the supply of demonstration machines and literature and advertising material and by the provision 
of training; Iptel Cm:pQratiQn y. Geperal Ipstrumept CQII)QratiQP and QIS CNQ. 2) [1991] RPC 235,· 
per Aldous I., at pages 239-242 - the factors relied on by the plaintiff to establish its arguable (:Me 
(I) The relationship of the United States defendants to the United Kingdom defendants which was 
shown to be more than a parent/subsidiary relationship, (2) Sales Support, and (3) The first 
defendant's patent portfolio; MQlplycke and MQther y. Proctor & Gamble Umjted and others <No. 
~ [1992] RPC 21 (CA), see Dillon L.J., at page 29. 
The Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IP AC) in its report "Patents, Innovation IDl 
Competition in Australia" 1984, recommended in Recomme~tion 33, "1ba~ in general. ~ 
supply of goods whose only use would infringe a ~nt, or ~hich are ~ by a ~tive 
inducement for the ultimate consumer to perform actions which would lDnocendy or knoWlDlly 
infringe a patent, should itself be an infringement o~ the patent." The Pate~ts Act 1990 ~ntains a 
provision to implement the response of the AustralIan Government to this recommendation - see 
section 117. The situation is, therefore, now different under the new Patents Act (Patents Act 1990 
and the Patents Regulations 1991 which came into effect on 30th April 1991) - see Appendix. 
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Regarding the question of whether the mere supply of component parts of a patented 
invention could amount to any act of infringement in itself, the earliest reported case was 
Walker & anor v. Alemite Corporation. 77 In that case the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, 
infringement of a patent for lubricating apparatus, of which a grease cup was an element. 
The plaintiff contended that a grease cup manufactured by the defendant infringed his 
combination claim because the grease cup would or had inevitably to be used with the other 
parts of the plaintiffs invention. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that the defendant was 
guilty of infringement.78 In reversing the decision, the High Court held that a patent for a 
combination of various parts was not infringed by the manufacture or sale of the separate 
parts, even with knowledge that the buyer would use it for infringement. To be liable the 
vendor must have made himself a party to the act of infringementJ9 
From the opinion, it is clear that the approach of Dixon J. echoed that of the English 
approach. Hence the mere sale of a component part of a patented combination to a person, 
even if it is known that he would use it to infringe the patent is not an infringement of the 
patent. This is so even if the seller gives the purchaser an indemnity against any 
infringement suit and even if the components sold have no other use than an infringing use. 
The only way a person can be found liable is if he has made himself a party to the 
infringement. It remains now to examine later cases to see whether this approach has 
changed in any way, or whether any gloss has been added to the basic approach. 
The concept of joint infringement was applied by the court in Best Australia Ltd and ors v. 
Aquagas Marketing Pty Ltd and ors80 which involved an application to discharge an order 
giving leave to serve the applicants' amended application and statement of claim upon the 
second respondent, Hydrox, outside Australia. Hydrox was a New Zealand corporation 
and it contended that the proceeding did not fall within the category of cases in which 
service could be effected outside Australia. The court dismissed the motion, holding that the 
exclusive licence agreement between the fIrst and second respondent took the second 
respondent into the role of participant in the alleged infringement and there was a primn 
facie case of infringement by the second respondent in association with the fIrst respondent. 
After discussing the cases of Walker v. Alemite Corp., Belegging, Morton-Norwich 
Products Inc. v. Intercen, and after holding that the "joint venture agreement" between the 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Walker & anor v. Alemite Corporation (1933) 49 c.L.R. 643 (H. Ct, Australia). 
Alemite Corporation v. Walker (1933) V.L.R. 154. 
Walker & an or v. A/emite Corporation (1933) 49 c.L.R. 643 (H. Ct, Australia), per Dixo~ J., at 
pages 657-658, relying on Townsend v. Haworth, Sykes v. Howarth, and Du.nlop Pn~umauc Tyre 
Co. y. Dayid Moseley & Sons Ud. McTiernan J. expressed agreement With ~e ~udge.ment of 
Dixon J., while Rich 1.. and Starke J., with whom Evatt J., concurred, expressed similar views. 
Best Australia Ltd and ors \'. Agua&as Marketin& Pty Ltd and ors (1987-1988) 12 IPR l·n (h'd. 
Ct. Australia, General Div.). 
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respondents was not enough to constitute Hydrox a participant in the alleged infringement 
by Aquagas, the court went to consider the exclusive licence agreement and concluded:81 
" ... It seems to me that the effect of the exclusive licence agreement is to take 
Hydrox beyond the role of facilitator and into the role of participant. Clause 5.5 is 
particularly significant. It casts upon Hydrox a positive obligation to assist Aquagas 
in marketing the product. Moreover, the evidence discloses that Hydrox has already 
taken some action to open up market opportunities in Australia." 
The patentee sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from infringing 
the plaintiffs patent in Firth Industries Ltd & ors v. Polyglas Engineering Pty Ltd and 
ors.82 One of the grounds for the alleged infringement of the method claims by the 
defendants was that the defendants, in selling infringing compost bins with instructions as 
to their use, had advised and procured others to employ the patented methods. In refusing 
interlocutory injunction upon the defendants giving certain undertakings, the Court held, 
inter alia, that it was a matter open to some doubt whether the type of acts by which it was 
alleged the defendants infringed the five method claims could amount to infringement. Even 
if they could, no case of infringement of these claims had been made out as the evidence did 
not establish that anyone had on the defendants' advice undertaken a particular integral step 
prescribed in those claims.83 Besides doubting that the activities of the defendants could 
amount to an infringing act, the court also relied on a technical objection that there was no 
evidence of any actual direct infringement. However, the High Court of Australia in 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd's Application84 seems to be of the opinion that such activities 
could amount to an infringement, though the matter was left open.85 Wootten J. in Eli Lilly 
& Co's Application86 also expressed the same opinion. 
81 Best Australia Ltd and ors v. Aguagas Marketing Pty Ltd and Ors (1987-1988) 12 IPR 143 (Fed. 
Ct, Australia, General Div.), per Wilcox J., at page 147. 
82 Firth Industries Ltd & ors v. Polyglas Engineering Pty Ltd and ors [1977] RPC 213; [1975] 49 
ALJR 263. 
83 See Stephen J., Firth Industries Ltd & ors v. Polyglas Engineering Pty Ltd and ors [1977] RPC 
213, at page 218, citing Innes v. Short and comparing it with Townsend v Howarth, Adhesive Dry 
Mounting Co. Ltd v. Trapp and Walker v. Alemite Corporation. 
84 Wellcome Foundation Ltd's Application [1981] FSR 72; (1979-1980) 30 ALR 510. 
85 The appellant urged the Court to sustain a claim to the sub~tance in a pa~kage with. directions 
where a claim for the process has been allowed because thiS would prOVide ~ solutlOn to the 
problem of policing the patent and thereby deter rival manufacturers from destrOYing the effi~cy of 
the patent by selling the container and contents with instructions to u~e th~ cont~nts In ~e 
patented process. The Court, relying on the dictum of Russell L.J. In Clba-Gelgy (Purr s) 
Auulication ([ 1977] RPC 83. at page 89, said that "it is questionable whether a rival manufacturer 
of the known substance would be entitled to sell it with instructions that it is suitable for use in a 
manner which would infringe the appellants' patent", per, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Murphy and 
Wilson J1., [1981] FSR 72. at page 76. 
86 Eli Lilly & Co's AuUlication (1982) 42 ALR 10 1. at 110; [1982] I NSWLR 526, at 53'+. "Such a 
doctrine of contributory infringement has not to date been established in English law. In ~ 
Geigy AG (Durr's) Application .... the question was left open by the Court of Appeal. The High 
Court adopted a similar stand in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v. Commissjoner of Patents 30 AU 
510. at 515 ... It would seem. therefore. that the question whether our law recognises a doctrine of 
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The question of whether selling all the unassembled parts of a patented article with 
instruction for its use was an infringement was again an issue in Windsurfin& International 
Inc & anor v. Petit & anor.87 The first plaintiff was the proprietor and the second plaintiff, 
the exclusive licensee in Australia of a patent for a wind surfer. The patent was for a 
combination of various known integers. Claim 10 of the specification was for a particular 
embodiment of the invention described by reference to drawings which depicted a 
sailboard. The defendants, Madowind Pty Ltd and Borsimex Pty Ltd, imported and sold in 
Australia sailboards in an unassembled kit form which was the way in which sailboards 
were invariably sold. 
The plaintiffs alleged infringement by the defendants of the patent and sought an injunction 
and damages. The defendants denied infringement, relying on Walker v. Alemite, 
Townsend v. Haworth, and Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley. The patent was 
held to be invalid and the plaintiffs' claim failed. However, what was more important was 
the court's opinion that the facts of the cited cases were different from the present in that 
sailboards were invariably sold in an unassembled form. Therefore, the sale of an 
unassembled sailboard in kit form would have infringed the right given by s. 69 of the 
Patents Act 1952, because of the ordinary course which vending the invention took.88 
However, the matter has still to be regarded as open and subject to some doubt. Young J. 
in Ryan v, Lum, after holding that the patent should be revoked for lack of novelty and 
obviousness, went on to record the relevant cases but he fmally declined to express an 
opinion on it.89 
4.4.3. Canada 
There is still no specific provision regulating the indirect exploitation of a patented invention 
in Canada.90 The fIrSt and leading case on the problem of indirect exploitation in Canada is 
contributory infringement has not really been put to the test, but there is some encouragement to 
think that it might be adopted as part of our law." 
87 Windsurfina Iotemational Ioc & 80ar y. Petit & anor (1983-1985) 3 IPR 449 (Sup. Ct of New 
South Wales). 
88 WindsurfinaIotemationat Inc & anor y. Petit & IDOr (1983-1985) 3 IPR 449, per Waddell J., at 
page 456, and at page 459. 
89 RYan y. Lum (1988-1989) 14 IPR 513, per Young J., at pages 521-522. It seems strange that he 
should say that "however, in the light of analogous cases in copyright such as CBS Sonas y. 
Amstrad ... that it would need a lot more than mere instructions of use on a product to enable. a 
court to find that the seller procures the tort". Instructions to use a tape deck to recml a song IS 
totally a different matter from giving instructio~s to operate a ~nted process or make ~ paImted 
combination. Further it has to be noted that WJodsurfi0alotem,bopll Inc. " agO[ y. Pebt " I0OI' 
was not cited in his opinion. 
90 The Dsley Report recommended against the incorporation of a ~vision for contributory 
infringement without providing any reasons or argument on the pomt (papa 107-8. Royal 
Commission of Patents, Copyright and Industrial Design "Report on Patents of Invention". 
Chairman - J.L. Dsley, 1960]. Despite the fact that the Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, 
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that of Copeland-Chatterson Co. Ltd v. Hatton and Guertin. 91 The plaintiffs were the 
owners of a patent for an improvement in binders and sheets therefor. There were, inter 
alia, claims relating to the combination of the binder and sheets. The defendant Hatton 
bought a binder from the plaintiffs on the condition that it was for use only with sheets sold 
by or under the plaintiffs' authority. It was alleged that contrary to such condition, Hatton 
had used in it sheets supplied by the defendants, the Guertins. The Guertins, knowing of 
the terms upon which Hatton had purchased a binder from the plaintiffs, had furnished him 
with sheets prepared and adapted for use in that binder. To induce Hatton to buy the 
Guertins sheets, they had given him an undertaking to indemnify him against any action the 
plaintiffs might bring against him in that behalf. Based upon the above facts, the plaintiffs 
contended that Hatton had infringed their patent and that the Guertins were contributory 
infringers. 
Burbridge 1. held that having purchased a binder from the plaintiffs on the condition that it 
was to be used with sheets sold by or under the plaintiffs' authority, breach of that 
condition amounted not only to a breach of contract but also an infringement of the patent 
by Hatton. On the issue of infringement by the Guertins, the court, despite being urged by 
counsel for the plaintiffs that the activities would amount to a contributory infringement, 
was doubtful whether such a doctrine would apply in Canada. However, if the act 
complained of as a contributory infringement was in fact an infringement, the court had 
jurisdiction.92 After considering the relevant United Kingdom cases, the judge said that in 
answering that question, two questions needed to be answered, namely, whether what they 
did was actionable or not, and if so, then whether that actionable wrong may, with 
propriety, be termed an infringement of the plaintiffs' patent.93 The judge concluded that 
one who knowingly and for his own ends and benefit and to the damage of the patentee 
91 
92 
93 
prepared for the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, June 1976, recommended the 
inclusion of such a provision (at page 198), this has still not been accepted by the Government. 
For a review of the case law in this area, see Grenier, F., "Contributory and/or Induced Patent 
Infringement", (1987) 4 Canadian Intellectual Property Review 26. 
Copeland-Chatterson Co. Ltd v. Hatton and Guertin (1906) 10 Ex. c.R. 224 (Exchequer Court); 
affd (1906) 37 S.C.R. 651, although there was no discussion on the issue of inducement. 
Copeland-Chatterson Co. Ltd v. Hatton and Guertin (1906) 10 Ex. c.R. 224 (Exchequer Court) per 
Burbridge J., at pages 241-242. 
On the second question, the judge said, at pages 246-247. "But it does not follow of course that the 
actionable wrong that the Guertins in that way committed was an infringement of the patent. One 
who without justification or excuse induces another to break a contract may commit a wrong but 
he does not break the contract. One may commit a wrong by knowingly and for his own ends 
inducing another person to commit an actionable wrong, but the two wrongs may not always be 
the same. Under the grant made by Canadian letters patent the patentee .. , acquire during the 
prescribed term the exclusive right privilege ... of making. constructing and ~sing. and ve~ding. to 
others to be used. in Canada. the invention covered by the patent. And ... any InvaSIOn or VIolatIOn 
of that right is an invasion of the patent. But is not that the right which one invades who 
knowingly and for his own ends induces and procures another to violate or infringe it? And if so, 
may not the act of the procurer or inducer be with propriety termed an infringement of the patent? 
In short docs not one who knO\vingly and for his own ends and benefits and to the damage of the 
patentee induces and procures another to infringe a patent himself infringe the patent? It seems to 
me on principle that it comes to that." 
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induces, or procures, another to infringe a patent is himself guilty of infringement. The 
Guertins had, therefore, infringed the patent. 
It is interesting to note that the judge considered the Guertins' activities as an infringement 
and not a separate tort of procuring an infringement. Further, it has to be noted that the 
injunction did not restrain them from selling the sheets, but from procuring or inducing 
persons whom they knew to have purchased one or more of the plaintiffs' binders on the 
conditions mentioned to purchase such sheets from themselves and to use them in such 
binders. 
The above view was accepted in Slater Steel Industries Ltd et ai. v. R. Payer Co. Ltd et 
ai. 94 The patents in issue was for the combination of preformed armour rods with a 
stranded electric power line. It was alleged that the defendants had infringed their 
combination claims by manufacturing the component, preformed armour rods, and offering 
them for sale to hydro-electric authorities (the power entities) in Canada knowing that such 
authorities would use them in a combination that would fall within the scope of the claims 
in the patent. The preformed armour rods made and sold by the defendants could not be 
used otherwise than as one of the components of the combination claims. The defendants 
had also prepared a catalogue in which they offered the preformed armour rods for sale to 
all hydro companies in Canada. The catalogue contained directions for the use of the rod, 
showing that they were intended to be used as a component of the combination. 
After making an exhaustive review of the case law on the point, it was held by Jackett P., 
applying Copeland-Chatters on Co. Ltd v. Hatton, that the defendants had not infringed the 
patents. Infringement of a claim in a patent is established when it has been alleged and 
proved that the defendant knowingly induced or procured another to infringe the patent. In 
the present case, the plaintiff had failed to make out a case that the defendants had exercised 
such influence that the defendants should be regarded as parties to a decision of one of 
these power entities to use the patented combination. The user of the combination was not 
induced to effect such use by the defendants.9 5 The judge concluded that the defendants 
had not been gUilty of infringement. 96 
94 
95 
Slater Steel Industries Ltd et aI. v. R. Payer Co. Ltd et ai. (1968) 55 CPR 61. 
Slater Steel Industries Ltd et ai. v. R. Payer Co. Ltd et ai. (1968) 55 CPR 61, per Jackett P., at 
pages 84-90. At page 87, he said, "In considering whether what the power entities did ... was 
induced or procured by the defendants, it must be borne in mind that what we are talking about is 
such acts by the defendants as would constitute the defendants parties to the power entities' 
wrongful acts. It must be clear, I think, that merely doing something that was the part of the 
events leading up to the wrongful acts, but which could not legally be regarded as the cause or one 
of the causes of the wrongful acts (a sine qua non), cannot be regarded as having induced or 
procured the wrongful acts."; and at pages 88-90, "I cannot conceive that, assuming these entities 
knew of the existence of the patents, anyone of them was induced or procured by the defendants to 
do something knowing it was illegal. Anyone of them is a giant compared with the defendants. 
Judicial knowledge can be taken in this modem world that they are all well serviced by lawyers aM 
engineers. I am prepared from my experience with such organisations to say that the balance of 
probability is that none of them would decide knowingly to do something that it regarded as 
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It is unfortunate that there was no discussion at all on the effect of the instructions contained 
in the catalogue issued by the defendant, even though Innes v. Short & Beal was referred 
to. It would seem that the existence of such directions is not conclusive of the issue of 
inducement or procurement. Therefore, there is a possibility of a finding of no inducement 
in fact, even though the vendor of the component gives directions in respect of the use of 
the component in a manner that would result in infringement. 
In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bristol-Myers Canada Ltd,97 the plaintiff owned a patent 
which included method claims for conditioning fabrics and product therefor by the 
commingling of clothes in the dryer during the drying process with a piece of cloth or other 
flexible carrier or substrate, treated with a chemical substance which imparted softness to 
the clothes and also removed "static cling". The defendant marketed in Canada a dryer-
added fabric conditioner, "Fleecy II", which imparted softness and a scent to fabrics and 
removed static electricity therefrom. The product, which was very similar to that of the 
plaintiffs, was specially designed for and sold with instructions for use in a domestic 
laundry dryer. The defendant was sued, inter alia, for infringement of the method claim. 
The court considered first the question whether these claims were infringed by the users 
and concluded that any person using Fleecy II for the purpose for which it was 
manufactured and in accordance with the directions of the defendant on the package of 
Fleecy II would be committing a literal infringement of all the method claims. Having 
concluded that the method claims were infringed by the users, the next question was 
whether the defendant was also guilty of infringement of these method claims. On the facts 
there was no evidence that the defendant itself used its product in accordance with the 
methods outlined in the method claims. On the other hand, it was evident that the members 
of the public who used the defendant's products had no licence expressed or implied from 
the plaintiff to do so. Addy J. referred to Slater Steel Industries Ltd et al, v. R. Payer Co. 
Ltd et al, and Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor, and said 
that it was clear that the mere making, using or vending of elements which afterwards 
entered into a combination was not prohibited where the patent was limited to the 
combination itself. He went on to say further that the mere selling, without more, of articles 
to be used for the purpose of infringing a patent is not an infringement of the patent. 
However, he said that there could be an infringement where the person who actually 
illegal. It is even less probable that they could be 'induced' or 'procured' against their own 
judgement to do something illegal by a 'one man show' such as that operated by the defendants." 
96 See also Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp. et al. (1986) 9 CPR 
(3d) 158. complete report (1987)13 C.P.R (3d) 410. affd (1988) 18 CPR (3d) 180 (Fed. Ct of 
Appeal); Pennacon Quebec Inc. et al. v. Lee Enterprises Arsenault & Freres Inc, (1 al. (1988) 19 
CPR (3d) 378 [Fed. Ct. Trial Div.]. Dube J. 
97 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bristol-Myers Canada Ltd (1979) 39 CPR (2d) 145 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.). 
Addy 1. Note: Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bristol-Myers Canada Ltd (1979) 42 CPR (2d) 33 (Fed. 
Ct of Appeal) - The defendant's appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on the question of validity of 
the patent was dismissed. There was no appeal on the question of infringement. An application for 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed (M artl and. Ritchie. Dickson. Estey 
and McIntyre. JJ.). 
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committed the act of infringement was the defendant's agent, or where some sort of a 
continuing systematic business arrangement existed between the vendor and the infringer 
purchaser, or where there had been not only a sale but also an invitation or request by the 
defendant to the purchaser of the article, to use it in order to infringe the plaintiffs patent. 98 
Addy J. said that in the present case, not only by its instructions and directions on the 
packages of Fleecy as to the method of using it, but by its advertising on television, the 
defendant invited and induced the public to infringe the method claims of the patent. He 
described the defendant's marketing tactics as amounting to "brain washing" or more 
appropriately in the circumstances, as "brain softening". He concluded that the defendant 
was thus a party to each infringement committed by such users.99 
The plaintiff in Cooper & Beatty v. Alpha Graphics Ltd. et al., the owner of a patent 
relating to photochemical images and a method of producing the same, sued the defendants 
for infringement of its image and process claims. The Court held that by providing others 
with the wherewithal to produce images by the infringing process, the defendants had 
infringed the image claims. 1 00 The next case to corne before the court was Saunders et d. 
v. Air&lide Deflectors Ltd et al, 10 1 The plaintiffs sued four defendants for infringement of 
their patent for a method of using certain deflectors in a tractor-trailer combination in a 
specified way. It was alleged that the first defendant, Airglide Deflectors Limited, 
manufactured and sold an allegedly infringing product called Airglide deflector. The second 
defendant, Levy-Russell Limited, sold and installed such deflectors, the third defendant, 
Aftercoolers of Canada Limited, bought these deflectors from the frrst defendant and 
98 Proctor & Gamble Co. y. Bristol-Myers Canada Ltd (1979) 39 CPR (2d) 145 (Fed. Ct, Trial Div.), 
Addy J., at pages 165-167, relying on Sykes y. Haworth (1879) 12 Ch.D 826, Incandescent Gas 
LiKht Co. Ltd v, New Incandescent Mantle Co, et al. (1898) 15 RPC 83, and Innes v, Short & 
B=l (1898) 15 RPC 449. 
99 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bristol-Myers Canada Ltd (1979) 39 CPR (2d) 145 (Fed. Ct, Trial Div.), 
Addy J., at page 167, " ... it is difficult to conceive how the defendant should not be consi~ as 
systematically engaging for its own profit in aiding and abetting any infringement by the pubbc of 
the plaintiffs method claims and should not be considered as constituting itself a party to each 
infringement committed by such users. Where the defendant has induced or procured an 
infringement, I do not feel that it is at all necessary in such cases for the supplier to have had any 
personal contact with the infringing consumer, to even know his or her identi!y or to have sOld.the 
article directly to that person. It is sufficient in such cases, if it is also established, that the article 
in fact has been sold by the defendant for the purpose of putting it on the market for sale to the 
ultimate infringer, regardless of whether the final sale is made by an agent of the defendant or by 
independent distributors or retailers. In the present case, the article being sold infringes the ~ 
claims of the plaintiff's patent and is produced and sold initially for ~e ex~ p~ of havmg 
it resold to the public to be used as directed by the defendant The Invention consIsts of both a 
product and a method. Under the circumstances, knowingly inducing or procuring the infringement 
by the public of any of the method claims constitutes in itself an infringement at law b~ ~ 
defendant of that method claim of the invention." See also Reeves Brothers Inc. Toronto QwlbDI 
& Bmbmidqy IJd (1979) 43 CPR (2d) 145 (Fed. Ct, Trial Div.), Gibson J., at page 163, Proctor 
y. Gamble Co. y. Bristol-Myers Caned, IJd (1978) 39 CPR (2d) 145. 
100 Cogpor" BA'tY y. Alpha Ggphics Ltd. "4. (1980) 49 CPR (2d) 145 (Fed. Ct Trial Div.), 
Mahoney J., at page 152. No reference, however, was made to any authorities. 
101 SI"""," ct .. y. Ajqlide DefJr&toIS Ltd Ct C. (1981) 50 CPR (2d) 6. 
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distributed them but did not install them. The last defendant, United Tire and Rubber Co. 
Limited used the Airglide deflectors as described in the claim. 
On the issue of infringement, it was held by Gibson J. that the fIrst three defendants did not 
infringe despite the fact that they knew that the fourth defendant intended to use the 
deflector in an infringing manner, since they had not in any way made themselves a party to 
the infringement, nor had in any way procured or induced the infringement by the fourth 
defendant. Only the fourth defendant was, therefore, liable for the infringement.l 02 
In Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG et al v. Advanced Construction Entewrise Inc. et al. ,l 03 the 
plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction in respect of three patents relating to reinforced 
concrete. One of the three patents contained method claims. The defendants denied 
infringement since they had only sold the components to a user who would be the infringer. 
Walsh J. granted the application for interlocutory injunction for the plaintiffs had 
established a strong prima facie case since the allegation was that the defendants did 
propose to prospective purchasers and advised them in the use of the patented methods. l04 
In Windsurfin~ International Inc. et al. v. Trilantic COW. ,l 05 the plaintiffs' patent was for a 
sailboard for use on water (windsurfer). It was alleged that the defendant, and others 
102 
103 
104 
105 
Saunders et aI. y. Aiq~lide Deflectors Ltd et aI. (1981) 50 CPR (2d) 6 (Trial Div., Fed. Ct), per 
Gibson J., at page 27, "The evidence established ... that the defendant, Airglide Deflectors Ltd 
manufactured the Airglide deflector and that the defendant-vendors and intennediate purchaser, 
namely, Levy-Russell Limited and Aftercoolers of Canada Ltd knew... that the ultimate 
purchaser/user, ... the defendant, United Tire and Rubber Co. Ltd, intended ... to use the deflector it 
purchased in a tractor-trailer combination in a manner contemplated by the patent. But the evidence 
does not establish that the defendants, Airglide Deflectors Limited, Levy-Russell Limited or 
Aftercooler of Canada Ltd or any of them, as the case may be, by their respective activities made 
themselves a party to infringement, breaching the right of the patentee as defined by s. 46 of the 
Patent Act (cf. Slater Steel Industries Ltd et aI. v. R. Payer Co et aI. (1968) 55 CPR 61] ... In 
addition, the evidence does not prove inducement or procurement by these other defendants of the 
ultimate purchaser/user, ... United Tire and Rubber Co. Ltd to infringe, nor does it prove 
conspiracy among these other defendants to cause the ultimate purchaser/user '" to infringe." 
Dyckerboff & Widmann AG et aI v. Advanced Construction Enterprise Inc. et aI. (1986) 11 CPR 
(3d) 371 (Fed. Ct Trial Div.). 
Dyckerhoff & Widmann AG et aI v. Advanced Construction EntelPrise Inc. et aI. (1986) 11 CPR 
(3d) 371 (Fed. Ct Trial Div.), per Walsh J., at pages 380-381, "One of the arguments raised by the 
defendants is that with respect to the Anchor patent which is for a method only and not in respect 
of the components thereof or the anchor itself the mere selling of components to be used in the 
method indicated by the patent is not an infringement, as they themselves do not carry out the 
method. They merely supply Allthread bar ... and related parts and are not contractors engaged in the 
installation of armouring rods or related products and do not carry out the method claims in the 
Anchor patent. It would be the users therefore who are the infringers: see Saunders ct tA y AirJlide 
Deflectors Ltd ct tAo (1980) 50 CPR (2d) 6. See also Procter & Gamble Co. y. Bristol-Moyen 
Caned,Ltd (1978) 39 CPR (2d) 145. However it would appear that defendants did propose ... to 
prospective purchasers and advise them in the use of methods which plaintiffs allege are in 
infringement of its methods patents. Plaintiffs contend that this is 'contributory infringement 
which was dealt with at length by Jackett P. ... in the case of Slater Steel Industries' Jd ct tj. y. 
R. Payer Co. 'at (1968), 55 CPR 61. ... I find ... that the plaintiffs have established a sttoDI 
primtJjacie case." 
WipdaurfjPIIptt;matiopallnc. ,,«. y. Irilaptic Corp. (1986) 8 CPR (3d) 241. at page 270 (Fed. 
Ct of Appeal). 
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induced by the defendant, infringed the patent by selling the sailboards in unassembled 
form. The trial judge dismissed the action, holding that the patent was invalid. 1 06 The 
Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the patent was valid and infringed. 
The Court rejected the defendant's technical defence that there was no evidence that it had 
sold its sail board in fully assembled form and the absence of evidence that anyone was 
induced or procured by the defendant or any retailer to assemble the sailboard in any 
manner that infringed the patent, as having no substance on the facts of the case. The 
defendant had clearly sold parts for the purpose of making a sailboard. Without assembly 
there could be no purpose in a purchaser buying the unassembled parts. In unassembled 
form they could not be used for the purpose for which they were purchased, to is to say, 
sail. The only inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the defendant knew and 
intended that the ultimate purchaser would utilise the sailboard parts for the assembly of a 
usable sailboard, which on assembly would infringe the plaintiffs' patent. To suggest that a 
person purchasing components, the only known use for which was assembling to provide 
the purchaser with what he obviously desired - a sailboard - had not been persuaded to do 
so by the holding out of the desired result by both the manufacturer and the vendor thereof, 
"stretched credulity to its limits". It must be inferred that by its conduct, the defendant knew 
of the existence of the plaintiffs' patent and induced and procured purchasers of its 
sailboards (albeit in kit form) to infringe the plaintiffs' patent. Therefore, it had become a 
party to the infringement. 1 07 
The Windsurfing case above seems to show that in blatant cases, the court is willing to give 
a remedy, despite reliance in other cases on Dunlop v. Moseley that even knowledge and 
intention, without inducement, is not enough to make the supplier liable. The case was cited 
by the Court of Appeal in a later case for the proposition that a person who sells all the 
component parts of a patented combination is guilty of an infringement. 1 08 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Wilkinson Sword Canada Inc. et al, ,109 seems to be the first case 
in Canada involving not only an allegation of inducement but also an alternative ground of 
concerted action. On the issue of inducement, the judge followed the line of authorities 
established by the case of Copeland-Chatterson Co. Ltd v. Hatton and Slater Steel 
106 Windsurfin~ International Inc. et al. v. Trilantic Corp. (1985) 3 CPR (3d) 95 and (1986) 8 CPR 
(3d) 241 and 270. 
107 Windsurfin~ International Inc. et aI. v. Trilantic Corp. (1985) 3 CPR (3d) 95 and (1986) 8 CPR 
(3d) 241 and 270, per Urie J., (Heald and Stone, 11. concurring) at pages 263-268. 
108 See Val met Oy et aI. v. Beloit Canada Ltd (1988) 20 CPR (3d) 1. per Prat~e 1., at page 14 
(Marceau and MacGuigan 11., concurred), "There seem to be onl.y two exceptIOns. to that rule, 
namely, that there is infringement, (a) if the vendor. alone (WlDdsurfin~ In~e,:"atlo~al Inc, v. 
Trilantic Corp. (Now BIC SPORTS INC.) (1986) 8 CPR (3d) 241) or in associatIOn With another 
(The Incandescent Gas Li~ht Co. Ltd v. The New Incandescent Mantle Co .. 1. Herben. De .Tossel. 
and Lefroy (1898) 15 RPC 81). sells all the components of the invention to a purchaser 10 order 
that they be assembled by him." 
109 Warnt:r-Lambcn Co. v. \VjlkinsPll Sword Canada Inc. it aI. (1988)19 CPR (3d) 402 (Fed. Ct, Tnal 
Div.). 
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Industries Ltd et ai. v. R. Payer Co. Ltd et ai. After making the finding that there was 
inducement on the part of the defendants, the judge went on to consider the issue of 
concerted action between the defendants. Relying on Morton-Norwich Products Inc. v. 
Intercen Ltd, the Judge held that there was an arguable case that the English defendant 
joined with the Canadian company, by means of the registered user agreement. in a 
concerted design to sell the infringing razors. I I 0 
Valmet Oy et ai. v. Beloit Canada Ltd, III involved a contempt proceeding for an alleged 
breach of an injunction order made earlier to refrain from infringing the plaintiffs patent by 
making, using or selling press sections within certain defined claims. The defendants were 
alleged to have, inter alia, supplied certain components of the press sections to a third party. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against a finding of guilt. On the question of 
infringement of a patent, the Court reiterated that the sale of parts did not constitute sale of a 
press section within the claim of the patent in suit. There was no infringement of a patent in 
selling an article which did not in itself infringe the patent, even when the vendor knew that 
the purchaser bought the article for the purpose of using it in the infringement of a patent, 
unless the vendor sold all the components to be assembled by the purchaser or if the vendor 
knowingly and for his own purpose and benefit, induces or procures the purchaser to 
infringe. To induce infringement, a person must do something that led the other person to 
infringe. If one did nothing, there could not be any inducement and there cannot be breach 
of a negative injunction. Since none of the above had been established, the defendants were 
not guilty of contempt. I 12 
4.4.4. Summary of the Approaches of the Commonwealth Jurisdictions 
The approaches towards the issue of indirect exploitation show very close convergence. 
1 . The court has shown a willingness to apply the concepts of tort law to assist the 
patentee in getting a remedy for certain indirect exploitation leading to a direct 
infringement of his patent. 
2. However, merely facilitating an ultimate direct infringement is not actionable per se. 
Hence a person is not liable as such if he makes or sells some parts or components 
of a patented product or supplies materials which are used in a patented process. 
110 Warner-Lambert Co. y. Wilkinson Sword Canada Inc. et ai. (1988)19 CPR (3d) 402 (Fed. Ct, Trial 
Diy.). pn Jerome, A.C.J .. at page .t07. 
111 Yalme' Oy fI aI. Y. Beloit Canada Ltd (1988) 20 CPR (3d) 1. 
112 Valme' Oy ef aI. \'! Beloit Canada Ltd (1988) 20 CPR (3d) 1. On the question of infringement, see 
the speech of Pratte 1., at pages 13-17. With whom Marceau and MacGuigan JJ., concurred. 
228 
This is so, even though he knows that the purchaser will use such parts or supplies 
to infringe the patent. 
3. This principle applies even if the parts sold have no other use than in the patented 
invention. 
4. If a concerted action could be shown between the parties, then the parties involved 
would be liable as joint tortfeasors. Liability as a joint tortfeasor may be imposed 
where a person acts pursuant to a common design with another person, even though 
the frrst person himself commits no act of infringement, for example, where he 
simply supplies parts or is situated outside the jurisdiction. 
5. When the defendant could be shown to have procured the direct infringement, he 
would be liable as a ioint infringer. Inducing a person to commit an infringement of 
a patent would probably in itself constitute an infringement, for example, where 
materials for use in a patented process are sold with instructions for use in that 
process. In blatant cases, the court is willing to infer that the other party has been 
induced by the defendant's act, for example, by intensive advertising. 
6. Selling all the components parts packaged together, so that they could be assembled 
by the consumer would make the supplier liable as a joint infringer. This flows 
from the fact that where the vendor sells all the parts of a patented product together, 
this would be regarded as a sale of the whole product and, therefore, an 
infringement. 
7. Before a person could be made liable for procuring an infringement, there must be a 
direct infringement caused by it. 113 
4.4.5. United States 
Prior to 1952, there was no express provision in the American patent law on contributory 
infringement.114 However, it soon became apparent that patented inventions would be 
inadequately protected if the definition of "infringer" was limited to one who makes, uses, 
or sells only the complete invention as defined by the claims. Under the rule in Prouty 11 S 
and other cases on the same point, the patentee could only exclude others from practising 
113 
114 
lIS 
C.B.S SODP Ltd &: OI'S y. Amstrad Consumer Electronics PIc and Dixons lid [1988] RPC. 567, 
~r Lord Templeman, at page 609, "Generally speaking, inducement, i~citement or persU8Sl~ to 
infringe must be by a defendant to an individ~al infrin~r. ~ m~t i~ntifiably procure a particular 
infrinaement in order to make the defendant liable as a Jomt mfringer. 
The Act of 1952 codified the decisional law on the subject in section 271. See Appendix. 
See supra, footnote 24 and accompanying text 
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the complete invention as defined by the claim. Acts falling short of direct infringement, for 
example, unauthorised manufacture, use, or sale of one or more but less than all of the 
elements of the patented combination, would not be actionable. To deal with this situation, 
and to ensure that proper protection was given to the patent owner,116 the courts, rather 
early in the development of American patent law, borrowed from the common law of torts 
the concept of joint and several liability among contributory tortfeasors. Application of this 
principle to one whose acts did not per se infringe a patent claim, but who nevertheless 
aided and abetted another's act of direct infringement, gave rise to a new fonn of the tort of 
patent infringement, known traditionally as "contributory infringement." 
According to many commentators, the first case in which this idea was put to judicial use 
was probably that of Wallace v. Holmes decided in 1871.117 However, as early as in 1846, 
the possibility of such an approach had already been expressed by Judge Kane in Kni&ht v. 
Gavit. 118 The patent in suit covered a paper calendering machine having certain rolls in 
contact with each other. The defendant made a similar machine but mounted the rolls out of 
contact with each other. He relied on this as a defence under Prouty v. Ruggles but it was 
noted that he had provided adjusting screws so that the rolls might be brought together if 
desired. Kane 1. charged the jury that "if the machine, as made by him, was intended by 
him to operate in such a way as to violate the patent, and was, in fact, so operated, he was a 
party to the infraction notwithstanding the ingenuity with which he may have sought to 
disguise his wrong." 119 The jury found for the plaintiff. From the facts of the case it 
appears, however, that the activities of the defendant amounted to an outright infringement. 
Though not fully fleshed out, there seems to be some indication of the beginning of the 
concept of contributory infringement. However, Wallace v. Hoimes120 was the case relied 
upon by all later judges to apply the concept of contributory infringement to cases before 
them. 121 In that case, the complainant patentee had a patent on a lamp claimed as a 
combination of a specially designed oil burner and a detachable chimney of conventional 
116 See for example, Wallace y. Holmes 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (CC D. Conn. 1871), per Judge Woodruff, at 
page 89, "It cannot be that, when a useful machine is patented as a combination. of parts, two or 
more can engage in its construction and sale, and protect themselves by showmg that, though 
united in an effort to produce the same machine, sell, and bring it i~to extensive use, ~h m~es 
and sells one part only, which is useless without the other, and s~ll another person, 10 prease 
conformity with the purpose in view, puts them together for use. If It were so, such patents would 
indeed be of little value."; Cortelyou y. Johnson, 145 Fed. 933, affirmed 207 US 167 (1907), per 
Judge Coxe, "The doctrine originates in a desire to secure to a patentee complete protection in all 
the rights granted him by the patent." 
117 See for example Miller, C.E., "Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement", 
53 JPOS 86 (1971), at page 90; also Thomas, E.M., "The Law of Contributory Infri~gement", 21 
JPOS 811 (1939), at page 816, and Oddi A.S., "Contributory Infringement in ~ Umted States of 
America: Theory. Application, Developments", 81 Patent and Trademarlc. ReVIew 499 (1983), at 
page 499. 
118 Kniaht y. Gavit 14 Fed. Cas. 765 (CC ED Penn. 1846). 
119 Kniaht y. Gayit 14 Fed. Cas. 765 (CC ED Penn. 1846), per Kane J., at pages 768-769. 
120 WaI'em y. Holmes 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (CC D. Conn. 1871). 
121 Though it was only IS years later that the term "contributory in&inFment" was first used in 
Syndcry, Dunooll 29 Fed. Rep. 47 (CC S.D.N.Y. 1886). 
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design. The defendants manufactured and sold only the burner, leaving the purchasers to 
buy the chimney, without which the burner was useless, independently from other sources. 
Chimneys of standard size could be bought almost anywhere. The lamps in the hands of 
purchasers from the defendants became a complete infringement of the patent claim. When 
sued for infringement, the defendants relied on the doctrine of Prouty v. Ruggles and 
Vance v. Campbell that there was no infringement of a combination patent unless every 
element was taken. 
The complainants argued that although the defendants had sold only the burners, that sale 
had been with the intention that the purchaser should complete the combination by obtaining 
a chimney elsewhere. They further argued that where the combination manufactured and 
sold, containing less than all the elements of the patented combination, was made and sold 
with the express purpose of having the other elements of the patented combination added, 
and was useless without such addition, the case was entirely different. In such a case, one 
who made and sold the minor combination knowingly and wilfully committed a part of an 
act the whole of which constituted infringement. He, therefore, was guilty of infringement, 
because he had participated in the infringement. It was further contended that infringement 
of a patented combination did not consist alone of putting the parts together. It commenced 
when the unauthorised party began to make the parts with the intention of completing them 
and putting them together, and at any stage of progress he was liable as an infringer. If the 
different parts were made by different persons, they jointly infringed the patent, and were 
liable both jointly and severally. 
The defendants were enjoined, notwithstanding that the things which they manufactured 
and sold did not in themselves embody the invention secured to the complainants. The act 
was found to be wrongful because of the obvious intent of the defendants to make the 
burner for use only with another thing which the user was to supply. 
Judge Woodruff said: 
" ... [T]he defendants have manufactured and sold extensively the burner, leaving 
the purchasers to supply the chimney, without which such burner is useless. They 
have done this for the express purpose of assisting, and making profit by assisting, 
in gross infringement of the complainants' patent. They have exhibited their burner 
furnished with a chimney, using it in their sales room, to recommend it to 
customers. and prove its superiority, and, therefore, as a means of inducing the 
unlawful use of the complainants' invention. ... If in actual concert with a third 
party, with a view to the actual production of the patented improvement in lamps, 
and the sale and use thereof, they consented to manufacture the burner, and such 
other party to manufacture the chimney, and in such concert, they actually make and 
sell the burner, and he the chimney. each utterly useless without the other. and each 
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intended to be used, and actually sold to be used, with the other, it cannot be 
doubted that they must be decreed to be joint infringers of the complainants' patent. 
... In such cases all are tortfeasors, engaged in a common purpose to infringe the 
patent, and actually by their concerted action, producing that result. ... Each is liable 
for all the damages. Here the actual concert with others is a certain inference, from 
the nature of the case, and from the distinct efforts of the defendants to bring the 
burner in question into use, which could only be done by adding the chimney. The 
defendants have not, perhaps, made an actual prearrangement with any particular 
person to supply the chimney to be added to the burner, but every sale they make is 
a proposal to the purchaser to do this, and his purchase is consent with the 
defendants that he will do or cause it to be done. The defendants are, therefore. 
active parties in the whole infringement, consenting and acting to that end, 
manufacturing and selling for that purpose. If the want of joinder of any parties 
could avail for any purpose (which is not to be conceded) they must set it up as a 
defence, and point out the parties who are acting in express or implied concert with 
them; nor is it any excuse that parties desiring to use the burner have all the glass 
manufacturers in the world from which to procure the chimneys. The question may 
be novel, but in my judgement, upon these proofs, the defendants have no 
protection in the rule upon which alone they rely as a defence against the charge of 
infringement." 122 
Several points should be noted from Judge Woodruffs opinion. 
1 . The part sold had no independent use other than in the patented combination. 
2. Although it is clear that the defendants were found liable on the principle of tortious 
liability, it is not clear on what basis the defendants were made liable. The judge 
used the words, "assisting", "inducing", "concerted action", "common purpose" in 
various parts of his opinion. It seems that on the ground that they had assisted or 
induced the actual infringers, they were deemed to be in actual concert with the 
direct infringers because they were engaged in a common purpose to infringe the 
patent. 
3. There must be knowledge and intent that the elements sold would be used for an 
infringing purpose. The activities of the alleged infringer must be for the purpose 
and with the intent of assisting in the outright infringement. 
122 Wallace y. Holmes 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (CC D. Conn. 1871), per Judge Woodruff, at pages 79-80. 
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4. Though there was no evidence to show that the defendants had actually engaged in 
any prearrangement to act in concert with the direct infringers, this fact could be 
inferred from the circumstances. 1 23 
5. Their conduct constituted them joint infringers, making them joint tortfeasors with 
the direct infringers. 
From that beginning in Wallace v. Holmes, the doctrine of contributory infringement soon 
became well-entrenched and accepted as part of the patent law of the United States, 
applicable not only to combination claims, but also to use claims. 1 24 
Knowledge that the elements he sells would be used to infringe a patent is essential before 
the defendant could be held liable. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 125 Alternatively, 
it seems to suffice if the element sold is specially adapted for use in the patented invention. 
This was stressed by the Court of Appeals in Elevator Appliance Co., Inc .. et aI. v. Brooks 
".126 
Where, however, the individual elements sold were not specially adapted for use in the 
patented combination alone, but had other common uses, or are also useful in other devices 
as well, then the alleged infringer would not be liable under this doctrine unless he could be 
shown by evidence to have the necessary intent to assist others in outright infringement of 
the patent. This was clearly pointed out in Saxe v. Hammond, where Judge Shepley, while 
agreeing with the rationale in Wallace v. Holmes, was able to distinguish the case before 
123 
124 
125 
126 
In Bowker y. Dows. 3 Fed. Cas. 1070 (CC Mass. 1878), Lowell J. at page 1071, applying 
Wallace y. Holmes, held that the "concert of action" between two or more parties necessary to 
support a finding of joint tortfeasance in the infringement of a patent could be shown by flagrant 
activities (Le., sale of an unpatented item coupled with advertising suggesting infringing use) on 
the part of one party (Le., the vendor of the saponine extract) to encourage direct infringement by 
another party (i.e., the purchaser). The necessary concert of actions having been established, the 
aggrieved patent owner can turn to either or both joint tortfeasors for his remedy. See also Judge 
Taft, in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Works Co. 80 F. 712 (CCA 6th Cir. 
1897), at pages 720-722. 
For examples of the application of the Wallace v. Holmes principle in a use claim, see Rumford 
Chemical Works y. Hecker 20 Fed. Cas. 1342 (D.C.N.J. 1876), per Nixon, District Judge, at page 
1346. For combination claims, see: Barnes y. Straus 2 Fed. Cas. 876 (D.C.N.Y. 1872), per 
Blatchford, District Judge, at page 879; Renwick y. Pond 20 Fed. Cas. 536 (D.C.N.Y. 1872), per 
Blatchford, District Judge, at page 541; Richardson v. Noyes 20 Fed. Cas. 123 (Mass. 1816), per 
Lowell, District Judge, at page 124; Schneider y. Pountney 21 Fed. 339 (D.C.N.J. 1884, per 
Nixon J., at page 403. See also Alabastine y. PaYne 21 Fed. 559 (CC N.Y. 1886), Trayers y. 
Beyer and ors 26 Fed. Rep. 450 (CC N.Y., 1886) and Willis and ors y. McCullep 29 Fed. Rep. 
641 (CC Penn. 1886). 
Whitney y. New York ScaffoldiPI Co. 243 Fed. Rep. 180 (CCA 8th Cir. 1917), r-r Sanborn, 
Circuit Judge, at page 185, "The question in contributory infringement is w~ .or not the 
defendant made or sold his machine or improvements with the intent or purpose of BIding another 
in the unlawful making, selling, or using of a third person's patented invention, and the burden is 
on the plaintiff to establish the affirmative of this issue." 
Bleyator Almiiapce Co.. Ioe .. II al. y. 8rpob II •. 40 USPQ 582 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1939), per 
SWID, Circuit Judge, at page 583. 
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him because that intent was lacking.127 This was again emphasised in Whitney v. New 
York Scaffolding Co., where Sanborn, Circuit Judge, said:128 
" ... The facts that the plaintiffs machine or device is capable of use in such a way 
as to aid in the infringement of the patented invention, that it has been so used in 
that way, that the defendant knew that it had been so used and still continue to 
manufacture and sell it, and that he fitted it for such use, are competent evidence of 
such an intention or purpose. But the mere fact that it is capable of such a use, when 
it is at the same time capable and fitted for a rightful and innocent use, is not 
sufficient to establish such an intention or purpose where, as in this case, the 
evidence is that the machine and its parts were expressly fitted for use in a rightful 
way without aiding in any infringement, and there is no evidence that the defendant 
ever knew of the use of the machine, or that it ever was sold or used in such a way 
as to aid others in infringing the patented invention." 
4.4.S.a. Refinement of the doctrine 
In Young Radiator Co. v. Modine Manufacturing Co. ,129 the Court of Appeals held that 
the defendant who manufactured and sold only one element of a claim will be guilty of 
contributory infringement if it sold an article capable of being installed in either an 
infringing or non-infringing manner, and if it materially contributed to installation or use of 
the article in an infringing manner, whether the contributing conduct be direct or indirect. In 
the particular instance, the defendant had, in its advertisements suggested and urged the 
installation and use of its device in such a manner as to secure the same results, and by the 
same means, as those employed and used by plaintiff. Despite the fact that these 
advertisements had been withdrawn shortly before the suit was filed, Judge Sparks said 
that the defendant was still guilty because nothing was done to counteract the effect of the 
127 Saxe y. Hammond 2 Fed. Cas. 593 (CC Mass. 1875), at page 594, per Judge Shepley. See also 
Snyder y. Bunpe1129 Fed. 47 (CC N.Y. 1886), per Coxe J., at page 48, "In each of these cases the 
complainant succeeded because the article dealt in by the defendant was only useful when combined 
as provided by the patent in question, and was sold by him intending that it should be put to this 
unlawful use. A careful examination has failed to find an authority holding a party liable as an 
infringer solely because an article sold by him might by used by the purchaser as one element of a 
patented combination. Such a doctrine would be too dangerous to be upheld ... 1be reccxd upon 
this branch of the case is too vague and uncertain to uphold the charge of infringement Where a 
necessary link is absent in the chain of evidence it cannot be supplied by mere suspicion."; 
Keystone Bridie Co. y. Phoenix Iron Co. et 01. 14 Fed. Cas. 449 (penna. 1872). per Mckennan, 
Circuit Judge. at page 450; Harvey Hubbell y. General Electric 267 Fed. 564 (CCA 2nd Cir. 
1920). per Hough, Circuit Judge. at page 571. 
128 Whitney y. New York Scaffoldina Co. 243 Fed. Rep. 180 (CCA 8th Cir. 1917). at page 185; see 
also Geot&e C. Beidler y. Photostat Com. 26 USPQ 237 (D.C. W.O. New York, 1935~, "In CI'der 
to sustain contributory infringement in the case of an article capable of general ~,.It must .be 
alleged and proofs must show that the arti~le i~ manufactured ~or: ~Id to I~~ With 
knowledge and intent and with purpose that It Will be used as an infringang use, per ~ppey, 
District Judge, at pages 240-241, citing Westinahouse Electric & Mfa Co. et aI. y. PreclSQ Mfa 
Qm. 11 Fed. Rep. (2d) 209 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1926). 
129 YonD, Bedjatgr Co. y. Mndjoe Mapufacturina Co. 12 USPQ 123 (CCA 7th Cir. 1931). 
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advertisements. Therefore, under all the circumstances, the court was convinced that the 
defendant's conduct contributed to the infringements. I 30 
Another refmement to the doctrine of contributory infringement was added in Individual 
Drinkin· C C E 131 & up o. v. rrett. The defendant was found guilty of contributory 
infringement by the district court for supplying paper cups, an article of ordinary use, and 
which could be used without relation to any apparatus, to the owner of an infringing cup-
vending machine. The Court of Appeals held that such a sale could not make the supplier a 
contributory infringer, even if he had knowledge that the same would be used in the 
infringing machine, and he was under no duty to ascertain whether the cups were adapted 
for use in the infringing apparatus.1 32 However, on the facts, the defendant was found to 
have induced the purchaser to use the infringing vending machine in order to sell his own 
products, and, therefore, was guilty of contributory infringement. This approach was 
followed in Duplex Envelope Co, Inc. v. Denominational Envelope Co.. Union Envelo.pe 
Co. & Wesley P. Shomaker. 133 
In The Morian Envelope Company v. The Albany Perforated Wrapper Paper Company, 134 
the claim of the patent involved was for a combination of a mechanism for the delivery of 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
Young Radiator Co. v. Modine Manufacturing Co. 12 USPQ 123 (CCA 7th Cir. 1931), at page 
128; see also Gauvin v. Smith 40 USPQ 267 (DC D. Connecticut, 1939) and CuglCCY et aI. y. 
Bundy Incubator Co. 36 USPQ 524 (CCA 6th Cir. 1937), where again, despite changing the 
offending catalogues which taught the patented method after notification of infringement, am 
suggesting another non-infringing use, the defendant was found guilty. 
Individual Drinking Cyp Co. v. Errett. 297 Fed. Rep. 733 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1924). 
Indiyidual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett. 297 Fed. Rep. 733 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1924), per Mayer, 
Circuit Judge, at page 740. This is because, "it would ... place a heavy burden upon trade, and go 
far beyond the beneficial purposes of the patent monopoly, to hold that it was the duty of the 
vendor of an unpatented article of commerce to ascertain whether the article was, as held by the 
decree below, 'adapted for use' in the infringing apparatus 'under such circumstances as would lead a 
reasonable person to suppose that the purchasers meant to use' the article in the infringing 
apparatus. Such a duty would require a vendor of the almost limitless ordinary article of trade, 
whether in raw or manufactured form, to determine first whether the device was an infringement, 
and, secondly, to what use the lumber, steel, or what not was to be put by the purchaser." See also 
the dissenting opinion of Wallace, Circuit Judge, at page 1011, in Thomson-Houston Elc;ctric Co. 
v. KelsCCY Electric Railway Specialty Co. et aI. 75 Fed. Rep. 1005 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1896), ''Being 
entitled to sell their article [for repairs etc.], they are under no obligation, before selling it, to 
inquire whether the purchasers intend to make an illegal use of it. Privity with a wrongdoer is not 
to be inferred from the exercise of a legal right. The man who sells a gun or a knife would be 
guilty of impertinence if he should inquire of the purchaser whether he intends to use it 
legitimately, and is under no duty to do so. The same rule applies to one who makes or sells an 
article which is not patented, but which may be used by the purchaser to work. an infringement of a 
patent if he so chooses. One who assists another to infringe a patent is, of course, a tortfeasor; IIJd 
whether he is called a contributory infringer, or merely an infringer, is only a matter of 
nomenclature. But he does not assist or concert with another to infringe merely because he sells 
him an article which may be used to effect an infringement. In other words, participation in a 
wrong is not established by doing a lawful act, without evidence of an unlawful intention." 
Dyplex Envelope Co, Inc. v. Denominational Envelope Co" Union Envelop; Co. &; Weslcy p, 
Shomaker 27 USPQ 325 (CCA 4th Cir. 1935), before Parker, Northcott and Soper, Circuit 
Judges. See page 328, opinion of Soper, Circuit Judge, citing Indiyidual Drinldnl Cup Co. y 
EImI& 197 Fed. 733 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1924), 
The Motaan Bayelope Company y. The Albany Perfllftrat Wqpp;r Paper Company 152 US 500 
(US Sup. Ct 1894). 
235 
paper to be delivered as used, with a paper roll. The infringement charged, inter alia. 
consisted "in the defendants selling oval rolls of paper of their own manufacture, with 
fixtures manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs, the fixtures having been obtained by the 
defendants from the original purchasers of the patented combination, and also by selling 
oval rolls of paper of the defendants' own manufacture to persons who had previously 
purchased fixtures and paper from the plaintiffs, with the knowledge and intention that the 
paper so sold was to be used in connection with the plaintiffs' fixtures." It had not been the 
practice of the plaintiffs to sell fixtures independently of its paper, and that they sold only to 
such parties as dealt in and used their paper. Purchasers were also required to buy a given 
quantity of paper to a given number of fixtures, to be sold only in connection with the 
paper, the rule being not to sell more than one fixture to one case of paper. The fixtures 
were also sold to hotels and other public buildings, with the understanding that their paper 
would be subsequently purchased of the plaintiffs' company. It appeared to have been their 
invariable rule to refuse to sell their fixtures except to persons also ordering paper. 
One of the question for decision was whether the sale by the defendants of paper made by 
themselves for use in fixtures bought from the complainants, amounted to an infringement 
or contributory infringement of the patent. With respect to this question, the court decided 
that the real question in this case was whether, conceding the combination of the oval roll 
with the fixture to be a valid combination, the sale of one element of such combination, 
with the intent that it should be used with the other element, was an infringement. The court 
was of the opinion that it was not. While agreeing with the rule that the manufacture and 
sale of a single element of a combination, with intent that it should be united to the other 
elements, and so completed the combination, was an infringement (citing Saxe v. 
Hammond, Wallace v. Holmes, Barnes v. Straus, Schneider v. Pountney) the court held 
that those cases had no application to one where the element made by the alleged infringer 
was an article of manufacture perishable in its nature, which it was the object of the 
mechanism to deliver, and which must be renewed periodically, whenever the device was 
put to use. The effect of holding that a sale of such product would amount to an 
infringement would be to give to the patentee of the machine the benefit of a patent upon the 
product, by requiring such product be bought of him. The defendants were, therefore, 
found not guilty of infringement. 
However, the Morgan Envelope case was distinguished in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor 
Talking Machine Company. 135 This was an action to enforce a court ordered injunction 
against contributory infringement. The defendant was found guilty of contempt for 
manufacturing unpatented records that could be played in the plaintiffs patented player. 
135 Leeds & Catlin Co, v. Victor Talkin~ Machine CompanY 213 US 325; 53 L. Ed 816 (US Sup. Ct 
1909). 
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Although the records themselves were not patented per se, they were claimed as part of the 
patented combination. 
The lower courts found the following facts to exist. The discs sold by the petitioner were 
equally suitable for the petitioner's machine as well as for the machine of the Victor 
Company, but that it "was not, at or before the time of beginning this proceeding, a 
practically or commercially known reproducer of musical or spoken sound, whereas the 
Victor machine, embodying the claims of the Berliner patent here under consideration, was 
at such times widely known and generally used, and that the petitioner knew, and sold its 
records with the knowledge that, if its output were to be used at all by the public, it would 
be used with the Victor machine, and in the combination protected by the claims of the 
Berliner patent." The lower courts also found that it was clear that the petitioner had "made 
and sold a single element of the claims of the Berliner patent, with the intent that it should 
be united to the other element and complete the combination; and this is an infringement." 
In finding for the patentee, the Supreme Court distinguished the Mor~an Envelqpe case, 
where the substance involved was a "passive" and perishable element of the combination, 
whereas in the present case the element coacted with the other elements of the combination, 
in other words, it was regarded as an "active" element.136 
4.4.5.b. Extension of the doctrine to breach of licensed conditions 
The willingness of the court to use the doctrine of contributory infringement to prevent the 
manufacture and sale of unpatented elements of a patented combination or process extended 
even to situations where a licensee was supplied with such parts in breach of the licence 
agreement. For example, a patentee could impose restrictions over the use of the patented 
invention in licence agreements unless certain other non-patented articles were used in 
conjunction with it. 137 Sometimes the patent owner would prescribe by notice attached to a 
patented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which must be used in the 
operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent. Initially, the courts were willing to 
136 Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talkin, Machine CompanY 213 US 325 (US Sup. Ct 19(9). Mr 
lustice McKenna delivering the judgement of the court, at page 335. "The function it performs is 
the result of the joint action of the disc and the stylus. The disc is not a mere .c~ncomi~t. to ~ 
stylus; it coacts with the stylUS to produce the result. Indeed. as we have seen. It IS the distinction 
of the invention. constituting, by its laterally undulating line of even depth and the effect thereof, 
the advance upon the prior art. To confound its active co-operation with the mere passivity of ~ 
paper in the mechanism in Moman Envelo.pe Company is not only to confound essential 
distinctions made by the patent laws, but essential distinctions between entirely different things. 
Besides, the lower courts found that the discs were not perishable" 
137 See, for example, victor Talkinl Macbipe Co. ct aI. y. The Fair 123 Fed. Rep. 424 (CCA 7th 
Cir. 1903), IMr Baker, Circuit ludge, at page 426, where the co~ held that the owner of a ~t 
who manufactures and sells the patented article may reserve to himself. as an ungranted part of his 
monopoly, the right to fix and control the prices at which jobbers or dealers buying from ~ may 
sell to the public, and a dealer who buys from a jobber with knowledge of such reservations. ... 
resells in violation of it, is an infringer of the patent. 
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fmd for the owners, on the principle that "within his domain, the patentee is czar" .138 The 
high point of the power of the patentee to impose, by licence or notice, restrictions on use 
of the patented invention subject to conditions was the case of Sidney Hemy et d. v. A.B. 
Dick Co. ,139 where the Supreme Court, in effect, gave the imprimatur to the further 
extension of the patentee's right to substances which were not even part of the patented 
combination, i.e., not only were unpatented elements in a patented combination protected 
by the doctrine of contributory infringement, but the doctrine was extended also to cover 
cases where the article sold was not part of the combination but the patentee had made it a 
condition that licence to use the patented subject matter was subject to the use of some other 
unpatented articles to be used in connection with the patented article. The Supreme Court 
had to consider the question whether the above act of the defendant constituted contributory 
infringement of the complainants' patent and answered in the affIrmative, on the ground 
that since any use in excess of the restriction would be an infringement, therefore, anyone 
aiding in the infringement would also be liable.140 
138 
139 
140 
Victor Talkin& Machine Co. et a1. v. The Fair 123 Fed. Rep. 424 (CCA 7th Cir. 1903), per Baker, 
Circuit Judge, at page 426. See also, Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. y. Eureka Specialty 
Co. et a1. 77 Fed. Rep. 288 (CCA 6th Cir. 1896). While admitting that it was "an unusual mode" 
of infringing, the court held that where the machines were sold by the patentee upon the condition 
that only the staples manufactured by the patentee (which were not patented) should be used 
therein, the manufacture and sale by another party, to the users of such machines, of staples which 
were intended to and could only be used therein, was a contributory infringement, and would be 
enjoined. This was based on the principle that since a licensee in breach of the condition would be 
an infringer, therefore any person assisting him in the breach would also be an infringer - see 
opinion of Judge Lurton at page 296. Further extension of this principle occurred in Rugg & 
Win&enfe1d Co. y. Elliott et a1. 131 Fed. Rep. 730 (CCA 6th Cir. 1904), where the patent owner 
of a machine for fastening buttons onto shoes allowed customers free use of the machines on the 
condition that the machines were to be used only with wires purchased from the patent owner. 1be 
court held that one who, with knowledge of the restrictions, supplied wires to such users, with the 
intention that it should be used on such machines, was liable as a contributory infringer. See 
Lurton, Circuit Judge, at pages 732-733. 
Sidney Hem et a1. v. A.B. Dick Co. 224 US 1 (US Sup. Ct 1912). 
Sidney HeIllY et a1. v. A.B. Dick Co. 224 US 1 (US Sup. Ct 1912), Mr Justice Lurton, for the 
Court, at pages 17-18, "That a patentee may effectually restrict the time, place, or manner of using 
a patented machine, so that a prohibited use will constitute an infringement of the patent, is fully 
conceded ... Any use in excess would obviously be an infringing use and the licence would be no 
defence .... This is so elementary that we shall not stop to cite cases". At pages 31-32, "But it has 
been earnestly said that a condition restricting the buyer to use it only in connection with ink made 
by the patentee is one of a character which gives to a patentee the power to extend his monopoly 
so as to cause it to embrace any subject, not within the patent, which he chooses to require that the 
invention shall be used in connection with. Of course, the argument does not mean that the effect 
of such a condition is to cause things to become patented which were not so without the 
requirement. The stencil, the paper, and the ink made by the patentee will continue to be 
unpatented. Anyone will be free to make, sell, and use like articles as they would be without this 
restriction, save in one particular - namely, they may not be sold to a user of one of the patentee's 
machine with intent that they shall be used in violation of the licence. To that extent competition 
in the sale of such articles, for use with the machine, will be affected; for sale to such users for 
infringing purposes will constitute contributory infringement. But the same consequence results 
from the sale of any article to one who proposes to associate it with other articles to infringe a 
patent, when such purpose is known to the seller. But could it be said that the doctrine of 
contributory infringement operates to extend the monopoly of the patent over subjects .not within 
it because one subjects himself to the penalties of the law when he sells unpatented things for an 
infringing use?" Note, however, the dissenting opinions of Mr Chief Justice White, at pages 51-
52, with whom Mr Justice Hughes and Mr Justice Lamar concurred, that giving the patentee sucb a 
right "amounts to exercising legislative power", and Chief Justice White, at page S3, that it would 
give sucb a vast power "to multiply monopolies" at the will of the patentee. 
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4.4.S.c. Contributory infringement and patent misuse 
Later, however, there was a growing unease and reluctance by the courts to allow such use 
of the patent monopoly to gain an unwarranted extension of patent monopolies by the use 
of tie-in and tie-out, and other devices to achieve the same ends. 141 The tide began to tum 
against the patentee in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing 
Company et all 142 The Supreme Court held that the owner of a patent might not restrict its 
use by a purchaser, by a notice attached to the machine embodying the patent, to specific 
materials necessary in its operation, but which were not part of the patented machine, and 
were not themselves patented. Neither not could he, by such notice, make the use of the 
machine subject to further conditions as to use or royalties that might be imposed thereafter 
in his discretion. In so holding, the court also held that the decision in Henry v. A.B. Dick 
Co. must be regarded as overruled. Since there was an attempt to extent the scope of the 
lawful monopoly granted under the patent statute, the patent owner was guilty of a patent 
misuse and was thus prevented from suing for contributory infringement. 143 
In Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corporation and Dry 
Ice Corporation of America 144 the American Patents Corporation had a patent for a 
distinctive transportation box. The relevant combination claims were directed towards a 
package in which ice cream could be kept cold and transported using dry ice (which was 
not patented and had been long known to the public, although it was one of the elements of 
the combination claim for the manufacture of the transportation package). The Dry Ice 
Company, its exclusive licensee, manufactured and sold carbon dioxide for use in the 
patented box, which it called by the name Dry Ice. It did not make or sell transportation 
packages in which solid carbon dioxide was used as a refrigerant, nor issue to other 
concerns licences to make such packages upon payment of a stipulated royalty. It did not 
fonnally license buyers of its dry ice to use the invention in suit. But each invoice for the 
dry ice sold by it bore the notice: "The merchandise herein described is shipped upon the 
following conditions: That Drylce shall not be used except in Drylce Cabinets or other 
containers or apparatus provided or approved by the Dry Ice Corporation of America; and 
that Dry Ice cabinets or other containers or apparatus provided or approved by the Dry Ice 
Corporation of America shall be refrigerated or used only with Dry Ice " . The defendant, 
141 How the Malaysian Act regulates the use of such restrictive clauses i.n p~tent lice~ces to prevent 
the patent owner from deriving rights not conferred by the patent IS discussed In Chapter 6 -
Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights, at para. 6.5. 
142 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturin~ Company el all 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917). This case is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the 
Patentee's Exercise of His Ex.clusive Rights, at para. 6.5.2.b. 
143 Motion Pictyre Patents Co, v. Universal Film Manufactyrin~ Company el aI. 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917). See opinion of Mr Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of the Court. at pages 
509-518. 
144 Carbjce COIl2oratjon of Amew:a v. American Patents Deyc,;\opmeot Corporation and Dr.y lee 
Corporation of America 283 US 27 (US Sup. Ct 1931). 
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Carbice Corporation also sold dry ice. It was charged with contributory infringement 
because it sold its product to customers of the Dry Ice Corporation with knowledge that the 
dry ice was to be used by the purchasers in transportation packages like those described in 
the patent. Relying on the Motion Picture case the Supreme Court held that the limited 
monopoly to make, use, and vend an article may not be "expanded by limitations as to 
materials and supplies necessary to the operation of it." As to the plaintiffs attempt to 
distinguish the Motion Picture case and the Morgan Envelope case from the present, by 
arguing that in the present case the unpatented supplies over which they were trying to 
obtain control was a necessary element in the patented combination, a dynamic element 
which produced the refrigeration, Mr Justice Brandeis said that it was a distinction without 
any legal significance. 145 Relief was denied because the Dry Ice Corporation was 
attempting to employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented material used in 
applying the invention. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine was also 
distinguished in that that case was an ordinary case of contributory infringement where the 
patentee had not tried to derive its profits from the unpatented supplies with which it was 
used.1 46 
So in Carbice the court refused to allow the patentee plaintiff the right to enforce 
combination claims against the manufacturer of a component of a claim where the patentee 
had misused his patent rights to attempt to gain a monopoly over the supplies of unpatented 
products. Although Carbice did not overturn Leeds, it did indicate a limitation on the scope 
of contributory infringement. However, the tide had irreversibly turned against the patentee 
as shown in the next case. 
In Leitch Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. The Barber Company, Inc. ,147 the Barber Company, 
the owner of a patent to a road-building process, permitted its use without charge so long as 
the user purchased from it an unpatented bituminous emulsion which the process called for. 
This emulsion was an unpatented staple article of commerce produced in the United States 
by many concerns and in common use by their customers for many uses. The Leitch 
Company also produced and distributed an emulsion which served the same purpose. It 
was sued by the plaintiff for contributory infringement by the sale and delivery of 
bituminous emulsion to a road builder, knowing that it was to be used in accordance with 
145 
146 
147 
Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corporation and DO' Ice 
Corporation of America 283 US 27 (US Sup. Ct 1931), at pages 31, 33, "These distinctions are 
without legal significance. Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort. aOO 
implies invasion of some right of the patentee, ... The Dry Ice Corporation has no right to be free 
from competition in the sale of solid carbon dioxide. Control over the supply of suc~ unpatented 
material is beyond the scope of the patentee's monopoly; and this limitation, inherent In the patent 
grant. is not dependent upon the peculiar function or character of the unpatented matenal or on the 
way in which it is used." 
Carbice Corporation of America v. American Patents Development Corporation and Dry Ice 
Corporation of America 283 US 27 (US Sup. Ct 1931). per Mr Justice Brandeis. at page 34. 
Leitch Manufacturin~ Co. Inc. \'. The Barber Company. Inc. 302 US 458; 36 USPQ 35 (US Sup. 
Ct \938). 
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the patented method. The defendant contended that the suit could not be maintained because 
to do so would give a limited monopoly of an unpatented staple article of commerce. The 
Supreme Court went beyond the Carbice holding and held that the patentee's method of 
doing business was the practical equivalent of granting a written licence subject to a 
condition that the patented method may only be practised with emulsion purchased from it. 
Relying on the Carbice case, the patentee was denied relief, since the sole purpose to which 
the patent was put was thereby to suppress competition in the production and sale of a 
staple unpatented material for use in road building. The Court made it very clear that no 
form of legal words can make legal that which was an obvious attempt to control the market 
in unpatented wares)48 
Two more cases in which the patentee had imposed licensed conditions on the use of its 
patented product reached the Supreme Court and in both the court had refused to lend its aid 
on the ground that the person who went beyond his grant in attempting to secure a limited 
monopoly of an unpatented article is barred from enforcing his patent against any alleged 
infringer)49 In fact, in B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, the court went so far as to say that 
even if the defendant had actively induced the infringement, in view of petitioner's use of 
the patent as the means of establishing a limited monopoly in its unpatented material, the 
maintenance of the suit to restrain any form of infringement was contrary to public policy, 
and that the district court had rightly dismissed it. Neither the convenience nor the 
commercial necessities of the patentee nor the activities of the seller of the alleged infringing 
unpatented product, justifies an extension of the grant to the unpatented product. 1 so 
Finally came the case of The Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continental Investment Company 
".151 This suit was brought by the respondent, Mid-Continent Investment Co., against 
the petitioner, Mercoid Corporation, for contributory infringement of the Cross 
combination patent for a domestic heating system. Mercoid denied contributory 
148 
149 
150 
1~1 
Leitch Mauufacturina Co. Inc. y. The Barber Company. Inc. 36 USPQ 35 (US Sup. Ct 1938), per 
Mr Justice Brandeis for the Court, at pages 35-37. 
See Morton S'alt Co. v. O.S. Sup,piaer 314 US 488,86 L. Ed. 363 (US Sup. Ct 1942) - patent for 
a machine for depositing salt tablets, respondent leased its patented machines to co~ercial 
canners under licences to use the machine upon conditions and with the agreement of the licensees 
that only the subsidiary's salt tablet be used with the leased machines. Mr Cbi~f Justi~ Stone 
delivering judgement of the court, said at page 4?1, "But a patent aff~~ n~ Immuruty for a 
monopoly not within the grant. .. and the use of It to suppress compe~t1on 10 tb~ sale of an 
unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid of the court of eqwty to restram an alleged 
infringement by one who is a competitor. It is the established rule th~t a patentee w~o has granted 
a licence on condition that the patented invention be used by the licensee only With unpatented 
materials furnished by the licensor, may not restrain as a contributory infringer one who sells to 
the licensee like materials for like use."; and B.B. Chemical Co. y. Ellis 314 US 495 (US Sup. Ct 
1942) - patent claimed a method of reinforcing insoles ~n shoe ~anufac~ng. The petitioner-
patentee supplied shoe manufacturers with a pre-coated fabnc for use In the claimed process and .-
part of the transaction a licence was granted to the purchaser. 
B.D. Chemical Co. y. Ellis 314 US 495 (US Sup. Ct 1942), Mr Chief Justice Stone deliverina 
the judgement of the court, at page 497. 
Tho Mcrcoid Coqxntion y. Mid-Contipental Inyestmept Company ".. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944). 
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infringement and contended that Mid-Continent should be barred from relief because it was 
seeking to extend the grant of the patent to unpatented devices. The controversy centred 
around the licence agreement between Mid-Continent and Minneapolis-Honeywell. By that 
agreement, Minneapolis-Honeywell received an exclusive licence to make, sell, and to sub-
license others to make, use, and sell the Cross combination patent. The royalty payments 
under the licence, however, were to be based only upon sales of the combustion stoker 
switch, which was an element of the combination patent embodied in the patented article but 
which was itself unpatented. Minneapolis-Honeywell, in advertising its stoker switches, 
stated that the "right to use" the Cross system patent was "only granted to the user" when 
the stoker switches of Minneapolis-Honeywell were purchased from it and used in the 
system. Neither Mid-Continent nor Minneapolis-Honeywell manufactured nor installed 
heating systems under the Cross combination patent. 
The District Court found that Mercoid did not contribute to the infringement of the Cross 
patent; that the respondents had conspired to establish a monopoly in an unpatented 
appliance beyond the scope of the patent and in violation of the anti-trust law. Therefore, 
the respondents were in no position to maintain the suit because of that conspiracy. The 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that judgement, holding that Mercoid was guilty of 
contributory infringement under the rule in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talkin& Machine 
CQ., and that Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., and Leitch Mf&. Co. v. Barber, 
did not bar recovery as the District Court had thought. 
The Supreme Court reversed, and held, by a majority, that a patent owner may not employ 
a patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the 
invention.152 
The following points were made: 
1. To allow either direct or contributory infringement suits would extend the aid of 
equity court in expanding the patent beyond its legitimate scope. 
2. There is no difference in principle to the above where unpatented material or device 
is an integral part of the structure embodying the patent. 153 
152 Mr Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the court, Mr Justice R~berts ~ the judgeme~t 
and Mr Justice Reed joined in his opinion. Mr Justice Black. while agreemg WI.th the Court s 
judgement, UIed a few remarks. to which Mr Justice Murphy concurred, Mr Justice Frankfurter 
dissented, as did Mr Justice Jackson. 
153 The Mercojd Cm:poration y. Mid-Continentallnyestmept Company et 01. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944). per Mr Justice Douglas. at page 24. "The Court has repeatedly held that to allo~. such 
suits would be to extend the aid of a court of equity in expanding the patent beyond the leg1~ate 
scope of its monopoly. It is true that. those ~ involved ~~ use of t!'e patent for a machi~ ex' 
process to secure a partial monopoly 1D suppbes consumed In Its operatlon or un~nted ~
employed in it But we can see no difference in principle where the unpatented matenal or device IS 
itself an intelfal part of the structure employing the patent" 
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3. The rule in Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., that one contributorily 
infringes by selling unpatented part of combination patent for use in assembled machine no 
longer prevails against the defence that the combination patent was being used to protect 
unpatented part from competition. 154 
4. Misuse of patent precludes the patent owner from enjoining direct, as well as 
contributory, infringement. 
5. Where there is collision between the principle in Carbice Corp. v. American Patents 
C,Qm., and conventional rules governing direct or contributory infringement, the former 
rule prevails. 155 
After the decision in the Mercoid case there was confusion and uncertainty as to the future 
of the doctrine of contributory infringement. This was due to the comment of Mr Justice 
Douglas at the end of his opinion, where he said: 156 
"The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit 
substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left 
we need not stop to consider. It is sufficient to say that in whatever posture the 
issue may be tendered courts of equity will withhold relief where the patentee and 
those claiming under him are using the patent privilege contrary to the public 
interest. " 
There were differences of opinion as to whether the doctrine of contributory infringement 
was still applicable. 157 It has to be borne in mind that the statement was made obiter. 1be 
IS4 
ISS 
156 
157 
The Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continental Investment Company et aI. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944), per Mr Justice Douglas, at page 25, "Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talkin& Machine Co. 
(No. 2l 213 US 325 is authority for the conclusion that he who sells an unpatented part of a 
combination patent for use in the assembled machine may be guilty of contributory infringement. 
The protection which the Court in that case extended to the phonograph record, which was an 
unpatented part of the patented phonograph, is in substance inconsistent with the view we have 
expressed in this case. The rule of the Leeds v. Catlin case (No.2) accordingly must no longer 
prevail against the defence that a combination patent is being used to protect an unpatented part 
from competition. That result obtains here though we assume for the purposes of this case that 
Mercoid was a contributory infringer and that respondents could have enjoined the infringement bEd 
they not misused the patent for the purpose of monopolising unpatented material. 
The Mercoid Cmporation v. Mid-Continental Investment CompanY et al. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944), per Mr Justice Douglas, at pages 25-26, "Inasmuch as their misuse of the patent would 
have precluded them from enjoining a direct infringement (Morton Salt Co. v Suppi&«) they 
cannot stand in any better position with respect to a contributory infringer. Where there is a 
collusion between the principle of the Carbice case and conventional rules governing either direct 
or contributory infringement, the former prevail." 
The Men;oid Cmpomtion V. Mid-Continental Investment CompanY et al. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944), per Mr Justice Douglas, at page 26. 
'dndja Mashine Co. v. Cb'8Q Tool Co. 61 USPQ 164 (CCA 6th Cir. 1944), per Sions, Circuit 
Judge, at paae 166; The Girdler Cmp. y. B.I. Dn Pont de Nemours &: Co. 62 USPQ 450 (DC D. 
Del. 1944), per Leahy, District Judge, at page 452; Hall v. Mont&OQleo' Wild &: Co; Same y. 
Sem, Rgobruk aM Co. 63 USPQ 114 (DC N.D. West Virginia, 1944), per Baker, District Judge. 
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ratio of the case is that a patentee who misuses his patent rights to monopolise trade in 
unpatented products would be deprived of the protection of the court. This applies even as 
against a direct infringer. Whether there was contributory infringement on the part of the 
defendant was not an issue before the court. In fact, in his dissenting judgement, Mr Justice 
Frankfurter, in the Mercoid case, said: 15 8 
" ... But in the series of cases in which that doctrine has heretofore been applied ... , 
not once has this Court found it relevant to reject, either explicitly or by indirection, 
another doctrine of the law, that of contributory infringement, nor has it seen fit to 
make animadversions upon it. That is so doubtless for the simple reason that 
appropriate occasions for relief against contributory infringement are unrelated to 
the circumstances which brings the Carbice doctrine into play ... 
To be sure, the doctrine of contributory infringement may be misconceived and has 
been misapplied. That is the fact of all shorthand statements of complicated ideas, 
whether in law or in the natural sciences. But the misapplication of a formula into 
which a complicated idea is compressed and thereby mutilated is a poor excuse for 
rejecting the idea. It will be time enough to defme the appropriate limits of the 
doctrine of contributory infringement when we are required to deal with the 
problem. Until then litigants and lower courts ought not to be embarrassed by 
gratuitous innuendoes against a principle of the law which, within its proper 
bounds, is accredited by legal history as well as ethics. The long and on the whole 
not unworthy history of our judicial administration admonishes us against 
expressing views on matters not before us .... " 
Congress, in 1952, finally enacted express statutory provisions to clear the doubts 
created. 159 
at page 122; Detroit Lubricator Co. v. Toussaint 63 USPQ 139 (DC N.D. lllinois, 1944), per LA 
Buy, District Judge, at page 139; American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co. 65 USPQ 114 
(DC D. Massa. 1944), per Sweeney, District Judge, at pages 117-118; ChicalO Pneumatic Tool 
Co. et d. y. HUlhes Tool Company 66 USPQ 425 (DC D. Delaware, 1945), Leahy, District 
Judge, page 428; Stokes & Smith Co. y. Tranprent-Wrap Machine Corp. 69 USPQ 278 (CCA 
2nd Cir. 1946), per L. Hand, Circuit Judge, at page 280; Sunlite Mapufacturinl Company y. 
Oarvan Com. 75 USPQ 269 (DC B.D. Wisconsin, 1947), per Duffy, District Judge, at page 270; 
Florence-Mayo Nuway Company y. Hardy et 01. 77 USPQ 439 (CCA 4th Cir. 1948), per Parker, 
Circuit Judge, at page 444. For a comment on the uncertain aftermath of the Mercoid case, see 
Wood, Lawrence I., "The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications", Vol. 27 JPOS 230 (1945). 
158 The Mercoid Corporation y. Mid-ContipentalIovestment Compapy et d. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. 
Ct 1944), per Justice Frankfurter, at page 29. 
159 See 35 USC section 271(b)-(d) in Appendix. Section 271(d) now regulates the relationship between 
contributory infringement and patent misuse. For an analysis of its application, see Dawson 
Chemical Co. y. Rabm " Hys Co. 206 USPQ 385 (US Sup. Ct 1980), per Justice Blackmun, at 
pages 398-407. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice White, for the minority, at pages 408-
415. 
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4.4.5.d. Sul11lllaty of US position 
1. An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the 
case.1 60 
2. All who take part in a trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and 
abetting it, will be held to be jointly and severally liable for the injuries inflicted. 
3. One who makes and sells one element of a patented combination with the intention 
and for the purpose of bringing about its use in such a combination, is guilty of 
contributory infringement, and is equally liable with him who in fact organises the 
complete combination. 
4. One who makes articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented 
combination, and offers them for sale to the general public, will be presumed to 
intend the natural consequences of his act, and will, therefore, be held to intend that 
they shall be used in the combination of the patent, and an injunction will be 
granted. 
5. Such an inference could not be drawn where the articles are adapted to other uses 
than in the patented combination. In the latter case the intention to assist in 
infringement must be otherwise shown affrrmatively, and cannot be inferred from 
the mere fact that the articles are in fact used in the patented combination or may be 
so used. 161 
6. Knowledge that a normal article of commerce would be used to infringe is not 
sufficient in itself to make the supplier a contributory infringer. There must, m 
addition, be proof that he has induced the infringement.162 
7. Before a person can be found guilty of contributory infringement, there must have 
been committed a direct infringement. However, in certain cases, even an 
anticipatory contributory infringement could be enjoined if the evidence warrants 
it.163 
160 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. y. Ohio Brass Works Co. 80 F. 712 (CCA 6th Cir. 1897). per 
Judge Taft, at pages 720-722; Lincoln Enajpeerin' Co. of Dlinois y. Stewart-Warner Cotp. 34 
USPQ 92 (CCA 7th Cir. 1937). Evan. Circuit Judge for the Court, at page 98. 
161 Where. however. the instructed non-infringing use is a colourable attempt to disguise an infringing 
use. the defendant is still liable. See. for example. Westin,house Electric &: Mfa· Co. ct .. y. 
Precise Mfa Com. 11 Fed. Rep. (2d) 209 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1926). per Manton. Circuit Judge. at 
page 212. 
162 Indiyidual Drinkina Cup Co. y. Ermtt 297 Fed. Rep. 733 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1924). 
163 See ThoIDlOQ-Houston Blecqjc Co. y. KeIse.x Blecqic RailwLY Sp;cialLY Co. ct d. 7S Fed. Rep. 
lOOS (CCA 2nd Cir. 1896). p~r Shipman. Circuit Judge. for the majority. at pages 1 fX11-1 008. 
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8. Misuse of a patent to gain a partial monopoly over unpatented products would 
disentitle the patentee from suing either for direct or contributory infringement. 
9. If the supply is for a legitimate use, as for example, supply of parts for the purposes 
of repair, to licensees or for export, the doctrine is not applicable. 
4.5. The Problem of Export Trade 
Closely linked to the problem of providing a fair degree of protection against unauthorised 
indirect exploitation by the supply of individual elements of a patented invention within the 
country is the problem associated with the manufacture of component elements of a 
patented invention for sale overseas. If the parts manufactured are assembled before export, 
there is no problem since there would be a direct infringement by the manufacturer. But 
where the complete assembly is to be carried out abroad, it could be argued that since there 
would not be a direct infringement within jurisdiction, the manufacturer could not be guilty 
of any wrongful indirect exploitation. If this argument were to prevail, it would be to 
"unduly reward the artful competitor who uses another's invention in its entirety and who 
seeks to profit thereby" and the holder of a combination patent would be denied "the 
benefits of his invention with respect to sales to foreign purchasers." 164 
There does not seem to be any reported case dealing with this situation m the United 
Kingdom or the other Commonwealth jurisdictions surveyed. It may be that faced with 
such a situation, the courts may be prepared to find the manufacturer liable for 
infringement. This view is based on the fact that where warranted, the courts have been 
prepared to find the manufacturer and supplier of "kits of parts" liable for infringement. 165 
However, the decisions were based on the fact that the ultimate user would be infringers 
when they assembled the kits of parts. It is uncertain what the outcome would be if the fmal 
user could not be regarded as infringers since there could not be an infringement by 
activities overseas. 
Under the doctrine of contributory infringement as developed by the United States courts, a 
manufacturer will not be liable for contributory infringement if he were to make and sell a 
single element of a patented combination with the purpose and expectation that such element 
164 
165 
See Oeepsouth Packing Co. Inc. v. The Laitram Corporation 406 US 518; 173 USPQ 769 (US 
Sup. Ct 1972), per Justice Blackmun. in his dissenting opinion. with whom the Chief Justice, Mr 
Justice Powell, and Mr Justice Rehnquist joined. at pages 775-776. 
See, for example, United Telephone Company v. Dale (1884) 25 Ch.D. 778, per Person J., at page 
782; Rotocrop Internatlllllal Ltd v. Genboume Ltd [1982] FSR 241. per Graham J .. at pages 258-
260; Windsurfing Intcrnatillnallnc & anor v. Petit & anor (1983-1985) 3 IPR 449, per Waddell J .. 
at pages 456 and 459; and WindsurfinK International Inc. el ai. v. Trilantic Corp. (1985) 3 CPR 
(3d) 95 and (1986) 8 CPR (3d) 2.+ I and no. per Urie J. (Heald and Stone JJ. concurring), at pages 
263-268. 
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should be sent to a foreign country and be used there in combination with other elements, 
or in the practice of a method covered by the patent. This is because the protection of the 
patent does not extend beyond the limits of the United States, and as there is no intent that 
the element should be put to an infringing use within the jurisdiction, there can not be an 
outright infringement within the jurisdiction. Absent this outright infringement, there can 
not be a contributory infringement. This was so held in Bullock Electric & Mfg Co. v. 
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co.166 The Court of Appeals in Computing Scale Co. v. 
Toledo Computing Scale Co. 167 extended this further and held that where the defendant 
made in the United States and shipped to Canada parts, to be assembled into complete 
scales, including the patented cylinder, in Canada, and there delivered to Canadian users, 
the defendant was not liable as a contributory infringing maker of such scales. Since no 
completed scale or complete cylinder was ever shipped to Canada, the defendant could not 
be liable, as there must be a completed infringement in the United States to which a 
contribution could be made. 
The defendants in Radio Corp. of America and American Telephone and Telemph Co. 
(appellees) v. Frank Andrea and Frank Andrea Inc. (appellants), 168 had manufactured all 
the elements of a patented combination for a radio receiver, except the required vacuum tube 
which they acquired in the open market. The tubes were separately packaged and placed 
within the same carton as the receiver. They contended that the apparatus was sold solely 
for export, and that, when it was sold, the patented combination was incomplete and was 
not intended to be completed except outside the country. Hence they denied that there was 
proof of any direct infringement, and they claimed to escape contributory infringement. 
166 Bullock Electric & Mti Co. v. Westin~house Electric & Mfe. Co. 129 Fed. Rep. 105 (CCA 6th 
Cir. 1904), Per Lurton, Circuit Judge, delivering the opinion of the court, at pages 111-112, ''The 
intent and pwpose that the element made and sold shall be used in a way that shall infringe the 
combination in which it is an element constitutes the necessary concert of action between him who 
furnish the single part and he who actually does the injury by the assembling and using of all the 
parts in such as way as to be an infringement ... That the single element was made and sold with 
the intent and purpose of aiding another in infringing must appear, or the necessary concert of 
action will be missing. This may be shown presumptively, as it is when the article is incapable of 
any other use than an infringing one. H, on the other hand, it be adapted to other uses 'the intenti~n 
to assist in infringement must be otherwise shown affirmatively', Thomson-Houston Co. v Ohio 
Brass Works ... These principles we think determine this case. 
The finding that the intent and pwpose in making and selling this motor was that it should be used 
in the patented devices in Canada is a finding against any infringing purpose. It would ~ot be an 
infringement to put the motor to the use intended, because the use w~ beyond the protection ~f the 
patent. The defence is as complete as if the intent had been to ~sh the I?ot~r to ~ne. haVIng a 
licence to make sell and use. In neither case would there be an mtent to asSiSt 10 an mfringement, 
and without such int~nt that plaintiff in error was not infringing the patent or disobeying the mIer 
of the court. 
What we have said applies as well to the method patent as to the combination claim. ~ must 
be shown a intent to assist another in an infringing use of the patented method. There bemg no 
intent to provide means by which another might unlawfully use the Tesla method, there is no 
contributory infringement." 
167 Computin& Scale Co. v. Toledo CmpputiO& Scale Co. 279 Fed. Rep. 648 (CCA 7th eir. 1921), 
see Baker, Circuit Judge, at page 678. 
168 Radio CoQl. of Amc;rica apd Agwicap Telq)hone and TeJeaapb Co. v. Fmk Andrq agI Fnmk 
Apcba Inc. 27 USPQ 365 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1935), per Swan, Circuit Judge, at pages 36S-366. 
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The Court of Appeals, following the doctrine propounded in Bullock Electric & Mfg. Co. 
y. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., found for the defendants, holding that sales of 
disassembled elements of a patented combination did not constitute direct infringement. 
Since the vacuum tubes were not yet physically connected to the receiver sets, the elements 
were not in operable relationship to each other. Even if all the elements of a patented 
combination were sold in the country with the intent that the purchaser should make and use 
the invention abroad, this would not be a contributory infringement. 169 The above 
approach was affmned by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. Inc. v. The 
Laitram Corporation. 170 In Deepsouth the plaintiffs patent was for a machine to devein 
shrimp. The defendant manufactured all the parts of the machines and shipped them in 
separate boxes to purchasers overseas, where they could easily be assembled by the 
purchasers in less than an hour. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that "make" 
connoted the substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine, and instead 
preferred the approach in Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea that a product was made only 
when it reached the state of final "operable" assembly. Therefore, the manufacturer of the 
unassembled parts in the United States could, if at all, only be guilty of contributory 
infringement. Since contributory infringement must relate to an actual infringement, and 
sale or use outside the United States did not constitute such an infringement, the defendant 
could not be liable as a contributory infringer.!71 However, in 1984, section 271 was 
amended to alter the holding in Deepsouth, and the factual situation that occurred in 
Decwsouth would now amount to an infringement. 172 
4.6. Ap,plication of these Tort Principles in the Malaysian Context 
How does the above discussion affect the position in Malaysia? As far as the present 
position in Malaysia is concerned, the law of tort is governed by section 3 of the Civil Law 
Act 1956,173 which in essence states that in the absence of any written local law, the 
common law and principles of equity will apply. Since there is no specific statute on the 
law of tort in Malaysia, the common law and principles of equity as administered in 
England will apply. There has been no reported case concerning issues of indirect 
exploitation of patented inventions in Malaysia where the common law principle is applied. 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
The principle in the above case was followed in the Court of Appeals in Cold t:Ktal ~ Co. 
y. United Enl'r & Foum Co. 110 USPQ 332 (CA 3rd Cir. 1956) and HeWItt-Rouse Ipc. y. 
Link-Belt Co. 151 USPQ 670 (CA 7th Cir. 1966). 
Dec;psouth Packinl Co. Inc. y. The Laitram Cotporatiop 406 US 518; 173 USPQ 769 (US Sup. 
Ct 1972). 
Decpsouth PackiPI Co. Inc. y. The Laitram Comoration 173 USPQ 769 (US Sup. Ct 1972), per 
Mr Justice White. at pages 771-774. 
See USC 35. section 271(f) in Appendix. For a commentary on this ame~nt, see ~nsi!""" 
Note. "Patent Infringement: Redefining the 'Making' Standard to Include Partial Assembbes. 60 
Wash. L. Rev. 889 (1985). 
Civil Law Act 1956 (Revised 1972), Act 67, Malaysia. See Appendix. Por a discussion of the 
reception of common law principles in Malaysia, see Chapter I, at para. 1.2.4. 
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However, a trawl of the Malaysian cases revealed two cases relevant for present purpose. 
In Government of Perak v. Adams, 174 the court turned for guidance to English tort 
decisions on fundamental principles. The cases of Lumley v. Gye and Allen v. Flood were 
cited by the judge in coming to his decision in In the matter of the petition of the Straits 
Steamship Company. Ltd and the Attomey-General. 175 Lumley v. Gye and Allen v. Flood 
were relied upon in The Koursk, 176 which was cited with approval in Morton Norwich and 
also in Unilever. 177 Further, since there have been express recognition that patent 
infringement is just a specie of tort, a statutory tort, and, therefore, the principles of the law 
of torts should be applicable to patent infringement, 17 8 there no reason to believe that the 
principles discussed above would not be applied by the Malaysian courts when similar 
issues come before them. 
4.7. Observations on the Common Law Remedies 
Despite what is said above, it is submitted that reliance on the common law remedies is 
unsatisfactory. A patentee who has been granted a patent should be entitled to the full 
economic benefits derivable from it. Keeping in mind the balance that needs to be 
maintained between the patentee and the public, it is justifiable that certain types of indirect 
exploitation of his invention by others should be restrained. This is to ensure that others do 
not unfairly impinge upon, or subvert his rights. Therefore, the patentee should be able to 
174 GoyemmentofPerak v. Adams [1914] 2 FMSLR 144. 
17 S In the matter of the petition of the Straits Steamship Company. Ltd and the Attorney-General 
[1933] 2 MLJ 43. In Lumley y. Oye (1853) 2 E. & B. 216, involving an action for procuring a 
breach of a contract for a theatre performance, ErIe J. laid down the general statement that the 
procurement of the violation of a right is a cause of action in all instances where the violation is 
an actionable wrong. Therefore, a person who procures the wrong is a joint wrongdoer, and may be 
sued, either alone or jointly with the agent - at page 232. This statement of principle was ~ 
by the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood [1898] A.C. 1, per Lord Watson, at page 96. See also the 
speech of Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495. 
176 The Koursk [1924] P. 140, a decision of the Court of Appeal which held that persons are not joint 
tortfeasors merely because their independent wrongful acts have resulted in one damnum, contained 
a useful discussion of the meaning of joint tortfeasors. There has to be a "nexus of responsibility" 
between the two parties alleged to be joint tortfeasors. Where there is a relationship of master and 
servant or of agency, such a nexus is obviously present. However, in other cases, the nexus of 
responsibility to tie two persons alleged to be joint tortfeasors together is ~e presence of a 
common design or concerted action, in the course of, and in furtherance of which, one of them 
commits a tort - per Scrutton L.J., at page 155. 
177 See supra, text accompanying footnotes 59 and 70 respectively. 
178 See, for example, Morton-Norwich Products Inc. y. Intercen lid [1976] FSR 513 {H. Ct), per 
Graham J., at page 521, "It will be convenient to deal first with the question of joint ~easance 
... There does not appear to be much authority on this question as applied to patent actions. but I 
sec no reason why the law should be any different in the tort of infringement ~ of any other 
tort ... ", and Unileyer PLC V. Gillette ev.K.) Ljmited [1989] RPC 83, per Mustdl L.J., at page 
602. For similar views from the other jurisdictions, see, for example, Australia - Spotless Grgyp 
lid and aoor y. Prop1ast PLY Ltd apd 80<1' (1986-1988) 10 IPR 668, King J., at page 670. and B.CIl 
Ayatralia Ltd and olS V' ""'lips Marketjnl PLY Ltd and ors (1987-1988) 12 IPR 143. per Wilcox 
J .• at pap 145; Canada - Cgp;Iapd-Cbatunon Co. 1M V. BlUM apd Guc:rtjn (1906) 10 Ex. C.R. 
224. Exchequer Court, at page 243; USA - I,incoln Boaior«inl Co. of Dliaois y. Stewart-W .. 
CD. 34 USPQ 92 (CCA 7th Or. 1937), ~r Bvan, Circuit Judge, at page 98. 
249 
prevent any active assistance leading to infringement, or any acts to induce or procure an 
infringement. His rights should also extend to the control of other forms of exploitation 
which, although not directly resulting in an infringement by the exploiter, nevertheless 
impinge on the exclusive rights of the patentee to exploit his invention commercially. 
From the earlier discussion, it is evident that by applying the principles of the law of torts, 
such activities could partially be curbed. Under the approach in the United States, the 
person who either induces another, or takes part in a concerted action to infringe is liable as 
a contributory infringer and could be sued severally, without the necessity of bringing 
action against the outright infringer. In the case of a staple article of commerce, there has to 
be evidence that the defendant has the intent and purpose to assist in the actual 
infringement. Mere knowledge that the article would be use in infringement of the patent is 
not enough. There has to be some active assistance to provide the necessary nexus between 
the two. If the article is specially adapted for the patented invention, such an intention could 
be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
The question is whether there is any difference in substance between the approach in the 
United States and that in the United Kingdom (which for all intent and purpose includes the 
Australian and the Canadian approaches). One of the most important principle in both 
approaches is that before an indirect exploitation can be actionable, a direct infringement 
must result from it. This rule is tied to the concept that the wrong caused by the indirect 
exploitation is due to the contribution to, or some form of inducement or participation in, 
the actual infringement. At common law, a mere conspiracy or common design to commit a 
tort, without more, is not actionable, as damage is the gist of the right to bring a private 
action. 179 In the absence of proof of a direct infringement, or if it could not be presumed 
from the circumstances, the indirect exploiter cannot be made liable as a contributory or 
joint infringer or joint tortfeasor. In both the systems, for an unauthorised indirect 
exploitation to be actionable, there is a requirement of some positive actions on the part of 
the indirect exploiter, whether it be by inducement, procurement, concerted actions or other 
179 See Morton-Norwich Products Inc. y. Intercen Ltd [1976] FSR 513. per Graham 1 .• at 524. This 
rule arises from the principle enunciated by Lord Coleridge C.I .• in MQKUI S.S. Co. y. McGrep. 
Gow " Co. (1888). 21 QBD 544. at 549. "But in an indictment it suffices if the combination 
exists and is unlawful because it is the combination itself which is mischievous. and which gives 
the public an interest to interfere by indictment. Nothing need be actually done in ~o~ it 
... It is otherwise in a civil suit; it is the damage which results from the unlawful comblDation 
itself with which the civil action is concerned. It is not every combination which is unlawful. ani 
if the combination is lawful. that is to say, is for a lawful end pursued by lawful means, or being 
unlawful there is no damage from it to the plaintiff. the action will not lie."; see also CroOcr HagJ 
Woyon Hmis Twmd Co. y. Veitch [1942] AC 435, per Viscount Simon L.C. at 439-440, "But 
the tort of conspiracy is constituted only if the agreed combination is carried into effect in a ~ 
or less degree and damage to the plaintiff is .thereby produ~. It must ~ so, for, ~ as a Civil 
wrong, conspiracy is one of those wrongs (like fraud or negligence) which sound In ~ and a 
mere agreement to injure, if it was never acted upon at.all and ne~.led .to any result affectiDa ~ 
party complaining, could not produce damage to him. The distinction between the essential 
conditions to be fulfilled by the crime and the tort respectively ate conveniently set out by Lad 
Coleridge in his judgement in MOl'll StMIDSbjp Co. y. McGromr. Gow " Co." 
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forms of indirect participation which contribute to the buyer's infringing activities. 1be 
terms, inducement, concerted action, aiding and abetting, etc., seem to be used very loosely 
in the cases. 180 In the United States, it was only after the enactment of section 271 that 
there was a distinction made between contributory infringement and inducing an 
infrin· t 181 Pr' h . .. gemen . lor to t at, both form of activItIes amounted to a contributory 
infringement. In the United Kingdom, there was initially an attempt to distinguish the 
wrongful acts by describing a person who took part in a concerted action to infringe as a 
joint tortfeasors (primary direct infringer), and the inducer as a joint infringer (secondary 
infringer). However, the distinction is sometimes blurred and seemed to be used 
interchangeably in the later cases.1 82 
In the final analysis, despite the differences in the terms used, the doctrine of contributory 
infringement exists in the United Kingdom, even prior to the 1977 Act, despite assertions 
to the contrary .18 3 If the mere making or selling of parts or components of a patented 
product or the supplying of materials which are used in a patented process amounts to a 
"contributory infringement", then it is correct to say that that concept does not form part of 
the law in the United Kingdom system. However, this is not even true in the United States. 
As mentioned earlier, there has to be some form of active participation over and above the 
mere supply of the components or materials. This is especially true in the case of a supply 
180 
181 
182 
183 
See, for example, Lord Templeman in C.B.S Son&s Ltd & ors v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics 
PIc and Dixons Ltd [1988] RPC 567, at page 608, "My Lords, I accept that a defendant who 
procures a breach of copyright is liable jointly and severally with the infringer for the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The defendant is a joint infringer; he 
intends and procures and share a common design that infringement shall take place. A defendant 
may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion."; Mustill LJ., in Unileyer 
PLC y. Gillette (U.K.) Limited [1989] RPC 583, at page 608, "I use the word 'common design' 
because they are readily to hand, but there are other expressions in the cases, such as 'concerted 
action' or 'agreed on common action' which will serve just as well. The words are not to be 
construed as if they formed part of a statute. They all convey the same idea. This idea does not, as 
it seems to me, call for any finding that the secondary party has explicitly mapped out a plan with 
the primary offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor, as it seems to me, is there any 
need for a common design to infringe. It is enough if the parties combine to secure the doing of 
acts which in the event prove to be infringement. " 
See United States Code, Title 35, section 271 (b), active inducement and section 271(c). 
contributory infringement. See also, Notes on the Committee of Experts on the Harmonisation of 
Certain Provisions in Laws for the Protection of Invention, Fifth Session (WIPO), Industrial 
Property - October 1988, 358 at pages 362 and 365, where the Chairman. in summing .up the 
conclusion of the discussion, stated that a distinction should be drawn between contnbutory 
infringement of a patent, which involved the indirect exploitation of a patent by the supply of the 
means of exploiting the patent, on the one hand, and inducement to infringe a patent, which 
involved more than the mere supply of means and an active incitement to use, by way of. fcx' 
example. instructions, on the other band. 
See. for example. Lord Templeman in C.B.S SonKs Ltd & ors y. Amstra4 Consumer Electronics 
PIc and Dixons Ltd [1988] RPC 567, at page 608, cited in footnote 69. and Unlleyer PLC y. 
Gillette ro.K.> Limited [1989] RPC 583 (CA). Mustill L.J., at page 608, cited in footnote 73. 
See, for example, Ladas, S.P., Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, National aDd International 
Protection (1975), Vol. I, at page 402; Cornish. W.R., Intellectual Property. 2nd Ed. Sweet cl 
Maxwell. London, 1989, at page 167; Lahore, J., ~I ill (Eds) Intellectual Property in Austtalia -
Patents, Designs, Trade Marks, Confidential Information. Unfair Competition. Volume 1 
Butterworths, Sydney, 1991, at page 802; Ricketson. S., The Law of Intellectual Property .. The 
Law Book Company Ltd. 1984. at page 988; Hoffmann. K., "Contributory or Indirect 
Infringement of Patents - A Review of the Legal position in 13 Countries", 6 C1PA 371 (1977). 
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of a staple commodity .184 If no specific meaning is attached to the words used but to the 
legal consequence of the activities, it would be seen that the United Kingdom courts have 
recognised as infringement the activities which would have been censured as contributory 
infringement in the United States. 
Different terms are also used in the various jurisdictions to describe the indirect exploiter 
who had been found guilty of carrying out the proscribed acts. In the United States, he was 
known as a contributory infringer. No practical distinction seemed to be made between the 
two modes of indirect exploitation, they were simply regarded as contributory 
infringement, implying that in both cases, there were contributions or participation in the 
outright infringement. 185 The approach in the United Kingdom, and Australia, is to regard 
the inducer as a joint infringer. Persons who take part in a concerted action or common 
design to infringe are regarded as joint tortfeasors.186 In Canada, the person who induces 
or procures an infringement would himself be regarded as an infringer.187 In principle, 
there seems to be no difference in the liability between a joint infringer and a joint 
tortfeasor. Since the tort involved is the infringement of a patent, the joint tortfeasor would 
be jointly involved in the infringement, and hence is an infringer. So it would seem that 
despite the various descriptions used to describe these activities and the wrongdoers, the 
persons involved in the indirect acts are infringers, just like the outright infringer, and are 
severally and jointly liable for their wrong. No importance should be attached to the 
descriptive words used, as it is only a matter of nomenclature, and in practice, it does not 
detract from giving the patentee due protection. I 88 
Whatever difference that exists is a matter of degree and is found in the different approach 
or attitude of the courts towards manufacture and supply of parts specially adapted for use 
in the patented invention, or what is sometimes referred to as a non-staple article. In the 
United Kingdom, unlike the United States, it had been held that even in the case of these 
class of articles, mere knowledge and intent that the articles were to be used to infringe a 
184 Thomson-Houston Electric CO. V. KelseY Electric Railway Specialty Co. et al, 75 Fed. Rep. 1005 
(CCA 2nd Cir. 1896). per Wallace. Circuit Judge. dissenting. at page lOll; Indiyidual Dripkio& 
Cyp Co, v. Errett 297 Fed. Rep. 733 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1924). per Mayer, Circuit Judge. at 740. 
18S cf section 271 of the United States Code. Title 35 - Patents (as last amended by Public Law 101-
580 of November 16, 1990), where a distinction is made between s. 27 I (b). "~oever ~vely 
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer" and s. 271(c), which describes the 
person who supplies components. etc. as a contributory infringer. 
186 Although Lord Templeman in C.B,S SOP&S Ltd & ors v. Amstrad Consumer Electropics Pic at 
Dixops IJd [1988] RPC 567. referred to such a person as a joint infringer too - see at page 606. 
187 CopeJapd-CbatteJsop Co. Ltd v' HattoP and Guertip (1906) 10 Ex. C.R. 224. at page 247. 
188 See Osborne. J.C., "Contributory Infringement" 14 CPR 75 (1951), at page 7S, "It has often been 
said that the doctrine of contributory infringement is unknown to the patent law of Canada . A 
moment's reflection will at once reveal that this very interesting mI apparently conclUSIve 
observation only acquires importance if some meaning can be attri~ted to the. words used. "'. and at 
paae 89, ''The momentous question of whether or not there I~ an action for, co.:'tnbutory 
infrinaement in Canada reveals itself as a mere debate over the meaning of an expression. 
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patent was not enough to fix liability on the supplier. 189 However, it has to be noted that 
the statement was made obiter, because the finding of facts was that the parts supplied had 
other non-infringing uses and there was no allegation of any actual infringement, the 
plaintiffs suing on the mere sales of the component parts. 1 90 The court also had no need to 
make any adverse inference against the defendants because of the finding that the plaintiffs' 
tyres had world-wide users and also that they had granted large and extensive licences 
within the United Kingdom.191 
It is submitted that there is no reason, in principle, why the Malaysian court could not adopt 
the tort approach in giving a remedy to the patentee where there is an unauthorised indirect 
exploitation of his patent. As mentioned earlier, the law of torts in Malaysia is based on the 
common law of the United Kingdom. Adopting this approach would not create an 
independent form of infringement, or new rights, outside those specifically provided for 
under the Act. Recognising that patent infringement is a tort, albeit a statutory tort, and that 
the indirect exploitation are different ways of committing the tort would remove the legal 
objections to the purported extension of the statutory provision. A person who makes the 
whole patented article is an infringer. Anyone who supplies the components with the 
intention to induce an infringement would thereby be taking part in the steps required to 
infringe. He can thus be said to be participating in the final act of infringement and should, 
therefore, be liable. Procurement and concerted actions merely deal with the different 
aspects of the statutory tort of infringement. 
The next question is whether relying solely on tortious principles is enough to give full 
protection. At first sight it would seem that reliance on the common law principles of torts 
would give sufficient protection against indirect exploitation. However, the patentee's 
rights would be further strengthened if the Malaysian courts could be persuaded to adopt 
the American approach towards component parts specially adapted to fit a patented article. It 
will be remembered that under the American system, sale of such parts would give rise to 
an inference that the supplier has the necessary intent and purpose to assist in the fmal 
infringement, unless the contrary is proved. This does not impose any undue hardship on 
legitimate trade because the innocent supplier could always prove that he was supplying the 
parts for legitimate trade, for example, for repair, export or to a licensee of the patentee. 
Together with the principle of vicarious liability in the case of agency and partnership, the 
patentee's rights seem to be satisfactorily protected. 
189 See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (1904) 21 RPC 274, per 
Vaughan Williams L.1 .. at page 280. 
190 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (1904) 21 RPC 274, per 
Vaughan Williams L.J., at page 278. 
191 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (1904) 21 RPC 274, per 
Vaughan Williams L.1., at page 281. See also Cozens-Hardy L.J., at page 282, where he 
mentioned that the parts sold could have legally been used for export. sold to licensees Of for use tn 
repairs. 
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Having said that, there is an obstacle to adopting the principles and approaches discussed 
above that may prevent an effective protection for the patentee. This is because of the rule 
that there can be no contributory infringement unless there is a direct infringement. 192 TIle 
Act contains an express provision limiting the rights of the patentee only to acts done for 
industrial or commercial purposes.1 93 There is no problem if the purchasers of the 
component parts were commercial users. They would infringe by making or using the 
product. Hence the supplier would also be liable for indirect infringement of the patent. If, 
however, the purchasers from the supplier of component parts were to assemble the parts 
for private use, it would seem that there would be no infringement of the patent. The same 
argument goes for purchasers of compounds or materials for use in a method or process 
claim. Since these purchasers would be protected by virtue of section 37, they could not be 
liable as direct infringers. Following this, the suppliers, too, would not be liable for any 
indirect infringement. There is no case law on this point in Malaysia or in the four 
jurisdictions investigated, but in principle, this seems to be correct. However, guidance 
may be found in German jurisprudence. 
Windsurfmi International Inc. v. Diekow-Segel KG194 was a decision taken under section 
6 of the Patents Act 1968 of the Federal Republic of Germany.J95 The plaintiff was the 
owner of a German patent concerning a "Rig for a sailboard". It was alleged, inter alia, that 
the defendant sold the sails to end users for non-commercial use, and to two frrms in the 
fine foods and beverage business who placed advertising messages on the sails and then let 
end users have them for non-commercial use. It was also alleged that the defendant had also 
supplied sporting goods stores who completed the sails to make up windsurfers possessing 
the characteristics of the patent in suit, and also sold them as extra, or replacement sails. 
The plaintiff contended that the production and distribution of the sales constituted a direct 
infringement of the patent through manufacture and distribution of parts of the protected 
overall device, as well as an indirect infringement of the patent rights. 
192 See, for example, Dee.psouth Packin& Co. Inc. v. The Laitram Cmporation 173 USPQ 769 (US 
Sup. Ct 1972), per Mr Justice White, at pages 771-774; see also Dow Chemical AG" &Dor y. 
Spence Btyson" Co. Ltd" anor [1982] FSR 598, per Falconer J., at 626, "As I have held that 
the first defendant's process for the manufacture of the alleged infringing carpet did not in~~e the 
plaintiffs' patent, the plaintiffs' case against the second defendant that the second defendant infrinpd 
by procuring the first defendant's infringement must fail." 
193 Section 37, Patents Act 1983 (as amended in 1986) Malaysia. This exception is further discussed 
in Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights, at para. 7.1.1. 
194 WjnmurfinllotematjQna1lnc. y. Diekow-Seeel KG 13 nc 645 (1982) (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany). 
195 Patent Law, 1968, of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 6, "The effect of the patent sball be 
such that the patentee alone is authorised to produce, put on the market, offer for sale. or usc, the 
subject matter of the invention industrially. commercially or professionally. If the patent has been 
granted for a process, the effect shall also extend to the products obtained directl~ ~y means o~ such 
process."; Article 47(1) - Any person who uses.a .invention contrary to the pro~ODS of Article 6. 
7 and 8 may be sued by the injured party to eDJom such usc. 'The present Act IS now the Patents 
Act 1981. SSe 10 and 11. See Scbafers. A .• and BaUmann. U.C •• "Completion of the Patent Law 
Reform in the Federal Republic of Germany". Vol. 20 Industrial Property 159 (1981). at page 163. 
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The action was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeal ruled against the 
defendant. The defendant petitioned for legal review. On the issue of indirect infringement, 
the Federal Supreme Court held that the defendant did not indirectly infringe by the sale to 
the end users since indirect infringement was the frrst part of a two-act sequence whose 
second part was the direct infringement committed by a third party while using the supplied 
item. Therefore, the indirect use could only amount to an infringement if there was a direct 
infringement.196 It held that to hold otherwise would be to create an independent form of 
infringement which would be inconsistent with the provision of the 1968 Act. 197 Since the 
second part of the two-act sequence was missing, the defendant could not be held liable. 
As is evident from the above decision, the feasibility of adopting the common law approach 
to solve the problem of indirect acts leading to direct infringement suffers from this inherent 
weakness. This weakness is not present in the various jurisdictions discussed earlier 
because the monopoly rights in these countries were not restricted only to commercial 
exploitation under their former patent laws. To overcome this weakness, express 
provisions would have to be legislated for. It is submitted that commercial activities leading 
to supplies of component parts or materials to consumers should not be exempted from 
infringement actions. This is because the supplier, by taking away potential sales from the 
patentee, has obtained a profit which was derived from the patented invention, and which 
should rightly belong to the patentee. To rely solely on tortious principles would not give 
the patentee an adequate remedy. 
196 Windsurfin& International Inc. y. Diekow-Se&el KG 13 IIC 645 (1982) (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany), at 
page 647, "Indirect infringement deals with a range of acts which, while representing a significant 
threat to the rights of the patent owner without quite constituting an accomplished infringement of 
the patent, are not covered by the customary categories of complicity and participation. because 
there is usually no collaboration between the indirect and the direct infringer. In order to cover this 
group of acts and to protect the patent owner against this type of threat to his rights, the courts 
have affirmed the latter's rights vis-a-vis the indirect user. In so doing, they regarded indirect patent 
infringement not as an independent category of use besides the four categories reserved to the patent 
owner under s. 6 Patent Act 1968 - which would not have been admissible in view of the statutory 
restrictions of the rights to the four categories of acts of use - but as a special form of participation 
in one of these four acts of use. Therefore, indirect patent infringement is the flfSt part of a two-act 
sequence whose second part is the direct infringement committed by a third party while using the 
supplied item ... Accordingly. the indirect act of use becomes an illegal patent violation only after 
it results in a direct infringement." 
197 Windsurfin& International Inc. y. Diekow-Seeel KG 13 IIC 645 (1982) (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany), at 
page 647, "According to the new legal provisions which. pursuant to Art. 12(1) Act on the 
Community Patent are not applicable to the present case, indirect patc:nt infringe~nt re~n~ an 
independent form of patent infringement whereas on the basis ~fpreV1OUSly app.li~l~ la~. ~ 
infringement was actionable only if it was viewed as a special form of partiClpatton In a ~ 
party's - direct - patent infringement. Accordingly, this court finds itself prevented from developmg, 
for reason of equity, the legal doctrine of indirect patent infringement in the sense of the new 
lopalation pursuant to sees. 10 and 11. Patent Act 1981. because this - in conflict with the 
provisions of soc. 6 Patent Act 1968 which is applicable to the present case - would ~ an 
iDdependent form of patent infringement which would not be consistent with the acts of use listed 
therein." 
2SS 
4.8. Proposals for Change 
Ultimately, therefore, there is still a need for legislative intervention to add a new provision 
to the Act, to cater for indirect exploitation of a patent without the need to show a nexus 
with a direct infringement. Legislation is also required to remove any uncertainty under the 
common law. The two models that could be followed are the United States model and the 
United Kingdom model. 198 It is submitted that the more appropriate model to follow is the 
United Kingdom model. The most cogent reason for the choice is that under the United 
States model, both forms of indirect exploitation are actionable only if there is a 
contribution to an underlying direct infringement. 199 This would not work in the Malaysian 
context because of the private use exception to infringement which is absent in the United 
States patent code. The United Kingdom model, by making these indirect exploitation an 
independent form of infringement is more suitable in the Malaysian context.200 It is, 
therefore, proposed that the overall structure of section 60(2) to (4), and section 60(6) of 
the 1977 Patents Act of the UK be adapted and adopted.20 1 
The proposed section should provide that it will be an infringement for a person to supply 
or offer to supply component part of a patented product or process when the supplier 
knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that it will be used to 
put the invention into effect. To cater for the possibility that the new right will result in a 
virtual monopoly of unpatented components of a patented invention, an exception should be 
made in the case where the supply is made to a person entitled to work the patent. These 
198 
199 
200 
201 
Although the Patents Act 1990, Australia, contains in section 117 provisions on contributory 
infringement, the phraseology of the section has caused problems in construction, and as construed 
by the court in Rescare Ltd v. Anaesthetic SURplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119; and Anaesthetic 
Supplies Ply Ltd v. Rescare Ltd (1994) AIPC 91-076, at 38,395, has rendered ineffective the 
envisaged protection for process patents against indirect exploitation. For a commentary on the 
case, see Monotti, A., "Contributory Infringement of a Process Patent under the Patents Act 1990: 
Does it Exist After Rescare?" (1995) 6 AlPJ 217. 
See, for example, Am Manufacturin& Co. Inc. et aI. v. Convertible ToR Re.placement Co. Inc. 
(Aro I) 128 USPQ 354 (US Sup. Ct 1961), per Mr Justice Whittaker, at page 357. There are also 
other differences. For a detailed discussion on these differences, see Benyamini, A., Patent 
Infringement in the European Community, IIC Studies Vol 13, VCH, Weinheim, 1993 - Chapter 
9. 
See section 60(6) of the 1977 Patents Act, UK, which specially caters for the situation of private 
users. 
Admittedly a substantial body of case law relating to the construction of section 60(2) and (3) of 
the 1977 Act has yet to be established. The few cases reported do not contain any analysis of the 
various ingredients of the provisions. See, for example, Rotocmp International Ltd y. Genboume 
Ltd [1982] FSR 241, Purr y. Iruline [1985] FSR 553, Rhone-Poulenc AG Co. & anor y. 
DiklOJide Herbicides Sdn Bhd & anor [1988] FSR 282, Helitune Ltd v. Stewart HUKhes IJd (1991) 
FSR 171, and Pavel y. SORY noted Vol. 16 IPD 16070 (1993). However, the UK provisions on 
indirect exploitation of a patented invention are substantially similar to the equiv~ent provi~ions 
of the Community Patent Convention - see Article 26 CPC. A detailed and exhaustive ~alyS1S of 
the working of the relevant provisions of the CPC is found in Benyamini, A., Patent Infringeme?t 
in the European Community, IIC Studies Vol 13, VCH, Weinheim, 1993 -~r 9. It !s 
noteworthy that the proposed Article 19(4) of the Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as Far as Patents are Concerned (Patent Law 
Treaty) is modelled upon Artice 26 of the CPC - see Document PLTIDCI3, in Industrial Property, 
February 1991, page 118. See also Introductory Chapter, at footnote 11, for further references. 
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would include compulsory licensees, concurrent patent owners, prior users, persons 
entitled to work a patented invention after a patent has lapsed and before reinstatement, and 
persons entitled to work the invention by virtue of the rights of the Government. 202 To this 
end, a non-exclusive list of persons entitled to work the invention is laid down. So as to 
enable the provision to work where the supply is to private users, the section should clarify 
that supply to such persons will not be regarded as supply to persons entitled to work the 
invention. However, as rightly observed by Benyamini, persons conducting experiments 
may be unable to produce the means needed for carrying out the invention, and the patentee 
is not obliged to supply them with such means.203 To prevent the supply of means essential 
to work a patented invention to experimental users would be to deprive the exception from 
infringement actions of any usefulness.204 It is, therefore, proposed that in this respect 
there should be a departure from the UK model by providing that for the purposes of the 
section on contributory infringement, experimental users are to be regarded a persons 
entitled to work the invention. 
Since the provision is not meant to permit the patent owner to control supply of staple 
commercial products, the supply of such products should, prima jacie, not be an 
infringement unless there was inducement by the supplier. However, to assist the court in 
the proper construction of the term "staple commercial product", it is proposed that a 
definition of this term be included. Benyamini, in his analysis, submits that the term is 
characterised by two main qUalities, i.e., that it is a basic product commonly used for 
various purposes, and that it is generally available on the market. 205 In Regicentre v. Isoka. 
International-Celomer et aI., the Paris District Court used the definition "a product generally 
available in commerce and customarily used" in other non-patented processes.206 It is 
submitted that such a definition could usefully be adopted in the proposed section. The new 
section should also contain a provision similar to that found in section 271(0 of the United 
States statute relating to export trade.207 
202 
203 
204 
20S 
206 
207 
See Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights, at paras. 7.2.2. to 7.2.4. 
Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Community, IIC Stu<!ies Vol 13, VC~, 
Weinheim, 1993 - Chapter 9, at page 185. Since supplying means for expenmental ~urposes IS 
unlikely to entail use of the invention on a large scale by the suppli~r or ~e expenme~ter, he 
further submits that the rights conferred by Article 27(c) of the CPC ID relation to expenmental 
use go beyond what is necessary to protect the patentee. 
For the analysis of the experimental use exception, see Chapter 7 - Exceptions, Limitations ard 
Loss of Rights, at para. 7.2. 
Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European Community, lIe Studies Vol 13, VCH, 
Weinheim, 1993, at pages 234-235. See also Benyamini, para. 9.8.3., at footnotes 25 and 26, f~r a 
summary of the various definitions proposed or applied to this expression in relation .to Article 
26(2) of the CPC and the corresponding provisions in the patent laws of the EEC countnes. 
Rolicen&re y. laoka. IntcmationaJ-Celmper ,t d. 20 nc 217 (Paris District Court, 1989), at page 
220. 
See discussion in para. 4.5., sll(Jm. 
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Therefore, it is proposed that a new section, section 58B, similar to the UK provision, but 
with the suggested modifications, be inserted in the Act. The proposed amendments to the 
Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are set out in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Issuance of Threats to Enforce Patent Rights 
5. Introduction 
The owner of a patent has the right to bring infringement proceedings to protect his 
exclusive rights under the patent. This is a legitimate means of protecting his monopoly. 
Could he, however, instead of resorting to the proper legal mechanism for resolving his 
dispute, rely on self help remedies by making allegations of infringement and by 
threatening to institute legal proceedings for the alleged infringement of his right? Should 
not competing manufacturers and traders be protected from patentees, licensees and others 
seeking to "obtain or extend the monopoly"! by possibly unwarranted allegations of 
infringement and threats of proceedings? The effect on the party to whom the allegations 
were made or against whom the threats were made may not be undeserved if they are true. 
What if they are false? The allegations and the threats may cause damage to his business. In 
this situation would the victim of such false statements in respect of his patent position have 
any remedy against such unfair attacks? 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the extent to which an owner could legitimately 
"warn off' his competitors or customers of the competitors, by making allegations or 
threats pertaining to patent infringement. It analyses the common law remedies for false 
allegations and unjustified threats to determine whether, and to what extent, a person 
unjustifiably threatened with legal proceedings for patent infringement could obtain 
satisfactory relief for any damage that he suffers. This is followed by an examination of the 
development of the United Kingdom threats provisions. The United Kingdom threats 
provision is chosen because of its long tradition and its more than one hundred years 
experience in dealing with this problem. Where necessary, references are made to the 
Australian and New Zealand statutes and case law on this area. The extent to which the 
common law remedies are applicable to Malaysia is considered. Since there is no statutory 
remedy provided in the 1983 Act for actions to be taken against unjustified threats, this 
chapter also discusses whether a statutory machinery should be provided, and if so, what 
provisions should be present. 2 The proposal is made in the light of the experience gained 
from the study of the United Kingdom system and with the aim of making remedial 
recommendations to achieve a proper balance between the rights of an owner to attempt to 
I 
2 
See Townsend Controls Pty Ltd y. Gilead and apor (1988-1989) 14 IPR 443. per von Doussa J. at 
page 448. 
Note that the provision of a statutory remedy for groundless threats is not something that is novel 
in the Malaysian context. Such a provision was found in the repealed Invention Enactment 1914. 
of the Fedended Malay States - see Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent 
System. para. 1.3.2.b. 
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protect his exclusive rights and also the right of his competitors to be free from unfair and 
false allegations or other unfair activities. 
5. 1 . The Remedies under the Common Law 
Besides the use of unjustified threats, other forms of actions are also utilised, for example, 
slander of title, or false and malicious representation, where an imputation is made 
questioning the title of certain person to deal with certain property, without at the same time 
containing a threat of legal proceedings. This would also deter the person to whom the 
communication was addressed from carrying on dealing with the person whose title was 
impugned. However, behind every threat is contained an implication that the person 
threatened has no right to deal with the relevant product or process. The common law 
remedy for such unfounded allegations is now examined. 
The main remedy available under common law involving false allegations is the action for 
the tort of injurious falsehood. Two particular forms of this tort of injurious falsehood are 
slander of title and slander of goods (sometimes referred to as trade libel). The law reports 
abound with cases on this topic. However, only two non-patent cases will be discussed 
because of their adoption by later courts when dealing specifically with false allegations in 
relation to patents. 
The first case, Pitt v. Donovan,3 involved an action for slander of title relating to land. The 
defendant imputed that the plaintiffs title to an estate would be disputed because he had 
purchased it from a person who was alleged to be insane. Due to this imputation the 
potential purchaser from the plaintiff refused to complete the purchase. At the trial the judge 
directed the jury that in order to maintain the action some malice must be fixed on the 
defendant, that is, the act must arise from an improper motive and be injurious. He further 
instructed the jury that if on a reasonable man's test, the evidence satisfied them that the 
vendor was insane, or that the defendant reasonably held such a view, then the defendant 
would not be liable. 
On that instruction the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal on the ground of a 
misdirection, it was held that the objective test of a reasonable man was not the proper test 
to be applied. The proper question for the jury was whether the defendant acted bona fide in 
the statement which he made, believing it to be true. This was to be judged according to the 
defendant's own understanding and impressions of the particular circumstance known to 
him.-l This means that whether the defendant is to be judged to have acted maliciously is to 
3 
4 
Pitt v, Donoyan (1813) I M. & S. 639; 105 E.R. 238. 
Sec the specches of Lord Ellcnborough C.J .. at pages 643-646. and Bayley 1. at page 649. "The 
question here is not what judgement a sensible and reasonable man would have fonned in this casc, 
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be based on a subjective test. Even if the statement made proves to be untrue or false there 
is no slander of the title, if he believes them. 
The same approach was followed in Green v. Button, 5 an action on the case for a false and 
malicious representation. Parke J. stressed that the action was maintainable if it was made 
maliciously, and without reasonable or probable cause, and the special damage accrued 
from the claim so made.6 Since it appeared that the defendant knew that there had been no 
agreement for a lien, he had falsely and wrongfully pretended that he was entitled to a lien, 
and made the representation from improper and malicious motives'? 
The first of the cases involving patents was that of Wren v. Weild. 8 The plaintiffs brought 
an action against the defendant for falsely and maliciously writing to the plaintiffs' 
customers alleging that the plaintiffs' machines were infringements of the defendant's 
patent, and that the defendant would sue them for infringement if they used the machine 
without paying royalties. The judge applied the rule in Pitt v. Donovan9 and Green v. 
Button, 10 and directed the jury accordingly. The plaintiffs obtained a rule for a new trial on, 
inter alia, misdirection by the judge. The ruling of the judge was upheld. Blackburn J. in 
delivering the judgement of the court, acknowledged that no action precisely like this had 
ever been brought. However, he then referred to the "well-known action for slander of title 
where an unfounded assertion that the owner of real property has not title to it, if made 
under such circumstances that the law would imply malice, or if express malice be proved, 
and special damage is shown '0' is held to give a cause of action." 1 1 He went on to say that 
there was no reason "why a similar rule should not apply where the false and malicious 
assertion relate to goods, and the damage arises from the loss of a bargain to sell them." 12 
He concluded that no action would lie in such a situation unless it could be shown that the 
threats were made mala fide only with the intention to injure the plaintiff. Basically 
therefore, the approach of the court was in line with the earlier decisions. Since the 
defendant had a subsisting patent, he had the right to threaten infringement action, as long 
as he was doing it bona fide and without malicious intent. 13 This judgement has always 
been taken as the foundation of the law on this subject. 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
but whether the defendant did or did not entertain the opinion he communicated. I forbear to give 
any opinion on the weight of evidence, but the short question is, whether the defendant acted bona 
fide." Dampier J. gave concurring opinions. 
Green V. Button (1835) 2 Cromp. M. & R. 707; 150 E.R. 299. 
Green v. Button (1835) 2 Cromp. M. & R. 707, at page 715, and relying on the authority of 
Gerrard v. Dickinson (4th resolution, 4 Rep. 18) and also Lovett v· Weller (1 Roll. Rep. 309). 
Alderson B., and Gurney B., concurred. 
Wren v. Wejld (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730. 
Pitt V. Donovan (1813) 1 M. & S. 639; 105 E.R. 238. 
Green v. ButtOn (1835) 2 Cromp. M. & R. 707. 
Wren V. Wejld (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730, at page 734, per Blackburn J. 
Wren v. Wejld (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730, at page 735, per Blackburn J. 
It is interesting to note in the speech of Blackburn J. in Wren v. WoUd (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 
730, at page 735, that the threats made were not actionable so long as the person making the 
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Another patent case which involved a threat of legal proceedings was Halsey v. 
Brotherhood, 14 where it was alleged that the defendant had threatened persons proposing to 
buy the plaintiffs engines that in the event of their dealing with the plaintiff, the defendant 
would take legal proceedings against them. Again, applying the law applicable to an action 
for slander of title, Jessel M.R. stressed that "the essence of the case is the falsity of the 
assertion and the want of good faith in making it. That is, the assertion is made, not for the 
purpose of preserving the alleged legal right, but for a different purpose, and has injured 
the plaintiff in his trade." 15 
The Court of Appeal, in affirming the decision, held that the holder of a patent, the Validity 
of which was not impeached, had the right to issue notices threatening legal proceedings to 
protect his rights. He would not be liable to an action for damages by the vendor of those 
articles for the injury done to the vendor's trade by his issuing them, provided they were 
issued bona fide in the belief that the articles complained of were infringement of his patent. 
Lord Coleridge L.C.J. said, "It seems to be clear law that in an action in the High Court in 
the nature of slander of title, where the defendant has property of his own in defence of 
• 4 
IS 
statement was willing to take legal proceedings to protect his right. Similarly, in Rollins v. Hinks 
(1871-72) 13 L.R. Eq. 355, Sir R. Malins V.C. held, inter alia, that a patentee was not entitled to 
publish statements of his intention to institute legal proceedings, in order to deter persons from 
purchasing alleged infringements of his patent, if he had no bona fide intention to follow up his 
threats by taking such proceedings, and the court would in such case restrain him from making 
such publication. Relying on his own decision in Pixon y. Holden 7 L.R. Eq. 488, Sir R. Malins 
V.C., at page 360, stressed that "this refraining from bringing an action, after their threat to do so, 
is of itself strong evidence of doubt on their part .... Then do the defendants believe in the validity 
of their patent? If they do, these circulars may be issued in good faith; but if not, I consider them 
so totally wanting in good faith as to approach closely to fraud." A similar approach seems to be 
present in Axmann v. Lund (1874) 18 L.R. Eq. 330, where it was held that the court would 
restrain a patentee from issuing circulars threatening legal proceedings against infringers unless he 
would undertake to commence proceedings to assert the validity of his patent. Similarly, in 
Household and Rosher y. Fairburn and Hall (1884) 1 RPC 109, and Household and Rosher y. 
Fairburn and Hall (1885) 2 RPC 140, the judges insisted on proceedings being brought too. 
However, this attempted restraint on the patentee's freedom to made allegations against his 
competitors, as long as it was made bonafide was disapproved in Halsey v. Brotherhood (1880) 15 
Ch.P. 514; (1881) 19 Ch.P. 386 (confirmed by CA), resulting in further strengthening of the 
threatener's position and erosion of the rights of the person threatened. Jessel M.R. held that a 
patent, so long as it subsisted, was prima facie good, and, therefore, a patentee who issued notices 
against purchasing from a vendor alleging infringement of his patent was not bound to follow up 
his notices by taking legal proceedings~ and provided he issued the notices bona fide in assertion of 
what he believed, though erroneously, to be his legal rights under his patent, he did not render 
himself liable to an action by the vendor for damages for injury caused by issuing them. At page 
517, Jessel M .R. said, "It is said that he is not entitled to tell persons buying the plaintiff's 
engines that they are infringements and that those persons are liable to an action; and that he is not 
entitled to even to give a notice that these engines are infringements of his patent rigbts unless he 
follows up that notice by some legal proc~ng. I must entirely ~ssent fr?m that ~po~!tio~. 
There is ... no law in this country compelling a man to assert his legal nght by actlon. His 
judgement was unanimously upheld by the Court of Appeal. However, in Royal BIkini Powder 
CO. y. Wrllbt. Crossley & Co. (1901) 18 RPC 95 (HL), Lord Davey, at page 99, said, "It is only 
repeating the same proposition in another form if I add that the threat to sue must be shown to 
have been made for the purpose of injuring the plaintiffs, and not for the boM fide protection of the 
defendants' rigbts, and without any real intention to follow it up by action or other legal 
_..,Ii .. " t'A~.gs . 
Halsey y. Brptbcrbood (1880) 15 Cb.D. 514; (1881) 19 Cb.D. 386 (confirmed by CA). 
Halsey y. Bmtherbood (1880) 15 Cb.D. 514,,.r Jessel M.R., at page 518. 
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which the supposed slander of the plaintiffs title is uttered, it is not enough that the 
statement should be untrue, but there must be some evidence, either from the nature of the 
statement or otherwise, to satisfy the court or the jury that the statement was not only 
untrue, but was made mala fide for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, and not in the bona 
fide defence of the defendant's own property. It seems to be clear that if a statement is made 
in defence of the defendant's own property, although it injures and is untrue, it is still what 
the law calls a privileged statement, it is a statement that the defendant has a right to make, 
unless, besides its untruth and besides its injury, express malice is proved, that is to say, 
want of bonafide or the presence of mala/ide. The law is so laid down in Wren v. Weild 
... The result of that may be injury to the plaintiff, ... but it appears to me that a statement 
made under such circumstances does not give a ground of action merely because it is untrue 
and injurious to the plaintiff, there must also be the element of mala fide and a distinct 
intention to injure the plaintiff apart from the honest defence of the defendant's own 
property. " 16 
It is instructive to note that despite the fact that the judge felt that the defendant's belief was 
not based on reasonable or probable cause, the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages nor to 
an injunction. 17 What was paramount was that the plaintiffs had not been able to prove the 
defendant's lack of bona fide. 
Though not stated in so many words, a similar approach was followed by the Court of 
Appeal in The Societe Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Til~hman's Patent Sand 
Blast Co. 18 There the plaintiffs brought an action to restrain the issue of threatening 
circulars by the defendants until the matters in dispute had been determined by arbitration. 
The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that where a trade circular is issued bona fide, an 
interim injunction will not be granted to restrain it unless it is in violation of some contract 
between the plaintiff and defendant, however much the balance of convenience may be in 
favour of granting it. 
For a brief moment the possibility was held out that a plaintiff in such a situation could be 
granted a remedy to restrain such unfair activities which tended to injure his property. This 
possibility could be discerned from the case of Dixon v. Holden, 19 where it was held that 
16 Halsey y. Brotherhood (1881) 19 Ch.D. 386. per Lord Coleridge L.C.J .• at page 388. See the 
concurring opinions of Baggallay L.J., at pages 389-390. and Lindley L.J .• at page 392; see also 
Suee y. Bray (1885) 2 RPC 223. where the same principle was applied. 
17 See also North J .• at page 243. in Suee y. Bray (1885) 2 RPC 223. "Now, if this question has to 
be decided by the expression of my own personal opinion. formed after hearing all the evidence ani 
all the arguments. I should say - knowing what I now know - that ... there was no reasonable (X' 
probable cause for any of the statements. But that is not the mode in which the question must be 
dealt with." 
18 The Societe Anopyme dr., Manufactures de GIgs y. TIlebmap's Patepl Sand Blast Co. (1884) 2S 
L.R. Ch, D. 1. see Cotton L.I., at pages 6, 7 and 9, and Lindley L.I., at page 11. 
19 Dixop y, Boldcp (1868-69) 7 L.R. Sq. 488, per Sir R. Malins V.C., at page 494, "In the decision 
I arrive at I beg to be unders~ as laying down that this court has jurisdiction to prevent the 
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the court had jurisdiction to restrain the publication of any document tending to the 
destruction of property, whether consisting of money or of professional reputation by 
which property was acquired. However, this short-lived possibility disappeared when the 
Court of Chancery Appeal, in Prudential Assurance Company v. Knott,20 held that the 
court had no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel as such, even if it was 
injurious to property. Dixon v. Holden and Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley21 were 
expressly overruled.22 
So Wren v. Weild and Halsey v. Brotherhood laid down the foundation for the approach of 
the common law to threats in relation to patent infringement. To obtain a remedy, it is not 
enough for the plaintiff to prove that the statement is untrue. It is not enough if the plaintiff 
merely proves that he has suffered damage. The rule is that as long as the statement is not 
malicious,23 there is no possibility of an action for damages. Even if malice is to be proved, 
20 
21 
22 
23 
publication of any letter, advertisement, or other document, which, if permitted to go on, would 
have the effect of destroying the property of another person, whether that consists of tangible or 
intangible property - whether it consists of money or reputation". 
Prudential Assurance Company v. Knott (1874-75) 10 L.R. Ch. App. 142. 
Sprin~head Spinnin~ Company v. Riley (1868) L.R. 6 Eq. 551. 
Prudential ASSurance Company v. Knott (1874-75) 10 L.R. Ch. App. 142, per Lord Cairns L.C., 
at pages 144 and 147, and Sir W.M. James LJ., at page 147; see also White v. Mellin [1895] AC 
154 (HL) - an action will not lie for a false statement disparaging a trader's goods where no special 
damage is proved. Lord Macnaghten, at page 169, with regard to the need to show special damage, 
specifically referred to the comments of Lord Cairns L.C., at page 147; and Skinner & Co. v. 
~ (1893)10 RPC 1, per Bowen LJ., at page 6. 
Although in an actions for slander of goods and malicious or injurious falsehood, malice is an 
essential element, the definition of malice in the context of malicious falsehood remains uncertain. 
It had been said that "there is a regrettable exuberance of definition" - British Railway Traffic ul 
Electric Co. Ltd v. CRC Co. Ltd and LCC [1922] 2 KB 260, at 268, per McCardie J. Various 
definitions have been adopted. See, for example, Royal Bakim: Powder Co. v. Wrieht. Crossley & 
C2. (1901) 18 RPC 95 (HL), where "maliciously" was said to mean "without just cause or excuse 
... It is only repeating the same proposition in another form if I add that the threat to sue must be 
shown to have been made for the purpose of injuring the plaintiffs, and not for the bona fide 
protection of the defendants' rights, and without any real intention to follow it up by action or 
other legal proceedings", per Lord Davey, at page 99; Halsey v. Brotherhood (1881) 19 Ch.D. 386, 
per Baggallay L.J., at page 390, "reasonable and probable cause is necessary."; White v. Mellin 
[1895] AC 154 (HL), at 160, per Lord Herschell - There is no evidence of malice if all that was 
shown was that the defendant wrote or spoke honestly, even though wrongly, in defence of a real or 
supposed right or title to the property, or carelessly, believing the words to be true, or merely for 
the purpose of advancing the sale of his own goods; Dunlo.p Pneumatic 'lYre Co. Ltd v. Maison 
Talbot (1904) 20 TLR 579 (CA) - Collins M.R. was reported to have said, at page 581, that "It 
was not malice if the object of the writer was to push his own business, though at the same time 
it might incidentally injure another person's business. To make the act malicious it must be done 
with the direct object of injuring that other person's business. Therefore, the mere fact that it could 
injure another person's business was no evidence of malice."; Olin Mathieson Chemical Co. v. 
Biorex Laboratories Ltd [1970] RPC 157, per Graham 1., at page 196, "Malice in this context 
means improper motive."; Household and Rosher y. Fairburn and Ha11(1884) 1 RPC 109, at 113, 
"That it is not mala fide for a man to issue cireulars in defence of his own right, if he bona flde 
believes that what is being done is an infringement of that right"; The Societe Anonyme des 
Mapufactures de Glm y. Iilahmap's Patent Sand Blast Co. (1884) 25 L.R. Ch. D. 1, per Cotton 
L.J., at pages 6-7, ''We must assume that those cireu.lars are honestly i~sued, .... th~t they lie 
issued by the defendants in the belief that they are required for the protecuon of their nght to the 
invention."; see also Pratt and ors y. British Medical Association and ors [1919] I KB 244, at 276, 
where McCardie 1. reviewed the cases and pointed out the various and wide meanings to the wmi 
"malice". 
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the plaintiff has to show that he has suffered special damage24 to be entitled to a remedy. In 
the absence of malice, even an injunction will not issue.25 This approach has been followed 
in every later case until the present day. 26 
In conclusion, the making of false statements about existing actions or goods, whilst not in 
itself an actionable threat may be actionable at common law if the statements are malicious. 
To establish his cause of action in an action for slander of title or goods or malicious 
falsehood, the plaintiff must prove that the words were uttered, that they were false, that 
they were published maliciously and, that they caused him special damage. Only if all the 
four conditions are satisfied would the person alleged to be aggrieved have a remedy. If 
even one of them is missing, then he is helpless because he has not suffered any legal 
injuria. 
5.2. The Introduction and Development of Threats Provisions in the United Kingdom 
5.2.1. The Legislative Response in the United Kingdom 
The case of Halsey v. Brotherhood exposed the weakness of the common law remedy for 
groundless threats. There was a realisation that the available common law remedy is far 
from satisfactory and is not the proper remedy for person subject to unfair or adverse 
24 
25 
26 
The words "special damage" was clarified in Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 QB 524, at 527-528. per 
Bowen L.J .• where the various meanings of special damage was discussed and explained. He further 
added that to support a case for malicious prosecution special damage in the sense of actual damage 
must be shown. See also Parr y. Weatherhead & Hardini (1932) 49 RPC 262. per Luxmoore J .• at 
page 267. "I think that so far as this type of case is concerned that means that the plaintiff must 
prove that he has suffered some actual loss which is directly attributable to the threats of which he 
is making complaint." 
Note that it is not necessary to prove special damage where section 3. Defamation Act 1952, as 
amended by Defamation Act 1996. Chap. 31 (UK) applies - i.e., if (1) the words on which the 
action is founded are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in 
writing or other permanent form; or (2) the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the 
plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at 
the time of the publication. There is no such a provision in the Malaysian Defamation Act. 
Halm y. Brotherhood (1880) 15 Ch.D. 514; (1881) 19 Ch.D. 386, per Lindley L.J., at page 393, 
"It seems to me that no injunction will lie against him so long as he acts honestly. But if it is 
proved that his statement is false to his knowledge, and there is reason to suppose that he intends 
to repeat these false statements, an injunction ought to lie, because he would be about to do that 
which he has not right to do." 
See, for example: Household and Rosher y. Fairburn and Hall (1884) 1 RPC 109; Household md 
Boshor y. Fairburn and Hall (1885) 2 RPC 140; BlltleI' y. Sharp (1886) 3 RPC 193; Colley y. 
ifill (1890) 7 RPC 101. See also the more recent cases on slander of title or trade libel, Faa y 
Wfl!8tbcdnd & Hardinl (1932) 49 RPC 262; B_dey & YOUDI Ltd & Gogdman Ltd y. Stillwell 
Darby &; Co. Ltd &; Kopil (1940) 57 RPC 291; Bwollell Paipts Ltd y. Bill [1975] FSR 421; 
Crest Homes Ltd y. Ascott [1980] FSR 396; Gtapby Martetipi Services Ltd y. Intcdee:o An &; 
Ala [1984] RPC 209. The same principle was applied in OUp Mathiesop Chemical Co. y. Bimx 
I abnratories 141 [1970] RPC 157, fMr Graham J't at pages 176-177. 
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comments about his business, especially when threats were issued.27 Though the problems 
were recognised yet the court felt unable to give any remedy and felt that legislative 
intervention was necessary. It was clear that some legislative action was needed to provide 
some justice to victims of such threats. Therefore, partly in response to the case of Halsey 
v. Brotherhood, the United Kingdom legislature introduced a statutory remedy for persons 
who were aggrieved by the issuance of unjustified threats.28 
The object of the provisions is to give the person threatened an entirely new right of action 
in which malice is not an issue.29 The provisions are aimed at "a patentee who causes 
damage by disseminating threats which he dare not or will not justify by an action, who is 
willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike. "30 Bowen LJ. said that it was the outcome of the 
Legislature's desire that "threats of patent actions shall not hang over a man's head; that the 
Sword of Damocles, in such a case, "shall either not be suspended or should fall at 
27 
28 
29 
30 
See, for example, the following comments: Halsey v. Brotherhood (1880) 15 Ch.D. 514; (1881) 
19 Ch.D. 386, per Lord Coleridge L.C.J., at page 389, "I feel strongly that there is great force in 
what Mr Ince has said about the difficulty in which a plaintiff may be placed by the conduct of a 
person in the position of the defendant. I do not pretend to be able to answer his observation on 
that head, but unless there is malafide, it is one of those instances in which the law, in the interest 
of society, permits an injury to be done without any remedy commensurate with it."; Crampton v. 
The Patents Investment Co .. Ltd (1888) 5 RPC 382, per Field 1., at page 392, "Before this 
enactment, if a person maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, threatened to 
interfere with another man's rights in that way, it might be made the subject of an action. But it 
was thought by the legislature that this did not afford sufficient protection to persons who were 
using patented inventions. ... There were ... several cases which were considered to be very 
oppressive. People in possession of rights apparently covered by patents were in the habit of 
threatening the customers of persons claiming to be patentees, destroying the sale by them of the 
subject of their patents, and then never proceeding any further."; Benmax v. Austin Motor Co .. Ltd 
(1953) 70 RPC 143; (1953) 70 RPC 284 (CA); per Evershed M.R., for the Court of Appeal 
(Jenkins L.1., and Morris L.J., concurring) at pages 294-295, "I can well understand that a business 
which receives what are commonly called "threatening" letters from persons who have a somewhat 
similar business may suffer serious business damage, and to rely upon the common law action for 
slander of goods may be a wholly ineffective remedy, having regard to the necessity of proving 
malice." . 
Skinner & Co. y. Pen;y (1893)10 RPC 1, per Lindley L.i., at page 5, " ... this section in the 
Patent Act was introduced after, and partly in consequence of the decision of the court in Halsey v. 
Brotherhood (1880) 15 Ch.D. 514 .... Now the object of this Act was to cure two blots - first of 
all to give an action for damages where there was not one before; and secondly, to enable an action 
to be brought against one who uses threats unless he will or does follow up his threats by 
commencing an action himself. That is the key note." 
It is not clear who exactly originated the threats provision in the 1883 Act It did not appear in the 
original Bill, nor was it mentioned by Mr Chamberlain, President of the BoaIrl of Trade, when he 
presented it during the Second Reading - Hansard Set 3, CCLXXVIll, 1883. It seems to have been 
introduced during the Committee stage (see Davies, A.J., "On Threats of Legal Proceedings and the 
32nd Section of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1833." Transaction of the Institute of 
Patents Agents, Vol. V Session 1886-7,218). According to Daniel, section 32 was introduced by 
Sir George Jessel who decided the case of Halsey y. Brotherhood, see Daniel, E.M., "On the 
Proviso to Section 32 of the Patents Act 1883", Transactions of the Institute of Patents Agent, 
Vol. VIII, Session 1889-90, 241, at 242. 
See Skinner & Co. y. Peny (1893)10 RPC 1, bonafides of defendant is irrelevant, what matters is 
what he said not what he intended: Craie y. Dowdjoe (1908) 25 RPC 259, per Cozens-Hm'dy 
M.R., at page 262, "Section 32 does not ... merely relieve a plaintiff from the obligation of 
establishing malice in the old common law action, but it confers an entirely new right of action, 
and one in which malice is not an issue between the parties."; see also Algi y Wript [1972] RPC 
125, PI' Whitford J., at page 129. 
Day y. Fostor (1890) RPC 54, per North J., at page 60. 
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once. "31 The provisions give a right to the plaintiff but not to the defendant. The latter is 
only given a shield or defence when he is able successfully to prove justification.32 
5.2.2. The Revealed Weaknesses and Further Strengthening of the Threats Provisions 
The original "threats section" was introduced by section 32 of the Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks Act 1883. This was re-enacted in section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act, 
1907. The threats provisions, though welcomed, contained several weaknesses. With 
reference to the 1883 Act, Kekewich J. said: 
" ... I have already said that the section is a legislative puzzle, and I am not sure that 
the puzzle can be properly resolved without the assistance of the Legislature. "33 
Hence, despite the intended purpose of providing protection against unjustified threats, the 
weaknesses of the section resulted in depriving persons threatened from getting the 
remedies intended by the section. This part of the chapter discusses the weaknesses 
revealed in the working of the threats provision and the legislative interventions to rectify 
them. 
1. The first defect in the 1907 Act was revealed, as illustrated in Diamond Coal Cutter 
Company v. Mining Awliances Company,34 where it was held that a person who claimed 
to be a licensee, even an exclusive licensee, did not claim to be the patentee of an invention 
within the meaning of section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907. Therefore, the 
threats issued by him did not fall within the "threats" section.35 This led to an amendment 
in the 1919 Act, whereby the phrase "Where any person claiming to be the patentee of an 
invention ... " in the 1907 Act was replaced by the phrase "Where any person claiming to 
have an interest in a patent ... ". 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Skinner & Co. v. Perry (1893)10 RPC 1. at page 8; see also Norbert Steinhardt and Son Ltd v. 
Meth and anor [1960-1961] 105 CLR 440, per FuUagar J., in the High Court of Australia, in 
relation to an equivalent provision in the Patents Act 1952-1955 (Cth) , at ~age 447, "It is 
intended, I think, to have a strict and dramatic effect - to supplement a less effectIve common law 
remedy."; and Townsend Controls Ply Ltd v. Gilead and anor (1988-1989) 14 IPR 443, per von 
Doussa J., at page 448. 
Mechanical Services <Trailer EnKineers) Ltd v. Avon Rubber Co. Ltd [1977] RPC 66, per Graham 
J., at page 75; see also Townsend Controls Ply Ltd v· Gilead and anor (1988-1989) 14 IPR 443, 
p~r von Doussa J., at page 448. 
The Combined Weiehinl Machine Co. v. The Automatic Weilhinl Macbine Co. (1889) 6 RPC 
502, at page 506. 
Diamond Coal Cutter CompanY X. Minjnl AwIjance3 Company (1915) 32 RPC 569. 
Diamond Coal Cutter CoJDPIAY v· Mjnjnl ApplianCes Company (1915) 32 RPC 569, per Lmd 
Cozens-Hardy M.R., at page 574, p~r Bankes LJ., at pages 574-575, who also expressed the view 
that "there may be ground for an amendment of tile law", and Warrington LJ., at pages 575-576. 
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2. A further defect in the section was revealed by the case of Ellis and Sons Limited v. 
Pogson,36 where it was held that although it had been proved that the defendant had 
threatened the plaintiffs' customers as alleged and that in consequence, the plaintiffs had 
suffered damage, the defendant was not liable. This was because section 36 of the Patents 
and Designs Act, 1907, as amended by the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, presupposed 
the existence of a patent. It did not apply to the case, such as that in the case at hand, where 
there had never been in existence a patent in respect of which the threats had been made. 3 7 
This defect was cured by section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1932, which repealed 
the former section 36 of the 1907-28 Acts, and enacted a new section 36 in its place. The 
new section gave a remedy for groundless threats irrespective of whether the person 
making the threat did or did not have any interest in a patent. 
3. Prior to the 1932 Act there was a special proviso to the threats section which read: 
"Provided that this section shall not apply if an action for infringement of the patent 
is commenced and prosecuted with due diligence." 
This proviso was subjected to a lot of adverse comments by judges.38 On the 
recommendation of the Sargent Committee,39 section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act 
36 
37 
38 
Ellis and Sons Limited y. Po~son (1923) 40 RPC 62; (1923) 40 RPC 179, Court of Appeal, per 
Lawrence J., at pages 66-68, and Warrington L.J., at page 182. 
The defendant had applied for a patent in January, 1921, and had lodged the complete specification 
in September, 1921. The threats were alleged to be uttered in November, 1921. Following 
opposition to the grant, the grant was refused in 1922. 
See reservation of Pearson J., at page 2, in Barnett and Foster v. Barrett's Screw Sto.pper Bottlin~ 
Co" Ltd (1884) 1 RPC 9, on the potential for abuse of the proviso, "I do not mean in the slightest 
degree to suggest any impropriety; but I do see this, that a motion of this kind being made, a 
defendant might, simply to stave off proceedings, issue a writ and nothing more; and then, when it 
had served his purpose, he might discontinue the action, and the court might be in great difficulties 
to know what to do."; Beomax y. Austin Motor Co" Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 143; (1953) 70 RPC 
284 (CA), per Evershed M.R., for the Court of Appeal (Jenkins LJ., and Morris LJ., concurring), 
at pages 295-96, "One of the problems which the section had earlier presented was solved by the 
removal from the present section of the former proviso that it had no application when an action 
for infringement was brought within a reasonable time after the alleged threat. I can see a sensible 
ground for removing that limitation."; see also The Combined Wei~hin~ Machine Co. v. The 
Automatic Wei~hin~ Machine Co. (1889) 6 RPC 502, per Kekewich J., page 508, "On the other 
hand, it seems to me impossible, even apart from authority, to hold that the patentee did not 
commence his action with due diligence, when he commenced within the fortnight after the threat 
was made. That lands me in a position of considerable difficulty. I find a plaintiff properly 
commencing his action, and exercising the right which is given him by Act of Parliament, ... at 
the time of issuing the writ, then, possibly, if one construction of the Act should prevail, defeated 
by something entirely future, which happened after his action is commenced, so that what was 
right on the 27th, became wrong on the 30th. The right of action given by the Legislature, ard 
properly exercised at one time, is, apparently, on that construction, taken away by the legislature 
three days afterwards. It is a strange conclusion at which to arrive; but if the Legislature has said so 
in plain words, I have no other duty than to adopt the Legislature's express meaning ... I hold that 
he has commenced his action with due diligence, and it is an action for infringement; and \BIder 
those circumstances, this follows. The section does not apply. It is a strange result, but the 
language .. is perfectly plain ... It certainly has given with one hand a right of action, and taken it 
way with the other." 
268 
1932, revoked this previous statutory defence to an action for threats of commencing and 
prosecuting an action for infringement with due diligence.4o 
4. Section 36 of the 1932 Act was re-enacted in section 65 of the 1949 Act 
(Consolidating Act). This section substantially re-enacted section 36 of the Act of 1932. 
The new provision was the addition of a new subsection (3) which read as follows: 
"For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a mere notification of the 
existence of a patent does not constitute a threat of proceedings within the meaning 
of this section. "41 
5 . The present provision is found in section 70 of the 1977 Act. In substance 
subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) reproduce, although in slightly modified language, the 
provisions of the previous legislation. Subsection (4) of section 70 is, however, new.42 
The new subsection (4) reads as follows: 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Report of the Departmental Committee on the Patents and Designs Acts and Practices of the Patent 
Office, Cmnd 3829 (1931), in paragraphs 163-169. 
For the difficulties in applying the proviso and who should the action for infringement be taken 
against, see Challender v Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, per Cotton LJ., at pages 373-374; per Bowen 
LJ., at pages 374-375; as to the meaning of "action for infringement", see The Combined 
WeiKhinK Machine Co. v. The Automatic WeighinK Machine Co. (1889) 6 RPC 502, per 
Kekewich J., at page 506, where he held that to be an action for infringement within the proviso it 
must be an infringement of the of the same character as that which is threatened." As to the 
discussion on the meaning of due diligence, see Challender v Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, per Cotton 
LJ., at pages 372-373, and per Bowen LJ., at page 375; Herrbur~r v. Sqpire (1888) 5 RPC 581; 
The Combined WeiKhinK Machine Co. v. The Automatic Weighing Machine Co. (1889) 6 RPC 
502, per Kekewich J., at page 508, "It certainly has given with one hand a right of action, arx:l 
taken it way with the other."; Barrett & Elers. Ltd v. DAY; Day v. Foster(1890) 7 RPC 54; Colley 
y. Hart (1890) 7 RPC 10 1; Waite & Saville. Ltd v. Johnson Die Press Co. Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 1; 
Voelker Incandescent Mantle. Ltd v. Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 
494, per Lord Alverstone L.C.J., at page 496; Pittevil & Co. v. Brackelsberg MeltinK Processes 
IJd (1932) 49 RPC 73 and 327, per Luxmoore J., at pages 80-81; Farr v. Weatherhead & HardinK 
(1932) 49 RPC 262, per Luxmoore J., at pages 266-267. For a thorough discussion of this 
proviso, see Colley y. Hart (1890) 7 RPC 101, where it was also held that it was not necessary to 
prosecute the action for infringement to a successful termination to be protected by the proviso. 
The difficulties of fixing a definite time within which an action must be brought to be commenced 
with due diligence was also illustrated. See North 1., at pages 106-110; North J.'s approach in 
Colley y. Hart was approved of and applied by the Court of Appeal in CraiK v. DowdinK (1908) 25 
RPC 259, per Buckley L.J., at page 264. 
Subsection (3) was based on the recommendation of the Swan Committee. Three reports were 
made: 1) Patents and Designs Acts - First Interim Report of the Departmental Committee, Cmnd 
6618 (April 1945), (2) Patents and Designs Acts - Second Interim Report of the Departmental 
Committee, Cmnd 6789, April 1946, and (3) Patents and Designs Acts - Final Report of the 
Departmental Committee, Cmnd 7206, September 1947. Paragraph 238 of the Swan Committee 
recommendations - Final Report of the Departmental Committee Cmnd 7206 states: 
"We recommend that a proviso should be ailed to subsection (1) to the effect that a circular, 
advertisement or communication addressed to any person, which comprises only a notification of 
the existence of a particular patent or patents upon which the proprietor relies for protecting his 
interests shall not, by itself, be deemed to be a threat of an action for infringement. .. 
No reason was given by the Committee in its Report. 
The inclusion of subsection (4) of section 70 was proposed by the Banks Committee, Report of 
the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407 (The Banks Report), 
HMSO, London. 1970, see paragraphs 274 and 275, at page 78; see also Patent Law Reform - A 
Consultative Document (Department of Trade) 1975. Her Majesty's Stationery Office (note: This 
269 
"Proceedings may not be brought under this section for a threat to bring 
proceedings for an infringement alleged to consist of making or importing a product 
for disposal or of using a process." 
5.3. The Present Working of the United Kingdom Threats Provisions 
This section of the chapter will focus on the working in practice of this threats provision. 
Some of the issues that were in doubt and the construction of the various elements in the 
section will be discussed. 
5.3.1. Could the Validity of the Patent be Challenged in a Threats Action? 
In the early case of Wren v. Weild,43 the position was that the validity of the patent was not 
in issue, therefore, any evidence by the plaintiff to show that the defendant's patent was 
invalid was irrelevant. As far as action under the threats section was concerned, it was 
initially uncertain whether the Validity of the patent could be challenged. For example, in 
Kurtz v. Spence,44 evidence tending to establish the invalidity of the patent in issue was 
held to be inadmissible. The issue was also raised in Challender v. Royce, where the Court 
of Appeal held that in an action under section 32 of the 1883 Act, the validity of the 
defendant's patent may be put in issue.45 
The issue was fmally settled in Pittevil & Co. v. Brackelsberg Melting Processes Ltd,46 
following Challender v Royce, and it is now accepted that invalidity could be made an issue 
in such a proceeding. The basic philosophy is based on the theory that since the essence of 
43 
44 
4S 
46 
document supplements the White Paper on Patent Law Reform, Cmnd 6000, and sets out in detail 
the Government's proposals for implementing the recommendations of the Banks Committee) - see 
paragraph 72, "Section 65 of the Patents Act provides protection against a patentee seeking to em 
competitive activities without putting his patent and claim for infringement to the test of court 
proceedings. The need for such protection is to obviate the possibility of the patentee seeking to 
coerce the customers of a competitor not to purchase the competitor's goods. But section 65 goes 
too far in giving protection also to primary infringers, as Banks recognised. Section 65 will 
therefore be revised so as to provide that no action for threats will lie where the threat is made 
against a person making apparatus or products for sale which are alleged to infringe. or using an 
alleged infringing process or importing for sale apparatus or products which are alleged to infringe. 
Such an action will still lie where the threat is made against a customer of such a manufacturer." 
See also, Patent Law Reform - Department of Trade, presented to Parliament on April 1975. Cmnd 
6000, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975, paragraph 20, "Other Banks' 
recommendations on infringement were for the abolition of the Comptroller General's jurisdiction 
over infringement, and for changes in the law on declaration of non-infringement, and the remedy 
for groundless threats in infringement proceedings. These recommendations will also be 
implemented. " 
Wren y. WeiJd (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730. 
Kurtz y. Spence (1886) 3 RPC 368, per Chitty J., at page 371. 
QwlleMer y. Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, per Bowen L.J., at page 375; also allowed in Law y. 
Ashworth (1890) 7 RPC 86. 
Pitteyil &: Co. y. Brw;kdsbeq Mellinl Processes I Jd (1932) 49 RPC 23. 
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the allegation is that a patent has been infringed, the person threatened should be allowed to 
defend himself by proving non-infringement and a patent that is invalid can not be 
infringed.47 
Since the 1932 Act, the point is beyond doubt because of the addition of "which is not 
shown by the plaintiff to be invalid". 
5.3.2. "Or Otherwise" not to be Construed Ejusdem Generis 
The term "or otherwise" had been held to encompass oral threats.48 Driffield & Co. v. 
Waterloo & Co.49 was the fIrst reported case on whether letters fall within the threats 
section. It was held that as each circular must be directed to some person in order to be 
useful, the words "any other person," plainly brought the letter which was written within 
the provisions of the section. "50 
This issue was exhaustively argued in the Court of Appeal in Skinner & Co. v. Pero,51 
where it was unanimously agreed by the judges that the term "or otherwise" is not to be 
construed ejusdem generis with the words, "circular" or "advertisement". The addition of 
the words "circulars or advertisements" was rather to enlarge the words "or otherwise" than 
to cut them down. 
47 Pitteyil & Co. y. Bracke1sberK MeltioK Processes Ltd (1932) 49 RPC 23. per Luxmoore J .• at 
page 26. at first instance. and per Lord Hanworth M.R.. at page 29. Lawrence L.J .• at pages 31-32. 
and Romer L.J .• at page 32. 
48 See. for example. Luna AdyertjsioK Co. Ltd y. Burnham & Co. (1928) 45 RPC 258; The National 
Scbool of Salesmanship. Ltd y. The Plomien fuel Economiser. Ltd (1942) 59 RPC 95. and 
H·V.EJElectric) Ltd and ors v. Cufflip HoldiPKs Ltd [1964] RPC 149. See also Tapley CHL) gl 
Cpo Ltd y. White Star Products Ltd [1957] NZLR 612. per North J .• at 617. decision under a 
similar provision of the Patents Act 1953. New Zealand. section 74. 
49 Driffie1d & Co. y. Waterloo & Co. (1886) 3 RPC 46. 
SO Driffield & Co. y. Waterloo & Co. (1886) 3 RPC 46. per Bacon V.C .• at page 48. See also. 
Cramptop y. The Patepts Inyestmept Co .. LId (1888) 5 RPC 382. per Field J., at page 393. ':For 
that purpose they allege that the ... words 'or otherwise' must be read by reference to the P":V10US 
words 'by circulars or advertisements'. or something ejusdem generis with that I have COIISldered 
the point and I do ~ot think there is any foundation for it"; The Combiped Wei&hipi Machine CPt 
y. The Automatic Wei&hipi Machipe Co. (1889) 6 RPC 502; Barrett & BIers. Ltd y. Day (1890) 
7 RPC 54. 
SI Skipper &: Cpo y. Pt;n:y (1893)10 RPC 1. per Lindley L.J., at pages 5-6. and Bowen L.J., at pages 
7-8. The same approacb was followed in subsequent cases, see. for example, Doullass y. Piptscb's 
Patept LilbtiPI Company (1896) 13 RPC 673; Bepmax y. Austip M()tor Co" Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 
143: (1953) 70 RPC 284 (CA), per Evershed M.R., for the Court of Appeal (Jenkins L.I., n 
Moms L.I .• concurring), at pages 294-295. 
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5.3.3. What is a "Threat" 
An express and direct threat would obviously fall within the meaning of the word "threat" 
in the section. However, the cases have shown that there is no need to prove that the 
defendants had actually threatened proceedings to constitute "threats" within the meaning of 
the threats section. The test that is to be applied is that enunciated by Clauson J. in Luna 
Advertising Co. Ltd v. Burnham & Co. 52 The sole issue in that case was whether the 
words expressed by a representative of the defendant amounted to a threat of legal 
proceedings for patent infringement. Mr Justice Clauson held that it was a question which 
entirely depended upon the inferences which an ordinary man would draw from the attitude 
of the parties if he was present at the interview.53 This approach was applied in Willis & 
Bates Ltd v. Tilley Lamp Co. ,54 where Bennett J. held that the terms of the Act were 
satisfied if the defendant in the action was proved to have asserted that he had legal rights in 
respect of letters patent and that he intended as against the plaintiff to enforce those rights.55 
Since a threat of an action for infringement could thus be made indirectly or by implication, 
regard had to be had to the background in which the alleged threat was made. 56 It has, 
however, been held that to circulate threats by others is not to threaten, but may 
nevertheless be restrained by injunction.57 The threats need to have been made within 
jurisdiction. 58 
52 Luna Advertisin& Co. Ltd v. Burnham & Co. (1928) 45 RPC 258. 
53 Luna AdyertisiD& Co. Ltd v. Burnham & Co. (1928) 45 RPC 258, per Clauson 1., at page 260. 
54 Willis & Bates Ltd v. Tilley LamP Co. (1944) 61 RPC 8. 
55 Willis & Bates Ltd v. Tilley Lamp Co. (1944) 61 RPC 8, per Bennett J., at page 11; Desiderio v· 
Currus Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 201, per Crossman J., at page 205; also followed by the Court of 
Appeal in H.Y.E.<E1ectric) Ltd and ors v. Cufflin HoldinKs Ltd [1964] RPC 149, per Salmon L.J., 
at page 158, and Rc(ymes-Cole v. Elite Hosier,y Co. Ltd [1965] RPC 102 (CA), at 112, 119-120, 
see Will mer L.J., at page 111. The same approach was also followed in John Summers & SODS 
Ltd v. The Cold Metal Process Co. (1948) 65 RPC 75; C. & P. Pevelo.pment Co. v Sisabro 
Novelty Co. Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 277 (CA), per Jenkins L.J., at page 282; Speedcranes Ltd v· 
Thomson and anor [1978] RPC 221, per Lord Emslie at page 224; Bowden CODtrols Ltd v. Acco 
Cable Controls Ltd and aoor [1990] RPC 427. per Aldous J., at page 431. "The letter does not 
explicitly threaten patent proceedings, but states that the first defendant will enforce its rights. The 
fact that it is not explicit that patent proceedings will be taken is in no way conclusive as a threat 
can be veiled or implied just as much as it can be explicit. ... (applying the approach of Oauson J. 
in Luna Advertisio& Co. Ltd v. Burnham & Co. (1928) 45 RPC 258)." 
56 See Surrid&e's Patents Ltd v. Trico-Folberth Ltd 53 RPC 420, at 423. 424; and Bowden Controls 
Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and anor [1990] RPC 427. per Aldous 1.. at page 432. 
57 See Ellam y. H.E. MartYn & Co. (1898) 16 RPC 28 (CA). 
58 See Ell Fillers & Containers (Aust) Propr;ietm Ltd v. Holed-The Packin& Com· & Packinl 
Products Com,) (1934) 51 RPC 9, followed by the High Court of Australia in Norbert Steinhardt 
and Son Ltd v. Metb and aoor [1960-1961] 105 CLR 440, p~r Eullagar J., at page 442, "It does, in 
my opinion threaten to institute proceedings for infringements of patents in various countries. But 
these threa~ were not made in Australia but in England. And, in my opinion, an action cannot be 
maintained in an Australian court for threats made in another country. See also Townsend Controls 
pty Ltd y. gU,.., apd M'" (1989-1990) 16 IPR 469, p~r von Doussa J., at page 474. 
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5.3.4. Could an Answer to Inquiry be Construed as a Threat? 
It would seem that a threat is not necessarily confined to volunteered threats. In some 
situations an answer to an inquiry may be construed as a threat. One of the issues in Beven 
& Alexander v. Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd59 was whether an answer in 
response to an inquiry from the customer of the plaintiff who sued for unjustified threats 
could amount to a threat. Byrne 1., after discussing the difficulties in such a situation, held 
that though in principle it could amount to a threat, the circumstances in the present case 
were different.6o In Alpi v Wright,61 the decision on this point was reserved. 
5.3.5. Conditional. Contingent and Future Threats 
A conditional or contingent threat, i.e., threatening to commence infringement proceeding 
unless the person threatened ceases carrying out the infringing activity will also amount to a 
threat, for "to threaten a person with an action for infringement must include case of 
threatening a person if he does not do what he is not bound to do. "62 
Bowen LJ. in Challender v. Royce,63 seemed to have created some doubts as to whether 
the threats section is applicable to threats relating to an intended infringement. He said, "I 
think these words indicate that the threat, which is the subject matter of the action, must not 
be merely a warning about something which is going to be done. It must be a threat of legal 
proceedings for liability in respect of an alleged manufacture - not a proposed manufacture, 
but an "alleged manufacture, use, sale, or purchase of the invention. "64 He further added, 
"Now, applying that to the facts, it seems to me that threats would not fall within that 
definition if they were mere threats or warning as to something which might be done in the 
future. "65 
This aspect of the Court of Appeal decision was to create some conflict of opinions until 
clarified by the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Edge. 66 There the court 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
65 
66 
Beven & Alexander v. Welsbach Incandescent Gas Li~ht Co. Ltd (1903) 20 RPC 69. 
Beven & Alexander v. Welsbach Incandescent Gas Li~ht Co. Ltd (1903) 20 RPC 69, per Byrne J., 
at pages 73-74, after referring to Douglass v. Pintsch's Patent Lighting Company (1896) 13 RPC 
673 and Skinner & Co. v. Peny (1893) IO RPC I. 
Alpi v. Wright [1972] RPC 125, per Whitford J., at page 132. 
See Kurtz v. Spence (1888) 5 RPC 161, per Kekewich J., at pages 171-173; Desiderio v. Currus 
Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 201, per Crossman J., at page 205; see also Reymes-Cole v. E1ite Hosier:y 
Co. Ltd [1965] RPC 102 - conditional threats - per Diplock L.J., at page 120. 
Challender v. Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363. 
Challender v Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, Bowen L.J., at page 374. 
Challender v Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, Bowen L.J., at page 375. In fact the headnotes to the case 
stated that "the section relates to threats of legal proceedings or liability in respect only of past acts 
alleged to be infringements." 
Johnson y. Ed~c (1892) 9 RPC 142. 
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considered and explained the judgement of Bowen J. in Challender v Royce and held that a 
warning directed against an intended infringement may be a threat within the section, 
provided that it could be made out that the intended infringement if carried out would be an 
actual infringement.67 Further, a threat to sue, once a patent is granted, is also caught by 
the section. 6 8 
5.3.6. "Threatens any Person" 
It was not necessary in order that the threat should be actionable that it should have been 
communicated either directly or through an agent to the person threatened. 
An interesting point was raised by the defendant in John Summers & Sons Ltd v. The Cold 
Metal Process Co., 69 where it was argued that the provisions of the section were not 
brought into play unless the threatener communicated a threat of proceedings to the person 
threatened, either directly or through an agent. This question was answered by Bowen L.J. 
in Skinner & Co. v. Peny,70 where he said in general term, "If I threaten a man that I will 
bring an action against him, I threaten him none the less because I address that intimation to 
himself, and I threaten him none the less because I address the intimation to a third person." 
Romer 1., in line with the views expressed by Bowen L.J., and taking into consideration 
the motive of the Legislature, held that the words in section 36, "threatens any person", 
read in their proper context did not only mean "communicate a threat to any person" but 
included also the expression of a threat, by circulars, advertisements or otherwise, in 
relation to any person. Therefore, a person who had expressed a threat to sue another 
person, although the threat was not communicated to the person threatened but to a third 
party, would be liable under the section.71 
67 Johpson y. F4&e (1892) 9 RPC 142, per Lindley LJ., at page 148, Kay LJ., at page 149. 
68 See Patrick Jobp Braip y. Io&1edew Brown Bennison and Garret & apor [1995] FSR 552, ~r Jacob 
J., at page 557. This part of his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, see Patock John 
Braip y. Io&1edew Brown Beppison and Garret & Mor [1996] FSR 341 (CA), per Aldous LJ., at 
pages 347-348. 
69 Johp Summers & Sops Ltd y. The Cold Metal Process Co. (1948) 65 RPC 75. 
70 Skipper & Co. y. Peqy (1893)10 RPC 1, at page 7. 
71 See Romer J.·s discussion on this issue in Johp Summers & Sops Ltd y. The Cold Metal Process 
CD. (1948) 65 RPC 75, at pages 96-97; followed in Spwknnss lid y. Thomsop aM apor [1978] 
RPC 221, per Lord Bmslie, at page 224; see also the facts in Olip Mathieson Chemical Co. y. 
Bigmx 'sebgpmes I ad [1970] RPC 157. 
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5.3.7. "Person Aggrieved" 
Any person who was actually threatened is a person aggrieved}2 However, the statutory 
right of action is not merely limited to the person to whom the threats were directly made; 
any person aggrieved, such as a rival patentee, to whom damage was occasioned by the 
issue of the threats is entitled to relief. Thus in Johnson v. Edge,73 where circulars were 
issued to the trade intimating that the articles manufactured and sold by the plaintiff were 
infringements of the defendant's patent and that proceedings would then be taken against 
any person dealing with such articles, it was held that the plaintiff was a person aggrieved 
and could maintain an action, although no threats were made to him personally. However, 
in Reymes-Cole v. Elite Hosiery Co. Ltd,74 the defendants were held not to be persons 
aggrieved as they had ceased production of the type of stocking prior to the threat being 
made.75 It would appear that even if the threats are directed at a company, a person who is 
likely to suffer damage in his personal capacity due to his intimate involvement with the 
direction and work of the company may be regarded as a person aggrieved.76 
5.3.8. Mere Notification and General Warning 
A mere notification of the existence of patent does not constitute a threat. This is specifically 
provided for in section 70(5). If, however, words are added to the effect that what was 
complained of constitutes an infringement of the patent, this will constitute a threat. 77 
A general warning to the trade that a patentee intends to enforce such rights as he has may 
avoid being an actionable threat so long as it points no warning finger against any specific 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Challender y Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, per Cotton L.J., at page 371; John Summers & Sons Ltd 
y. The Cold Metal Process Co. (1948) 65 RPC 75, per Romer J., at page 98. 
Johnson y. Ed~ (1892) 9 RPC 142. 
&cymes-Cole y. Elite Hosiery Co, Ltd [1965] RPC 102, per Willmer L.J., at pages 111-112, am 
Diplock L.J., at page 120. 
In Hart & Co. Ply Ltd y. Edwards Hot Water System (1979-80) 30 ALR 657, Lavan SPJ., 
following the case of Johnson y. F4~, held that "The statutory right of action conferred by s. 
202(1) is not limited merely to the person to whom the threats are made but may be exercised by 
any person to whom damage may be occasioned by the issue of the threats: see Johnson y. WI': 
[1892] 9 RPC 142."; see also Townsend Controls Ply Ltd y. Gilead and anor (1989-1990) 16 IPR 
469, per von Doussa J., at page 475, relying on John Summers. 
See Patrick Jobn Brain y. Iodedew Brown BenniSOn and Garret & agor [1995] FSR 552, per Jacob 
1., at pages 558-559. In that case, the plaintiff was the managing director and controller of the 
company threatened (lntox), and was regarded as the driving force behind it. However, this Pm:' of 
Jacob J.'s declaration was set aside on appeal. See Patrick John Brain y. IoeIedew Brown BepQlSOQ 
and Gaaet & apor [1996] FSR 341 (CA), per Aldous L.J., at pages 350-351, on the ground that it 
was not open to the judge to grant such a d~laration pursuant to ~.S:~., Order 14A, ~ ~t in.volved 
a question of fact. However, Aldous L.J. did leave ope~ the ~sslblbty. that ~ pl~ntiff lD that 
case might be able to establish that he was a person aggneved lD the particular sItuation. 
A good example is found in Finkelstein y. Bmia (1930) 47 RPC 516, per Bennett J., at page 518 
(threats in relation to a registered design, Patents and Designs Acts, 1907 to 1919. sections 36 anl 
61. See also JaybeBm Ltd y. Abru Aluminium IJd [1975] FSR 334; [1976] RPC 308. 
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trader. The threats section does not prevent a trader from issuing general warnings that he 
intends to enforce his patent against infringers.78 However, should such warning amount, 
by implication, to a suggestion that the manufactures of a certain person are infringements 
of the patent referred to, an action will lie under the section.79 
5.3.9. Justification for Threats 
It is a defence to the action for threats to show that "the acts in respect of which proceedings 
were threatened constitute or, if done, would constitute an infringement of a patent," unless 
the plaintiff shows the patent to be invalid so far as infringed.80 To set up this defence the 
defendant must in effect prove everything he would need to prove in a patent infringement 
action. For example, a patent for the use of an article cannot justify a threat of proceedings 
for the manufacture and sale of the article itself, unless the defendant could prove the 
additional facts needed to establish infringement by use.81 Similarly a plea that acts "if done 
would constitute" infringement is answered by evidence that they could be done in a non-
infringing way.82 The defendant, however, need not justify his threat upon all the patents 
mentioned in it, so long as he shows infringement of some such patent.83 
Justification will rarely be a defence to a motion for interlocutory injunction to prevent 
threats; the balance of convenience will nearly always call for threats to be stopped whilst 
the merits of the matter are fought out. The issue of whether interlocutory injunction is 
available if threats are to be justified was argued in Johnson Electric Industrial ManufactOIy 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Johnson v. Ed&e (1892) 9 RPC 142, per Lindley L.J., at page 148, "I cannot suppose that the 
section prevents a patentee from saying that which the patent itself implies - that anybody 
infringing must expect legal proceedings to be taken against him. I do not think it can mean that. 
That is merely saying what everybody knows already. That is not a threat against anybody in 
particular. II 
Johnson y. Edm; (1892) 9 RPC 142, per Lindley L.J., at pages 148-149. Kay L.J., at page 149, 
after referring to Challender v Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, held that "a general warning ... not 
pointed against any particular person, which would not be by the public understood to apply to any 
particular person, might not be within this 32nd section at all. II See also Bonebam & Hart y. Hirst 
Bros. & Co. LId (1917) 34 RPC 209, per Peterson J., at page 212, "The question is whether the 
warning, which they have issued, is merely a general warning that they have a design or have a 
patent and warns persons generally against the infringement of it, or is it directed against the 
plaintiffs?"; Alpi y Wriaht [1972] RPC 125, per Whitford J., at page 133, " ... if anybody is to 
bring a successful proceeding under section 65, it appears to me that they must be able to satisfy 
the court that a warning finger is pointed against the product of some other specific manufacturer or 
importer, or vendor."; The Selsdon Fountain Pen Co. Ltd y. Miles Martin Pep Co. Ltd (1948) 65 
RPC 365, per Harman J., at page 215, "It was su~e~ted that there w~ here. no ~. to 'any 
person', because no one in particular was named or mdicated. I do not think this POIDt WIll stand 
scrutiny. All the witnesses for the Martin Co. who were questioned on this point agreed that the 
Selsdon Co., amongst others, were aimed at." 
See section 70(2)(a) Patents Act 1977, UK. 
The Natiopal School of Salesmanship. Ltd y. The PlomieO fuel Ecopomiser. Ltd (1942) 59 RPC 
95, per Bennett J., at page 108. 
BJ,s'cott y. Dixop & Mapp (1909) 26 RPC 73, at page 80. 
Rosedale Associetr4 Mapufacturm Ltd y. Carlton 1Jre SaviPI Co. I lEI [1960] RPC 59 (CA). per 
Lord Bvershed M.R .• at pages 62-63. 
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Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K. K. 84 The plaintiffs sought interlocutory relief to restrain threats. 
The defendants, however, contended that infringement had occurred, that the patents in 
issue were valid, and that accordingly the threats were justified. This being so, they sought 
further to argue, by analogy to the practice with respect to justification in libel and trade 
libel cases, that interlocutory relief should not be granted. The judge held that "threats in 
relation to allegations of infringement of patent do not stand in the same position in relation 
to their potential damage as does a question of trade libel. Threats in the context of 
allegations of patent infringement represented a very grave mischief. To accede to this 
application would effectively mean that the threats section in the Act would be of no real use 
to persons who were aggrieved by activities of this kind. "85 
5.3.10. Is Relief Mandatoty or Discretionary? 
The section provides that "In any such proceedings the plaintiff or pursuer shall, if he 
proves that the threats were so made and satisfies the court that he is a person aggrieved by 
them, be entitled to the relief claimed unless:- ... ". The question to be answered here is 
whether such relief is discretionary or mandatory. This question was discussed 
exhaustively in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co., Ltd. 86 In Evershed M.R.'s view, the phrase 
"the plaintiff shall be entitled" cannot mean more than "that the plaintiff shall be entitled 
prima jacie,"87 and that the court retained a discretion to grant an injunction or 
declaration.88 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
Johnson Electric Industrial ManufactOIY Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] FSR 280. 
Johnson Electric Industrial Manufaclo[y Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] FSR 280, per 
Whitford J., at pages 284-289. It is otherwise if a threat within the ambit of section 70 is not 
involved. In such a case, the normal rule, that no interlocutory injunction will be granted where the 
defendant declares his intention of justifying his statement, will apply. See, for example, Easycare 
Inc. and anar y. B[Yan Lawrence & Co. [1995] FSR 597, per Aldous J., at page 602, citing 
Bestobell Paints Ltd v. Bi!:!: [1975] FSR 421, at page 429. 
Benmax y. Austin Motor Co" Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 143; (1953) 70 RPC 284 (CA). 
Benmax y. Austin Motor Co" Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 143; (1953) 70 RPC 284 (CA), per Evershed 
M.R. for the Court of Appeal (Jenkins L.J., and Morris L.J., concurring), at pages 295-96. 
See also, Tudor Accessories Ltd y. J.N. Somers Ltd [1960] RPC 215, where the court held that 
although the plaintiff was a "person aggrieved" by the threat within Patents Act 1949, s. 65, the 
court should in it discretion make no order in the action; and Rosedale Associated Manufacturers 
Ltd y Carlton Iyre Savini Co. Ltd [1960] RPC 59, per Lord Evershed M.R., at pages 62-63, ''If 
the relevant words in the subsection 'shall be entitled'lead (and we express no view, one way or the 
other) to the result that, in the absence of satisfaction of the specified conditions. the Court has no 
option but to grant the relief sought and this relief includes the equitable remedy of the injunction. 
it must (to say the least) be unusual to deprive the court. in granting such form of relief. of any 
discretion in the matter; and the absence of any such discretion would at least support the view that 
the language of the subsection ought to be somewhat closely construed." But see Norbert 
Steinhardt and Son Ltd y. Metb and 8IUI' [1960-1961] 105 CLR 440. per Fullagar J .• at page 448. 
in the High Court of Australia. in relation to the equivalent provision in the Patents Act 1952-
1955 (Cth). where section 121 of that statute provides that "a person aggrieved ." may obtain a 
declaration to the effect that the threats are unjustifiable. and an injunction against the continuance 
of the threats. and may recover such damage. if any .... " He said, "The only remaining question ... 
is ... whether the remedies given by section 121 are discretionary or as of right This is ... a 
difficult question. The corresponding English section (5. 65 of the Patents Act 1949) says that, 
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5.3.11. The Operation of Section 70(4) 
The effect of section 70(4) is to enable "primary" infringers to be "threatened with 
impunity".89 This applies to the actual users of processes, and the actual makers and prime 
importers of infringing articles. But the "secondary" infringers, the wholesalers and 
retailers of infringing articles and the actual users of articles (as opposed to processes) still 
may not be threatened. 
The subsection was considered and explained by the Court of Appeal in Therm-A-Stor Ltd 
v. Weatherseal Windows Ltd,90 where the ambit of subsection (4) came into question. 
Threats were made to certain manufacturers and suppliers of parts used by the defendants 
for making the alleged infringing products. The plaintiffs tried to rely on the section 70(4) 
defence in relation to the threats made to the three suppliers. The defendants argued that 
section 60(1) provides that a person infringes a patent if, when the invention is a product, 
he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose off, uses or imports "the product". So, it was 
submitted that section 70(4) is referring to a threat in relation to the making of the same 
product as is referred to in section 60(1). The Court rejected that argument. It was held that 
this exception extends to the making or importing of means essential for putting the 
invention into effect, thus making suppliers of components to a primary infringer 
susceptible to threats. The plaintiffs' threat in respect of the manufacture and supply to the 
defendants of the particular type of aluminium extrusion were, therefore, threats to which 
section 70(4) applied and could not properly be made the subject matter of a threats 
action.91 Therefore, it would seem that a person who makes or imports, for supply to a 
89 
90 
91 
unless the act threatened would be an infringement, the person aggrieved "shall be entitled" to the 
remedies of declaration, injunction and damages (if any damages have been sustained), but the 
difference of language in our s. 121 does not suggest to my mind that any different meaning was 
intended, and the "unless" clause strongly suggests that the only answer the defendant may make to 
the action for threats is by way of proof of infringement of a patent. On the whole, I am of 
opinion that, having reached the conclusion which I have reached, I am bound to make a declaration 
and grant an injunction. I can see no strong affmnative reason why I should not do so, but, if I IBI 
thought that these remedies under the section were discretionary in the sense in which they are 
discretionary in equity, I should have had to take into account my belief that an injunction is 
entirely unnecessary, and that the truth most probably is that it was merely per incuriam that the 
"threat" was expressed too widely." Note that Fullagar J.'s decision was in part reversed on a 
different point by the Full High Court - see Meth and anor v. Norbert Steinhardt and Son lJd 
[1962] 107 CLR 187). See however, Townsend Controls Pty Ltd v. Gilead and anor (1989-1990) 
16 IPR 469, per von Doussa J., at page 475, "I consider the remedies of injunction and declaration 
should be treated as discretionary in the sense in which injunctions and declarations generally are 
discretionary in equity: see Beomax y. Austin Motor Co. lJd (1953) 70 RPC 284, at 295-6. Such 
relief should not be granted by consent or in default of defence or appearance at trial unless it is 
established to the satisfaction of the court that it is proper to do so." 
Therm-A-Stor Ltd y. WeatheR Windows Ltd [1981] FSR 579, per Oliver L.J., at page 594. For 
the reason for the introduction of this subsection, see supra, footnote 42. 
Dlerm-A-Stor Ltd y. Weathmeal Wipdows IJd [1981] FSR 579. 
See opinion of Oliver L.J., for the court, in Thean-A-Stor Ltd y. Weatherseal Windows I Jd [1981] 
FSR 579, at pages 593-594. At page 594, he said, tiThe word 'product' is a perfectly general wmi 
apt to describe any article and there is .no~~g in subsec~on (4) of section 70 which !ndic~ an 
intention to confine it to a product which IS Itself the subject matter of a patent. The Intention of 
the legislature seems to have been to enable a person, whether a patentee or not, to threaten 
infringement proceedings with impunity under either subsection (1) or (2) of section 60 where what 
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primary infringer, any of the means relating to a essential element of the invention, for 
putting the invention into effect, i.e., infringement under section 60(2) could also be 
threatened without any legal repercussion. 
In Bowden Controls Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and anor,92 the plaintiff, manufacturer 
of the allegedly infringing parts, submitted that subsection (4) only prevented proceedings 
being brought in respect of threats alleged to consist of making or importing a product for 
disposal and that the statements made in the defendants' letter went wider and included 
threats in respect of sales by the plaintiffs. Thus, the subsection did not provide a defence 
in respect of the particular threats that were made. Aldous J. held that the plaintiff had a 
reasonably arguable case that the threats did go wider than threats to enforce the patent to 
restrain the manufacture, since the letter could be read as seeking to enforce all rights given 
under section 60 of the Patents Act 1977.93 
Though admittedly at interlocutory level, it is submitted that this decision could not stand in 
view of the purpose for the introduction of the subsection. Since every manufacturer of 
articles or parts of articles would ultimately have to sell them to third parties, it would leave 
the subsection inoperative if Aldous J.'s argument were to be accepted. However, the 
views expressed in Bowden Controls were adopted by the Court of Appeal in Cavity Trays 
Ltd v. RMC Panel Products Ltd,94 where it was held that section 70(4) defined the acts of 
alleged infringement that were excluded and not the type of persons who could be 
threatened. Therefore, a person who threatens a manufacturer in respect of sale of the 
infringing manufacture could not rely on the defence. 9 5 
5.4. The Conseqyences of Threats by Patent Owner 
The detrimental effects of unjustified threats and false allegations of patent infringement are 
glaringly illustrated by the cases. Underlying the harmful effects of a threat of patent 
infringement action is the fear of getting involved in one. Whitford J. aptly explained why 
threats in relation to patent infringement action are so effective. He said that "it is never 
advisable to get involved in any type of litigation if it can possibly be avoided, but the 
expense and the waste of time and money which is involved in patent litigation is likely to 
mean that the mere threat of proceedings is going to be a very effective deterrent calculated 
92 
93 
94 
9' 
is complained of as an infringement is the making of a product for disposal." For another case 
relating to the operation of section 70(4). see Neild v. Rockley and apor [1986] FSR 3. per 
Falconer J .• at pages 5-6. 
Bowden Controls Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and agor [1990] RPC 427. 
Bowden Controls Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and anor [1990] RPC 427. ~r Aldous 1.. at 
page 434. 
Cayity 1J&ys Ltd v. RMC Panel Products I Jd [1996] RPC 361. 
Cayity Trays Ltd y. RMC Panel Products lid [1996] RPC 361. ~r Aldous L.J., ~t pages 370-
380. Sir John Balcombe and Neill L.JJ., concurred. at pages 382, and 384-386 respectively. 
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to ensure that anybody who might have embarked upon a course which could bring him 
into conflict with a patentee will decide that it is better to abandon it. "96 
Lord Esher M.R. quaintly commented that "a man had better have his patent infringed, or 
have anything happen to him in this world, short of losing all his family by influenza, than 
have a dispute about a patent. "97 Threats in relation to allegations of infringement of patent 
do not stand in the same position in relation to their potential damage as does any question 
of trade libel. It is true that in a trade libel case damage may be caused by loss of business 
through the activities of the defendant. This, however, is not the same or as serious as 
when potential customers of one manufacturer were told by another manufacturer that if 
they were to continue buying from the fITst manufacturer they would be sued for patent 
infringement.98 
This fear of being involved in patent litigation has been effectively used by unscrupulous 
patent owners to falsely accuse their competitors or potential competitors of infringing their 
patents. Several tactics, based on the utilisation and exploitation of this fear were used by 
the threatener. They range from direct threat of infringement proceedings against the 
competitor to direct threats against the customers of the competitor. More insidious are the 
indirect or veiled threats like intimating or insinuating to the rival's customers that the 
product they are dealing in may lead to problems of infringement actions, or that the 
competitor has no right to deal with the products, thereby implying that the customers had 
better be careful too, or else they might find themselves in legal difficulties. 
All these forms can have equally disastrous result on the competitor. When a person rightly 
or wrongly accuses another person of infringing his patent, the threats could do serious 
damage to his business and could even wipe out his business.99 The effect is worse if the 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Johnson Electric Industrial Maoufactmy Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] FSR 280, per 
Whitford J., at page 284. Stedman, J.C., "Invention and Public Policy", 12 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 649 (1947), at page 658, said, "Theoretically, the existence of a horde of 
spurious patents poses no serious problems. The error can be corrected by an infringer's going into 
court and demonstrating the invalidity of the patent, whereupon the court will declare it 
unenforceable. Unfortunately, the problem is not that simple. Patent litigation is notoriously 
expensive, complicated, cumbersome, and slow. It is little satisfaction to an 'infringer' of an 
invalid patent to prove that he had a right to use the 'invention' if he had been ~ned, or almost 
ruined, in the process of proving it. In these circumstances, a patent may constitute a powerful 
coercive weapon for a long period before the court get around to taking the weapon away." 
In Unear y. Suee (1892) 9 RPC 113, at page 117. See also Bowen L.J., in Skinner & Co. y. 
fma (1893)10 RPC 1, at page 8, "Now, every person of common sense knows what is involved 
in patent actions. and what the expense of them is. and everybody know~ that ~ be threatened ,,:ith 
a patent action is about as disagreeable a thin~ as can hap~n t~ a. man 10 bUSlDes~. m,xl the thing 
most calculated to paralyse a man in his buslDess, even If he IS IDnocent of any IDfringement of 
patent law; and Cars y. Blapd Liellt Syndicate Ltd (1911) 28 RPC 33, per Warrington J., at page 
39. 
As explained by Whitford J., in Johnson Electtic lnd1Wrial Manufactmy Ltd y. Mabuchi Motor 
.K.K. [1986] FSR 280, at page 287. 
A good example is in Neild y. Rockley and anor [1986] FSR 3, PI' Falconer J., at pages 5-6, "1be 
threats had and have frustrated the two sets of negotiations... She has bad several years delay in 
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threats were made to customers of the competitor, who would be reluctant to get involved 
in what is essentially a dispute between the patent owner and the competitor. Therefore, the 
customers are easily persuaded into not dealing with the competitor of the patent owner. 
This, in away, is worse than a direct threat made to the competitor himself, who would be 
in a better position to assess the validity of the threats. An even more ingenious tactic is to 
send letters to customers of the competitor, intimating to them that they may be dealing with 
infringing products, but at the same time assuring them that they would not be sued. This is 
especially effective when both are competing for supply of products or competing for the 
same supply contract. 1 00 Even if the customers were not put in fear of being sued directly, 
there is still the problem of being cut off from supplies in the future if there was action 
against their supplier, resulting in disruption of their production or services to their own 
clients.! O! This would result in a commercial decision not to have any further dealings with 
such a "risky" supplier whose right to deal with the products in question was impugned. At 
the very least, the competitor threatened would be inconvenienced in having to persuade his 
customers that it is safe to buy or use the products. 
The cases show vividly the effect of such threats on the patentee's rival. Threats of legal 
proceedings could and had led, at the very least, to the threatened competitor being 
inconvenienced by having to waste the time and effort of taking expert advice about his 
patent position,! 02 or being forced to give an indemnity to his customers to safeguard 
against any risk before they would be willing to purchase his products.! 03 His fmancing 
arrangement with a financial institute could be temporarily derailed or aborted.! 04 It could 
deter customers from dealing with him or lead to a cessation of negotiation of purchase 
contract by his customer who feared getting involved in a patent litigation with the patent 
owner,lOS or the competitor's retailer ceasing to advertise or carry the competitor's 
marketing her existing stock... she had not been able to obtain some return on her capital 
expenditure ... and had lost a possible opportunity to obtain a niche in the market." 
100 See. for example in Johnson Electric Industrial ManufactOO' Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] 
FSR 280. 
101 Bowden Controls Ltd y. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and anor [1990] RPC 427. per Aldous J .• at 
page 434. 
102 Benmax y. Austin Motor Co .. Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 143; (1953) 70 RPC 284 (CA). per Evershed 
M.R., for the Court of Appeal (Jenkins L.J. and Morris L.J. concurring), at page 295, "It also 
seems open to serious doubt whether on any inquiry as to d~~ges they could prove any ~ge at 
all, and whether taking expert advice about their patent posItIon and the costs thereby mvolved 
could be regarded in any event as damages within the meaning of this section." 
103 As in Wren y. Weild (1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730, see Blackburn J., at page 733, and Howson 
CW.H.> Ltd y. AlmPh,y Ltd [1965] RPC 183. per Lloyd-Jacob J., at page 186. 
104 As happened in Berkeley & Youpe Ltd & Goodmap Ltd y. Stillwell Darby & Co. Ltd & Konie 
(1940) 57 RPC 291. where the Finance Corporation were not prepared to ~nd any further moneys 
for financing the schemes of the second plaintiffs until they could be satisfied that there was no 
question of infringement of the patent - see Farwell J., at pages 302-303. 
lOS See. for example. in Halsey y. Brotberbood (1880) 15 Ch.D. 514; (1881) 19 Ch.D. 386. Wrep y. 
~ 1868-69) 4 L.R. Q.B. 730. Blackburn J .• at page 733. and Skipper & Co. y. PmY (1893)10 
RPC 1. See also Solapite Sips Ltd y. Wood (1933) 50 RPC 315. per Maugbam J .• at page 319 -
negotiation for an amalgamation of their businesses broken off. also loss in investment of capital 
in the proposed venture. 
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products. 1 06 Even when there was already a contractual relationship between the competitor 
and his client, the threats could result in countennanding of orders made to the 
competitors. I 07 In the case of a pending patent, threats could lead to abandonment of 
negotiation for the sale or licence of the patent rights when acquired. I 08 Last but not least. 
in one case it led to the customers insisting on a deduction from the contracted price, 
amounting to the sum which they had paid the patentee in consideration of the patentee 
waiving any rights which he might have in the patent. I 09 According to the British Science 
Guild, "hardship from this cause is most frequently incurred by makers of seasonal goods, 
who sometimes lose the market for a year in consequence of threats addressed to their 
customers by some person clarning an interest in a patent. " 11 0 
Finally, it is not only the business of the competitors which are affected or ruined, the 
public at large is also affected. The closing down of a competitor's business or the resultant 
impainnent in competition results in the consumers having fewer sources of supply or 
alternative choices. This would have the undesirable anti-competitive effects on the supply 
of the particular product in question. Ultimately, assuring fair competition among 
enterprises will benefit the economic development of the country. 1 1 1 
5.5. The Present Position in Malaysia 
There is at present no statutory provision in the Patents Act providing a statutory remedy 
for unjustified threats. There is also an absence of any unfair trade practices statute. The 
only section that may have a bearing on this issue is section 62 of the Act, which provides a 
possibility for any interested person to bring proceedings against the owner of a patent for a 
declaration that the perfonnance of a specific act does not constitute an infringement. 
However, this provision will not be able to give as effective a remedy as a threats provision 
because the plaintiff in such action will have to prove non-infringement. There is also no 
provision for the award of damages or the grant of an injunction. Therefore, a person 
aggrieved can only rely, if at all, on the common law remedies. It may be surprising that a 
search through the Malaysian law reports failed to come up with any reported cases dealing 
106 As in Berkeley & Young Ltd & Goodman Ltd v. Stillwell Darby & Co, Ltd & Konig (1940) 57 
RPC 291; see also Craig v, Dowding (1908) 25 RPC 259, 
107 As in The National School of Salesmanship. Ltd v. The Plomien Fuel Economiser. Ltd (1942) 59 
RPC 95, at page 108. 
108 As in Home v Johnston Brothers (1921) 38 RPC 366, per Sargant J .. at pages 371-372. 
109 See Speedcranes Ltd y. Thomson and anor [1978] RPC 221, per Lord Emslie, at page 225. 
I 10 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Patents and Designs Acts and Practice.s ~f the Patent 
Office. Cmnd 3829 (1931) (Sargent Committee), paragraph 47 of the submISSIon of the 
Committee of the British Science Guild cited in paragraph 164 of the Report. See also Menuuore 
v, Fomento (1955) 72 RPC 157 (CA) - threats which stopped "Christmas trade". 
III See WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Invention - Volume I Patents. World 
Intellectual Property Organisation. Geneva 1979, Commentary on the Model law, at page II-l. 
")8~ 
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with threats of infringement proceedings for patent infringement (or for that matter. 
infringement of other intellectual property rights) under the common law. Similarly the 
search failed to reveal any reported cases dealing with the common law actions for slander 
of title or goods or malicious falsehood relating to any economic activity. I 12 
The first question is whether the common law doctrines discussed earlier are applicable to 
Malaysia. I 13 The latest opinion on this point was given in the case of MBF Holdings Bhd 
& anor v. Houng Hai Kong & ors. 114 In this case concerning a motion to commit for 
contempt, it was argued, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with 
proceedings for contempt of court since it was derived from the common law of England. 
This would mean that after independence the court no longer enjoys the same jurisdiction in 
respect of proceeding for contempt of court as it has done before Merdeka (Independence 
Day) by virtue of section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, read together with Article 
162 of the Federal Constitution. Annuar J. held that: 
" ... With respect I do not agree with the learned counsel's interpretation of Article 
162. The common law is not a mere precedence for the purposes of making a 
judicial decision. The common law is a substantive law which has the same force 
and effect as written law. It has been accepted in this country and is recognised as a 
binding authority. It is therefore not true to say that under Article 162 the common 
law no longer exists. I am of the view that under Article 162 the common law 
comes within the meaning of "existing law" and therefore until it is repealed by the 
authority it continues to be enforced after Merdeka Day ... " 115 
Secondly, is such a tort of malicious falsehood recognised in Malaysia? Two reported cases 
on malicious falsehood were uncovered, although there was no detailed discussion on the 
proper application of the law to be used because the point was not directly in issue. In 
Joseph v. Government of Sarawak & anor, 116 the plaintiff sued for malicious falsehood, 
alleging that a memorandum contained statements about the plaintiff which the defendants 
knew to be false. The defendants made an application to set aside the writ on the ground 
that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and that it was frivolous 
and vexatious. It was held that as the statement of claim properly set out the facts in support 
of his claim for damages arising out of the alleged malicious falsehood directed against him, 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
There are, however, many cases on the common law action for libel and slander, but all dealing 
with personal reputation. It is of interest to note that in all these cases, common law principles are 
unhesitatingly applied by the court, and English cases on this branch of the law are constantly 
referred to as guidance on the proper application of the law to Malaysia. 
Note: In certain situations, the Common Law of England is deemed to be a part of the general law 
of Malaysia - see section 3, Civil Law Act 1956 (Revised 1972), Act 67, in Appendix. See also 
Chapter I - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.2. 
MBF Holdin~s Bhd & anor v. Houng Hai Kong & ors [1993] 2 MLJ 516. 
MBF Holdin~s Bhd & anor v! HQung Hai Kon~ & ors 1993] 2 MLJ 516, at page 524. 
Joseph Y. Gl)\'Crnm\nt ofSwawak & aoor [1975] 2 MLJ 38. 
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"the action is not frivolous and vexatious and should be allowed to proceed to trial." In this 
event this motion was refused with costs. 1 17 
The only other reported case on malicious falsehood was Dato Ong Kee Hui v. Sinyium 
Anak Mutit,118 regarding false statements leading to the loss of the plaintiffs seat in 
parliament. Salleh Abas F.J., delivering the judgement of the Court, said: _ 
"The tort of malicious falsehood, sometimes known as injurious falsehood, consists 
of a false statement made by the defendant to a third party concerning the plaintiff 
whereby he suffers loss through the action of this third party. (Salmond, 13th Edn. 
page 682)." 119 
From the above it can be concluded that the English doctrines will be applied, together with 
all the weaknesses in the law. On this point it is useful to refer to the opinion of the Privy 
Council in Lee Kee Choong v. Empat Nombor Ekor eNS) Sdn Bhd & ors.120 On the 
application of English law, Lord Russell, delivering the judgement of their Lordships, said: 
"Their Lordships do not need to go to comment on possible developments since 
1956 in the law in England concerning ability to go behind a valuation on the 
ground of mistake or error in principle, having regard to the emergence of an ability 
to sue such a valuer for negligence: see, for example Campbell v. Edwards [1976] 1 
WLR 403. For present purpose it appears that the Civil Law Ordinance 1956, 
section 3, adopted English law as administered at its effective date, so that any 
subsequent march in English authority is not embodied ... " 121 
So even if there is a change in the common law approach to trade libel, the Malaysian courts 
would not necessarily apply it to Malaysia because of this cut-off date. 122 Therefore, if and 
when such a case comes up for decision in a Malaysian court, there is no reason to hope 
that the court will apply a different set of rules which would be more favourable to the 
plaintiff aggrieved by such threats or falsehood. This shows that it is all the more important 
that the Patents Act should have a provision dealing with unjustified threats to provide a 
remedy for persons aggrieved in such a situation. 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Joseph v. Government of Sarawak & anor [1975] 2 MLJ 38, per Yusoff 1., at page 40. 
Dato Qn~ Kee Hui v. Sinyium Anak Mutit [1983] 1 MLJ 36. 
Dato Qn~ Kee Hui v. Sinyium Anak Mutit [1983] 1 MLJ 36, at page 42. 
Lee Kee Choon~ v. Empat Nombor Ekor (NS) Sdn Bhd & ors (1976) 3 PCC 235. 
Lee Kee Choon~ v. Empat Nombor Ekor (NS) Sdn Bhd & ors (1976) 3 PCC 235. at pages 240-
241. 
For citations of the various contentions of the effect of this cut-off date, see Chapter I - Historical 
Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.2.3 .. footnote 17. 
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5.6. Is There a Need for Legislative Reforms? 
The cases have shown the detrimental effects threats have on those subjected to them. Such 
threats will undoubtedly be even more effective in a country like Malaysia where the 
awareness of intellectual property is low and so the mere whiff of the danger of being 
involved in any patent litigation is enough to scare traders off from dealing in the alleged 
infringing products. Even more pertinent for present purposes is the fact that it seems to be 
a matter of course for intellectual property owners in Malaysia to issue threats of legal 
proceedings against anyone suspected of being involved in dealings with allegedly 
infringing goods. 123 
From the study of the United Kingdom situation it can be seen that the threats provisions, 
even though they have not completely eliminated the occurrence of groundless threats, have 
succeeded to a great extent in achieving the desired effect of reducing the incidence of such 
threats.124 The fact that despite the presence of the provisions there are still threat 
proceedings shows that such provisions are essential to act as a deterrent to traders who 
may be inclined to these kind of activities, and to provide an effective remedy to those 
affected by them. 
The common law remedies are clearly shown to be inadequate. 125 No liability will attach to 
the threatener if he acts bona fide in the protection of his rights. His honest belief, even 
though false and even though damage is occasioned to the person to whom the statement is 
directed at, provides a good defence. Malice has to be proved, but "the inquiry into the 
good faith or actual belief of a man in the righteousness of the threats or representation he 
was making, is one of the most difficult of all tasks of judicial investigation." 126 This 
123 
124 
125 
126 
Personal communications from legal practitioners and officials in the Intellectual Property 
Division of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Malaysia. 
The figures culled from the Reports of Patent Cases and Fleet Street Reports on the number of 
reported threats actions for every ten year period from the years 1884 - 1995 are illuminating: 
1884-1893 = 28; 1894 - 1903 = 26; 1904 - 1913 = 9; 1914 - 1923 = 5; 1924 - 1933 = 7; 1934 -
1943 = 12; 1944 - 1953 = 7; 1954 - 1963 = 6; 1964 - 1973 = 6; 1974 - 1983 = 3; 1984 - 1994 = 
3. 
Parr y. Weatherhead & HardiO& (1932) 49 RPC 262, illustrates the weak position of the person 
aggrieved in the absence of statutory protection. In Em. the plaintiff was forced to rely on the 
common law remedy as the defendants were able to avail themselves of the proviso of section 36 of 
the Patents and Designs Acts, 1907-1928. Despite the fact that it was held that the statements 
published by the defendants amounted to threats and that they were not justifiable, but since there 
was no evidence of malafidess or of special damages the plaintiff was not entitled to any remedy -
see Luxmoore J., at page 266. In this respect, it is perhaps quite surprising that the New Zealand 
Ministry of Commence has recommended that the existing threats provision in the Patents Act 
1953 (section 74) be repealed. In their view, it is questionable whether retention of such remedies 
is justifiable. They were of the opinion that the existing common law remedies and under section 
13(i) of The Fair Trading Act 1986 are adequate. Further, the threats provision may have the effect 
of protecting infringers - see Reform of the Patents Act 1953 - Proposed Recommendations -
Competition Policy and Business Law Division, Ministry of Commence, Wellington, February 
1992 (Publication prepared by the Intellectual Property section and the Patent Office of the 
Ministry of Commerce), paragraph 6.2.7 - Groundless Threats of Infringement - page 51 md 
Paragraph 6.3, Proposed Recommendations (page 52). 
Daniel, E.M., "On the Proviso to Section 32 of the Patents Act 1883", Transactions of the 
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position is unduly favourable to the patentee. Under the common law, the person threatened 
would have to prove the four elements required for a successful action - the fact that the 
threat was made, that it was false (which would mean that he has to bear the onus of 
proving that he had not infringed), that it was made mala fide, and lastly that he has 
suffered special damage. 127 This places too onerous a burden on the plaintiff. Another 
shortcoming of the common law provision is that interlocutory injunction will normally not 
be granted if the defendant pleads justification. By the time the action comes for trial and it 
is held that the defendant is liable for malicious falsehood, the damage would already have 
been done. The trial judge in Crest Homes Ltd v. Ascott128 granted the plaintiffs an 
interlocutory injunction, departing from the general rule that no such relief will be granted 
where the defendant says he will justify his assertion. The Court of Appeal, allowing 
appeal and discharging the injunction, held that there was no reason to depart from the 
general rule that an interlocutory injunction will not be granted against a defendant in a libel 
action if he intends to plead justification unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement is 
untrue. 129 
Introducing a threats section130 would not in any way detract from the rights of a patent 
owner. A patentee who feels that his right has been impinged upon always has the right to 
initiate infringement proceedings. In fact that should be the proper procedure to adopt. 13 1 
Besides, commencing an action will not constitute a threat. 13 2 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
Institute of Patents Agent, Vol. III, Session 1884-5,241, at page 242. 
Farr v. Weatherhead & Hardin& (1932) 49 RPC 262, per Luxmoore J., at page 266, "In order to 
establish a right of action in such a case there are four things which a plaintiff must establish. He 
must establish first that the defendant has made threats; secondly that the threats are not justifiable 
in fact, thirdly that the threats were made malafide; and lastly, that he has suffered special damage." 
Crest Homes Ltd V. Ascott [1980] FSR 396. 
Crest Homes Ltd v. Ascott [1980] FSR 396, per Lord Denning M.R., at pages 397-398, referring 
to Bonnard V. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269, Monson v. Tussauds Ltd (189401 QB 671, and Quartz 
Hill Consolidated Gold Minin& Co. v. Beall (1882) 20 Ch. D. 501. Contrast this with Johnson 
Electric Industrial Manufactmy Ltd v. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] FSR 280, per Whitford J., at 
page 287 - a case under the threats section. 
The Royal Commission of Patents, Copyright and Industrial Design "Report on Patents of 
Invention", Chairman - J.L. Ilsley, 1960 (Canada) - in Part XI, section 7, page 109, recommended 
the introduction of a threats section in the Canadian Patent Act. The Ilsley recommendation was 
incorporated into the Proposed Patent Law in the proposed section 101. The proposal followed 
section 65 of the Patents Act 1949 (United Kingdom) - see Proposed Patent Law - prepared for the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, June 1976 (Canada). It is not known for what 
reasons this proposal was not carried into effect when the Canadian Patent Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. P-
4) was amended in 1987 by the Patent Amendment Act, 1987 (S.C. 1987, c. 41). 
See Graham J., in Mechanical Services <Trailer En~neers) Ltd v. Avon Rubber Co, lid [1977] 
RPC 66, at page 75, "A patentee's first and proper remedy when he considers the def~t !s 
infringing is to bring an action for infringement, without making any .threats at all. This IS 
however in the life of the market place no doubt a counsel of perfection and, patentees Ri 
travellers being human as they are, no doubts threats against potential defendants will continue to 
be made. That does not mean to say that the law approves of such action, which, as already statal, 
can obviously cause serious damage which is often difficult or impossible to recover,"; see also 
Townsend Controls PLY Ltd v, Gilead and anor (1988-1989) 14 IPR 443, von Doussa J., at page 
448. 
See Beven" Alcwmder y, Welsbacb Incapdeg.ent Gas Lipt Co, Ltd (1903) 20 RPC 69, and also 
Boomax y. Austin Motor Co .. lid (1953) 70 RPC 284, at 295, per Evershed M.R. I 
Note that the costs of, and incident to, an action for infringement of a patent, as the costs m any 
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In these hard economic times, a trader in trying to guard his business from rivals may see it 
as fair game to try to gain an advantage over, or stem the flow from his business to a rival 
enterprise by indulging in unfair market behaviour.133 To prevent unscrupulous traders 
from trying to maximise or extend their monopoly right by unscrupulous means in the 
market place and to deter them from temptation, there is a need for such a provision to 
combat this "grave mischief'.134 
It is true that in some cases of innocent infringement a simple warning letter may be enough 
to bring such activities to a stop. This will be faster and cheaper and it is also more 
advantageous to the innocent infringer. However, on balance, because of the potential for 
abuse it is still better to have a statutory machinery for threats. 
5.7. Features of the Proposed Section 
From an analysis of the case law and the legislative development of the United Kingdom 
threats provision, the proposed threats section, to provide the proper balance, should cater 
for the following considerations. 
133 
134 
other action, are in the discretion of the court, and the court has full power to detennine by whom 
and to what extent such costs shall be paid - see, for example, Rediffusion Simulation Ltd v. Link-
Miles Ltd [1993] FSR 369, per Aldous J., at page 410. Therefore, a party who is responsible for 
unnecessary litigation, or the costs of a part of the process of litigation will have to bear his own 
costs or even his opponent's costs - see Mohamed bin Hussin & anor v. Hashim bin Said [1978] 1 
MLJ 127, Petroliam Nasional Bb:l & anor v. Cheah Kam Chiew [1987] 1 MU 25. According to 
O'Hare, J., Hill. R.N., Civil Litigation, 5th Ed., Longman, 1990, at page 22, the writing of a 
letter before action is an important procedural step. A litigant who commences proceedings without 
writing such a letter may find that, even if successful, the court will disallow some or even all of 
the costs, citing R. v. Inland Revenue. ex parte Qpman International UK [1986] 1 WLR 568. 
There does not seem to be any case on point where the interface between the "duty" to send a letter 
before action and the liability for threats is discussed. In relation to intellectual property cases, 
there does not seem to be any frrm rule that such letters should be sent. See, for example. 
Weinprten Bros y. Charles Bayer & Co. (1905) 22 RPC 341 (HL), per Lord Macnaghten, at page 
350, "It was also argued that if the plaintiffs really objected to Mr Bayer taking their scroll they 
ought to have written to complain and told him what they complained of before taking legal 
proceedings. I cannot think that there is any substance in that objection. Why should a person 
assailed and injured by unfair competition teach his opponent how far he may safely go in 
undermining a rival business which he wishes to destroy? Why should he throwaway the only 
chance of obtaining by process of law redress for injury already done?", and contrast this with 
American Tobacco Co. y. Guest (1892) 9 RPC 218, per Stirling J. at page 220, where costs were 
refused in a trivial case, where an action had been commenced without notice against the innocent 
purchaser of a small quantity of spuriously marked goods. It would appear that there could be a 
tension between the usual practice in Malaysia of sending "letters before action" or "notices of 
demand" and the existence of threats actions. However, it is submitted that the proposed inclusion 
of the threats section to the Act would have the force of law. It would override the discretion vested 
in the court to award costs of proceedings provided by the Rules of the High Court. Further. there 
is nothing to prevent the patent owner from adopting the safe option of sending "notifications" -
see infra. para. 5.7., point 7. 
Byrne, N .• "Groundless Threats of Patent Proceedings" Law for Business, February 1992. page 
102. 
Johnson BIectric Iodustrial Manufactoa Ltd y. Mabuchi Motor K.K. [1986] FSR 280, per 
Whitford J. at page 287. 
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1. The threats provision should apply to any person who issues threats, whether he 
has or has not an interest in a patent or patent application. This is to prevent 
circumvention of the provision by the issuing of threats by someone who has no 
interest in the patent. 
2. The provision must make clear that any fonn of threats is actionable. Instead of the 
phrase "or otherwise" used in the United Kingdom and Australian provisions, the 
phrase "or in any other way, whether in oral or written fonn" is to be preferred. 
3 . Any person aggrieved by the threats should have a right to institute a threats 
proceeding. The proposed section should be framed in such a way that it is beyond 
question that the threat need not be communicated to the person threatened for there 
to be an actionable threat. So the phrase "or express a threat in relation to any 
person ... " should be added the for purpose of ensuring greater clarity and certainty 
in the law.1 35 
4. For the purpose of clarification, the remedies available should be stated in a way to 
show that the granting of the remedies is discretionary. There is, at present, still 
conflict of opinions among the judges in United Kingdom and also in Australia as to 
whether the remedies are discretionary or mandatory. Therefore, in the proposed 
section, the preferred phrase to use is "may, in its discretion" instead of "shall" or 
"may" to show the remedies available are discretionary, and not mandatory .136 
5. A patentee who is able to justify his threats should not be liable for threats. The 
provision should, therefore, provide a defence for him where he can show that the 
alleged act amounts or would amount to an infringement of his right. The burden of 
proof to show infringement should, however, be on the patentee. I37 Even if the 
patentee proves that the alleged act was an infringement or would constitute an 
infringement of his patent rights, the plaintiff should be able to obtain his remedies 
if he could show that the patent is invalid. So the present United Kingdom defence 
should be adopted in the proposed law. 
6. A threat against a primary infringer, i.e., a person who is the originating source of 
the allegedly infringing products, should not be actionable. The patent owner 
should be allowed to threaten at "source", i.e. the person who manufactures or 
imports the infringing products. This exemption should also apply to the person 
135 See the earlier discussion on John Summers & Sons Ltd v. The Cold Metal Process Co. (1948) 65 
RPC 75, in paragraph 5.3.6. 
136 See earlier discussion on this aspect in paragraph 5.3.10. 
137 On this aspect, the writer feels that the WIPO Model Law approach, which places the burden. of 
proving non-infringement on the plaintiff. is too onerous. See the WIPO Model Law. section 
163(2). 
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138 
139 
140 
141 
who supplies the means for enabling an infringement to take place. 138 In the frrst 
place, the primary infringer may be in a better position to face the threats. Secondly, 
in certain situation the issuing of threats may be beneficial because it could lead to 
negotiations for the settlement of the patent dispute and thus avoid the necessity for 
the needless issuing of court proceedings. 139 It is believed that this exception will 
provide a proper balance between practical expediency and the potential for abuse 
when the threats are issued against people involved in the alleged secondary 
infringing act. There is a need to clarify in the proposed section that the exception 
applies even against the manufacturer in his retail or other activities, because he is 
not, in the true sense of the word, involved in the secondary activities of retailing 
the products. 140 To prevent possible side-stepping of this exception by the 
communication of threats against the primary infringer, not to him directly, but to 
customers, the section should contain a provision that the exception applies only if 
communicated directly to the alleged primary infringer. It is not applicable if the 
threats are communicated to the customers of the alleged primary infringer.l41 
As to this, see the recommendation for a statutory provision for contributory infringement in 
Malaysia in Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights, 
para. 4.8. 
See the justifiable disquiet of North 1., in Barrett & Elers. Ltd v. Day; Day v. Foster(l890) 7 RPC 
54, at page 59, "It has been held ... that such a letter by a patentee's solicitor to an alleged infringer 
or his solicitor, threatening an action for infringement, does give a cause of action under this 
section, and I fear this will have the effect of preventing a patentee from adopting the course thus 
pointed out to be fair and reasonable, and that for the future the warning letter will only accompany 
instead of preceding the writ, and will consequently be useless.". See also Alpi v. Wrieht [1972] 
RPC 125, per Whitford 1., at page 132, "Section 65 has presented great difficulties in the past in a 
number of cases. It does very often stand in the way of the initiation of negotiations for settlement 
of patent actions, because people are afraid to say anything to potential defendants lest they be faced 
with a threats action. It is no doubt a very useful weapon against patentees who make a habit of 
going round and threatening purchasers so as to impede the arrangement for distribution and sale by 
their competitors. It is probably of more doubtful value for its relation to direct dealings between 
competing manufacturers or distributors." The problem alluded by the judges has now be mitigated 
by section 70(4) of the 1977 Act. 
Compare the views expressed by Aldous J. in Bowden Controls Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls lJd 
and anor [1990] RPC 427, at page 434, and the Court of Appeal in Cavity Trays Ltd v. RMC 
Panel Products Ltd [1996] RPC 361. See, supra, para. 5.3.11. 
One possible scenario where there could be an attempted evasion if there is no such condition is 
when the patentee issues circulars to customers of the alleged infringing manufacturer. The circular 
will contain allegations that the manufacturer is infringing certain patent rights and that actions 
will be taken against him. However, the circular is careful to assure the customers that the patentee 
will not in any circumstances proceed against them for infringement. In this scenario, there is no 
threats against the retailers. If the aggrieved manufacturer sues for threats, he will be met by the 
defence of merely issuing a threat against the primary infringer. However, despite the assurance of 
being told that they will not be sued, the manufacturer's customers may be reluctant to deal further 
with the manufacturer, who will then suffer damage without a remedy. The potential for harm is 
neatly illustrated by the case of Strix Ltd y. Otter Coptrols Ltd [1991] FSR 163, though the ~ 
was on a different issue, being concerned with an application by the defendants for costs on the 
indemnity basis. The plaintiffs had written to some ten customers of the defendants, drawing their 
attention to the existence of litigation for patent infringement between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants. However these letters made it clear that the customers themselves would not be sued. 
There was evidence that at least one contract which the defendants believed they were certain to 
obtain was put on hold pending disposal of the action. Aldous 1. in the Patents Court, commented 
that a party who had been damaged by the action of another must look to his legal remedies to 
recover them; whether it be by way of a threats action or by way of an action for malicious 
falsehood, or otherwise, depending on the facts. But it has to be noted that on the facts he was 
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Further, the provision should state that a person not entitled to sue for patent 
infringement cannot rely on this proviso.142 Therefore, the defence only applies to a 
person having the right to actually bring legal proceedings in respect of a patent. 
This would exclude the defence from any person other than the patent owner or the 
"beneficiary" under section 61 of the Act. 143 
7. The owner should still be allowed to issue general warnings or to notify the public 
of the existence of his patent rights. This is merely a right flowing from the 
monopoly given by a patent. 144 Therefore, the common practice of issuing a 
general warning against infringement by the insertion of notices in the public press 
should still be allowed. These notices serve a useful function as they bring notice of 
the patent to the public. 
8. There should not be a proviso that the threatener is absolved from his threats if he 
commences and prosecutes an proceedings for infringement with due diligence. 
This is justified by the difficulties involved in applying this proviso prior to the 
1932 amendments,145 and that it "gives with one hand a right of action, and takes it 
way with the other."146 With reference to this proviso, North J. said of the 
plaintiff, that "he may find that his cause of action is cut from his feet by an action 
such as was threatened being commenced within a reasonable time."147 
9 . The proposed section should include a provision exempting a legal practitioner or a 
registered patent agent from threats proceedings in respect of an act done in his 
professional capacity on behalf on his client, similar to section 132 of the Australian 
provision. This would obviate the necessity for adopting the dubious reasoning in 
142 
143 
144 
14S 
146 
147 
unlikely to get a remedy for either cause of action. As regards the possibility of a threats action, it 
is likely that the plaintiff could shelter behind the section 70(4) defence since the threats were made 
against the defendants and not against their customers. 
This point was raised in Bowden Controls Ltd v. Acco Cable Controls Ltd and anor [1990] RPC 
427. However, Aldous J. declined to rule on it since it was unnecessary to his decision - see page 
434. 
Note that under the Act, the right of a licensee to sue is not restricted to an exclusive licensee. On 
this point, see Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights, para. 3.7.3. 
Challender y Royce (1887) 4 RPC 363, per Bowen L.J., at page 375, "Everybody, it seems to me, 
has still a right to issue a general warning to pirates not to pirate, and to infringers not to infringe, 
and to warn the public that the patent to which the patentee is entitled, and unde~ which he claims, 
is one which he intends to enforce."; Johnson v. Ed&e (1892) 9 RPC 142, per Lmdley L.J., at page 
148, "I cannot suppose that the section prevents a patentee from saying that which the patent itself 
implies - that anybody infringing must expect legal proceedings to be taken against .him. I do not 
think it can mean that. That is merely saying what everybody knows already. That IS not a threat 
against anybody in particular." 
See the discussion on this point in paragraph 5.2.2, point 3. 
The Combined Weiahio8 Machine Co. y. The Automatic Wei8hin8 Machine Co. (1889) 6 RPC 
S02, per Kekewich 1., at page S08. See also the critique on this proviso by paniel, E.M., "On the 
Proviso to Section 32 of the Patents Act 1883", Transactions of the Institute of Patents Agent, 
Vol. m, Session 1884-S, 241. 
Sldnner" Cp. y. Shaw" Co. (l893) 1 Ch. 413, per North 1., at 417. 
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Earles Utilities Ltd v. Harrison, 148 which could have stemmed from a desire not to 
have a solicitor acting in his professional capacity to be sued, even though the 
section under consideration clearly states that "any person" could be sued. 149 
10. To ensure that all the issues are settled, the defendant in a threats action should be 
allowed to make a counterclaim for infringement of the patent. Similarly, the 
plaintiff is entitled to make a counterclaim for invalidation of the patent. 
5.8. Proposals for Change 
The harmful effects of threats of patent infringement proceedings against the receiver have 
already been shown. The common law remedies have been found wanting and are too 
favourable in favour of the patent owner. Bearing in mind the cut and thrust of the business 
world, it is conceivable that every loophole will be exploited to its fullest to the advantage 
of the exploiter and to the consequent disadvantage and detriment of his competitors and the 
public in general. There is a need to achieve a proper balance between the right of the 
patentee to notify the public of his patent rights and to issue general warnings against 
infringement of his rights, and the need to ensure that such warnings do not exceed the 
boundary of fair practices to the detriment of his rivals. It is believed that the proposed 
addition of a new section 61A to the Patents Act 1983 will achieve this balance. The 
provision will go towards deterring patent owners from indulging in such unfair practices. 
At the very least, the alleged secondary infringers would be spared being harassed by "legal 
thunderbolts in the shape of lawyers' letter warning them of the awful consequences that 
will ensue if they continue to infringe." 150 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are 
set out in Chapter 8. 
148 Earles Utilities Ltd y. Harrison (1935) 52 RPC 77 - letter by solicitor stating that he will advise 
his clients to apply for an injunction unless manufacture ~f alleged infringing articl~ is ceased -
letter held not to be a threat, per Farwell J., at page 80. " ... It has bee~ known for a cbent ~o .refuse 
to take his solicitor's advice. In my judgement, that cannot be S81d to be a threat within the 
meaning of section 36. If a solicitor says: I shall advise my client to commence proceedings, there 
is not, in my judgement, a threat within section 36." 
149 In view of what is expressed in point 6 of para. 5.7., supra. that a person not having the right to 
bring legal proceedings in respect of a patent infringement should not be covered by the proposed 
defence, such a provision needs to be spelled out 
150 Davies, A.J., "On Threats of Legal Proceedings and the 32nd Section of the Patents, ~igns, ... 
Trade Marks Act, 1833." Transaction of the Institute of Patents Agents, Vol. V, Session 1886-7. 
at page 174. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
6. Introduction 
Statutory Control of the Patentee t s Exercise of His 
Exclusive Rights 
Several rationales have been advanced for the justification of the patent system. Machlup 
listed four major bases for patent protection, namely, the "natural-law" thesis, the "reward-
by-monopoly" thesis, the "monopoly-profit-incentive" thesis, and the "exchange-for-
secrets" thesis.! That the reward to the inventor is not the prime, but rather one of the 
several incidental objects of the Malaysian patent system can be derived from the inclusion 
of the various provisions offering the possibility of compulsory licensing, and the 
provisions making certain conditions in licensing agreements invalid. The inclusion of these 
provisions in the Act indicates that the underlying policy behind the Act is not only to 
protect the interest of the patentee, but at the same time, the interests of the public. Further, 
the provisions on exhaustion of rights clearly show that the Act does not intend that the 
patentee should be able to exercise his exclusive rights indefinitely. The protection given to 
a prior user, despite the fact that no patent has been applied for by the prior user, at the 
expense of the patentee who as a result has a less than complete set of exclusive rights, is 
also an indication of this balance. 
The powerful position of the patentee was best reflected by an early US case, Victor 
Talkini Machine Co. v. The Fair,2 where it was said that "[w]ithin his domain, the patentee 
is czar. The people must take the invention on the terms he dictates or let it alone for 17 
years. This is a necessity from the nature of the grant. Cries of restraint of trade and 
impairment of the freedom of sales are unavailing, because for the promotion of the useful 
arts the constitution and statutes authorise this very monopoly." However, contemporary 
judicial and statutory attitude is reflected in Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & 
2 
See Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15 (1958), at pages 20-
25. 
Victor Talkin& Machine Co. v. The Fair 123 Fed. Rep. 424 (CCA 7th Cir. 1903), per Baker, 
Circuit Judge, at page 426. In the UK, see Incandescent Gas Company Ltd v. Caotelo (1895) 12 
RPC 262, per Wills J., at page 264, "[T]he patentee has the sole right of using and selling. the 
articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all. Inasmuch as he has the ~ght 
to prevent people from using them or dealing in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thmg, 
that is to say, to impose his own conditions. It does not matter how unreasonable or how absurd 
the conditions are." See also Columbia Graphophone Co. Ltd y. MllIRY (1922) 39 RPC 239 
(Ch.D.), per Russell 1., at page 241, "[T]he owner of a patented article is entitled to ~pose any 
conditions he likes when he is granting a licence to somebody to use the patented artlcle. 1bere 
appears to be no limitation to the conditions that he may impose, and if he imposes condi~ODs ani 
those conditions are brought to the knowledge of the person who uses the patented article, the 
person using the patented article must refrain from violating those conditions. It appears to me that 
... if he violates the conditions imposed by the licence, then he has no licence at all, and. ~fore. 
he has committed a breach of the patentee's rights." 
292 
Smith Co. ,3 where the US Supreme Court said, "The fact that a patentee has the power to 
refuse a licence does not mean that he has the power to grant a licence on such conditions as 
he may choose." Aware of the potentially powerful position of the patentee, and the need to 
curb any attempts at abuse by the exercise of the patentee's patent monopoly,4 the Act 
contains express provisions to deal with actions or inactions which might be contrary to the 
public interest. The two provisions in the Act designed to deal with the abuse of the patent 
rights are those on compulsory licensing, and the prohibition against the insertion of certain 
clauses in a licence agreement which attempt to extend the patents rights beyond their lawful 
scope. The provisions of the Act on invalid clauses practically echo the sentiment voiced in 
Transparent-Wrap. 
The ftrst part of the chapter deals with the provisions on compulsory licensing, both for 
abuse of monopoly position and for interdependence of patents. Another form of 
compulsory use, those given to the government to use the patented invention is also 
analysed. In discussing the extent of the application of the provisions dealing with invalid 
clauses in licence contracts, guidance will be sought from the US cases. Even though there 
are no general statutory provisions covering patent licences in the US law, in practice, 
through the misuse doctrine, there is an effective code regulating illegal licensing practices. 
The analysis will, however, be kept only in the context of the exclusive rights as provided 
for in the Act, since the regulation of competition as such is outside the scope of this thesis. 
References to principles of competition and so on must be read within the context of patent 
law. Accordingly, although guidance will of necessity be sought from the US cases, cases 
based exclusively on antitrust or competition law will not be relied on. The Malaysian 
Government has announced its intention to legislate for a competition statute. To date, there 
has been no indication of the proposed coverage, structure, and philosophical framework of 
the proposed legislation. It may be a long while before the Bill is fmally produced. 
However, there is no reason to believe that it could not co-exist with the prohibitions under 
the Patents Act. Any potential conflict could be resolved by the provision of exceptions 
under the proposed Bill. Finally, a brief summary is given of the administrative control 
3 
4 
Iransparent-Wmp Machine Corp. y. Stokes & Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), per 
Justice Douglas, at page 152. 
Although the word "monopoly" is used to refer to the exclusive rights given to a patent owner 
under the Act, it is merely used here for the sake of convenience. It is recognised that it is not 
strictly correct to refer to a patent right as a monopoly within the traditional and accurate sense of 
that term. For example, the US Court in Standard Oil y. United States 221 US 1 (US Sup. Ct 
1911) defined monopoly thus, " (1) the monopolists have the sole right to buy, sell or m~e, ad 
(2) others [are] deprived of a pre-existing right to buy, sell, or make. The patent grant gIves the 
patentee only the right to exclude others; his own right to practise the invention may be 
subservient to another patent. Moreover, since novelty is a requisite of patentability, the grant does 
not exclude the public from a pre-existing right." In United States y. Dubilier 289 US 178 (US 
Sup. Ct 1933), the Supreme Court said, "Though often so characterised, a patent is not, accurately 
speaking, a monopoly. ... The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for 
buying, selling, working or using a thing which th~ public freel~ enjoyed PJ'!or to the. grant .Th~ 
a monopoly takes something from the people. An Inventor depnves the pubhc of nothing which It 
enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum 
of human knowledge. 00' He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely." 
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over transfer of technology under the Industrial Co-ordination Act. However, smce 
measures taken under this Act are administrative in nature, a detailed evaluation of the 
effects of this control is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6.1. Compulsory licences 
Although a patentee has the right to decide on whether, and how he wishes to exploit his 
patent,S in certain circumstances, this will come up against the public interest policy of the 
country. When the action or inaction of the patent owner leads to demand for the patented 
product being inadequately satisfied or being only available at an unreasonably high price, 
or when there is no local working of the patented invention, the State may have to intervene 
to prevent continuation of the state of affairs. The potential for abuse of the patent system 
leading to anti-competitive consequences or which retards the economic development of a 
country is recognised and it is internationally accepted that powers should be given to 
regulate such practices.6 It is generally accepted that the compulsory licensing regime of a 
patent system is introduced to prevent or correct such abuse of monopoly rights.7 It is a 
feature present in most of the patent systems throughout the world, with the notable 
exception of the United States, the main opponent of such a regime in the international 
arena.s However, even in the USA where attempts to enact a statutory code for compulsory 
licensing in the patent statute have so far been resisted,9 a de facto regime in fact exists 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
See, for example, the statement of Warrington J., in Re Robin Electric Lamp Co. Ltd (1915) 32 
RPC 202, at page 215, "A patentee may use the advantage given by his patent either by putting it 
into operation himself and supplying the public with the article, or by licensing others to do so. If 
he himself maintains an adequate supply there is no necessity, from the public point of view, for 
the granting of licences, and, in my opinion, subsection (5) contemplates these alternatives as 
legitimate mode of working a patent. " 
See Article 5A, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at Stockholm 
in 1967, and Article 31, Document MTNIFA IT-AIC, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Part II, Section 5: Patents. 
See, for example, Halcon SO Group Inc.s' Patents [1989] RPC 1, per Falconer J., in the Patents 
Court, at page 17, "I accept that the policy of section 48 and the ancillary provisions, for example 
under section 50( 1), is to prevent the abuse of monopoly and to get the invention into use in the 
sense of being worked in the United Kingdom." 
Although 35 USC, the US patent statute does not contain a compulsory licensing provision, 
provisions regarding the compulsory use of patents are in fact to be found in various other statutes. 
See, for example, 28 USC, section .1498, enacted in 1910, which provides immunity from 
injunction when a patented invention is used or manufactured by the United States or by a 
contractor of the United States. Only compensation remedy is provided, hence this amounts to a de 
facto compulsory licence; Atomic Energy Act, 1946, 42 USC, sections 2011-2183 which provide 
that if the Atomic Energy Commission finds a patent meets certain qualifications, including 
primary importance in the production and utilisation of special nuclear material, a comp~sory non-
exclusive licence can be issued; The Plant Variety Protection Act, 1973, 7 USCA, sections 2321-
583. Section 2404 of this Act provides that a compulsory licence is obtainable where "necessary in 
order to ensure an adequate supply of fibre, food or feed ... (if) the owner is unwilling or unable •.. 
to supply the public needs ... at a price which may reasonably be deemed fair"; and The Clean Air 
Act, 1970,42 USCA, sections 1857-58a (Supp. 1974) which provides for the mandatory licensing 
of patents upon the Attorney General's certification to a District Court that the use of the patent is 
necessary to meet the environmental standards set by the Act and the court's subsequent 
determination of reasonable licence tenns. 
For a comprehensive review of the various attempts to impose a statutory regime for compulsory 
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through the impositions of certain sanctions against the patent owner on proof of abuse of 
his patent monopoly or violation of the antitrust laws. 1 0 Through judicial refusal to enjoin 
the defendant from continuing infringing acts in cases where there have been patent abuse 
or in the case of a patentee's conviction for violation of the antitrust laws, there is a de facto 
scheme to compel the granting of licences on reasonable terms. I I The US Supreme Court 
in Besser Manufacturin~ Co. v. United States upheld this principle on the ground that 
"compulsory licensing is a well-recognised remedy where patent abuses are proved in 
antitrust actions and it is required for effective relief' .12 In fact, in some cases of abuse the 
court had gone even further than the mere granting of compulsory licences on reasonable 
terms, and had ordered a royalty-free compulsory licence to whoever desired it. In the 
Hartford case, the Supreme Court refused to sanction the grant of royalty-free compulsory 
licences, saying that if it was assumed that the defendant owned a valid patent, it was 
difficult to say that, however much in the past the defendant had abused the rights thereby 
conferred, it must now dedicate them to the public. 13 However, in United States v. 
National Lead Co., the Supreme Court did not rule out the constitutionality of such an order 
where it "would be more necessary and appropriate to the enforcement of the Antitrust Act" 
than the case at hand.1 4 Even where patent misuse or breach of the anti-trust laws is not 
alleged, the court has sometimes refused to grant an injunction against the infringer. For 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
licensing in the USA, see Herz, A., "Compulsory Licensing" 28 JPOS 889 (1946); Mirabito, 
A.1., "Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal", 57 JPOS 404 
(1975); Arnold, T., Goldstein, E., "Compulsory Licensing: The 'Uncentive' for Invention", Patent 
Law Review 1975, 113. 
The justification for this is based on the provision of 35 USC 283, under which the court may 
grant injunctive relief in accordance with the "principles of equity", see Arnold, T., Goldstein, E., 
"Compulsory Licensing: The 'Uncentive' for Invention", Patent Law Review 1975, 113. 
See, for example, Morton Salt Co. y. G.S. Suppi~er Co. 314 US 488, 52 USPQ 30 (US Sup. Ct 
1942), and B.B. Chemical Co. v Ellis, 314 US 495, 52 USPQ 33 (US Sup. Ct 1942). For a 
review of the cases, see Coburn, H.H., "Compulsory Licensing by the Courts", 28 JPOS 180 
(1946); Sease, E.J., "Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory Licence", 55 JPOS 233 
(1973). Hagan, T.W., Henry, S.1., "Is a Compulsory Patent Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study 
of the U.S. and Foreign Experience", 7 Law and Policy in International Business 1207 (1975), am 
Arnold, T., Goldstein, E., "Compulsory Licensing: The 'Uncentive' for Invention", Patent Law 
Review 1975, 113. In fact, Coburn argues that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Morton 
S.al1 case interferes with the rights of the owner of the abused patent more radically than the most 
general compulsory licensing on a royalty basis could possibly do. 
BeSser Manufacturin~ Co. y. United States 343 US 444, 93 USPQ 321 (US Sup. Ct 1952). 
Hartford Empire Co. et al. v. US 323 US 386, 64 USPQ 18, opinion clarified at 324 US 570, 65 
USPQ 1 (US Sup. Ct 1945). In the Hartford Empire antitrust proceedings, the principle was 
clearly established that where there has been a violation of the antitrust laws, the Federal Courts 
have the power to compel a patent owner to grant licences under his patent to all applicants 
therefor at reasonable royalties. For a critique of this case, see Coburn, H.H., "Compulsory 
Licensing by the Courts", 28 JPOS 180 (1946), who also argues that the j~dicial branch o! the 
government today possesses, without enabling legislation, the power effectively to deal .Wlth a 
great many of the so-called abuses of the patent system by directing the o~nder to grant licences 
on reasonable terms and conditions to all or to any selected group of applicants therefor. See also 
Clapp, N.A., "Some Recent Developments in Patent-Antitrust Law", 34.JPOS 945, at pages 958-
961, where the possibility of judges ordering royalty-free compulsory licences after the Hartfml 
case is discussed; and Bicks, R.A., "The Relation Between Antitrust Patent Relief and the Patent 
Laws" 41 JPOS 791 (1959), where the history of patent-antitrust relief is reviewed. and the role 
played' by the courts in providing antitrust relief. in the form of compulsory licences, whether with 
royalty or royalty-free. to promote competitive conditions, is discussed. 
United Statos y. National'''' Co. 331 US 319 (US Sup. Ct 1947). 
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example, in a case where there was non-use of the patent by the owner, the court, instead, 
awarded the patentee damages on a royalty basis, on the ground of fairness. 15 
6.1.1. History of Compulsory Licensin~ in Malaysia 
Statutory compulsory licensing has been a feature of the Malaysian patent system for more 
than a century. On the whole, the development of the compulsory licensing provisions in 
the various component states prior to the 1983 Act followed closely the pattern developed in 
the United Kingdom. Although the ftrst patent statute of the Straits Settlements in 1871 
contained no speciftc provision for grant of compulsory licences, power was given to the 
Governor in Council to revoke the exclusive privilege on certain grounds. 16 The absence of 
a compulsory licensing provision then is not surprising in view of the fact that such 
provisions were only enacted for the ftrst time in United Kingdom in the Act of 1883.17 
However, even when the Ordinance was amended at various times, the opportunity was not 
taken to insert these provisions. 18 Similarly, the ftrst North Borneo patent legislation, being 
15 
16 
17 
18 
See, for example, Foster v. American Machine & FoundIy Co. 182 USPQ 1 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 95 S. Ct 58 (1974). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused an injunction and refused 
the plaintiff Foster to use the patent injunction "as a club to be wielded" to enhance his negotiating 
stance. Foster was a patent lawyer who had never been in the welding or welding equipment 
business, had never been equipped to practise his patented process, or to manufacture equipment 
that would. His patent had both apparatus and method claims directed to a feature of the progressive 
continuous welding of metal that was only a part of the total continuous welding technology. The 
defendants manufactured infringing welding equipment and was sued. The patent was found valid 
and infringed. However, while damage was awarded, the injunctive relief was refused. The Appeal 
Court affirmed, and after noting that the patent owner did not manufacture while the infringer did, 
said (per Gurfein, District Judge, at page 6), "Here the compulsory licence is a benefit to the 
patentee who has been unable to prevail in his quest for injunctive relief. To grant him a 
compulsory royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circumstances of his utter failure to exploit 
the patent on his own, that seems fair," and concluded, "In the assessment of relative equities, the 
court could properly conclude that to impose irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunction, 
without any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be inequitable." For a critique of this case, 
see Arnold, T., Goldstein, E., "Compulsory Licensing: The 'Uncentive' for Invention", Patent Law 
Review 1975, 113, at pages 128-131. See also Goldstein, E., and Arnold, T., "Compulsory 
Licensing: A Slowly Awakening Reality", Industrial Property Law, 1975,503 at 511, "For some, 
the decision in the Foster case may be a rude awakening into the realities of compulsory licensing 
in the United States. For others, it is merely an extension of, and possibly an expected outgrowth 
of, a slow awakening started many years ago. For all, however, it must be considered a recognition 
that to deny that compulsory licensing exists in the United States is to be out of touch with 
reality. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the Foster case typifies the new awakening to the 
reality of compulsory licensing." 
Ordinance No. 15 (Inventions) of the Straits Settlements, 1871. The grounds provided under 
section 22 were that the grant or the mode in which it was exercised, "was mischievous to the 
State or generally prejudicial to the public; or if a breach of any special condition on which ~ 
petitioner had been authorised to file a specification, or upon which the term o! the exclUSive 
privilege has been extended, is proved to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court. and If the Governor 
in Council thereupon declares that such exclusive privilege shall cease." It is interesting to note 
that such an equivalent provision was absent in the UK statute of that time or thereafter. 
See section 22, Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1883, UK. In Brownie Wireless Co. 's 
I\p,plicatiop (1929) 46 RPC 457, Luxmoore J., at pages 469-472, conveniently set out the history 
of the compulsory licensing provisions of the Patents Act from 1883 to 1919. See also H.ts;bs;k's 
PatePts (1909) 26 RPC 228, per Parter J., at pages 244-245. 
It is not known whether this was due to a deliberate policy, ignorance of the prevailing law in the 
United Kingdom, or reflected a lack of real importance of the system. 
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almost an exact replica of the Straits Settlements model, did not contain any provisions for 
compulsory licensing, although it had a provision for revoking the patent rights on the same 
grounds. 19 
However, by the time the other states enacted local patent legislation in 1896 and thereafter, 
the United Kingdom patent statute had already in place statutory control of abuse of 
monopoly rights by means of compulsory licensing. Therefore, each of these indigenous 
patent codes contained provisions for compulsory licensing. So, when Selangor enacted its 
patent legislation in 1896, there was present a compulsory licensing provision. This 
provision, also present in the other enactments of Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang,20 
was in pari materia with that found in section 22 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks 
Act, 1883, of the UK.21 Section 22 of the 1883 Act of the UK was repealed and 
substituted by section 3 of the Patents Act 1902, UK, which provided a different code for 
compulsory licences. This new code was substantially adopted in the Federated Malay 
States when the 1914 Inventions Enactment for the Confederation was enacted, replacing 
the earlier identical codes adopted by the four separate states before confederation.22 
It is interesting to note that in line with the UK scheme, the actions that could be taken 
under the Federated Malay States provisions included not only an application for 
compulsory licence but revocation of the patent grant as well.23 The grounds for revocation 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
See section 24, The Patents Proclamation 1908, North Borneo. 
See, sections 15 and 16 of The Inventions Order in Council No.2 of 1896, Perak., Inventions 
Order in Council N of 1896, Negri Sembilan, and Inventions Enactment No. V of 1897, Pahang, 
respecti vely. 
Inventions Regulation V of 1896, Selangor, section 16. By virtue of section 15, there was also a 
provision for revoking patent rights similar to that found in the Straits Settlements Ordinance. See 
generally, Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.3.2.a. 
See Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.3.2.b. By section 
25 of the Inventions Enactment, 1914, FMS, if the court was satisfied that the reasonable 
requirements of the public with regard to an invention had not been satisfied, it might order the 
grantee to grant licences on such terms as was just, or if not satisfied that the reasonable 
requirement of the public would be satisfied by the grant of licences, the patent might be revoked. 
These provisions practically mirrored the new provisions substituted by The Patents Act, 1902, 
United Kingdom. The only difference was that the provision of the amended section 22(5) of the 
UK was not adopted. Section 22(5) of the UK Act provided that "If it is proved to the satisfaction 
of the Judicial Committee that the patent is worked or that the patented article is manufactured 
exclusively or mainly outside the United Kingdom, then, unless the patentee can show that the 
reasonable requirements of the public have been satisfied, the petitioner shall be entitled ei~er to 
an order for a compulsory licence or, subject to the above proviso, to an order for the revocation of 
the patent." 
Under the 1907 Patents and Designs Act of the UK, the provisions regarding revocation and issue 
of compulsory licences for abuse of monopoly rights were regulated by the same provisions of the 
Act in section 24. There was also a separate provision under section 27 of the 1907 Act for 
revocation of a patent where the patented invention was exclusively or main~y worked outside ~ 
United Kingdom. However, the Patents and Designs Act of 1919 repealed section 24 and repl~ It 
with a provision for licence of right. Section 27 of the 1907 Act was also repealed and subs~tuted 
by a new section which laid down the provisions for the prevention of abuse of monopoly ~gbts. 
This new section 27 gave power to the Comptroller to order that the patent to be endorsed With the 
words "licences of right", or grant compulsory licences, or revoke the patent. The Patents Act 1932 
made some minor amendments and additions to section 27 of the 1907-1932 Patents Act. 
maintaining, however, the power of the Comptroller to give the same relief for abuse of monopoly 
rights, i.e., encbsed licence of right. compulsory licence and revocation. The Patents Act 1949 
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laid down in section 26 of the FMS enactment were similar to the provisions found in 
section 15 of the previous enactments of the four states mentioned earlier, which, in tum, 
were similar to those found in the Straits Settlements Ordinance.24 Further, by virtue of 
section 16 of the same Enactment, the Chief Secretary was empowered to refuse to refer an 
application to an examiner or to accept an application or specification or to make a grant of 
exclusive privileges in any case in which it might appear to him that the granting of 
exclusive privileges would be prejudicial to the public interest or of doubtful public utility. 
Section 16 allowed the Chief Secretary to refuse to grant, whereas section 26 gave power to 
revoke. As can be seen, there were in place wide powers to either refuse or to revoke a 
grant conferred on the issuing authority. 
The frrst patent enactment of lohore followed the Selangor mode1.25 However, in 1924, 
there were amendments made to the grounds for compulsory licences.26 Section 8 of the 
1924 Amendment Act repealed section 16 of the principal enactment and substituted new 
provisions for compulsory licences. The new grounds were exactly the same as those 
contained in the Inventions Enactment, 1914, of the Federated Malay States, with the single 
difference that there was no power to entertain any request for revocation of the patent 
based on the same grounds. 
When all these local granting systems were later converted to a re-registration of UK 
granted patents, these provisions relating to compulsory licences were not incorporated into 
the new enactment. Similarly, when these statutes were repealed and replaced by the 
Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, 1951 with the formation of the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948,27 there were no specific provisions relating to compulsory 
licensing. 
The remaining component states of the Federation which had a patent system, Sarawak, 
Perlis and Kelantan, adopted a re-registration system from the beginning.28 Hence there 
24 
2S 
26 
27 
28 
basically maintained the previous scheme, with voluntary endorsement of licences of right now in 
section 35, and compulsory licences under section 37, power being given to the Comptroller to 
order compulsory licences or endorsement of the patent with the words "licences of right". Power is 
given under section 40 for any Government department to apply to the Comptroller that the pate~t 
be endorsed with the words "licences of right". The power of the Comptroller to revoke for abuse IS 
now transferred to section 42. A revocation order may be applied for at any time after the expiration 
of two years from the date of any order for a compulsory licence under sectio~ 37. Under ~e 1977 
Patents Act. the provisions are now contained in sections 46 and 47 for licences. of nght, am 
sections 48 to 54 for compulsory licences, including non-voluntary endorsement ~Ith the words 
"licences of right". There is no power to revoke the patent for abuse of monopoly nghts. 
See footnote 16. supra. 
By the Inventions Enactment, Enactment No.3 of 1911. Johore. Section 15. relating to cessation 
of exclusive privileges, and section 16 on grounds for compulsory licensing. were exactly the same 
as that contained in the Selangor Ordinance. 
See Inventions Enactment, 1911. Amendment Enactment, 1924, Enactment No. 13 of 1924. 
Johore. section 8. 
See Chapter 1 - Development of the Malaysian Patent System. para. 1.4. 
For an account of the introduction of patent law in these States. see Chapter 1 - Development of 
the Malaysian Patent System. paras. 1.3.3 and 1.3.4. 
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were no express provisions for compulsory licensing, contending as it were, with the 
provision that "the certificate of registration shall confer on the applicant privileges and 
rights ... similar in all respects to those conferred by the issue of the patent in the United 
Kingdom." However, it may be argued that the sanction of compulsory licensing for abuse 
of monopoly rights that were found in the Federated Malay States and the United Kingdom 
may be incorporated into the statutes. 
Therefore, from 1937, and until the coming into force of the Patents Act 1983 in 1986, the 
availability of compulsory licensing in Malaysia is uncertain. 
6.1. 2. The Present Scheme 
Unlike the position under the various repealed statutes, the present Malaysian scheme does 
not mirror the provisions of the UK or other common law countries.29 In this respect, there 
is also a departure from the tendency of the drafters of the Act to adhere closely to the 
WIPO Model Law.30 As in the former law, there is no special provision relating to 
compulsory licensing in respect of food or medicine. Also, unlike the provisions of some 
countries, and as allowed under the Paris Convention on the fulftlment of certain strict 
conditions, there is no provision for forfeiture of a patent for non-working.31 Hence the 
scheme is meant to be remedial rather than punitive, since there is no power to revoke a 
patent even if abuse is found to exist. 
The Malaysian model provides for the possibility of compulsory licensing and compulsory 
use in three different situations:32 
1. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
compulsory licensing for" abuse of monopoly" ,33 
See sections 48-54. Patents Act 1977. United Kingdom; sections 133-136. Patents Act 1990. 
Australia; and sections 65-69. Patent Act (R.S.C. 1985. c. P-4) Canada. The Australian am 
Canadian provisions are substantially similar to the UK provisions. 
Section 148(1) of the WIPO Model Law provides that non-working or insufficient working in the 
country is a ground for the grant of a compulsory licence. As will be discussed later. the Malaysian 
provisions lay down further grounds for the application for a compulsory licence. No compulsory 
licensing scheme exists under the Sri Lankan Act. 
See Paris Convention, Article 5A(3). The possibility of revocation is also envisaged by the TRIPS 
Agreement, see TRIPS. Part n. Section 5, Article 32. 
By section 48 of the Act, "compulsory licence" ~eans the authorisation to perfo~ in Malaysia 
without the agreement of the owner of the patent In respect of "the patented I~venti~~ any ~f the 
exclusive rights that are given to the owner. Another form of cOn;tp~so~ licen~ IS envisaged 
under section 35A (rights after reinstatement of lapsed patents). This IS discussed In Chapter 7 -
Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights. para. 7.2.4. 
Although the expression "abuse of monopoly" is used, it is ~ that certain si~tion~ which 
justify a grant of a compulsory licence under the Malaysian proViSion do not necessanly ~~ from 
an abuse through the patentee's exercise of his patent rights. Sometimes ~ lack of ex.plOitatiOn of 
the patent is through the inability of the patentee to make more exteDSlve use of his patent for 
various reasons. See generally, Coburn, H.H., "Compulsory Licensing by the Courts", 28 IPOS 
180 (1946), at page 191 , "However, non-use of a patented invention may constitute anything from 
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2. compulsory licensing on grounds of "dependency", and 
3. compulsory use of a patent by the Government. 
The provisions governing compulsory licensing under the Malaysian system are found in 
sections 48 to 54 and section 84. Section 49 relates to grant of compulsory licence for 
abuse of monopoly status, section 49A governs compulsory licence based on inter-
dependence of patents, while section 84 relates to Government use of a patented invention. 
6.2. Compulsory Licences for "Abuse of Monopoly" Status 
6.2.1. Grounds of Application for "Abuse of Monopoly" 
Section 49{ 1) of the Act provides that at any time after the expiration of three years from the 
grant of a patent, any person may apply to the Registrar for a compulsory licence on the 
following grounds: 
(a) that there is no production of the patented product or application of the patented 
process without any legitimate reason; 
(b) that there is no product produced under the patent for sale in any domestic market, 
or there are some but they are sold at unreasonably high prices or do not meet the 
public demand without any legitimate reason. 
From an analysis of the section, there are four possible grounds that could be relied upon 
by an applicant for a compulsory licence:34 
1. non- working in the country without any legitimate reason. 
2. no sale in the domestic market despite local production. 
a mere absence of commercial use of the invention by the patentee to a deliberate plan of acquiring 
exclusive rights in all invention that are competitive with a particular invention, with the intent of 
suppressing any commercial use of the inventions covered by the patent rights acquired. ... [I]f 
Congress should merely declare that unreasonable refusal to permit a patented invention to be 
commercially used was unlawful, it is quite possible that the actual abuses could be reached by the 
courts without substantial impairment of the lawful rights conferred by the patent monopoly." 
34 Note that the GAIT-TRIPS Agreement does not lay down the grounds which would justify the 
grant of a compulsory licence. The relevant provisions contained in Article 31 merely specify the 
conditions that must be observed before a compulsory licence is granted. Article SA(2) and (4) of 
the Paris Convention mentions, as examples of abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rigbts conferred by the patent, a failure to work or insufficient working. Therefore, it 
would appear that the various grounds provided under the Act are not incompatible with our 
international obligations, nor under Alternative B of Article 26(1) of the proposed Patent Law 
Treaty (see Introductory Chapter, footnote 11, for further references to the Patent Law Treaty). 
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3 unreasonably high price of patented products despite local production and sale in the 
domestic market. 
4. insufficient supply to meet the public demand despite local production and sale in 
the domestic market. 
The first ground applies in the simplest situation where it can be shown that the patent 
owner has not used his patent to manufacture the patented product or use the patented 
process. The Act does not expressly mention that these activities need to take place in 
Malaysia. However, read together with section 49(1)(b), it would seem that the above 
activities have to take place in Malaysia. This is because section 49( 1 )(b) envisages 
situations which are meant to qualify the circumstances in section 49(1)(a).35 It is 
submitted, therefore, that a ground could be made out under section 49(1)(a) if it were 
proved that there is no production of the patented product or application of the patented 
process in Malaysia. It would be helpful if this were made clear in the provision,36 
Further, to ensure that the patentee does not try to circumvent the provisions, the local 
working has to be more than token or symbolic. It has to be understood to be a long-term 
manufacture of the patented product or use of the patented process, involving effective 
exploitation, with adequate quality and price conditions. 3 7 
Grounds 2-4 apply even if there is working of the patented invention in the country. 
Ground 2 seems to envisage a situation where the patent owner has made use of his patent 
by causing the manufacture of the patented product locally, but the products so 
3S 
36 
37 
Further, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended that the applicant be put to the trouble am 
expense of having to make world-wide enquiries and search to ascertain the place and level of 
production. It is also worth noting that a domestic working requirement is the norm in most 
countries - see Julian-Arnold, G., "International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the 
Reality", 33 IDEA 349 (1993), in Appendix A, where the author identifies only four countries 
where importation of the patented products is considered working. Note that the situation is 
different now in the UK because of the effect of European Community law - see generally, CIP A 
Guide, 4th Ed., at para. 48.07. In view of the decision of the ECJ in E.C. Commission y. United 
Kinadom (Case C-30/90) [1993] RPC 283, the compulsory licensing provisions in the 1977 UK 
Act have now to be interpreted as if most of the references in these provisions to "the United 
Kingdom" should be replaced by a reference to "a member state of the European Community". See 
also Articles 46 and 77 of the CPC, where the putting on the market, in a territory of a 
Contracting State, of patented goods manufactured in another Contracting State, is deemed to be 
sufficient working of the patent in the fIrSt-mentioned State. 
It is still unclear whether the TRIPS Agreement has negated the right of a country to insist on 
local working of a patented invention. Gosain, R., Sherrill, U.K., "The Effects of G~ ITfI1UPS 
on Brazil's Patent Legislation", Patent World, May 1995, 24, at page 25, comme?ting on the 
proposed changes to the law which include amending the p~visio~s for compul~ory bce?ces, note 
that the proposed law requires local working of the patented Invention, and that lDlportation per se 
would not be sufficient. This, they feel, could be seen as conflicting with the provisions of Article 
27(1) of TRIPS. For the view that the requirement of local working is a contravention of the 
TRIPS Agreement, see infra, footnote 38. Note that Alternative B of Article 26(1) of the ~
Patent Law Treaty would allow compulsory licensing measures to be taken for non-c~p~ 
with the obligation, specified in Alternative B of Article 25(l)«ili), to work the patented Invention 
locally. 
See Mskr&bnjo Bros. Ltd's APJilicatiop (1934) 51 RPC 461, at 468, per Luxmoore J. See also 1& 
Fabrjgnetor Co. I ",,'s APPlication (1936) 53 RPC 307, per Comptroller-General, at page 310. 
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manufactured are meant only for the export market. Hence none of the manufactured 
products are made available for sale in Malaysia. The third ground is similar to the situation 
in ground 2, with the difference that the goods are made available locally, although only at 
an unreasonably high price. The last ground applies when, although manufactured locally, 
the goods are not made in sufficient quantity to satisfy the reasonable demand of the public. 
It would seem from the provisions that the availability of the patented products locally 
through importation by the patentee is not enough to prevent a successful application for 
compulsory licence. 3 8 It would also appear that this applies even if the patented products 
are available in sufficient quantity and at a reasonable price, provided again that the goods 
are made available only through importation and not local manufacture. 
From the four grounds mentioned above, it is clear that the policy consideration underlying 
the Malaysian provisions seeks to achieve two main objectives, local working of the 
patented invention,39 and to ensure that the patented products are available in sufficient 
quantity to satisfy the reasonable requirement of the pUblic. Closely related to the second 
objective is the need to ensure that the patented products are obtainable at a reasonable 
price.40 
38 
39 
40 
Under section 148(2) of the WIPO Model Law, a compulsory licence will not be granted if the 
patentee could show circumstances which justify the non-working or insufficient working. 
However, importation of the patented product does not constitute such a circumstance. Kolker, 
P.L., Should Importation be Considered as Working? A Study of Article 27 of the GAIT TRIPS 
Agreement, The Intellectual Property Institute, 1996, at pages 17-21, argues that since Article 27 
of the TRIPS Agreement, provides, inter alia, that patent rights are enjoyable without 
discrimination as to whether products are imported or locally produced, a requirement for local 
working is a clear discrimination against imports. Therefore, he maintains that lack of local 
working of a patented invention, when the patented product is imported, as a ground for the grant 
of a compulsory licence, is a breach of the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. If this view is 
correct, it would mean that the grounds provided under the Malaysian provision would have to be 
construed accordingly. Straus, J., "Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent 
Law", in Beier, F.K., Schricker, G., (Eds), From GAIT to TRIPS - The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TIC Studies Yol. 18, YCH, 1996, at page 205, 
states, without giving any reason, that by virtue of Article 27(1) it may be assumed that sufficient 
exercise of the patent rights may also be ensured by importation of patented products. However, it 
has to be pointed out that the provision regarding non-discrimination between imported and locally 
manufactured product is found in Article 27, which relates to patentable subject matter and patent 
rights. If the intention is to be in accordance with his submission, surely it would be more logical 
to insert this provision in Article 31, which deals specifically with compulsory licences? Further, 
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement could be construed as referring otherwise than to compulsory 
licensing. For example, it is more likely that the provision that "patents shall be available SId 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to ... whether products are imported or locally 
produced" is meant to reinforce the obligation under Article 5 quoter of the Paris Convention. 
which provides that if a country grants rights to holders of process patents. it has to grant such 
rights irrespective of whether the product made from the patented process are manufactured 
domestically or imported. 
In fact, section 52(a) of the Act specifically provides that the scope of the compul.sory licence may 
not extend to the act of importation. This objective is commonly found 10 all the three 
jurisdictions surveyed. To quote from a case in the United Kingdom, fum"', Hone Corporation's 
Patent [1982] RPC 361, per Whitford J. at page 384, "Patents are not granted in this country to 
enable patentees who are able to afford to take out w~d-wide p~tectio~ to manipulate. its market 
in this country as it pleases, but to encourage the working of the IOventlon here. In my Judgement, 
the superintending examiner righdy concluded that a licence should be granted ..... 
In this context, it is relevant to quote Penrose, Edith Tilton, The Economics of the International 
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Before the applicant can make an application based on any of the grounds specified under 
section 49, it would appear that he must have made a request to the patentee for a voluntary 
licence, and that he had been unable to obtain such a licence on reasonable terms and within 
a reasonable time. Although this requirement is not specifically mentioned in the section, 
evidence of this is required when the application for a compulsory licence is made to the 
Registrar of Patents.41 The application is made to the Registrar, but consideration of the 
application is by the Patents Board.42 
6.2.1.a. When is a patented product deemed to be produced? 
There is no problem if a patented product is wholly made within jurisdiction. However, 
there could be problems of deciding whether the compulsory licensing regime is applicable 
in cases where the patented product is only partially manufactured within the country. From 
the cases, it would seem that there is no necessity that the patented product should be 
wholly made within the jurisdiction to escape the penalties of the compulsory licensing 
provisions. United Kingdom jurisprudence relating to this issue is helpful. In Johnson's 
Patent,43 the machines made in accordance with the patented invention were wholly made 
abroad in the United States. However, before sale in the United Kingdom, a few parts were 
taken out and other locally made parts substituted. It was contended that, owing to the 
special tools and to the precision required in making the patented machines, certain 
important parts could not be made in the UK, or could only be so made with great difficulty 
and expense and after a long time. It was further contended that there were serious practical 
obstacles in the way of working into the machine parts which could be made in the UK 
with those which could not, and that the substitution of certain parts of the machine for 
others contained in it when imported, which substitution was carried out in the UK, was 
practically all that could be done towards manufacturing it there. It was held that the 
Patent System", The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1951, at pages 116-117, "Any country 
must lose if it grants monopoly privileges in the domestic market which neither improve nor 
cheapen the goods available, develop its own productive capacity nor obtain for its producers at 
least equivalent privileges in other markets. No amount of talk about the 'economic unity of ~ 
world' can hide the fact that some countries with little export trade in industrial goods and few, If 
any, inventions for sale have nothing to gain by granting patents on inventions worked am 
patented abroad except the avoidance of unpleasant foreign retaliation in other directions. In this 
category are agricultura1 countries and countries striving to industrialise but exporting primarily 
raw materials. Strong supporters of the International Union deplore the ~act that many of .~ 
countries have failed to join the Union .... Whatever advantages may eXist for tJ:tese countnes ~f 
they joined the International Union ... they do not include advantages related to theu own econolDlc 
gain from granting or obtaining patents on inventions." 
41 See section 49(2), Regulation 38, and Patents Form No. II. The position is the same .in ~ 
United Kingdom. See, for example, Re Loewe Radio (1929) 46 RPC 479, before an application 
can succeed, there must be a concrete refusal by patentee to grant a reasonable licence - per 
Luxmoore J. at page 490. This is also a requirement under the TRIPS Agreement - see Part fi, 
Section 5, Article 31 , (b). 
42 See sections 5 I, 52 and 54 of the Act. For the composition and other functions of the Board, see 
Part n of the Act, and Chapter I - Development of the Malaysian Patent System, para. 1.5.3. 
43 Johnson', Patent (1909) 26 RPC 52. revocation for non-working, Patents and Designs Act 1907. 
section 27. 
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patented article had not been manufactured to an adequate extent in the UK, and an order 
was made revoking the patent forthwith. In coming to this decision, the Comptroller 
applied the test of whether the "essential features of the patented article" were manufactured 
in the UK to such an extent as to substantially satisfy the local demand there. If the essential 
features were manufactured overseas, then the patented article was not manufactured to an 
adequate extent in the UK. 44 
Lake's Patent45 contains a useful guideline to assist in the determination of this Issue. 
There, an application was made to revoke a patent relating to improvements in sound-
magnifying horns for phonographs and the like on the ground that the patented article was 
manufactured exclusively or mainly outside the UK. The evidence for the applicant was 
directed to showing that the "sound boxes," which he alleged to be part of the patented 
article, were in all cases made in the US; and that large numbers of talking machines 
coming within the claims were imported and sold by other parties. The patent owners fIled 
declaration to the effect that there was a substantial manufacture of "the improved sound 
magnifying horn" in the country, and that these improved horns was the only "patented 
article" which it was necessary for them to manufacture in the UK to escape the penalties of 
the Act. The Comptroller-General held that on a proper construction of the specifIcation, the 
real invention of the patentee was the improved sound magnifying hom, and that although a 
sound box was claimed in combination, there was no claim for any special form of sound 
box. It was not necessary, therefore, for the sound box to be manufactured in the country 
to escape the provisions of section 27, the general rule being that a patentee ought not to be 
called upon to manufacture any mechanism or machine, which he had not specifIcally 
described and claimed in his specification.46 The application was dismissed. 
44 
4S 
46 
Johnson's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 52, per Comptroller-General, at page 56, "It seems to me 
impossible to contend that the public demand in this country for the patented article is 
substantially met by the manufacture here of a comparatively small number of substituted parts, 
which are mere modifications, made to suit the taste and convenience of certain purchasers, for 
which there would be no demand except for the purpose of using them as parts of the entire 
machine." 
Lake's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 443. 
Lake's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 443, at 447. The Comptroller-General continued, "If, however, the 
general principle stated is correct, the following general rule would seem to follow, viz. : If the 
patentee has claimed a wholly new machine or mechanism, he must manufacture that in this 
country or run the risk of coming within the provision of section 27. If he claims a new 
improvement in a well-known machine,. he mu~t manufa~ the i~IH:0vem~nt, and ~ot 
necessarily the whole machine: but if he clanns the Improve~ent lD comblD.atlon w~th a machine 
consisting of well-known parts it may be that he must, beSides manuf~~g the tm~roveme~t, 
put together the whole machine in this county, or at any rate the comblDation he clalll~s. If his 
new invention merely consists in a new combination of old and ~ell:kno~n elements, I~ ~ould 
seem sufficient for him prima facie to put together the whole mac~ne lD this coun~, and It IS .not 
necessary for him to manufacture the old and well-known parts, which are also poSSibly the subject 
matter of prior patents [and therefore, he would infringe if he were to manufacture them]; but 
different consideration may again arise where important alterations in the well-known parts ale 
necessary for the new combination. Each case must of co~ be decided u~n its I!'eri~; and in 
each case it will have to be determined on a proper construction of the patentee s specification what 
the patentee's invention really is, and what are its essential features." For the same Canadian 
approach, see eie Mw;hjncaje Reooel.lnc. v, Putzmeister InterholdjPI GmbH (1983) I CIPR ISS 
(Commissioner of Patents, Canada), at pages 157-158 - Mere mounting in Canada of the patented 
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What the "patented article" is in each case must, therefore, be determined after an 
examination of the whole specification, which should be construed like an ordinary legal 
document; and a patentee may be estopped by his claims if they are too widely drawn.47 
The cases also show that in the determination of this issue, the comptroller and the court 
have not been too rigid. For example, in Kent's Patent,48 the application for revocation was 
based, inter alia, on the allegation that the patented machines made in the UK since the 
relevant date were not completely made in the country, but that some of the most important 
parts had been provided from abroad. In rejecting the application, the Comptroller-General 
held, inter alia, that taken as a whole the machine was made within the country. As to the 
allegation that the most distinctive portions were made not locally, it was held that in the 
particular circumstances of the case it was excusable in view of the need for special material 
to manufacture these parts. However, as a rule the excuse that it was impossible to 
manufacture efficiently certain parts of the machinery would not be viewed favourably.49 
An interesting case is the case of Hatschek's Patents,50 where the term "patented article" in 
section 27(1) of the then United Kingdom statute was held to mean an article which was the 
subject of a British patent, and was manufactured in accordance with the specification, or 
by means of the process therein described, by whomsoever manufactured, and that 
consequently manufacture by infringers in the United Kingdom had to be taken into account 
in favour of the patentee under the relevant section. The same approach was followed in 
Mercedes Daimler Motor Co. Ltd's Patent. 51 In that case, Fiat Motor Ltd applied to revoke 
7 patents belonging to Mercedes Co. Ltd on the ground that the patented articles were 
manufactured exclusively or mainly outside the UK. It was admitted by the applicants that, 
in addition to the manufacture of the patentees and their licensees, there was an extensive 
47 
48 
49 
'0 
'I 
combination, a concrete pump assembly, on carrier and repairs of the pump did not amount to 
working of the patent - an application for compulsory licence on ground of non-working under 
section 67(2)(c) of the then Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4. 
See also The COOJ)eratiye Union. Ltd's Alwlication (1933) 50 RPC 161, Comptroller-General (Mr 
M.F. Lindley), at page 163. 
Kent's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 666. 
Kent's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 666, at page 670, "On behalf of the applicants it was urged that the 
most distinctive portions, the rolls and the rings, were supplied in each case from abroad .. TIle 
answer to this was that these required somewhat special material, and that the patentee was anxIOUS 
not to prejudice the early sales of the machines by obtaining inferior material. It was also pointed 
out that these same parts had equally been supplied for many years i~ the manuf~ of tJ:te 
foreign machines. While I should not accept this as a conclusive answer In all cases, I think that In 
view of all the circumstances, it is in this case sufficient as a reason for the present absence of 
manufacture of these parts in this country. I shall always decline to accept, ~ a rule, ~y ar~e~t 
based on the impossibility of securing an efficient manufacture of Special ~chinery. In this 
country, but I think it is natural for a patentee, who desires to put the best poSSible machine upon 
the market, to be somewhat over-scrupUlous at fust in obtaining his materials, an~ supervising ~ 
construction of his machine. This appear to be the case, at frrst here, but the machine as a whole IS 
now substantially made in this country, and there appears to be no reason why the ring and the 
rolls should not also be manufactured here, at an early date." 
H_bek's Patents (1909) 26 RPC 228. 
Mc;rcedm PajmlGl' Motor Co. Ltd's Patent (1910) 27 RPC 762. 
305 
manufacture by infringers in the UK, but it was contended by the applicants that 
manufacture by infringers in the UK should not be taken into consideration, and could not 
be relied upon by the patentees in defence to an application under the section. Relying on 
the decision in Hatschek's Patents,52 the Comptroller was of the view that the tenn 
"patented article" in section 27(1) meant an article which was the subject of a British patent, 
and was manufactured in accordance with the specification, or by means of the process 
therein described, by whomsoever manufactured, and that consequently manufacture by 
infringers in this country had to be taken into account in favour of the patentee under 
section 27(1). The Comptroller's decision was upheld on appeal.53 
6.2.1.b. Unmet public demand 
Unmet public demand for the patented product, without any legitimate reason, is made one 
of the grounds for an application for a compulsory licence. It would be a simple matter to 
show that there was no availability of the product at all. However, where the products are 
available for sale, but the contention is that it is insufficient to satisfy the local demand, then 
evidence would have to be forwarded to show the level of this demand and the level of 
availability of the products to enable the Board to detennine whether the allegation of 
inadequacy is satisfied. 
6.2.1.c. Excessive pricin~ 
There is no guideline provided as to what is meant by "unreasonably high price". The UK 
cases seem to show that even though the price charged is higher than that charged in other 
52 
53 
Hatschek's Patents (1909) 26 RPC 228. 
Mercedes Daimler Motor Co. Ltd's Patent (1910) 27 RPC 762. The explanation for this approach 
was given by Parker J., at pages 767-768. At page 768, he said, "The present case raises an 
analogous point with regard to the extent to which the article or process ... is, within the meaning 
of the subsection, manufactured or carried on within the limits of the UK. In computing this extent 
ought the Comptroller to enquire whether what has been done within the UK is, or is not, in 
derogation of the rights of the patentee under his patent, and to exclude from the computation what 
has been done in derogation of such rights? I have come to the conclusion that he ought not to.-
This appears to follow from what I have decided in Hatschek's Patent, for it would be illogical ard 
unfair to count against a patentee all that is done abroad without his licence, consent or 
cooperation, and to count in his favour only what is done in this country by himself or his 
licensees or otherwise without derogating from his rights under the patent. Further than this, it 
seems to me impossible that the Legislature could have contemplated, under subsection (1), an 
enquiry so far-reaching as to embrace the rights inter se of the patentee and everybody in the UK. 
who is manufacturing the article or carrying on the process the subject of his patent. One man may 
be manufacturing the article, or carrying on the process, because he believes the patent is invalid. 
another because he maintains that, on the construction of certain correspondence between himself 
and the patentee, he has a free licence; a third because he contends that in equity the patent belongs 
to him; and yet a fourth because he thinks that in an action for infringement he will have a ~ 
under section 25 of the Act. There may be all sorts of questions to determine before it can be 
decided whether what is being done in any particular case is in derogation of the patentee's rights 01' 
otherwise. The Comptroller has quite enough to do in coming to a conclusion as to whether a 
particular article or process is in fact the article or process for which the patent has been obtained 
without entering into all these further questions, and in my opinion be is not, according to the true 
construction of the subsection, concerned with these further questions at all. " 
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countries, this in itself would not lead to the conclusion that the pnce charged is 
unreasonable or exorbitant. At most, a primLl facie case would be made out.54 
Consideration has to be given for the possibility of the patentee charging a monopoly profit. 
The fact that prices charged in other countries are lower could be explained by the fact that 
in countries where he does not have a patent, the patentee has to compete with other 
manufacturers, and the consequence of that is that he would be compelled in those countries 
where he has competition, to sell at a lower price.55 Re Kamborian's Patent seems to 
indicate that the proper approach to be taken in this situation is a pragmatic approach, i.e., 
in deciding whether the price charged is reasonable, the question is to be judged in the light 
of what the customer is prepared to pay. Therefore, in the absence of public dissatisfaction 
with the price, this ground is unlikely to be made out.56 
6.2.2. Legitimate Reasons for Non-Working 
The compulsory licensing regime prevents a patentee from using his patent for mere 
obstructive purpose. Therefore, merely using the patent to obstruct the local working by 
others is not deemed to be legitimate.57 However, both the sections 49(1)(a) and (b) 
grounds are not available to the applicant if the patentee is able to satisfy the Patents Board 
that there is a legitimate reason for his action or inaction. Again, guidance may usefully be 
sought from the United Kingdom cases concerning the reasons which may be deemed 
legitimate. The basic rule seems to be that if there is a demand, however small, it has to be 
satisfied. In Intertype Ltd's Application, the reason advanced by the patentee for his failure 
to manufacture the patented article in the UK was that there was no demand for the patented 
product. This was rejected, the Comptroller holding that the fact that the applicant had done 
some trade in machines containing the patented invention showed that a demand, albeit 
small, for the patented product existed. Therefore, the applicant should be allowed to 
S4 
SS 
56 
57 
See Kent's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 666. per the Comptroller-General. at page 669. 
BadjA AnHin und Soda Eabrik y. W.G. Thompson & Co. Ltd. & ors (1904) 21 RPC 473. In an 
action for infringement of two patents relating to dyes the defendants alleged that the patents were. 
or had become invalid because. inter alia. the plaintiffs had charged exorbitant prices for the 
patented articles. much in excess of those in other countries. The plaintiffs contended that their 
prices in the United Kingdom were not exorbitant having regard to the circumstances. including the 
more complete protection against infringement as compared with other countries. in some of which 
chemical products cannot be protected by patents - see Warrington 1. at page 478. 
Re 'Broboriao's Patent [1961] RPC 403. Mr A.E. Tollerfield. Assistant Comptroller. at page 405. 
"The question of whether terms are reasonable or not falls ... to be judged in the light of what the 
customer is prepared to pay. There is no evidence before me of public dissatisfaction with the price 
of the machine at the date of the application. " 
See IntertY,pe Ltd's Almlicatiop (1926) 43 RPC 305. per Mr Martin. Assistant Comptroller. at 
page 309. "I cannot conceive that, because the patentees. for reasons which seem to them expedient 
and sufficient, do not see fit to exploit the invention in this country. they have an unquestionable 
rigbt to decline to permit the manufacture of the patented article on reasonable terms by other 
persons interested. If this view is correct, it would appear that, in effect, the patentee 1ft 
maintaining the patent in force mainly for obstructive purposes and it seems to me. therefore. on 
the evidence available. that the present case is precisely one which the provisions of section 27 
were intended to meet" 
307 
satisfy this demand since the patentee was reluctant to do so.58 The fact that the patentee 
may have to import special machinery or skilled personnel into the country to produce the 
patented article would also not seem to be valid reasons for non-working.59 However, in 
Re Boult's Patent, the fact that special equipment was required was held to justify the 
limited local production to date. The Comptroller-General held that the particular facts of the 
case and the special character of the machine furnished satisfactory reasons for any 
deficiencies in respect to adequacy of working.60 
It would appear that the failure of the patentees to exploit the invention in the country during 
and within a reasonable period after a state of war may be excusable.61 It may be that the 
inability to make a profit could also be considered a reasonable ground.62 Although, if 
despite the patentee's contention that local manufacture is not commercially viable, the 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Intertype Ltd's Application (1926) 43 RPC 305, per Mr Martin, Assistant Comptroller, at page 
309. 
See Johnson's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 52, per Comptroller-General at page 57, "In paragraph 11 of 
the declaration he ... declares that having regard to the nature of the tools and the skilled 
workmanship required, it would be absolutely impossible to successfully manufacture in the UK 
entire sewing machines according to the patent. It is very natural that the patentees and their 
employees should, in perfect good faith, believe that their machine is a better one that anyone else 
can produce, and that the American firm, which has done their work well for 40 years, are the best 
tool manufacturers in the world. But it is manifest that opinions of this kind must be received with 
considerable hesitation, having regard to the high class machinery turned out in this country and on 
the Continent; and that, even if they can be substantiated, they would not, of themselves, afford a 
satisfactory reason for not manufacturing in the UK. For assuming them to be correct, they do not 
explain why the patentees have not taken steps to import into this country the requisite tools am 
skilled labour for the manufacture of the machine. " 
Re Boult's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 383, at pages 386-399, "The circumstances of each case are often 
widely different, and it will be difficult to make any case serve as a precedent for another, either as 
regards the definition of adequate working, or as an illustration of what may be held to be 
satisfactory reasons. Had this been a case of a simple process, or an improvement in machinery 
already at work and established in the UK, I do not think that the same consideration would apply, 
or the arguments put forward by the patentees have had equal weight. Such a process might have 
been started here without any delay, and such an improvement might have at once been applied to 
existing machinery and the patentees would have greater difficulty in explaining any delay or 
inaction on their part, or claiming consideration for any efforts to improve the machine in their 
own country. In this case the machine is a new machine with no established market here. It bas 
been constantly improved by the patentees' effort, which were confined in their own country. Hal 
the patentees given any preferential treatment to other foreign countries like France or Germany, it 
might have been difficult for them to excuse their inaction, but upon the evidence I am satisfied 
that this has not been the case here. Stress was also laid upon the fact that the article in question 
was a complicated and delicate piece of mechanism, and it was stated that many of the parts could 
not properly be manufactured here. I think it possible that there may be exceptional instances in 
which this is the case, but I shall be slow to believe without the strongest evidence that 
manufacturers and workmen of this country are incapable of turning out even the finest and most 
delicate machinery." 
See Intenxpe Ltd's Application (1926) 43 RPC 305, per Mr Martin, Assistant Comptroller, at 
page 309. 
See the obiter comment of Warrington I., in Badiscbe Apilin uod Soda fabrik y. W.G. ThoPlPsoP 
& Co. Ltd. & ors (1904) 21 RPC 473, at page 478, "So far as the facts are concerned I have this: -
The plaintiffs have never manufactured in England. The ground which they put forwards as tI;'e 
reason for their not having manufactured in England is that alcohol forms an important element ID 
the manufacture of this product, and that the excise laws in England impose such a duty upon 
alcohol as that the manufacture cannot be canied on at a profit in this country. Whether their 
reason is a good or bad one does not really concern me; but, at all events, it is Dot an unreasonable 
one, and it commends itself as having some reasonableness behind it." 
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applicant is still willing and able to start local manufacturing, the opportunity should be 
. hi d 63 gIven to m to 0 so. Therefore, when such an assertion is made, a strict examination of 
its veracity needs to be made. However, according to The Fabricmeter Co. Ltd's 
Awlication case, the fact that a smaller profit will be realised if the patentee goes for local 
manufacture instead of importation is not acceptable, although this case seems to reinforce 
the earlier statement that the impossibility of profit is a valid ground.64 Similarly, where the 
demand is extremely small, that would justify the absence of a more extensive 
manufacture.6s Consideration should also be taken of the difficulty of starting a new 
industry, 66 or the difficulty involved in developing and establishing a new market, or 
when the invention is of an unusual character which involves new technology and may 
need new basic manufacturing techniques,67 or of a trade recession.68 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
See Hamson's Application [1958] RPC 88. See also Meinhardt, P., Inventions Patents and 
Monopoly, 2nd Ed. Stevens & Sons Limited, 1950, at page 264, who opines that it would be 
difficult for a patentee to substantiate a satisfactory reason for non-working, since the mere fact that 
a competitor is interested to work the patent creates a presumption that the non-working by the 
patentee is wrongful. 
See The Fabricmeter Co. Ltd's Application (1936) 53 RPC 307, the Comptroller-General, at page 
313, "But even if it had been proved that the patentees would have made smaller profits by 
manufacturing them here that by manufacturing in America and exporting to this country, that in 
itself would not in my view by a satisfactory reason for non-working, and in this view I am 
supported by a consideration of the remarks of Mr Justice Parker in the case of Hatschek's Patent. 
It has certainly not being shown that the patentees would have made no profits at all by 
manufacturing their machines here in the numbers in which they were imported from America, and, 
having regard to the estimated and actual figures given in evidence of the cost of manufacturing this 
and similar machines in this country and to the prices charged for the completed machines, it seems 
to me that such a contention would have been difficult to sustain." 
Kent's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 666, at page 669. 
See, for example, Bremer's Patents I Ho~ner's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 449, per Parker J., at page 
464, "It is by no means an easy thing to establish an industry for the first time. Both managers and 
workmen must buy their experience, and the attempt becomes the more difficult if it must be made 
in the teeth of the competition from a firm who has already acquired a great reputation for the 
qUality of their own goods, and have access to English markets. If, however, the person who 
attempts to establish such an industry has patent rights in this country, such patent rights are, of 
course, of great value, for they will enable him to exclude or limit, the competition which might 
otherwise prove fatal, but even such patent rights may be of little use if the competitor is in a 
position to put goods on the market which he can sell by virtue of his reputation, even if they OJ 
not contain the latest improvements." See also, Extrude Hone Cor.poration's Patent [1982] RPC 
361, per Whitford I. at page 383, "Of course, no patentee. especially perhaps a foreign patentee, 
can be expected to launch into a full scale attempt to meet the demands of the UK market ~ soon 
as he got his patent. ... Some inventions are less easy to market than others. a fact recognised by 
section 50(2). That was well in the mind of the superintending examiner. who accepted the 
evidence in this case that this was an invention of a kind which was not going to be especially 
easy to introduce upon the market. [H]owever ... Extrude Hone have failed all together to make out 
a case that any reasonable steps were taken to secure a satisfactory level of exploitation over a 
considerable period." 
Fette's Patent [1961] RPC 396, per Mr A.E. Tollerfield, at page 400, "[I]t is sought to justify it 
on the ground that the invention is of an unusual character involving difficulties in developing ani 
marketing. I am not ... convinced ... that the invention i~ of this. n~ture. It does not ~ new 
ground in the sense of introducing a new art of thread rolling as ~stinct from ~ cu~ng, ani 
such as might be expected to involve the development of new basiC manufacturing techniques; ... 
The only remaining reason for the delay in manufacturing in the UK seems to have been the 
difficulty encountered by the patentees in establis~ng a market. It w.as to be e~ that 
customers using thread cutting devices had to be convmced that thread rolling was an effiCient ani 
preferable alternative. and that in some cases the heads had to be modified to meet customers' 
requirement In these circumstances. it is not ~urprising that the operation~ of a single ~~y d!1 
not bring more rapid development of sales. It IS also understandable that while sales were limited It 
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Other reasons that were accepted include the fact that serious and genuine negotiations had 
already been entered into prior to the application for a compulsory licence.69 
It would seem, from the approach adopted in the United Kingdom, that attempts by the 
patentee to justify non-manufacture within the country on the ground of lack of demand 
may not be sympathetically received, if there was evidence of a demand abroad.7o 
6.2.3. Scope of the Compulsory Licence 
Once a decision to grant a compulsory licence is made, the Board is empowered by section 
52 of the Act to fix terms regarding the scope of licence, the time period and the royalty rate 
payable by the licensee. The time limit within which the beneficiary of the compulsory 
licence shall begin to work the patented invention in Malaysia has also to be laid down. 
This is important because it is a ground for cancellation of the compulsory licence if the 
licensee has not begun the working of the patented invention within the time limit fixed, or 
has not begun serious preparation towards such working.71 
Under section 52(a), the Board, in fixing the terms of the compulsory licence, may not 
extend the licence to the act of importation. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that in 
some situations, parallel importation of goods originating from the patentee seems to be 
allowed under the Act. 72 Therefore, the prohibition would have to be read to mean that a 
compulsory licensee cannot be authorised by the Board to import products not originating 
from the patentee or someone acting with his consent. Further, by virtue of section 53 of 
the Act, the beneficiary of the compulsory licence has no right to conclude licence contracts 
with third persons under the patent in respect of which the compulsory licence is granted. 
The provisions of section 54 deal with amendment, cancellation and surrender of 
compulsory licence. By this section, the patentee or the compulsory licensee may apply to 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
would not be a commercial proposition to set up a new plant for the sole purpose of meeting that 
demand. But it seems to me that the patentees were content with this position. for there is no 
evidence ... of any attempt on their part either to extend the sales organisation and so speed up 
sales to the point where they or MSE could begin manufacture in the UK. or to interest other 
British manufacturers." 
Extrude Hone Cmporation's Patent [1982] RPC 361. per Whitford J. at page 384. ''The 
superintending examiner. in my judgement, gave careful consideration to all the rele~ant factors. 
He did not fail to take into account consideration of the argument advanced by Mr Laddie based on. 
for example, outside influences which may have affected sales, such as trade recession." 
See Jottrand's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 830, per Comptroller-General, at pages 832-833. 
On this point, the Comptroller-General in Re Boult's Patent (1909) 26 RPC 383, held, in relation 
to the question of adequate manufacture, that if the patentee manufactures abroad, and ~ is a 
demand abroad, the absence of a demand in the United Kingdom was not necessarily a valid excuse 
for absence of manufacture. The patentee must in any case make an effort to create a demand for the 
patented article in the country, and the establishment of a manufacture may help to create the 
demand - see at page 387. 
See section S4(2)(b) of the Act. 
See, injrtJ, Chapter 7 - Bxceptions. Limitations and Loss of Rights. para. 7.1.2. 
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the Board to amend the decision granting the compulsory licence to the extent that new facts 
justify such amendment. This enables the scope of the compulsory licence as originally 
fIXed by the Board to be either narrowed or broadened. Further, the patentee may request 
the Board to cancel the compulsory licence on various grounds. 7 3 
6.2.4. Observations 
To date there has not been any application for compulsory licences,74 and hence the 
effectiveness of the provisions in combating abuse of monopoly rights could not be 
assessed. However, non-use of the provisions does not necessarily imply that such 
provisions are irrelevant or unnecessary. It may have a deterrent effect against abuses and 
serves a disciplinary function as an incentive for patentees to grant licences voluntarily. 75 
This seems to be one of the commonly accepted views among writers and researchers.?6 It 
is also interesting to note that despite the low usage of the scheme, the Banks Committee, 
set up to review the British patent system, decided to retain it. 77 So, despite the lack of use 
73 
74 
7S 
76 
77 
See, section 54(2)(a) to (d) of the Act. 
In fact, the experience in other countries indicates that the compulsory licensing procedure is 
seldom resorted to. See, for example, Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, Department of 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Canada, 1976, page 103, Herz, A., "Compulsory Licensing" 28 
JPOS 889 (1946); and Kolker, P.L., Should Importation be Considered as Working? A Study of 
Article 27 of the GAIT TRIPS Agreement, The Intellectual Property Institute, 1996, at pages 15-
17. 
Herz, A., "Compulsory Licensing" JPOS, December, 1946, Vol. xxvm, No. 12, page 889, at 
page 902, notes in his study of the compulsory licensing system in the United Kingdom that in 
the majority of the suits brought for a compulsory licence as a remedy against patent abuse or "in 
the public interest", the litigation had not been terminated by decision, but was settled by the 
parties, with the respective patent offices encouraging such settlement. He concludes that this 
showed very clearly to what great extent the compulsory licensing provisions in the British Patent 
Act served their disciplinary function. Arnold, T., Goldstein, E., "Compulsory Licensing: 1be 
'Uncentive' for Invention", Patent Law Review 1975, 113, at page 152 refer to these situations as 
the yielding of voluntary licences "in terrorem". 
See, for example, UN Report No. 65: The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries, Report to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, 1964, at page 
25; Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 
Canada, 1976, page 104; Cohen, S., "Compulsory Licensing of Patents - The Paris Convention 
Model", 20 IDEA 153 (1979), at page 189, "The infrequent use of compulsory licensing may be 
attributed to the fact that the courts, especially in developed countries, have placed substantial 
obstacles in the path of applicants seeking a compulsory licence. It may indicate, however, that 
compulsory licences are an effective remedy, and that patentees prefer to negotiate a voluntary 
licence to avoid the sanctions of compulsory licensing. In some instances, a patentee may be 
induced to work the patent itself rather than expose it to compulsory licence. In some countries 
revocation or forfeiture of a patent is 00ded incentive for the patentee to attempt local working of 
the patented technology." This possibility was also mentioned in Phillips and Firth, Introduction 
to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd Ed., Butterworths, London, 1995, at page 85; Lees, C., Patent 
Protection - The Inventor and His Patent, Business Publications Ltd, London, 1965; Hen, A., 
"Compulsory Licensing" 28 JPOS 889 (1946) at page 901. See also, Intellectual Property 
Advisory Committee: Report on Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia", ~9.08.84, at 
page 28; Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental Comnuttee (Swan 
Committee), Cmnd. 6789, 1946, at para. 27; Memorandum of Evidence to the Committee to 
Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, 1968, at para. 
39. However, this possibility was doubted in the UK Government Green Paper "Intellectual 
Property and Innovation", Cmnd. 9117, 1983, at para 5.15. 
Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law, Cmnd. 4407 (1be Banks 
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to date, some observations will be made towards detennining whether any changes should 
be made to the provisions to make the compulsory licensing mechanism more effective to 
serve its intended purpose. 
The compulsory licensing scheme is based on the premise that if the patentee refuses or 
neglects to work the patent locally, or in any other way abuses his patent rights, then an 
interested applicant can step in to fill the void. It presupposes that such an applicant is in 
possession of the necessary fmancial capability and specialised skills in the relevant 
technology to exploit the patented invention. This may be true when the technology 
involved is of a low level. However, where high technology is involved and the 
expenditure of considerable amount of money is necessary to exploit the patented invention, 
such a scenario is fanciful in view of the comparatively low level of technological skills in 
Malaysia. In other words, there is a technological barrier preventing a local entrepreneur 
from taking advantage of the scheme.18 This non-legal external constraint due to a lack of 
technological capabilities will in many cases result in a lack of use of the system. An 
applicant for a compulsory licence, if successful, is entitled to a licence to exploit the 
invention. He is not entitled to have the patentee reveal all the necessary know-how relevant 
to the manufacture of the patented product or the use of the patented process, since the 
patentee is under no obligation to supply the necessary know-how.19 Therefore, these 
provisions are of most relevance to "an experienced applicant who is anxious to adopt the 
new technology and has the capability and initiative to do so on his own without 
cooperation from the patentee".80 In other words, compulsory licences provide access to 
patented invention but it may not be an effective vehicle for full technology transfer.81 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Report), HMSO, London, 1970, at pages 101-106. 
See UN Report No. 65: The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, Report to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, 1964, at pages 25 and 43. 
This, and several other constraints are listed by Beier, F-K., "Does Compulsory Use of Patents 
Promote Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?" [1986] 12 EIPR 363, at pages 365-364. 
They are, "... On the production side the patentee or the licensee must have access to sufficient 
capital, a suitable work force, raw materials and supplies, a suitable location, organisational 
ability, and most importantly, the technical know-how so critical for carrying the patented 
invention into effect. On the marketing side, a sufficiently large demand must exist in the internal 
market, or there must be access to export markets along with a corresponding organisation for 
distribution. Finally, other legal and economic conditions must be considered which allow an 
economically profitable production within the country, or at any rate not hinder it. Worthy of 
mention are employment and tax rules, regulations for investment and limitations on capital and 
licence transactions." 
See, for example, Cassou's Patent [1971] RPC 91, per Mr J.E. Mirams, in the Patent Office, at 
page 93. The Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, Department of Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs, Canada, 1976, page 105, quoting the Economic Council of Canada "Report on Intc:l1ectual 
and Industrial Property" of January, 1971, notes that as long as a ~tentialli.censee ~ not 
only a licence under the patent but also the assistance of the patentee 10 SUpplylOg essential know-
how, compulsory licensing procedures are not likely to encourage full technology transfer. 
The Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 
Canada, 1976, at pages 105-l()6. 
Note that under section 57 of the Law on Inventions and Marks of Mexico, 1981, the patentee is 
required to supply all the necessary know-how to manufacture the product covered by the patent to 
a compulsory licensee. Failure to do so could result in the patent being revoked. ~owever, such a 
requirement is absent in the new Industrial Property Law of 1991, as amended 10 1994. Under 
section 55(3)(a) and (c) of the present Patents Act 1994, of Singapore. the Registrar may, on 
312 
Hence in the absence of power to order that the required know-how be supplied to the 
successful applicant for a compulsory licence, the mechanism may not be effective. In fact 
this weakness was pointed out in a UK Green Paper as one of the reasons for minimal use 
of the mechanism, and it was proposed therein that the existing UK compulsory licensing 
provisions be made more effective by the inclusion of the transfer of associated know-how 
essential to its successful working. It suggested that the existing powers to set licence terms 
should be used to require the patentee to transfer the associated know-how to the 
compulsory licensee.82 However, the UK Government's response to this was that since 
"know-how" is an "inherently imprecise term" and that the licensee may only have a limited 
idea of what information he needs, there would be difficulty in determining what know-
how existed and how much should be transferred. In any case, where the patentee was not 
exploiting the patent, there may not be any significant know-how to impart. Further, the 
result of requiring a compulsory transfer of know-how may result in inventors relying on 
secrecy rather than patents to protect their valuable information. In view of this, the UK 
Government decided against the proposal.8 3 
It would seem, therefore, that unless there are foreign entrepreneurs who are interested in 
exploiting the patented technology, either alone, or through a joint venture, the statutory 
scheme may be of little relevance. 
Even when an applicant is technologically and financially capable of taking advantage of the 
compulsory licensing scheme, there is another major problem to be faced. This is the 
problem of competition from the patentee himself, unless the compulsory licensee is given 
an exclusive licence. In view of the high proportion of foreign applicants for Malaysian 
patents,84 it is more likely than not, if there is non-working of the invention, that the 
foreign patentee obtains the patent merely to protect his export market in Malaysia. He may 
have made a commercial decision not to manufacture locally in Malaysia, but to rely on 
imports of patented articles manufactured elsewhere into Malaysia. If a patent has been 
compulsorily licensed, especially on ground of unmet local demand or unreasonably high 
price, an unhappy or dissatisfied patentee may nullify the whole thing by the simple device 
of resorting to selling the products which hitherto are meant only for the export market, or 
increasing his local production, or by importation from abroad.8s This would be 
82 
83 
84 
as 
granting a compulsory licence, order the transfer of any know-how associated with the patented 
invention as he thinks fit. 
See UK Green Paper "Intellectual Property and Innovation", Cmnd. 9117, 1983, at para. 5.16 (iii) 
and para. 5.22. The fact that the acquisition of a compulsory licence in itself is of no. advantaa;e 
since its terms could not compel an unwilling patentee to disclose the kn~w-how to the licen~, IS 
also mentioned in the Second Interim Report of the Departmental COmmittee (Swan COmmittee), 
Cmnd. 6789. 1946. at para. 45. 
See UK Government White Paper "Intellectual Property and Innovation", Cmnd. 99712, 1986, 
paras. 4.17 to 4.20. 
See Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysian Patent System. para. 1.6. 
The Working Paper on Patent Law Revision, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 
Canada. 1976, pap 105, quoting the Economic Council of Canada "Report on Intellectual ... 
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catastrophic to the compulsory licensee who has invested huge fmancial resources and 
efforts in setting up manufacturing plants and distribution network. The result is that it 
would make it impossible for the local manufacturer to make a reasonable profit. 
The problem mentioned above, especially when high investment is needed to set up the 
manufacturing plants, could be solved if, when a compulsory licence is issued, the Board 
has the power to cancel existing licences, even exclusive licences, leaving the applicant as 
the exclusive licence without fear of any competition.86 This power, in fact, was present in 
the Patents Act 1977 of the United Kingdom until it was repealed.87 Similar power was 
also present in the former Canadian scheme.88 The introduction of a similar power under 
the Malaysian Act would solve the above-stated problem. However, this would be in 
conflict with Malaysia's obligation under both the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. 89 
Another possible solution, to cater for the situation where the patentee is competing by 
importation, is to provide that if the working of the invention in Malaysia is being hindered 
by the importation of the patented products, an abuse may exist. In the above case, a licence 
could be granted to anyone who could satisfy the Board that he could manufacture the 
invention adequately in Malaysia, if relieved from the competition of the imported articles. 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Industrial Property" of January, 1971, notes that perhaps one of the reasons why compulsory 
licence provisions have attracted relatively little attention is that a potential licensee must 
necessarily look ahead to the possibility that the patentee will be his major competitor once he 
obtains a licence and attempts to enter the market. It points out that there is nothing to prevent the 
patentee from drastically reducing his prices for the market to the point where they are marginally 
above his cost. Faced with the patentee as a competitor, the licensee would have little margin for 
profit, even if he could manufacture as efficiently as the patentee. 
On this point, the commentary to the WIPO Model Law, at page 97, states, "The question of the 
possible exclusive character of non-voluntary licences is very controversial. The supporters of 
exclusive licences point out that Article 5A of the Stockholm text deprives non-voluntary licences 
based upon non-working or insufficient working of a good part of their efficacy in advance. 
According to this argument, working by the beneficiary of a non-voluntary licence often involves a 
considerable investment, to which must be added the payment due under the non-voluntary licence. 
If, after these investments have been made, the beneficiary finds himself exposed to the 
competition of the owner of the patent or licensees, he may not be able to be competitive, 
especially if this competition is from imported products. The risks encountered by the beneficiary 
are thus considerable, which discourages requests for the grant of non-voluntary licences and, 
consequently, prevents the system from achieving its goal, which is the promotion of local 
working." 
See the former section 49(3), Patents Act 1977, UK, which gave power to the Comptroller to 
direct that the licence shall operate to deprive the proprietor of the patent any right he has to work 
the invention concerned or grant licences under the patent. In addition the Comptroller had power to 
revoke all existing licences granted under the patent. Section 49(3) has, however, been deleted by 
the C.D.P.A. 1988, Schedule 5, para. 13, with effect from August 1, 1989. 
See sections 66 and 67, Patent Act, R.S.,c. P-4, s.1. (Canada). Under this power, if the 
Commissioner is satisfied that the invention "is such that it cannot be so worked without the 
expenditure of capital for the raising of which it would be necessary to rely on the exclusive rights 
under the patent, he may, unless the patentee or those claiming under him will undertake to find 
that capital, order the grant to the applicant .... if able and willing to provide that capital, of an 
exclusive licence on such terms as the Commissioner may think just. .. " - section 66(1)(b) Patent 
Act, R.S.,c. P-4, s.l. (Canada). Effective the 1st of October, 1989, this subsection has now been 
repealed. 
See Paris Convention, Article 5A(4) and TRIPS Agreement, Part fi, Section 5: Patents, Article 
31, (d), both of which provide that such use shall be non-exclusive. 
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Power is also given to the Board to include a tenn in the licence precluding importation by 
the patentee or his licensees. Such a provision could be found in the Canadian Patent Act 
prior to 1st October 1989, which provided that the exclusive rights under a patent shall be 
deemed to have been abused if the working of the invention within Canada on a commercial 
scale was being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article 
by the patentee or persons claiming under him, by persons directly or indirectly purchasing 
from him or by other persons against whom the patentee was not taking or had not taken 
any proceedings for infringement.9o Under section 66(l)(b) of the same Act, the 
Commissioner, in ordering the grant to the applicant of a licence, might include a tenn 
precluding importation by the patentee and all his licensees. However, this ground, and the 
related power, was deleted from the statute in 1993. Such a provision would now seem to 
be prohibited by the TRIPS Agreement. 91 
Further, the problem is compounded by the fact that Malaysia is a small market. A 
manufacturer may not be willing to take the risk of applying for a compulsory licence to 
manufacture locally merely to supply the small home demand unless he is also assured of 
being able to export outside the country. One possible solution is to adopt the approach 
found in some countries, whereby the compulsory licensee is allowed to supply the export 
market. However, this may be prevented by the patentee if he holds parallel patent rights in 
the countries with promising marketing opportunities, leaving only a few countries 
unprotected by patents. Invariably these will be the small unimportant markets. Another 
obstacle is that under the TRIPS agreement, the compulsory licensee is only allowed to 
manufacture "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorising such use" .92 
It would appear, therefore, that international obligations, under the GATT TRIPS 
Agreement in particular, have emasculated the compulsory licensing scheme to a point 
when it has lost most of its potency. In view of these restrictions, it would seem that the 
alternative, albeit, a less desirable remedy, is to allow the applicant to import the patented 
products into Malaysia. This would be useful in the case where the patentee is charging 
90 See section 65(2)(b) Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, Canada. These provisions were based on 
similar provisions found in sections 37(I)(c) and 38(3) of the 1949 Patents Act of the UK (now 
sections 48(3)(c) and 49(3) of the 1977 Act). Under section 49(3) of the 1977 Act, in granting a 
compulsory licence, the Comptroller may direct that the licence shal~ operate to deprive ~ 
patentee of any right which he may have as patentee to make, use, exerCJ.~ .or v~nd the .mvention 
or to grant licence under the patent. He also has the power to revoke all eXisting bcences m res~ 
of the invention. However, from August, I, 1989, the powers of the Comptroller under section 
49(3) of the 1977 Act has been deleted by the C.D.P.A. 1988, Schedule 5, para. ~3. A~g to 
the CIP A Guide, the operation of the provision appeared never to have been senously COIISldered 
and its existence was an embarrassment to the Government in resisting the implementation of 
similar provisions by some developing countries - see C.I.P.A. G~de to the .Patents Ac~ ~o~ 
Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995, at para. 49.02. There IS no eqwvalent proVISIon In 
Australia. 
91 See TRIPS Agreement, Part fi, Section 5: Patents, Article 31, (d), which provides that use without 
the authorisation of the rigbt bolder shall be non-exclusive. 
92 See TRIPS Agreement, Part fi, Section 5: Patents, Article 31, (f). 
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excessive prices for the patented products which are either manufactured locally or 
imported. It would be an especially useful tool to use in the situation envisaged above 
where there has been an abuse of the patent rights but the invention cannot be manufactured 
in Malaysia. This would mean that the present restriction against importation by a 
compulsory licensee would have to be amended to allow importation in certain situations. It 
is admitted that the proposed power to allow for importation by the compUlsory licensee is 
drastic. However, this is less drastic than to propose the introduction of a power to revoke 
the patent on the ground that the grant of a compulsory licence would not have been 
sufficient to prevent the abuse of the monopoly rights.93 
Some commentators of the compulsory licensing systems have said that the systems, 
especially in the developing countries, have not been effective to serve the objective of 
technology transfer between developed and developing countries.94 In this context it is of 
interest to refer to Beier's view.95 He notes that not every patented product can be 
profitably produced in every country regardless of the size of the internal market, the 
opportunities for export or other basic economic conditions. The traditional compulsory 
working of patents, which is related to the national market, contradicts basic economic 
sense as well as principles of international division of labour in research, development and 
production. In most cases it is only possible and practical, for micro-economic as well as 
macro-economic reasons, to produce the patented products in a sufficiently large quantity in 
a few countries for a larger, generally regional marketing area. He concludes that it 
necessarily follows that the different markets within this region can be supplied better and 
cheaper through imports than through domestic, licensed products. This may be so. 
However, if a local applicant, after carrying out the necessary market research and 
assessing all the factors, still feels that he could manufacture locally at a profit, there seems 
to be no reason why he should not be allowed to do so. Beier also argues that sanctions and 
other compulsory measures basically manifest an intent to "nationalise" foreign inventions 
for the benefit of the domestic economy. 96 However, this misses the point of the scheme, 
i.e., compulsory licence can be asked for by foreign applicants with the necessary expertise 
and capital, and willing to work the patented invention locally in the country. Hence, it is 
93 
94 
95 
96 
See Article 5A (3), Paris Convention. 
See, for example, UNCT AD Secretariat Report, The International Patent System as an I?strument 
of Policy for National Development, TOIB/C. 6/AC.'1J3. 1975. at paras. 42 to 46; Beier, F-K., 
"Does Compulsory Use of Patents Promote Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?" 
[1986] 12 EIPR 363, at 364. It must be noted that under the Malaysian scheme. the objective of 
the compulsory licensing provision is strictly speaking. not to encourage the transfer of 
technology, but to encourage local working and to prevent abuse of the system by monopoly 
pricing - see earlier discussion. 
Beier, F-K., "Does Compulsory Use of Patents Promote Technology Transfer to Dev~loping 
Countries?" [1986] 12 EIPR 363. at 364. See also, Kolker, P.L., Should Importation be 
Considered as Working? A Study of Article 27 of the GATT TRIPS Agreement, The Intellectual 
Property Institute, 1996. at pages 17-18, and UN Report No. 65: The Role of P~tents i~ the 
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, Report to the Secretary-General, Umted Nations, 
New York, 1964, at pages 39-40. 
Beier, F-K., "Does Compulsory Use of Patents Promote Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries?" [1986] 12 BlPR 363, at 364. 
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not true that the scheme manifest an intent to "nationalise" but it is more accurate to describe 
it as an attempt to "localise" manufacturing facilities within the country. 
Therefore, bearing in mind the possibility that there could be parties interested and capable 
of exploiting the invention in the future, it will be useful to identify the possible weaknesses 
of these provisions and propose possible solutions to overcome them. 
There have been several observations that the compulsory licensing provisions are stacked 
heavily against the applicant, and that an applicant would need inflnite patience and 
resources before he would ever contemplate an application.97 To make it easier for an 
applicant, it is proposed that a provision like that previously found in the Canadian scheme 
be introduced. Under this scheme, the Registrar is empowered to require the patentee to 
deliver to him a return stating whether the patented invention is being worked on a 
commercial scale in the country, and the place where, and the name and address of the 
person by whom, the patented invention is being so worked. The failure of the patentee to 
comply with the terms of the notice shall be deemed to be an admission on the part of the 
patentee that the patented invention is not being worked on a commercial scale in the 
country.98 The advantage of this provision is that the applicant will not have to be put to 
unnecessary time and expense in discovering these facts. If the working is disputed, it is 
the owner of the patent who bears the burden of proof and has to show that the patented 
invention is in fact being worked in the country in a sufficient manner.99 Such a burden 
would not be deemed to be onerous because the patentee would be the person who is in the 
best position to be able to furnish all this information. It would be unduly burdensome for 
the applicant to have to show insufflcient working.! 00 This is also the approach of the 
WIPO Model Law.1 01 
Under section 51 of the Act, the Board, in considering an application for a compulsory 
licence, is empowered to require the applicant, licensor or licensee to appear before the 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
See, for example, Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental 
Committee (Swan Committee), Cmnd. 6789, 1946, para. 30. See also Phillips, J., & Firth, A., 
Introduction to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd Ed., Butterworths, London, 1995, at para. 7.18. 
See section 64(1) and (2), Patent Act, R.S.,c. P-4, s.l. (Canada). Effective the 1st of October, 
1989, this subsection has now been repealed. 
The legal technique of reversing the burden of proof in suitable situations is not ~nted. 
See, for example, the reversal of the burden of proof in the case of a process for obtaInIng a 
product, Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights, para. 3.2.2.a. See also, section 100 of the !rade .Marks 
Act 1994, United Kingdom, which provides that in any civil proceedings where a question anses as 
to the use to which a registered trade mark has been put, it is for the proprietor to show what use 
has been made of it. 
For example see Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental 
Committee (Swan Committee), Cmnd. 6789, 1946, para. 30. "Such interpretation have narrowed 
the apparent scope of section 27. Moreover, the uncertainty of its application, the high costs of 
proceedings under it which are taken t~ ap~, and the heavy onus ~~ proof cast upon the 
applicant, who in the ordinary course IS not In so advantageous a poslti~n as ~ paten~ to 
furnish proof of the relevant facts, have combined to discourage resort to this secbon. Relatively 
few applications have been made under it, while the abuses which it intended to curb still occur." 
See page 98, WIPO Model Law. 
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Board and to give a statement or to hand to the Board any document or any other item. This 
power could usefully be used to request of the patentee production of documents relating to 
his cost, expenses and profits to help in the determination of whether the price charged by 
the patentee is unreasonably high. 
However, to prevent the system from being abused, and the patentee being put to 
unnecessary harassment, the present provisions need to be amended to provide a balance. 
Under the present scheme, any person can make an application for a compulsory licence. 
There is a possibility of abuse of the system in that a person who is not interested in 
working the patent may make applications for compulsory licences just to cause 
inconvenience to the patentee or to discover information about the business of the patentee 
with whom he is in competition. l 02 To safeguard the interest of patentee and "to prevent the 
patentee being harassed and put to expense by frivolous, vexatious or hopeless 
litigation",l03 section 49 should be amended with the addition of the word "interested" to 
the word "person" in section 49(1). Such an "interested person" may be a person who is 
genuinely interested in exploiting the patent, 104 or a person who is being sued for 
infringement, 1 05 even though he does not admit the validity of the patent involved, 1 06 or 
even a present licensee. 
To ensure that the sanctions of the compulsory licensing provisions are not evaded by 
means of sham exclusive licensing agreements, power should be given to the Registrar to 
deprive existing exclusive licensees of exclusivity under the agreement. There should, 
therefore, be a provision that the grant of a compulsory licence will not amount to a breach 
of contract between the patentee and his exclusive licensee. 
One glaring omission from the ambit of the compulsory licensing scheme is the exclusion 
of inventions protected by utility innovations)07 Is this desirable? In view of the low 
threshold for the grant of utility innovation rights, which makes them more easily 
102 
103 
104 
106 
107 
See Hatscbek's Patents (1909) 26 RPC 228. at pages 245-246. per Mr Iustice Parker. See also ~ 
Cogperatiye Union. Ltd's Ap,plication (1933) 50 RPC 161. the Comptroller-General (Mr M.F. 
Lindley). at pages 163-164; Cathro's Application <No. n (1934) 51 RPC 75. the Comptroller-
General, at page 79. 
Ricbco Plastic Co's Patent [1989] RPC 722 (patent Office). per Dr P. Ferdinando. at page 723. 
See also F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. S.A.'s Patent [1971] RPC 311. per Whitford I., at pages 
330-332, a person interested need not necessarily be already engaged in manufacture or should 
already have incurred expense in setting up a production line. . , 
See, for example, IntcrtYJle Ltd's AP,plication (1926) 43 RPC 305, and Extrude Hope Comorauon s 
Patept [1982] RPC 361. 
See Halcon SO GrouP Ioc.s' Patepts [1989] RPC 1, per Falconer J., in the Patents Court. at page 
19. 
See section 17 A(2) of the Act, which provides, inter alitJ, that Part X of the Act does not apply to 
utility innovations. However, the other provisions, i.e., invalid clauses, government use, etc., 
apply. 
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obtainable, it is all the more important that compulsory licences should be made available 
against the holders of such rights if there are abuses. 
The grounds provided under the present provisions are worded wide enough to cover the 
different situations that need to be catered for arising from an abuse of the monopoly rights. 
So there is no need to amend the provisions with respect to the grounds for application. 
However, from the above discussion, it will be seen that it is the limited scope of the 
exercise of the patent rights allowed to a successful applicant that makes the compulsory 
licensing mechanism unsuited to serve its intended purpose. Due mainly to the various 
constraints imposed on it by international treaty obligations, many possible options to make 
it a more effective tool are not available. In view of this, it is clear that the powers given to 
the government by virtue of section 84 is potentially the most effective weapon against any 
abuse of a patentee's exclusive rights. l 08 This will be especially relevant where the patentee 
has made a commercial decision not to market a patented product in Malaysia. and it is not 
economically viable, or through the lack of the requisite know-how, possible, for an 
applicant to take advantage of the compulsory licensing provisions to start local 
manufacture. To the extent that it is in the public interest that the market be supplied with 
the relevant products, the Government can intervene to import these products. 
6.3. Compulsory Licence Based on Inter-Dependence of Patents 
The purpose of this provision is to remedy the situation that arises where it is not possible, 
without infringing an earlier patent, to work in the country an invention claimed in a later 
patent. To use the customary terminology, the earlier patent and the later patent are 
"interdependent". The best solution for the owner of the later patent is to obtain a 
contractual licence from the owner of the earlier patent. However, if, due to the 
understandable reluctance on the part of the earlier patentee to grant a licence, the owner of 
the latter patent may, provided the invention claimed in the later patent constitutes an 
important technical advance with respect to the invention claimed in the earlier patent, obtain 
a compulsory licence. Without this provision, the owner of the earlier patent can arbitrarily 
hlock the working in the country of a patented invention constituting an important technical 
advance. 
More than the grounds discussed earlier, the present ground is even more important to 
ensure that the holder of a patent does not use his exclusive rights to stifle or hinder 
technological development that could result from a later invention based on an earlier 
invention. It has first to be noted that an application for a compulsory licence based on 
section 49A can be made at any time after the patent is granted, unlike under section 49 
IOH Sec later, para. 6A. 
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where the applicant has to wait for a period of three years from the date of the grant before 
making any application.l 09 Further, the provision is only applicable to the owner of the 
later patent, assuming all the conditions are satisfied. It is not independently available to the 
owner of the earlier patent. The owner of the earlier patent is merely entitled to a "reciprocal 
licence" which is contingent upon the granting of the frrst one. 
6.3.1. Conditions to be Satisfied 
Two conditions need to be satisfied before an applicant can succeed under this head. The 
first is that the carrying out of his invention would infringe the earlier patent. If the later 
patent can be used in a way which would not involve the use of the earlier patent, then 
section 49 A does not apply. It would seem that if the owner of the earlier patent can show 
that the invention covered by his patent would not be infringed if the later patentee were to 
make or exercise his invention in some other practical way which would avoid infringement 
the ground would not be made out. I I 0 The second, and more important condition, is that 
the invention of the later patent constitutes an important technical advance in relation to the 
invention claimed in the earlier patent. I I I No guidance is given in the Act as to what is 
meant by "important technical advance". This qualification is meant to protect the patent 
owner against applications made by the owner of a later patents which merely embodies 
minor inventive features and serves the purpose of avoiding abuses which could result from 
applicants fuing patent applications on trifling inventions for the sole purpose of being able 
to work the invention. 112 However, from the provision, it is clear that any such advance 
has to be measured against the earlier invention and not against the general state of the 
art,l13 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention, which requires that an application for a compulsory licence 
may not be made on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a 
period of four years from the date of filing of a patent application or three years from the date of the 
grant of the patent, does not apply here since there is no "abuse" involved. See also Parke Davis & 
Co. y. The Comptroller of Patents and British DruK Houses. Ltd [1954] 71 RPC 169, involving 
the question of whether section 41 of the Patents Act, 1949, UK, relating to compulsory licences 
under patents for food and medicine, and which allowed application to be made within three years of 
the grant, was at variance with Article 5A of the Paris Convention. The House of Lords held ~at 
Article 5A was concerned only with abuse of monopoly, whilst section 41 was not concerned ~lth 
such abuse, being based on the character of the invention. The Comptroller was, therefore, entitled 
to consider such applications before the period of three years was up - per Lord Cohen, at page 172. 
See Burrell, T.D., Burrell - South African Patent Law and Practice, 2nd Ed., Butterworths. Durban, 
1986, on the equivalent provision in section 55 of the Patents Act 1978, South Africa, at page 
341. 
This follows the tenn used in the WIPO Model Law - see section 149(1) of the Model Law. cf the 
equivalent provision in section 48(3)(d)(ii) of the Patents Act 1977, UK, which used the tc:rm 
"substantial contribution to the art". There does not appear to be any reported cases on the meamng 
of this qualification. 
See WIPO Model Law, at page 99. 
For similar views in relation to the section 36 of the Federal Law on Patents for Invention, 
Switzerland. 19S4, as revised in 1976, regulating compulsory licences for patent dependency, see 
Walter, H.P., "Compulsory Licences in Respect of Dependent Patents under the Law of 
Switzerland and Other European States," 21 nc 532 (1990), at page 534. 
320 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, before a compulsory licence based on dependency could be 
granted, besides satisfying all the conditions listed in Article 31(a) to (k), and Article 
31(l)(ii), the dependent patent has, in addition, to involve "an important technical advance 
of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the frrst 
patent".114 This latter requirement seem to imply that two further conditions have to be 
satisfied, i.e., not only must the second patent involve an important technical advance (the 
nonnal pre-TRIPS requirement), but now an added requirement, that it must be "of 
considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent", 
has to be satisfied. It is not clear what the added condition means, though it seems to have 
introduced some commercial consideration which is tied to the frrst patent. 115 
A compulsory licence under this section may be granted only to the extent necessary to 
avoid infringement of the earlier patent . Therefore, if the application is only to enable the 
applicant to simply work the earlier patent simpliciter, then he would have to go under s. 49 
and not s. 49A. Further, the possibility of obtaining such a compulsory licence is available 
not only to the owner of the later patent, but also to any licensee of a contractual licence and 
beneficiary of a compulsory licence under the later patent. 
6.3.2. Cross-Licensing 
If a decision is made to grant a compulsory licence under this section, the Board, upon the 
request of the owner of the earlier patent, the licensee of a licence contract under the earlier 
patent or the beneficiary of a compulsory licence under the earlier patent, may grant a 
compulsory licence under the later patent.116 This possibility is designed to introduce a 
balance between the relative positions of the interested persons. This is especially important 
when the production and sale of products based on the later patent will result in 
obsolescence of products under the earlier patent. 
114 See TRIPS Agreement, Part n, Section 5, Article 31(1)(i). The Paris Convention, and also the 
proposed Patent Law Treaty, do not have any specific provision regulating patent dependency. . 
liS Section 133(3B)(a) of the Australian Patents Act 1990, with effect from 1~ January 1995, c~ntalDs 
an equivalent provision. Similar changes are made to the patent law of SWitzerland - see Article 36, 
Federal Law on Patents for Invention (patent Law, LBI) of 1954, as last amended on February 3, 
1995. The proposed Bill to amend the Brazilian patent law also provides. that ~~ there. is patent 
dependency, a compulsory licence will only be granted if the second lDvention IS an lDl~t 
technical advance of considerable economic significance in respect of the base patent - see Gosain, 
R., Sherrill, H.K., "The Effects of GAlTlfRlPS on Brazil's Patent Legi~lation",. Patent World, 
May 1995, 24, at page 25. As yet there is no reported case on the construction of this phrase. 
116 Section 49A(2) oftbe Act. 
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6.3.3. Observations 
As some junior patents may not be able to satisfy the requirement that they should constitute 
an "important technical advance", there may be a possibility that the later patentee may not 
be able to exploit his patent until the expiry of the earlier patent. This is undesirable and 
may act as a disincentive to innovation activities, and there should be a provision allowing 
him to exploit his patent where it does not conflict with the economic interest of the earlier 
patentee even if the later patentee does not satisfy the requirement that it should constitute an 
"important technical advance". Since the desired use is non-competitive, the earlier 
patentee's position is not jeopardised. The former provision found in Switzerland may be 
useful here. Under the former Swiss scheme, a compulsory licence for dependency could 
be granted on two grounds. The first was when the later patent involved a considerable 
technical advance. The second ground was that the invention served a purpose entirely 
different from that of the prior patent. 117 According to Walter, difference of purpose is 
understood in economic and not technical terms, in the sense that the two inventions must 
fulfil different needs. The requirement will be satisfied if the invention is made or used in 
different branches of industry .118 
6.4. Rights of Government 
None of the previous indigenous State patent enactments contained any specific provision 
regulating government use of a patent. 119 Presumably, therefore, the government had to 
rely on the general compulsory licensing provision provided for by these enactments. When 
the re-registration of United Kingdom patents was introduced, it is unclear to what extent 
the government use provision of the United Kingdom statue was applicable to Malaysia. 
However, the matter became academic when the Patents (Rights of Government) Act, 
1967, was enacted. By this statute, the government was free to use any patented invention 
without the obligation to pay any compensation.120 The present provision is contained in 
section 84 of the Act. 
117 See Article 36 of the Federal Law on Patents for Invention, Switzerland, 1954, as revised in 1976. 
However, when the Federal Law was amended in 1995, the second ground was repealed. The Patent 
Law 1992, of Ghana, in section 46(1)(a) also contains a similar provision, i.e., "serves industrial 
purposes different from those served in the invention which is the subject of the earlier patent~. 
Although the repeal in the Swiss Act was presumably to c~nform to the TRIPS Agreem~nt, It 
needs to be mentioned that this ground for a compulsory licence for a dependent patent IS not 
expressly prohibited - refer TRIPS Agreement, Part II, Section 5, Article 310). 
118 See Walter, H.P., "Compulsory Licences in Respect of Dependent Patents under the Law of 
Switzerland and Other European States," 21 IIC 532 (1990), at page 534. 
119 Unlike the United Kingdom patent statutes, w~ch fr?m an early time, con~ specific 
provisions relating to government use of a patented Invention. See, for example, section 27 of the 
Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883. The present provision is found in sections 55-59 of 
the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. 
120 See section 3 <a) and (b), Patents (Rights of Government) Act, 1967, Act 53 of 1967, Malaysia. 
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The fIrst thing to note about this provision is that there is no time limit imposed on the 
government before it can rely on the provision. Further, there is no mention of the grounds 
on which the government could rely on before it can take advantage of this provision. 121 
There need not, therefore, be demonstrated an abuse by the patentee of his monopoly 
rights. Section 84 provides that the government "may do any act which would otherwise be 
an infringement of the privileges or rights of the patentee. This would, therefore, include 
importation which is not allowed under a compulsory licence. Secondly, the rights under 
the section apply not only to the Government of the Federation, but include the Government 
of any State, a Ministry or Government department or any person authorised by such 
Government, Ministry or Government department.122 
From the way the section is framed, any exploitation of the patented invention by the 
Government by virtue of this section is not an infringement of patent right, for no 
infringement is involved. No prior permission need to be sought from the patentee. The 
section basically provides the Government with rights which amounts to a concurrent right 
of use, with the condition that a reasonable amount of compensation is paid. If this view is 
right, this is an important distinction because it has an impact upon the way the 
compensation is to be assessed.l 23 For "compensation" for exercising a "concurrent right 
of use, does not stand on the same footing as a claim for damages for infringement" .124 
121 
122 
123 
In this respect, it is similar to the former section 19 of the Canadian Patent Act, R.S.,c. P-4, s.l. 
(Canada). From the 1st of October, 1989, however, the Government has to apply to the 
Commissioner for authority to use a patented invention. Under the new section 19(1), the authority 
will not be given unless it could be shown that there had been an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a 
licence from the patentee on reasonable terms, although this requirement need not be observed in 
cases of national emergency or extreme urgency or when the use for which the authorisation is 
sought is a public non-commercial use. The use of this provision is limited in its scope to the 
supply of a predominantly domestic market. This change was brought about by the TRIPS 
Agreement - see Part II, Section 5, Article 31(b). See also section 156 of the WIPO Model Law, 
which authorises the Government to exploit a patent where the "public interest, in particular, 
national security, nutrition, health or the development of other vital sectors of the national 
economy, so requires." 
See section 84(a) of the Act. 
See, Patchett's Patent [1967] RPC 237 (CA), per Diplock L.J., at pages 251-53, "The sum 
payable by the Government department is not compensation for an infringement by the Crown of 
the patentee's monopoly rights, for no infringement is involved. It is erroneous to regard a patentee 
as having an exclusive right to manufacture or to permit the manufacture of the patented invention. 
For that is a right which is shared by the Crown. The sum payable under [the Act] is in the nature 
of remuneration payable to the inventor or his successor entitled for the use made by the Crown of 
his invention pursuant to that concurrent right ... The learned judge approached the matter by 
asking himself the question: "What would a patentee of the invention as a willing licensor and the 
Crown as a willing licensee agree upon as a reasonable royalty to be paid by the Crown for its use 
of the patented invention?' This is the correct approach provided it is borne in mind that the only 
subject matter of the payment is the use of the invention. The learned ju~ge too~ ~e vie~ .~at the 
patentee who was himself a manufacturer, and had invested money 10 proVIding faclhties for 
manufacturing the invention himself, would be more reluctant to grant licences to another person. 
which would reduce the demand for the products of his own manufacture. and would be likely. to 
insists upon a royalty which included either a return upon his investment in any manufactunng 
facilities which would be unused as a result of his failing to obtain an order himself, or the cost of 
converting his unused facilities to some other manufacturing use. But ~y such elemen.t ~n the 
royalty t like the claim based on loss of profits. is by way of compensation for not obtalrung an 
order although the measW'C of such compensation is different It is a sum incl~ in ~ royalty 
which is claimed by him not in his capacity of a willing licensor of the patented lDventiOD ~t .as 
one who. like an exclusive or other licensee. bas invested money in preparing to manufacturing It. 
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6.4.1. Observations 
On the face of it, this provision is capable of such a wide interpretation that it could render 
the exclusive rights of the patentee economically valueless, although, unlike the previous 
scheme, a reasonable compensation has to be paid.125 Under the present provision, there is 
nothing to prevent the government from authorising another person to exploit the patented 
invention even if the patentee has been manufacturing his patented invention in Malaysia 
and supplying the public at a reasonable price. For example, permission may be granted to 
a favoured third person to import a patented product in competition with the patentee. Even 
if there is no reduction in the price charged, the sale of the imported version may undermine 
the patentee's sale, resulting in damage to his business. In the interest of the patentee, the 
grounds under which the government may exercise its rights under section 84 should be 
laid down to indicate that these rights of government should only be used in special 
situations where the interest of the country is affected. The present provision may also be a 
breach of the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 126 Therefore, there may be a need to 
specify the circumstances under which the Government can make use of the provision, like 
on the ground of national defence, public health and public safety , or when they have been 
violation of competition law. 127 
124 
12S 
126 
127 
In my view no regard should be had to any circumstance of this kind in assessing the payment to 
be made by the Crown to the patentee under section 46 of the [1949] Act". 
See Allen & Hanbwys Ltd's (Salbutamol) Patent [1987] RPC 327 (patents Court and Court of 
Appeal), per Whitford J., at pages 357-358, "I can now turn to the question of royalty. Royalty is 
not an easy question. To say, as everyone said before me, that it should be such a royalty as would 
be agreed between a willing licensor and a willing licensee sounds satisfactory enough but, 
although it sounds well, it is of little assistance because, in cases such as these, no such creatures 
exist. A question arose as to whether it would be right, in fixing the royalty, to consider the 
patentees position as manufacturers .... Compensation for Crown use, the Crown having a 
concurrent right of use, does not stand on the same footing as a claim for damages for infringement 
and Patchett's Patent, in my judgement, in no way establishes that in considering the question of 
royalty. the patentees' position as a manufacturer should not be brought into consideration. In my 
experience of royalty negotiations. it always has been considered. ~n the Crown use ~ you are 
considering compensation. You are not considering the royalty which would be appropnate ~o ~ 
bargain struck between a willing licensor and a willing licensor and, in a royalty negobabon 
between two such creatures, the position of the licensor as manufacturer must be one of the 
relevant matters to be brought into account". Contra Dillon L.1., in the Court of Appeal, at pages 
379-380, where he disagreed with Whitford J.'s holding that the position of the patentee as a 
manufacturer was to be taken into account. 
See section 84(b) of the Act. 
See TRIPS Agreement, Part fi, Section 5: Patents, Article 31 (b), and Section 8, Article 40. 
See Article 31(k), TRIPS Agreement, Part fit Section 5: Patents. Note that Alternative B of 
Article 26(3) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty (for this, see footnote 34, supra) woul~ ~low f<r 
the exploitation of a patented invention by the Government, etc., on the grounds of public mterest, 
national security. nutrition. health. or the development of other vital sectors of national economy. 
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6.5. Invalid Clauses in Licensing Contracts 
6.5.1. General 
As part of the exclusive rights granted to the owner of a patent, the owner is given the 
exclusive right to conclude licence contracts. Under the Act, a licence contract means "any 
contract by which the owner of a patent (the licensor) grants to another person or enterprise 
(the licensee) a licence to do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection 
(1), and subsection (3), of section 36" .1 28 It would seem that the definition of a licence 
contract is wide enough to include a leasing agreement. A patent licence is no more than the 
right not to be sued for infringement by the patentee. 129 It is a legal device which enables 
the patentee to retain at least the right to sue those who infringe his claims and yet to allow 
others, namely the licensees, to share in the exploitation of the patented invention. A 
patentee may grant to another the right only to use. Such an arrangement would, in effect, 
be a lease. Similarly, a patentee may grant to another the right only to sell or the right to 
make and sell upon certain conditions, as for use in a defmed field. The defined field may 
be expressed either positively, enumerating the applications to which the article may be put, 
or negatively, enumerating the forbidden applications. Correctly used, the right to licence 
gives the patentee a greater opportunity, and possibly greater efficiency, in exploiting his 
patented invention profitably. 
However, by use of various arrangements in the licence agreements, the patent owner may 
abuse his position as a patentee and use the patent as a tool to control or monopolise areas 
of trade which the patent rights do not legitimately grant to him. Therefore, certain 
limitations in the patentee's licensing powers are normally provided, either in the fonn of 
specific statutory prohibitions, as in the United Kingdom, or through decisional law, as in 
the United States. To borrow the expression of Justice Douglas, the absence of any 
restrictions, statutory or otherwise, would mean that "[e]ach patent owner would be his 
own patent office and, by reason of the leverage of the patent, obtain a larger monopoly of 
the market than the Constitution or statutes permit." 130 
Under the common law, such "limited licences" were quite common and the courts were 
quite ready to enforce them, unless they could be considered illegal under the doctrine of 
unfair restraint of trade. 131 Statutory control of monopolistic practices in relation to unfair 
128 See section 41 of the Act, and also see generally, Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights, para. 3.7. 
129 See, for example, Geperal TaJkiol Pictures Co. y. Western Electric Co. 304 US 175, 181, 37 
USPQ 357, 359 (US Sup. Ct 1938), citing Deforest Radio Co. y. United States 273 US 236, 242 
(US Sup. Ct 1927). 
130 Automatic Radio Mfa Co. y. HeWline Research Co. I Ad 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950), per 
Justice Douglas, at page 382. 
131 Incandescent Gas Company Ltd y. Caotelo (1895) 12 RPC 262 reflects the attitude of the Courts 
towards this kind of device. In relation to Validity of a tying clause in a contract for the sale of a 
patented gas maude, Wills J. at page 264 held that "[1be] sale of a patented article carries with it 
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conditions attached to the sale or other dealings with patented articles was fIrSt introduced in 
the United Kingdom by section 38 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907.132 Breach of the 
section resulted in the impugned conditions being rendered null and void, as being in 
restraint of trade and contrary to public policy. Further, by virtue of section 38(4) of that 
1907 Act, the existence of such conditions was a defence to any infringement action relating 
to the same patent. Hence it was of a penal nature. The present United Kingdom provision 
is found in section 44 of the Patents Act 1977.133 Despite the existence of these powerful 
weapons to combat these form of abuse of the monopoly power of the patentee, it is 
perhaps surprising that none of the earlier Malaysian patent statutes contained any express 
provision to regulate these abusive practices. However, it is arguable that the provisions 
allowing the authority to revoke a patent on the ground that "the mode of exercising the 
exclusive privilege is mischievous to the state or generally prejudicial to the public"134 may 
be wide enough, although drastic, to cater for such abusive practices. 
The provision in the Act which has a bearing upon the abuses of monopoly rights is section 
45, which makes certain clauses containing restrictive conditions invalid in any licensing 
contracts. It is the means whereby the patentee's private interest is reconciled with the 
public interest, imposing, as it were, a statutory code of licensing practice. This provision 
is especially important in the Malaysian context in the absence of any competition law and 
provisions on unfair competition. 135 
132 
133 
134 
135 
the right to use it in any way that the purchaser chooses to use it, unless he knows of restrictions. 
Of course, if he knows of restrictions, and they are brought to his mind at the time of the sale, he 
is bound by them. He is bound by them on this principle: the patentee has the sole right of using 
and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all. Inasmuch as he 
has the right to prevent people from using them or dealing in them at all. he has the right to do the 
lesser thing, that is to say. to impose his own conditions. It does not matter how unreasonable or 
how absurd the conditions are." See also Incandescent Gas Li&ht Company Ltd v. Bro~den (1899) 
16 RPC 179, at 183,per Kennedy J. 
See, for example, the comments of Romer LJ., in Huntoon Coy v. Kolynos Clncomorat.edl (1930) 
47 RPC 403, " ... the object of the legislation was to prevent persons who had obtained a 
monopoly in respect of an article or a process by means of a patents of using that monopoly as to 
obtain for themselves a virtual monopoly in respect of other articles and processes for which they 
had not obtained any patent"; Viscount Simonds in Tool Metal y. Iun&sten Electric (1955) 72 
RPC 209 (House of Lords), at pages 213-214. See also Banks Report at para. 519, with reference 
to sections 57 and 58 of the Patents Act, 1949, United Kingdom - the provisions of section 57 of 
the Act are intended to prevent insertion in contracts relating to patents of conditions by which a 
patentee uses his patent rights to obtain business in goods not covered by the patent. 
This section is substantially a re-enactment, though more broadly drafted, of section 57 of ~ 
Patents Act 1949, which in turn was based on section 38 of the 1907 Act. The correspo~ng 
provisions in the Australian patents statute can be found in sections 144 to 146 of the Austraban 
Patents Act, 1990. 
See supra, para. 6.1.1. 
Note that Section 8, Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for remedial measures to be taken 
to prevent abuses of intellectual property rights through licensing practice~ ~aving an ~ve~ e~ 
of competition in the relevant market. However, there is no specific proVISIon regulabng bcensmg 
practices which attempt to enlarge the scope of patent rights. irrespective of whether or not 
competition is affected. Neither the Paris Convention, nor the proposed Patent Law Treaty, has 
regulatory provisions on these areas. 
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6.5.2. The Malaysian Model 
Although having the same objective as the equivalent provisions found in the United 
Kingdom Act, the Malaysian provision is laid down in very different terms, and has 
different effects, from the United Kingdom model. It, in fact, mirrors the provision of the 
Sri Lankan Model,136 which is in turn modelled along the line of the 1964 WIPO Model 
Law.l 37 Such being the case, United Kingdom cases pertaining to this area are merely 
indicators of the way the UK courts have interpreted the specific provisions of the UK Act. 
They could not be used as a basis on which to construe the Malaysian provisions, though 
the cases may be useful as an indication of what is regarded as unjustified conduct by 
patentees which would justify certain measures to be taken against him. 
The Act provides that "Any clause or condition in a licence contract shall be invalid in so far 
as it imposes upon the licensee, in the industrial or commercial field, restrictions not 
derived from the rights conferred by this part on the owner of the patent, or unnecessary for 
the safeguarding of such rights."138 
6.5.2.a. Preliminary observations 
It is important to note that unlike the UK model, the Malaysian prohibitions are not of a 
penal nature. Breach of the section merely results in the offending clauses being deemed 
invalid and hence not enforceable. This would mean that the failure to fulfil or observe the 
impugned restrictions will not be actionable as a breach of contract. 139 However, a third 
party who is not in a contractual relationship with the patent owner is not given a right to 
use the presence of these invalid clauses as a defence to an infringement action. Therefore, 
it is submitted that the section does not have to be construed strictly in favour of the 
patentee. 140 
Further, it is not necessary that before the section comes into operation, the restrictive 
clause should be inserted or imposed by the patent owner. The section is not so limited. It, 
therefore, applies to any conditions, whether imposed by the patentee, or by or with the 
knowledge or authority of the patentee. Therefore, an exclusive licensee who has the power 
to grant sub-licences would also be affected. 
136 See the Sri Lankan Act, section 90. 
137 See section 33, WIPO Model Law, 1964. This provision is absent in the ~ew WIPO Mode~ Law 
of 1979. Unfortunately, no guidance is given in the 1964 Model Law regarding the cons~cbon of 
this provision. There have also been no reported cases in the Sri Lankan law reports relating to the 
application of this provision. Hence guidance will have to be sought elsewhere. 
138 See section 4S of the Act 
139 Huntoon Co, y. Kolynos lIpcoqxnIr4l (1930) 47 RPC 403, per Clauson 1., at page 410. 
140 Unlike the approach in the United Kingdom. See, for example Tool Metal v, Thnptcn BJa;tris 
(19SS) 72 RPC 209, and Fichera v, Flgptes [1984] RPC 257 (CA). 
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Unlike the United Kingdom provisions, there are no express prohibitions set out. The 
prohibition is expressed in terms of restrictions not derived from the rights under the Act. 
Hence reference has to be made to section 36 which lists the rights conferred on a patent 
owner.l 41 Therefore, where the clauses in a licence agreement seek to restrict the licensee's 
activities with reference to any of the patentee's exclusive rights, such clauses would not be 
deemed to be illegal. Any clause which goes outside this boundary would be invalid, unless 
specifically permitted under section 45(a) and (b) of the Act. 142 
As is evident from the phraseology of the section, the import of the section is potentially 
very wide, the only guidance given in the Act is that "restrictions not derived from the 
rights conferred by this part on the owner of the patent, or unnecessary for the safeguarding 
of such rights" are invalid. In the determination of what clause or condition in a licence 
contract is to be deemed invalid, the section has to be construed on the basis that a licence is 
required only when the act, if done, would infringe the patentee's exclusive rights. 
Therefore, the general rule should be that any condition in the contract that would result in 
the patentee's rights in respect of his patented invention being wider in scope and longer in 
duration than that conferred by a patent itself would be invalid, since this results in an 
extension of his lawful exclusive rights as defined under the ACt. 143 For example, in a 
process patent which involved the use of certain unpatented substances as an ingredient in 
the patented process, the substances are not protected by the patent, and hence any 
condition requiring the purchase of these substances from the patentee will be invalid. 144 
6.S.2.b. Awlicability of the doctrine of patent misuse 
In 1873, the US Supreme Court pronounced that "A patentee may license any, some or all, 
of his patents on any terms which the parties agree, and the licence will be enforced by the 
courts according to its language, just like any other contracts. These are substantive 
rights. "145 This early willingness of the US courts to allow the patentees to expand the 
scope of their lawful monopoly to include unpatented products reached its high point in 
Sidney Henry el d. v. A.B. Dick Co. 146 However, judicial attitude has changed since then, 
and the court soon moved away from its earlier policy of assisting patentees in securing an 
extended monopoly through the leverage of their patent monopolies. In Motion Picture 
141 See Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights. paras 3.1 and 3.2. 
142 Permissible restrictions are discussed in para. 6.5.4 .• infra· 
143 Samson y. Frepay (1914) 31 RPC 330 (CA). per Swinfen Eady L.J .• at page ~3~. "In order to. be 
protected by the patent the right that is sought to be protected must ~ within th~ p~~tion 
afforded by the patent; it must be properly described, and specified and clauned. Otherwise It IS not 
protected by the patent." 
144 Samson y. freMY (1914) 31 RPC 330 (CA). per Swinfen Eady L.J .• at page 336 - ingredient in a 
patented process. See also Huptoop Co. y. Kolypos Uncmporaredl (1930) 47 RPC 403. per Lad 
Hanworth M.R., at page 418 - unpatented component parts of a patented article. 
145 Adam' y, Burke 17 Wall. 453. 21 Law Ed. 700 (US Sup. Ct 1873). 
146 Por a discussion of this case and the doctrine of contributory infringement. see Chapter 4 - Patent 
Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights. at para. 4.4.5.b. 
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Patents Co. v Universal Film Manufacturin& Company et aI. ,147 the Supreme Court 
expressly overruled A.B. Dick, and refused to hold the defendants liable for contributory 
infringement by the supply of unpatented films to purchasers of the licensees in breach of 
the licensed conditions attached to their patented motion picture projection machines. The 
rationale for refusing a remedy to the patentee was based on the ground that the patentee, if 
he decided to exploit the invention, whether by himself or through others, was thereby 
restricted to "the use of the invention as it was described in the claims of his patent, and not 
as it might be expanded by limitations as to materials and supplies necessary to the 
operation of it." Therefore, "the exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to 
the invention described in the claims of the patent, and that it was not competent for the 
owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its 
patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but 
which are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machine forth into the channels of 
trade of the country subject to conditions as to its use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed 
thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner." Up to this point, however, the court had 
not gone so far as to hold that the patentee's illegal conduct in attempting to expand his 
monopoly would be a defence to actual infringement of the patent. 148 
The seminal case for the patent misuse defence is Morton Salt Co. v. a.s. Suppi&er, 149 
where the basis for refusal of the court's aid to the patentee and the relationship between the 
misuse doctrine and violation of the anti-trust legislation was explained. In Morton Salt, the 
respondent leased its patented machines to commercial canners under licences to use the 
machine upon conditions, and with the agreement of the licensees, that only the 
subsidiary's salt tablet be used with the leased machines. The petitioner made and leased to 
canners unpatented salt depositing machine, alleged to infringe the respondent's patent. The 
petitioner also competed with the respondent in the sale of the tablets. The trial court, 
passing over the issues of Validity and infringement, granted summary judgement 
diSmissing the complaint. It took the ground that the respondent was making use of the 
patent to restrain the sale of salt tablets in competition with its own sale of unpatented 
tablets, by requiring licensees to use with the patented machines only tablets sold by the 
147 
148 
149 
Motion Picture Patents Co. y. Universal Film ManufacturinK Company et al. 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917). 
Motion Picture Patents Co. y. Universal Film Manufacturin& CompanY et al. 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917). See Justice Clarke, who delivered the opinion of the court, at pagc:s 508-518. See 
also Carbice Coqxntion of America y. American Patents DevelopIIlGnt CmporatiOD and Dry 1m 
COJl)OratiQP of America. 283 US 27 (1931), Mr Justice Brandeis delivered the judgement of the 
court, at page 31; Leitch MaoufacturlPK Co. Inc. y. The Barber Compapy. InC., 36 USPQ 35 
(1938); 302 US 458. per Mr Justice Brandeis, for the court: 36 USPQ 35, at pages 35-37; 1k 
Mercoid Comoratiop y. Mid-CoptipentalInvestmept Company et al. 60 USPQ 21 (US Sup. Ct 
1944), per Justice Douglas, at page 24, delivering the opinion of the Co~ .. These c:ases R 
discussed in Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect ExplOItation of Rigbts, at 
para. 4.4.S.b. 
Morton Salt Co. y. G.S. Sumailet Co. 314 US 488, 86 L. Ed. 363 (US Sup. Ct 1942). See also 
Internatiopal Salt Co. y. United States 332 US 392, 75 USPQ 184 (US Sup. Ct 1947). 
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respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision because it thought that 
respondent's use of the patent was not shown to violate s. 3 of the Clayton Act as it did not 
appear that the use of its patent substantially lessened competition or tended to create a 
monopoly in salt tablets. The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Stone, who delivered 
judgement of the court, stated categorically that "The question we must ask is not 
necessarily whether the respondent has violated the Clayton Act, but whether a court of 
equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it as the 
effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article." ISO It is 
pertinent to note that relief was denied to the patentee when he attempted to monopolise the 
trade in unpatented articles, not on the basis that there was a violation of the anti-trust law. 
By such conduct, the patentee was deprived of the aid of the court of equity to restrain an 
alleged infringement by one who was a competitor. By attempting to extend his monopoly 
rights outside the scope of his patent rights, the patentee had misused his patent, hence the 
doctrine of patent misuse. The court recognises that since the patent right is limited by the 
"letter", the person who goes beyond his grant in attempting to secure a limited monopoly 
of an unpatented article is barred from enforcing his patent. 1S1 
It has been repeatedly held in the Supreme Court, and Morton Salt is the leading case, that 
the patentee is under an obligation not to use the patent beyond the limits of the grant. The 
fact that the patentee has the power to refuse a licence is no justification for his granting a 
licence subject to terms which are not within the scope of his patent rights, and which have 
the effect of enlarging the monopoly of the patent. IS2 
The philosophical basis for the patent misuse doctrine is the policy of protecting the 
public's interest in free competition by refusing to enforce contracts which suppress free 
competition or restrain trade. Under this doctrine, the patentee enjoys a monopoly as to his 
invention, but he may not use his patent or patents to control the manufacture, use, or sale 
of unpatented articles or materials. Hence restrictive controls are legitimate only if they are 
made with reference to the particular patents. The Supreme Court in Automatic Radio Mfi 
Co. y. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd said that "[t]hat which is condemned as against the 
ISO Morton Salt Co. y. G.S. Sup,pieer Co. 314 US 488 at 491, 86 L. Ed. 363 (US Sup. Ct 1942), 
per Chief Justice Stone. 
lSI Morton Salt Co. y. G.S. Syppieer Co. 314 US 488, at 490, 86 L. Ed. 363 (US Sup. Ct 1942), 
per Chief Justice Stone, "A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to 
make, use and vend the particular device described and claimed in ~ patent But a paten~ ~o~ no 
immunity for a monopoly not within the grant ... and the us~ of It to suppress co~petition I~ the 
sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aId of the court of eqwty to restrain an 
alleged infringement by one who is a competitor. It is the established rule that ~ patentee who ~ 
granted a licence on condition that the patented invention .be used by. the li~n~ only WIth 
unpatented materials furnished by the licensor, may not restraIn as a contributory Infringer one who 
sells to the licensee like materials for like use." 
152 United States y. Masonite COQl. 53 USPQ 396 (US Sup. Ct 1942), at page 401, ~r Justice 
Douglas, "The owner of a patent cannot extend his statutory grant by ~ontract o( agreeme~~ •.. 
Beyond the limited monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the patent are utilised 
are subject to the general law . " 
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public policy by the 'tie-in' cases is the extension of the monopoly of the patent to 'create 
another monopoly' or restraint of competition - a restraint not countenanced by the patent 
grant".153 The same Judge explained that "[t]he patent law confers on the patentee a limited 
monopoly, the right or power to exclude all others from manufacturing, using, or selling 
his invention... The extent of that right is limited by the defInition of his invention, as its 
boundaries are marked by the specifIcation and claims of the patent. ... He may grant 
licences to make, use, or vend, restricted in point of space or time, or with any other 
restriction upon the exercise of the granted privilege, save only that by attaching a condition 
to his licence he may not enlarge his monopoly and thus acquire some other which the 
statute and the patent together does not give."154 The stress in all these cases is the 
prohibition against the patentee attempting to enlarge his patent monopoly by the use of 
restrictive terms or conditions in a licence agreement. I 55 
Under United States law, the effect of a fmding of misuse is the possibility of the 
invocation of it as a defence in either an action for infringement or in an action for royalty 
payment. Relief is denied to the patentee even though the buyer, by the contract of sale, has 
assented to the plaintiffs condition. Such a defence of patent misuse is available not only to 
one under licence with the patentee but to all parties who are sued for infringement. I 56 
153 
154 
155 
156 
Automatic Radio MfS Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950), per 
Justice Minton, at page 380. 
Ethyl Gasoline Coxp. et al, v. United States 44 USPQ 614 (US Sup. Ct 1940), per Justice Stone, 
at page 620. 
See also The Mercoid Corporation y. Mid-Continental Investment Company et aI. 60 USPQ 21 
(US Sup. Ct 1944), per Justice Douglas, at page 25, delivering the opinion of the Court, "The 
instant case is a graphic illustration of the evils of an expansion of the patent monopoly by private 
engagements .... The patent is employed to protect the market for a device on which no patent has 
been granted. But for the patent such restraint on trade would plainly run foul of the anti-trust laws. 
If the restraint is lawful because of the patent, the patent will have been expanded by contract. That 
on which no patent could be obtained would be as effectively protected as if a patent had been 
issued. Private business would function as its own patent office and impose its own law upon its 
licensees. It would obtain by contract what letters patent alone may grant. Such a vast power 'to 
multiply monopolies' at the will of the patentee (Chief Justice White dissenting in Henry v. A.B. 
Dikk at p. 53) would carve out exceptions to the anti-trust law which Congress has not 
sanctioned. " 
The reason for this was explained in Morton Salt Co. v G.S. Sup.wGl' Co. 314 US 488 (US Sup. 
Ct 1942), at 493-4, per Stone C.J., "Where the patent is used as a means of restraining 
competition with the patentee's sale of an unpatented product, the successful prosecution of an 
infringement suit even against one who is not a competitor in such a sale is a powerful aid to the 
maintenance of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a contributing factor 
in thwarting the public policy underlying the grant of the patent. Maintenance and enlargement of 
the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article are dependent to some extent upon persuading the 
public of the validity of the patent, which the infringement suit is inten~ to establish: Equity 
may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to entertain a SUit 
for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has 
been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated. cf. D.JL 
Chemical Co. y. Ellis ... The reason for barring the prosecution of such a suit against one who is 
not a competitor with the patentee in the sale of unpatented product are fundamentally the same as 
those which preclude an infringement suit against a licensee who has violated a condition of the 
licence by using with the licensed machine a competing unpatented article, Motion Picture .•. , (X' 
against a vendee of a patented or copyrighted article for violation of a condition for the maintenance 
of a resale price, ... It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit 
in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, 
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The essence of the misuse then, is that the inherent monopoly power of the patent grant is 
being expanded beyond its statutory scope to engulf other objects.IS7 Under the doctrine it 
is a matter of "public policy .... [that] excludes from [the grant] all that is not embraced in the 
invention" .15 8 Justice Roberts considered patent misuse to be "a pure question of the extent 
of the right of exclusion conferred by the patent statute. It nowise involves the antitrust 
acts. "159 Similarly, it is a matter of statutory policy, as laid down by the Malaysian Patents 
Act that certain restrictions which are not derived from the Act are proscribed. The basic 
underlying policy behind the Malaysian provision seems to be that while it is in the public 
interest to grant exclusive rights to a patent owner, it is also in the public interest that such 
rights should not be exercised in such a way that competition is restricted by using the 
patent as a lever to compel the acceptance of terms which tend to extend the owner's patent 
rights. Provisions in licence contracts will be invalid if they are deemed to be outside the 
rights conferred on the patentee by the Act, or unnecessary for the safeguarding of such 
rights. This statutory philosophy reflects the "misuse doctrine" as developed by the courts 
in the United States. The statutory language "restrictions not derived from the rights 
conferred on the owner of the patent" in the Act, and the expression used by the United 
States courts, "rights not derived from the patent grant" reflect a common philosophical 
basis, prohibiting unfair extension of the scope of the patent rights. In view of this 
similarity, there is justification in relying on the misuse doctrine in the construing the extent 
and application of the Malaysian provisions. 
6.S.2.c. A caveat 
It is important to note that to establish the defence of patent misuse, it is not necessary to 
show a violation of the antitrust statutes, or the existence of an actual monopoly. A court of 
equity will not lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly if the patent is used as an effective 
means of restraining competition through misuse of the patent.160 Misuse is an application 
of the "venerable equity doctrine of 'unclean hands' in the patent field."161 The doctrine "is 
a rejection of the concept of the patent as an absolute property right in favour of its 
definition as a right which must not be exercised in a manner not consistent with the 
constitutionally-defined purpose for which it was conferred" .162 However, a patent misuse 
regardless of whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent. " (citations 
omitted). 
I 57 See Siekman, T.C., "Post Expiration Royalty Payments and Mandatory Package Licensing as 
Patent Misuse," 11 Vill, L. Rev. 382 (1966), at page 390. 
158 Morton Salt Co. y G.S. SUPJ)i&er Co. 314 US 488, at 492, 86 L. ed. 363 (US Sup. Ct 1942), per 
Chief Justice Stone. 
159 Mercoid Corp. y. Mid-COntinent Co. 320 US 661 (US Sup. Ct 1944), at page 674. 
160 See MonOn Salt Co. y. G.S. SVllPi&er Co. 314 US 488 (US Sup. Ct 1942), 52 USPQ 30, at 32, 
p~r Chief Justice Stone; Berlenbacb y. Apderson & Thompson Ski. Co. Inc. 141 USPQ 84 (CA 
9th Cir. 1964). 
161 United States Gxpsum Co. y. NatiOnal Gxgsum Co. 352 US 457, at 465, 112 USPQ 340, at 343-
344 (US Sup. Ct 1957). 
162 Hensley BgpiPlDMt Co. y. Esco Cm;p. 155 USPQ 183, 189 (CA 5th Cir. 1967). 
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may restrain trade and thereby violate antitrust laws,163 and violation of the antitrust 
statutes would amount to a patent misuse, since by violating the antitrust laws as a patent 
holder, he also violates the patent law by extending his limited grant beyond its statutory 
limit. 164 Originally, the doctrine was grounded on a violation of patent policy itself. 
Recently, however, certain anticompetitive licensing practices have prompted the courts to 
utilise the broader standards of antitrust in applying the doctrine of patent misuse. 165 
However, even though it is now settled that patent misuse may be found in the absence of 
an antitrust violation, some patent misuse cases have been decided solely within the 
antitrust framework. 166 In these cases, the court have utilised the standard prohibiting 
163 
164 
165 
166 
See International Salt Co. v. United States 332 US 392, 75 USPQ 184 (US Sup. Ct 1947), 
United States v. Loew's Inc. 371 US 38, 135 USPQ 201 (US Sup. Ct 1962), and Hensley 
Equipment Co. Inc. v. Esco COW. 155 USPQ 183 (CA 5th Cir. 1967). Since activities giving rise 
to patent misuse frequently have actual or anticipated adverse effects on competition, there is a 
close relationship between patent misuse doctrine and anti-trust law. 
For a more detailed analysis of the relation between misuse and the anti-trust laws, see Chisum, 
D.S., Patents A Treatise on the Law of Patentability and Infringement, Matthew Bender, Times 
Mirror Books, 1995, Vol. 5, at para. 19.04[2]. 
There have also been legislative proposals to abolish patent misuse and incorporate it under the 
antitrust regime. For a discussion of these proposals, see Merges, RP., "Reflections on Current 
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse", JPTOS 793 (1988), and Unsigned Note, "Standard Antitrust 
Analysis and the Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason", 46 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. 209 (1984). 
See, for example, USM Corp. v. SPS Technolo~ies. Inc. 216 USPQ 959 (CA 7th Cir. 1982), per 
Posner, Circuit Judge, at pages 964-65, "But we must also consider whether the patent misuse 
doctrine goes beyond these specific practices and constitutes a general code of patent licensing 
distinct from antitrust law. The doctrine arose before there was any significant body of federal 
antitrust law, and reached maturity long before that law (a product largely of free interpretation of 
unclear statutory language) attained its present broad scope. Since the antitrust law as currently 
interpreted reaches every practice that could impair competition substantially, it is not easy to 
define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent anti competitive practice - abuse of a 
patent monopoly. Once possibility is that the doctrine of patent misuse, unlike antitrust law, 
condemns any patent licensing practice that is even trivially anti competitive, at least if it has no 
socially beneficial effects. This might seem to explain cases such as Duplan Corp. v. Deerine 
Milliken. Inc. 197 USPQ 342 (D.S.C. 1977) ... which held that a patent tie-in agreement is 
misuse per se unless the patentee shows that he had some non-monopolistic reason for the tie-in, 
such as protection of goodwill. To prove a tie-in prima facie unlawful under the antitrust laws all 
you have to show is that the defendant has some economic power in the market for the tying 
product. United States Steel Cox:p. v. Fortner Entewrises. Inc. 429 US 610 (1977), and Duplan 
eliminates this requirement in misuse cases. But if a patentee has no market power... he cannot 
use a tie-in to practice price discrimination, which presupposes market power ... Much less can he 
lever his way into a dominant position in the market for the tied product. The logical presumption 
in such a case is that the tie-in promotes efficiency - and there is no lack of hypothesis as to how 
this might do it. See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 375-81 (1978). It is hard to understand why in 
these circumstances, where if any presumption is warranted it is that the tie-in promotes efficiency 
rather than reduces competition, the burden of proof on the issue of misuse should be shifted to the 
patentee. But probably cases like Dyplan - which was, like Motion Picture, a tie-in case - are best 
understood simply as application of the patent misuse doctrine within its conventional, ~ 
stereotyped boundaries. Outside those boundaries there is increasing convergence of ~nt ~~u,se 
analysis with standard antitrust analysis. ... One still finds plenty of statements 10 Judicial 
opinions that less evidence of anticompetitive effect is required in a misuse case than in an antitrust 
case ... But apart from the conventional applications of the doctrine we have found no cases where 
standards different from those of antitrust law were actually applied to yield different results. ... [I)f 
misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be 
tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the 
day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to 
debilitating uncertainty .... We come at last to. the particulars of.USM's charge ~f patent ~suse. 
which the district court dismissed on summary Judgement and which for reasons Just explained we 
think must be evaluated under antitrust principles. " 
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restraint of trade and lessening of competition to determine the legality of the patentee's 
conduct. 167 
This trend is significant, since the Malaysian provision is based on restrictions going 
beyond the scope of the patent rights and not on any breach of any competition law. 
Therefore, in the examination of US case law, it is important to keep in mind the need to 
distinguish between situations which amount to a mere patent misuse and those that are in 
violation of the relevant anti-trust law. Some of the decided cases involved both patent 
misuse and anti-trust matters, so that care has to be taken to sieve out only those principles 
relevant to the concept of patent misuse in the interpretation of the Malaysian provision to 
ensure that condemnation of the patentee's conduct is based on the doctrine of patent 
misuse rather than on, and as a separate issue from, antitrust law.168 
6.5.3. The Prohibited Restrictions 
The application of the misuse doctrine to the various licensing arrangements in the United 
States, and, where applicable, the common law position, are, therefore, examined to 
determine and evaluate the extent to which the specific instances are relevant to the 
Malaysian context. The classic patent misuse cases will first be examined,169 before 
examining other arrangements which are also considered by the US courts as patent 
misuse. However, it needs to be stressed here that an exhaustive discussion of the misuse 
doctrine in all its potential applications is not possible here and is not within the scope of the 
167 
168 
169 
For the argument that the legitimate rights of the patent holder have been abrogated by the court's 
utilisation of antitrust principles, see Nicoson, "Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement 
Suits", 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 76 (1962). See, however, Maffei, T.F., "The Patent Misuse Doctrine: 
A Balance of Patent Rights and the Public Interest", 52 JPOS 178 (1970), who argues that by 
upholding the independent status of the patent misuse doctrine as a check on the patentee's conduct 
apart from the application of antitrust principles, the court has achieved the necessary balance 
between the patentee's legitimate rights under the patent grant and the public interest in 
safeguarding competitive market opportunities. 
It has been argued that the lower antitrust-based standard is an inappropriate way to determine if 
certain restrictive practices amount to patent misuse. Therefore, there is no sound reason why the 
present misuse doctrines need to be eliminated in favour of antitrust analysis of the same practices. 
Therefore, the misuse doctrine has a bona fide claim to a viable, independent existence - see 
Merges, R.P., "Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse", JPTOS 793 (1988). 
The classic situations of patent misuse are conditions requiring the purchase of unpatented goods 
for use with patented apparatus or processes, prohibiting production or sale of competing goods, 
and conditioning the granting of a licence under one patent upon the acceptance of another Iftl 
different licence - Automatic Radio Mfa Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US 
Sup. Ct 1950), per Justice Minton, at page 379. However, the list is not close - see BWa: 
Laboratories. Inc. y. Gist-Brocades N.Y. 208 USPQ 777 (CA District of Columbia Circuit, 1980), 
per MacKinnon, Circuit Judge, at page 781, " ... the parameters of the doctrine are indistinct... Iftl 
fluid."; Skil Cm:p. y. Lucerne Products. Inc. elm. 206 USPQ 792 (NO Ohio, 1980), per Lambros. 
District Judge, at page 821, "The guiding doctrine in patent misuse is the equitable doc~ne that 'he 
who comes into equity must come with cleans hands' .... The outer scope of the doctrine has not 
been clearly defined. "; and Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Law 
251 (1965), "The outer reach of the misuse doctrine has not yet been fully defined" . 
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thesis. Only the more common situations will be analysed to illustrate the possible 
application of the section. 
6.5.3.a. Tying arrangements 
The most common method of extending a patentee's rights in a patent to non-patented 
products is by the use of the device of tying arrangements. A tying arrangement may 
consist of either a tie-in or a tie-out. Basically a tie-in clause is one in which the licensor or 
vendor makes the purchase, hire or use of a patented article or invention conditional on the 
purchaser, hirer or licensee also acquiring other goods from the patentee or his nominee. In 
a tie-out situation, the purchaser, hirer or licensee is prevented from using certain goods, 
materials or processes not supplied or owned by the patentee. 17 0 In the case of a process 
patent, a tying arrangement could, for example, involve the patentee allowing the licensing 
of the use of his process patent only if the licensee agrees to practice the process together 
with the use of the patentee's machinery .171 These practices are expressly prohibited under 
the United Kingdom provision.172 Such practices were formerly frequently resorted to in 
the United States,173 and it was only in Motion Picture Patents Co. v Universal Film 
Manufacturing Company et al. that they were enjoined. 174 
Neither the convenience nor the commercial necessities of the patentee nor the activities of 
the seller of the alleged infringing unpatented product, justifies an extension of the grant to 
the unpatented product. 17 5 A clause would still be regarded as having this effect even if 
there were no express clause requiring the licensee to undertake to purchase the non-
patented product from the patentee, as long as the effect of the clause is, in practice, to 
result in tying of an unpatented products. 176 Therefore, even indirect methods of achieving 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
The US Supreme Court in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States 356 US 1 (US Sup. Ct 1958), 
at pages 5-6, defined a tying arrangement as "An agreement by a party to sell one product but only 
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he 
will not purchase that product from any other supplier ". and [w]here such conditions are 
successfully exacted competition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curb." 
See, for example, Senza-Gel Cor.p. et aI. v. Seiftbart et al, 231 USPQ 363 (CAFC 1986). 
See s. 44(I)(a) and (b) Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. 
See Motion Picture Patents Co. V Universal Film Manufacturin& Company et aI. 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917), per Justice Clarke, who delivered the ~pini.on of ~e ~o~ ~t p~e 5~, "It. is 
obvious that in this case we have presented anew the Inqwry, which IS anSIng With InCl'e8S1llg 
frequency in recent years, as to the extent to which a patentee .or his assi~c:e is au~orised by our 
patent laws to prescribe by notice attached to a patented machine the conditions of Its use and the 
supplies which must be used in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent" 
MotiOn Picture Patents Co. V Uniyersal Film Manufacturln& Company ct 01., 243 US 502 (US 
Sup. Ct 1917). See text accompanying footnote 147, supra. 
B.B. Chemical Co. y. Ellis. 314 US 495, 52 USPQ 33 (US Sup. Ct 1942). See Chief Justice 
Stone, who delivered the judgement of the court, at page 497, "It is without significance that ... it 
is not practicable to exploit the patent rigbts by. ~ting licences ~se o! the peferences.of 
manufacturers and of the method by which petitioner has found It convenIent to conduct Its 
business. The patent monopoly is not enlarged by reason of ~e ~act that i~ would be ~ 
convenient to the patentee to have it so, or because he cannot avail himself of Its benefits within 
the limits of the grant." 
See HUnter's Patcmt [1965] RPC 416 (Sup. Ct Republic of Ireland), on an issue relating to the 
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the end of tying unpatented articles to the use of a patented device will be caught by the rule 
against tying. I77 
It is important to note, however, that the patent misuse doctrine does not prevent a patent 
owner from producing unpatented materials for sale to licensees or purchasers. The owner 
is free to do so. However, it will be patent misuse to condition the grant of a licence on 
purchase of the unpatented compounds.178 Similarly, in Bissell Inc. v. E.R. Wagner Mfg 
Co. ,179 the patents in suit related to an apparatus for applying detergent to rugs and the 
like, commonly called a rug shampoo applicator. In a suit for infringement, the defendant, 
Wagner, alleged that Bissell had misused its patents. It was held that the patent was 
misused where dealers in the patented applicator were required to purchase unpatented 
shampoo to be applied by the applicator inasmuch as no reasonable business purpose was 
shown other than the patentee's intent to use the patented device to promote sale of 
unpatented shampoo. However, it was not misuse of patent for the manufacturer to package 
its applicator together with a container of its unpatented shampoo and to sell such 
combination at one unit price. The shampoo in the container was sufficient only to clean a 
9' x 18' carpet. After the shampoo was consumed, and for the remainder of the life of the 
applicator, the end-users could purchase any desired shampoo, and competitors were 
equally free to vie for the trade in shampoo. The plaintiff had established a proper 
manufacturer's motive in furnishing sample of its shampoo for sale and efficient initial 
operation of the applicator which introduced a new concept in home carpet cleaning. 1 80 
Another situation where a tie-in may be justified is where the restriction is motivated by 
quality control. This, in fact, will fall within proviso (a) to the section, which will be dealt 
with later. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.a. Smith Corp. involved two patented devices, a 
glass-lined silo and a silo unloader. The defendant originally sold the devices separately. 
However, upon receiving many complaints that the unloader did not perform satisfactorily 
in other silos, thus tending to discredit the usefulness of the unloader, the defendant 
instituted a policy of refusing to sell unloaders to any customers who did not have a 
patented glass-lined silo or who would not buy one. The court looked at the particular 
equivalent section in the Irish Patents Act, per Kin~smill Moore J:, at page 427. For similar 
attempts which failed in the United States, see LeItch ManufactunDK Co. Inc. y. The Barber 
Company. Inc., 36 USPQ 35, at pages 36-37 (US Sup. Ct 1938); 302 US 458, per Mr Justice 
Brandeis, for the court. 
177 See for example, Barber Asphalt Cm:p. y. La Fera Greco CoptactinK Co. 116 F2d 211 (3rd Cir. 
1940) - A patentee may not charge a lower rate of royalty when unpatented supplies are ~ 
from him than when they are purchased from others. See also Dehydrators. Ltd v. Petrobte C~. 
117 F2d 183 (9th Cir. 1941, and Natiopal Foam System. Inc. v. Urg.ubart 202 F2d 659 (3rd Cu. 
1953). 
178 This point was specifically made by Kinneary, District Judge, in Noll et aI. y. O.M. Scott &: Sops 
CQ. 169 USPQ 336 (DC SO Ohio 1971), at page 349, where he referred to Monop Salt Co. y. 
O.S. Supi," Co. and Merroid. 
179 Bjsse1llnc. y. B.R. Waper Mfa Co. 133 USPQ 469 (DC ED. Wisconsin 1962). 
180 Bissolllpc. y. B.R. Waper Mfa Co. 133 USPQ 469 (DC BD. Wisconsin 1962), per Grubb, 
District Judae. at pages 480-481. 
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technological facts involved and noted that the real question was whether the devices were 
truly "separate" in a technological sense. Holding that the selling arrangement was not 
illegal, the court stated, "Articles, though physically distinct, may be related through 
circumstances. The sound business interests of the seller, or phrasing it another way, a 
substantial hardship apart from the loss of the tie-in sale, may be a circumstance. It would 
not be thought, for example, that a one-legged man could insist on purchasing only a left 
shoe .. we must first consider what may be fairly treated by seller as inseparable." 181 
Further example indicating that the court will look carefully at all the particular 
circumstances before summary condemnation is United States v. Jerrold Electronics 
~. ,182 which recognises that entry into a new technological field might justify tie-in 
restrictions for a limited time. The defendant was installer and manufacturer of community 
TV antenna systems, which systems solved a particularly vexing problem in home TV 
reception. Because of the history of equipment malfunctioning, and because the fledgling 
defendant corporation could ill-afford to acquire a bad reputation in relation to service, the 
defendant contracted with distributors under, inter alia, the following provisos: (1) that all 
service to the system be provided by defendant's servicemen and (2) that all replacement 
parts either be furnished by the defendant or approved by them. The court applied the per se 
rule with respect to operations of the Jerrold corporation after finally establishing itself 
economically and technologically. With respect to "tying" arrangements at the inception of 
the business, there was no violation, since the unique position of the new corporation both 
in relation to business and technology necessitated rigid control over maintenance of its 
antenna systems with respect both to service and replacement parts, in order to serve 
properly the contract customers. However, once established, the defendant could not 
continue to maintain tying set-ups since initial technical and business problems did not 
justify them. 
6.S.3.b. Mandatoty packa~ 
Another device that could be used by a patentee is the practice of mandatory package 
licensing, whereby the patentee refuses to grant a licence under one or more of his patents 
unless the licensee accepts and pays for additional patents which are not required by him. 
Like the prohibition against tying, the practice of package licensing could be deemed to be 
outside the exclusive rights of a patentee. This practice would be condemned as an unlawful 
use of a patent and hence comes under the patent misuse doctrine in the United States.183 
181 See, for example, Debydratine Process Co. y. A.D. Smith COIP. 292 F.2d 653 (CA 1st Cir.), cert. 
denied 368 US 931 (1961). 
182 United States y. Jerrold Electronics Corp. 187 F. Supp. 545 (B.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam. 365 
US 567 (1961). 
183 See United States y. Paramount Pictures. Ioc. 334 US 131, 77 USPQ 243 (US Sup. Ct 1948); 
Ethyl Gasoline eoq,. y. United Statc§ 309 US 436. 44 USPQ 614 (US Sup. Ct 1940), IIId 
Automatic Radio Mfa Co. y. Hamltjne Rwm;h Co. I Jd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950). See 
337 
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, "The patent monopoly of one invention 
may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of another ... than for the 
exploitation of an unpatented article, ... or for the exploitation or promotion of a business 
not embraced within the patent." 184 In the words of Chief Judge Bigg, "Mandatory 
package licensing is no more than the exercise of the power created by a particular patent 
monopoly to condition the licensing of that patent upon the acceptance of another patent, 
but that is too much. The protection, or monopoly, which is given to the frrst patent stops 
where the monopoly of the second begins. Whatever may be the asserted reason or 
justification of the patent owner, if he compels a licensee to accept a package of patents or 
none at all, he employs one patent as a lever to compel the acceptance of a licence under 
another. Equity will not countenance such a result." 185 
Thus, the possible vice of package licensing lies in its potential use to coerce the licensee to 
accept a licence under one patent on condition of acceptance of a licence under another, or 
the entire package. Therefore, in order to constitute a misuse, there must be an element of 
coercion, such as where there has been a request by a prospective licensee for a licence 
under less than all of the patents and a refusal by the licensor to grant such a licence. 186 The 
mere inclusion of two or more patents in a single licence agreement does not of itself 
constitute patent misuse where the parties mutually agree that a group of patents are to form 
the subject matter of the licence agreement. 1 87 It is only where the patent owner refuses to 
grant a licence under less than all of his patents, or requires a licensee to accept a licence 
under unwanted or inapplicable patents in order to obtain the use of desired patents, that the 
practice is condemned as mandatory or coercive package licensing. 188 Therefore, when the 
generally, Adams, E.F., "The Legality of Compulsory Package Licensing of Patents", 12 Antitrust 
Bull. 773 (1967). 
184 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States 309 US 436, 44 USPQ 614 (US Sup. Ct 1940). 
185 American Securit Co. y. ShattexproofGlass COW. 122 USPQ 167 (CA 3rd. Cir. 1959), per Biggs, 
Chief Judge, at 174. 
186 Automatic Radio Mfi Co. y. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950). In 
McCullou&h Tool Co. v. Well Surveys. Inc. 145 USPQ 6 (CA 10th Cir. 1965), the defence failed 
because there was no such showing of coercion. In fact the trial judge specifically found: 'After 
June 1, 1956, WSI has been willing to grant licences on its patent individually or collectively 
upon negotiated reasonable terms ... There was no coercion of licens~e~ con~cting su~sequ~nt t~ 
June 1, 1956 to accept licences under all of the WSI patents unwillIngly. - see HIll, ClI'Cwt 
Judge, at pages 27-29. 
187 Duplan Corp. y. Deerin& Milliken. Inc. 197 USPQ 342 (D.S.C. 1977), at 384, per Dupree, 
District Judge, citing United States y. Paramount Pictures 334 US 131, 77 USPQ 243 (US Sup. 
Ct 1948). 
188 See American Securit Co. y. Shatterproof GlasS Corp. 122 USPQ 167 (3rd Cir. 1959), see Big~s, 
Chief Judge, at 174, cert. denied, 361 US 902, 123 USPQ 589 (US Sup: <:=t 1959). ~. Third 
Circuit found for the defendant in an infringement action where the plamtift' had maIntaIned a 
policy of requiring its licensees to accept package licensing. See also Beckman Instruments. Ipc. y. 
Technical development Crup. ct aI. 167 USPQ 10 (CA 7th Cir. 1970), per Swy~ert~ Chief Judge, 
at page 14, "The licence agreement provides that it shall extend to the 'da~ of ~xpll1ltion of the l~t 
to expire of the United States letters patent inclu~~ in Li~ Patent Rig~ts. In Count ~ of !ts 
complaint, the plaintiff charges that this proVISion constitutes patent mISuse by ex~~ng Its 
royalty obligation for an indefinite and unreasonable period of time and bey~ the expll1ltion ~ 
of patents which may cover some of the apparatus manufactured by pl~tiffs. ... . We are. In 
agreement with the Tenth Circuit that a package licence agreement, voluntanly entered 1Oto, which 
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licensee is not presented with a "take all or none of the patents and no alternative was 
available", and the package licence is purely voluntary and a licensee who does not want the 
whole package could obtain a licence on a reasonable basis covering any particular patent he 
does want, the agreement will be enforceable. 189 
Not all package licensing is an attempt by the patentee to extend the scope of his monopoly 
illegally. In a highly complex and defined field, it will often be difficult and time consuming 
to ascertain whether a licensee's product utilises inventions protected by patents. This is 
especially true when the manufacturer-licensee produces articles very similar to those 
patented, but unlicensed. He may thus overstep his licence. In such situations, package 
licensing is the only viable option to enable the licensee to exploit certain inventions without 
fear of being involved in infringement actions. In relation to a package involving process 
patents, there are other advantages where a licence includes future improvements, the 
licensee benefits by being able to use the improved process. Where the licence includes two 
groups of patents, covering alternative processes, the licensee receives the benefit of being 
able to use either one, and being able to change at will from one to the other. 190 
Further, a mandatory package may be permissible in certain situations where interlocking or 
blocking patents are involved. The expressions "interlocking patents" or "blocking patents" 
refer to patents related to the production of one product whereby a commercially feasible 
product could not be manufactured under one of the patents without infringing the other. 191 
189 
190 
191 
requires the payment of royalties beyond the expiration of some, but not all, of the licensed patents 
is valid. However, the question remains whether the licensing agreement in the case before us was 
voluntarily entered into or was 'conditioned' in a manner proscribed by Zenith. We perceive no 
significant distinction between the payment of royalties on apparatus which were never patented 
and payment of royalties on apparatus on which the licensed patents have expired. When improper 
conditioning is proved, both arrangements are unjustified attempts to expand the scope of the 
patent monopoly to cover ideas in the public domain." 
McCullou&h Tool Co. v. Well Surveys. Inc. 145 USPQ 6 (CA 10th Cir. 1965), per Hill, Circuit 
Judge, at page 29. See also, OAF Corporation v. Eastman Kodak Co. 213 USPQ 356 (DC, S.D., 
New Jersey, 1981), per Pierce, District Judge, at pages 380-381; Hull v. Brunswick Corporation 
218 USPQ 24 (CA 10th Cir. 1983). 
See Bums, J.W., "Does Package Licensing of Patents Violate the Antitrust Laws?", 41 JPOS 258 
(1959), at page 269. See also, Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the 
Antitrust Laws (1955), at 239, "A package licence may include more than one or all of the 
licensor's patents. Packaging is frequently used to avoid troublesome questions of infringement, 
complex bookkeeping, the difficulty of determining which patents cover the present and future 
needs of the licensee, cost differences, and similar practical considerations". See, however, 
Siekman, T.C., "Post Expiration Royalty Payments and Mandatory Package Licensing as Patent 
Misuse," 11 Vill. L. Rev. 382 (1966), at page 391, where he argues that the licensing of many 
complicated and entangled patents as a package should not find refuge from the sanctions of ~ 
misuse doctrine merely by reason of the complexity and entanglement and warns that the practice 
should be scrutinised closely, to ensure that they are kept within the law. 
Further, even though the licensed patents are not interlocking in the .sense that. devices sold by the 
licensee require use of all licensed patents, there might ~ot necessarily ~ a uu~use. For ex~le, 
when the initial agreement is made with reference to a smgle patent, With the licensee agreemg to 
pay a certain royalty on articles incorporating the invention. Later, by a supplementary agreement, 
two or more patents are included in the agree.ment, to enable the licen~ ~o i~corporate.the DC,!" 
features in his products, without any change In the royalty rate. In this ~ltuatiOn, the licensee s 
contention that the licence agreement covers more than one patent and proVides for a flat percentage 
of the sales price of the article in which they are embodied without providing for a reduction in the 
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This situation is best illustrated by the case of International Mfg Co., Inc. \', Landon, 
Inc. 192 In that case, the defendant alleged misuse as a defence to an infringement suit. The 
patents covered device for skimming and filtering the water in swimming pools and 
vacuuming the sides and bottom of such pools. One patent was granted to Robert Pace and 
the other was granted to Steffan and Cavenah. Both had been assigned to Landon Inc. It 
was alleged that Landon was guilty of patent misuse, because it adopted a policy of 
mandatory package licensing of both the Cavenah and Pace patents. The trial court found 
that, although the two patents were issued at different times, they together covered only a 
single article and that no commercially feasible device could be manufactured under one of 
the patents without infringing the other. In fact, Landon's first efforts to licence 
manufacturers under the Cavenah patent alone were frustrated by the manufacturers' 
unwillingness to accept Cavenah without also being licensed under Pace. In order to end 
this impasse, Pace, then owner of the Pace patent, and Landon entered into an agreement 
whereby (1) the Pace patent was assigned to Landon, (2) Landon granted Robert Pace a 
royalty-free, non-exclusive licence under both patents, (3) Landon promised to licence the 
patents collectively only, and (4) Landon and Robert Pace agreed to share royalties 
according to a set formula. The Court of Appeals held that Landon's practice of mandatorily 
licensing both patents collectively and never individually did not amount to a patent misuse. 
The Court made a distinction between competing patents and blocking patents. In the case 
of competing patents, although they produced the same result, they could possibly be used 
independently without infringing one another. This is a crucial distinction, since mandatory 
package licensing in that case would mean that the prospective licensee, in order to obtain a 
licence under one patent, would be compelled to accept licences under patents that were not 
necessarily needed. In the case of blocking patents, the prospective licensee is being 
compelled to accept no more than he would, in any event, have to obtain in order to make 
worthwhile a licence under any of the patents. It is different from a tying arrangement since 
a tying arrangement involves two separate, distinct products. It follows that it is not an 
unlawful tying arrangement for a seller to include several items in a single mandatory 
package when the items may be reasonably considered to constitute parts of a single distinct 
product. A licence package containing blocking patents may be considered a single distinct 
product. By definition, blocking patents disclose interdependent parts of the same product. 
The product - in this case a skimming and filter device for swimming pools - is no less a 
single product because its novel aspects are disclosed by two interlocking patents. In such a 
amount of royalty at the expiration of the first patent, which is considered as the most im~ortant .in 
the package, is in effect exacting a royalty for the use of the invention .after ~e patent expires. will 
not be accepted. This is because there is no reason why, where an article might embody only one 
of the invention, the parties can not agree that a proper royalty for the use of the later patent alone 
should be the same for the use of the first patent alone, or for the use of both together - see ~ 
v, Dazor Mf~ Corp. 161 USPQ 168 (Mo. Sup. Ct 1968), per Stockard, Commissioner, at page, 
178 - where the device might embody only one invention, it is proper that royalty for use thereof 
be same for use of another invention alone or for the use of both together. 
192 International Mfg Co .. Inc. v. Landon. Inc. 142 USPQ 421 (CA 9th Cir, 1964), see Hamley, 
Circuit Judge, at pages 4::!6-427. 
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case, not only is it not unreasonable to treat both patents as constituting a single product, 
but also licensing them in a package deal appears to be the most practical way of making 
them available for public use. 193 It is important to note that just because mandatory package 
licensing of blocking patents is condoned, it does not mean that a licensor can compel a 
prospective licensee to accept an entire licence package - thought by its owner to contain 
only interlocking patents - even though the licensee believes that he can produce a 
commercially feasible product under only part of the licence package. This is because if the 
licensee could produce a commercially acceptable product utilising one patent but not 
infringing the other in the package, then clearly the package does not involve blocking 
patents. 
When a licensee seeks relief from mandatory package licensing which he signs voluntarily, 
he should show a demand by him and a refusal by patent holder for the desired patent as a 
separate item.194 To escape from the charge of mandatory package licensing, the patentee 
not only has to offer individual patents as well as the entire package to licensees, but he 
must also price the licences of individual patents in such a way that price "disproportion" 
will not result. 195 Therefore, there may have to be an inquiry as to what the patents are, the 
value of each patent, whether they are basic, improvement, complementary, or 
supplementary . 
The practice of mandatory package licensing seems to be acceptable in the United 
Kingdom. In Brownie Wireless Co.'s Awlication,196 the applicant for a compulsory 
licence alleged, inter alia, that the patentee had refused to grant a licence on reasonable 
terms. One of the grounds of complaint was that the patentee, Marconi Company, had 
refused to differentiate between the various circuit patents and declined to grant any separate 
licences in respect of particular patents, but offered to grant a general licence in respect of 
193 
194 
195 
196 
The court also gave another reason for upholding the mandatory package licensing of blocking 
patents. See International Mfg Co .. Inc. v. Landon. Inc. 142 USPQ 421 (CA 9th Cir. 1964), see 
Hamley, Circuit Judge, at page 427, "There is a further consideration which supports the result we 
reached here. If we were to condemn mandatory package licensing of blocking patents as a patent 
misuse, an owner of a blocking patent complex would be compelled to licence only a part of the 
patent complex. This would be true even though he knew full well that the licensee would be able 
to use the patents only by violating the remaining unlicensed patents. A patent infringement suit 
arising from such circumstances could produce only one of two results: (1) it would be held that 
the licensee has obtained a useless licence because it cannot be used without infringing other 
outstanding patents, or (2) it would be held that the licence carried with it an implied licence to 
utilise the remaining part of the complex. The only relief a court could logically give in such a 
case is a privilege to use all the blocking patents or none of them. For this reason, we cannot see 
how it would be unreasonable for the parties, under these circumstances, to negotiate on an all or 
nothing basis from the beginning." 
See Rocform CoW. y. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall. Inc. 151 USPQ 305 (CA 6th Cir. 1966), 
per Edwards, Circuit Judge, at page 307. 
See, for example, Sheller-Globe Com. et gI. y. Milsco Mf& Co. " aI. 206 USPQ 42 (ED 
Wisconsin, 1979), per Reynolds, Chief Judge, at pages 67-68, "As a matt~r of .licen~ng policy, 
plaintiffs attempted to licence the Henrickson and Gonzalez patents at a specific, InfleXIble royalty 
rate that would remain the same whether the licensee elected to accept rights under both or under 
just one of those patents .... Plaintiffs' policy amounts to package licensing." 
Brownie Wireless Co.'s ApplicatioQ (1929) 46 RPC 457, ptr Luxmoore 1., at pages 475-476. 
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the whole group of circuit patents. Both the Comptroller and the Court found that this 
practice was reasonable for several reasons. They included the fact that the whole subject 
matter of the circuit patents was highly technical and difficult and frequently it was a 
debatable question as to which of the circuit patents were being utilised in any particular 
receiving sets. Further it was impracticable to deal with individual patents and to demand in 
respect of each set manufactured a royalty proportionate to the value of the patents actually 
used in that set. It was consequently fairest to the manufacturers to strike a general average 
and impose royalties calculated in a simple manner to cover the whole range of the circuit 
patents. Such a course not only avoided the complication and expense in assessing the 
royalties, but placed each manufacturer in a secure position, because whatever variation he 
might make in his receiving sets, he did not need, in practice, to consider the range and 
extent of his licence, for he would always be working within it. Consequently the court 
held that the standard form of licence known as A2 was not an unreasonable licence. 197 
In the Malaysian context, mandatory packaging seeks to impose on the licensee restrictions 
which are not derived from the rights conferred on the patent by the Act. It is also not 
necessary for the safeguarding of such rights. Hence it would be caught by section 45. 
6.S.3.c. Royalty payments 
Closely linked to the legality of the practice of mandatory package licensing is the issue of 
the obligations relating to the payment of royalties. The way a royalty is charged may fall 
foul of the prohibition under section 4S. The various aspects of this question relate mainly 
to the question of post-expiration royalty and the royalty bases. On the basis that a patentee 
has the right to exclude anyone from the use of his patented invention, including the right 
to refuse to license anyone to use his patented invention, this would mean that a patent 
owner, when giving permission to use his invention, has the right to charge a consideration 
for its use. In theory, a patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can 
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.l98 However, the right to license and charge 
for that privilege should not include a right to charge royalties on the use of patents which 
have expired. If a patent is used as a leverage to project the royalty payment beyond the life 
of the patent, this should be regarded as analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of 
the patent by tying the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented 
197 Brownie Wireless Co.'s Ap.plication (1929) 46 RPC 457. per LUXDlOOte J., at page 476, ''The 
whole subject matter of the circuit patents is highly tec~ca1 ,~ ~fficult ~uently it, i~ a 
debatable question as to which of the circuit patents are beIDg utIlIsed ID ~y partIcular receiVIng 
sets. It is impracticable to deal with individual patents and to demand ID respect of each ~t 
manufactured a royalty proportionate to the value of the patents actu~J1y used ID ~at set. It IS 
consequently fairest to the manufacturers to strike a general average and lDlPOse royaltIes cal~ 
in a simple manner to cover the whole range of the circuit patents. Such a course not ~nly aVOids 
the complication and expense in assessing the royalties. but places each manufacturer ~n a ~ 
position. because whatever vari~on, he may make i,n his receiving se,ts. he, ~ n~t In practice 
consider the range and extent of his bcence, for he wdl always be working within It .. 
198 See Brulotte y. Thys Co. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964), per Justice Douglas, at page 266. 
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ones. On expiration of the duration of protection, the grant of patent monopoly is spent, 
and the public is entitled to full and free use of the invention which is now in the public 
domain. Any attempt to make the licensee pay after that time will amount to attempting to 
derive rights from the patent which is not conferred by the Act. In theory, the patentee may 
utilise any method for the computation of such a royalty as may be acceptable to his 
licensees. Bases used in the determination of royalty payments fall into two main groups, 
those that bear a direct relationship to the use made of the patent right and those that do not. 
The latter type of base is used when the total royalty charge depends on the total commercial 
activities of the licensee and not solely on activities connected with the licensed patent 
rights. The imposition of royalty obligations on the licensee, and the method of 
computation, or the royalty structure, may expose the licensor to charges of attempting to 
derive a benefit which is in contravention of section 45. The royalty provision in a licence 
agreement, therefore, has to be scrutinised closely since the licensor may, by use of the 
royalty provision, accomplish indirectly what he is forbidden to accomplish directly. 
Under the law of the UK and countries following the common law tradition, the courts 
seems to regard the issue of royalty duration as purely a question of contractual 
interpretation, not constrained by considerations of statutory patent policy. Following this 
"contractual intent" approach, such clauses are binding and enforceable if they are agreed 
to, and contracted for. Such clauses are not regarded as illegal per se, and any attack on 
them has to be judged by the common law doctrine of unreasonable restraints of trade. 199 
However, when that defence is raised the onus is on the party seeking to enforce the 
obligation to show that, having regard to the circumstances, the obligation is reasonable 
between the parties and in the public interest. It would be so regarded if, for example, the 
obligation was seen as a reasonable way of allowing a licensee to compensate the licensor 
for past infringement. 200 A similar approach to assessing the legality of such clauses is 
199 
200 
In the early case of Siemens v. Taylor (1892) 9 RPC 393. the royalty of 2 shillings per ton of 
steel produced was to be paid "until the expiration by effluxion of time of all the terms of years 
respectively granted by the said letters patents. and of any prolongation or extension of the said 
terms respectively. or until the said letters patent should become void or invalid by reason of the 
fees and stamp duties payable thereon not being paid within the requisite period. or by reason of 
any decision of any court or competent jurisdiction. either un~ed ~om or unrev~ on 
appeal. cancelling or in fact rendering invalid the same letters. or until the licensee should entirely 
abandon the use of the said invention. and destroy the said furnace or furnaces erected by them. 
whichever even should happen first". The licensees contended that royalties had only to be paid in 
respect of any use of the patents still in force. They argued that as soon as a patent had expired all 
the world could use them. and if they used it there were no longer working under the patent ~ut 
under the rights common to everyone. Further. it was contended that the contrary construction 
would offend against the Statute of Monopolies and it was not reasonable that they should go on 
paying royalties while anyone else could use the thing for nothing. The court. held ~ the contrary 
contention of the plaintiffs, that royalties had to be paid for any use of the lDventions so long as 
anyone of the patents were subsisting. was correct However. on the facts the court held that no 
royalty was to be paid since there was no use of the invention by the defendants - see Romer J., at 
page 400. 
See, for example, Tool Metal y. TunISien Blr&ttis (1955) 72 RPC 209, per Lord Oaksey. at paae 
218. 
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seen in Canada. 201 It may be surprising that there had been no attempts to formulate a 
doctrine similar to the patent misuse doctrine, as has emerged through judicial activism in 
the United States, in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth jurisprudence. However, a 
possible explanation may be that at a comparatively early stage, the United Kingdom 
legislature had already enacted specific provisions to deal with any attempted abuse of the 
exercise of a patentee's monopoly rights.202 However, be that as it may, the propriety of 
the obligation to pay royalty on patents which had expired was questioned, although 
eventually upheld, in Bristol Repetition Ltd v. Fomento (Stirling Area) Ltd. 203 
Therefore, guidance will have to be sought from the US cases to assist in the determination 
of the extent to which provisions relating to royalty payments may fall within the misuse 
doctrine. An analysis of US cases pertaining to the legality of these devices shows that the 
mere presence of such clauses need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is patent 
misuse in these situations. 
6.S.3.c.(i). Post-expiration royalties 
The obligation of a licensee to pay royalties for patents which have expired falls under the 
misuse doctrine in the United States.204 The leading case in the United States on the legality 
of such obligations is Brulotte v. Thys Co. ,205 where the court determined the validity of 
201 
202 
203 
204 
20S 
See Culzean Inventions Ltd v. Midwestern Broom Co Ltd (1984) 1 CIPR 243 (Saskatchewan 
Court of Queen's Bench) - on the issue of whether a post-expiry patent royalty was an unlawful 
restraint of trade. The defendant contended that notwithstanding that clause 6 of the licensing 
agreement provided for payment of royalty up to and including the date of termination of the 
agreement, the patentee was not, at common law, entitled to retain and require payment of royalties 
beyond the term of the patent. The plaintiff argued that the fact that the licensing agreement 
required payment of royalties beyond the expiration of the patent did not itself make the agreement 
void unless the defendant established that it was void for other reasons, as in restraint of trade. 1be 
defendant failed to establish that, and the court was satisfied that the licence agreement was not 
unreasonable or unconscionable, nor contrary to the public interest. The agreement was entered into 
with a full and complete understanding of its purpose, obligations and effect, in respect of which 
each party had independent, well-informed, legal advice. See per Grotsky J., at pages 263-264. 
In the form of the former section 38 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907, United Kingdom. See, 
supra, para. 6.5.1. General. 
Bristol Repetition Ltd y. Fomento (StirlinK Area) Ltd [1961] RPC 222, per Cross J., at 226. "It 
certainly does not seem very reasonable that one particular person should be obliged to pay for the 
use of an invention after the monopoly granted to the inventor had expired and the rest of the world 
was free to use it without charge. There is. however, nothing to prevent people entering into an 
agreement to this effect, if they decided to do so and with the best will in the world." Note that 
under section 45 of the Patents Act 1977. United Kingdom, the licensee can give three months 
notice to terminate the agreement if the relevant patent or patents have expired. 
Note that this has not always been so. Prior to the leading case of Brulotte v.ThYs Co. 143 USPQ 
264 (US Sup. Ct 1964). the court seems to have applied the "contrac~ intent" approach ins~ 
of the "statutory policy" approach. See. for example. E.R. SQwbb & Sons y. CbelDlcal 
Foundation 36 USPQ 282. at 283-284 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1937). per Swan. Circuit Judge. "There is a 
presumption that royalties are not to be paid after the expiration of a patent; if the intenti~n is to 
have them continue longer. the parties should phrase their contract in language from which such 
intention may fairly be inferred." For a historical discussion of the two approaches. see Altman. 
L., "Is There an Afterlife?" The Effect of Patent or Copyright Expiration on Licence Agreements," 
64 JPOS 297 (1982). 
Brulotte y. ThYs Co. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964). 
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post-expiration patent royalties upon public policy considerations, rather than upon the 
private arrangement of the contracting parties. The respondent, owner of various patents for 
hop-picking, sold a machine to each of the petitioners for a flat sum and issued a licence for 
its use. The licence issued to the petitioners listed 12 patents relating to hop-picking 
machines, but only seven were incorporated into the machines sold to and licensed for use 
by the petitioners. Of these seven, all expired on or before 1957. But the licences issued by 
the respondent to them continued for terms beyond that date. The petitioners refused to 
make royalty payments accruing both before and after the expiration of the patents, relying 
as defence, on the respondent's misuse of the patents through the extension of the licence 
agreement beyond the expiration date of the patents. The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court's judgement allowing the collection of royalties which accrued after the expiry of the 
last of the patents incorporated into the licensee's machines. The court rejected the holding 
of the court below that the requirement for post-expiration payment was a device to spread 
over the payment for the use of the patents. The evidence showed that the agreements were 
not designed with that view in mind. No distinction in the amount of yearly royalties was 
drawn between the term of the patent and the post expiration period. The same provisions 
as respects both use and royalties were applicable to each. The court held that the contracts 
were "a bald attempt to exact the same terms and conditions for the period after the patent 
have expired as they do for the monopoly period." The fact that the licensor was demanding 
royalties for "the post-expiration period was a telltale sign that the licensor was using the 
licences to project his monopoly beyond the patent period." Such a projection of the patent 
monopoly after the patent expired was unlawful per se and not enforceable. If that device is 
available to patentees, the free market visualised for the post-expiration period would be 
subject to monopoly influences that have no proper place there.206 Misuse of the leverage 
afforded by a pending patent is also subject to the Brulotte rule.207 
The general rule from Brulotte is that any obligation imposed on a licensee to continue 
payment after the expiration of the patent in issue is a patent misuse and unenforceable. 
However, from Brulotte, and other cases, several other principles could be derived. In 
206 Brulotte y. Ibys Co. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964), per Justice Douglas, for the Court, at 
pages 265-268. For a critique of this case, see See, H., Caprio, F.M., "The Trouble with Brulotte: 
The Patent Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension", 4 Utah L. Rev. 813 (1990). See also 
Aronson y. Quick Point Pencil Co. 440 US 257, 201 USPQ I, at 4 (US Sup. Ct 1979), per 
Burger C.J. Stone C.J., speaking for the Court in Scott Paper Co. y. Marcal~ Co. 326l!S 2~9; 
67 USPQ 193, at page 196 (US Sup. Ct 1945), said, "Any attempted reservation or continu~tion 
in the patentee or those claiming under him of the pate~t monopoly, after the patent e~ues, 
whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws. 
207 See Aronson y. Quick Point Pepcil Co. 440 US 257, 201 USPQ I, at page 4 (US Sup. Ct 1979). 
See also BQlaIed y. Keeper Products 228 USPQ 130 (CA 6th Cir. 1985),. per Keith, Circuit. Judge, 
at page 134. In BOlded. the licensee had invented an extruder specdical!y for use WI~ • the 
licensor/defendant's Play Do product The licence agreement, executed pnor to the plamtiff's 
application for a patent but in clear contemplation of such application, called for royalty payments 
to be made for 2S years - regardless of whether the patent application resulted in the issuance of a 
patent. The court held that the licensee was not obligated to pay royalti~ h,eyond th~ seventeen 
year term of the patent that eventually issued. The same rule was applied In Machlpe y. PPG 
Industria, Inc. 231 USPQ 400 (CA 7th Cir. 1986), per Cummins C.J., at pages 404-402. 
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certain situations, an obligation which may, at first sight, be seen as an attempt to extend 
the payment of royalty beyond the term of the patent grant, will be allowed if it is in fact 
used as a method of spreading the payments for the use of the patents during the life of the 
patent. 208 If the agreement relates both to the use of patent rights and use of trade secrets, a 
hybrid agreement, then any royalty payment beyond the date of the expiration of the last of 
the patents involved may be valid as relating to a post-expiration payment intended for the 
use of trade secrets. However, in this case, there must be evidence to show that there is an 
allocation of payments between trade secrets and patent rights, and the payments for patent 
rights are not continued after the expiration of the patent, even though the payment for trade 
secrets may extend beyond the period of the patent. 209 This difference in rates is to reflect 
the fact that, after the expiration of the patent, what is payable is only for the use of the 
trade secrets. If the base is the same, then the inference is that the licensor is attempting to 
charge royalties for an expired patent. The burden of proof to establish that there is a 
contractual intent that the royalties are divisible, or that they are for purposes other than the 
use of the patents, whether before or after their expiration, is upon the patentee. 210 
208 
209 
210 
See, for example, veltman et aI. v. Norton Simon. Inc .. et aI. 194 USPQ 168 (DC SDNY, 1977), 
per Pollack, District Judge, at page 170. This is also the approach of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, see Kai Ottun.: v. Klee & Weilbach AlS and Thomas Schmidt AlS Cease 
320/87) [1990] 4 CMLR 915, at page 919. 
See, for example, Pitney Bowes. Inc. v. Mestre 218 USPQ 987 (CA 11th Cir. 1983). In Pitney, 
one of the agreements in issue, the Vertical Collator Agreement, licensed both patent rights mxl 
trade secrets. By its term the agreement was to expire on the latest of three dates: the date of the 
death of Mestre (the licensor), after 17 years, or when the last patent expired. Mestre died on April 
6, 1980, the 17 years period expired October 16, 1976, and the last patent expired October 17, 
1978. Therefore, by its terms the agreement should have expired April 6, 1980. However, Pitney, 
the licensee by its letter of February 28, 1979, notified Mestre that in its view the Vertical 
Collator Agreement expired on October 17, 1978. The District Court, citing Brulotte y. Thys Co. 
agreed with Pitney Bowes. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision. Johnson, Circuit Judge, at 
page 993, "With these general considerations in mind, we tum to an analysis of the Vertical 
Collator Agreement. As in Brulotte, two provisions in the agreement suggest that the patentee 
used the leverage of his patent to project its monopoly beyond the 17-years patent period. First, the 
'exclusive rights' granted under the agreement applied equally before and after expiration of the 
patent. Like the assignment and removal restrictions on the hop-picking machines in Brulotte, the 
grant of exclusive rights is 'pertinent to protection of the patent monopoly,' but its applicability to 
the post-expiration period is a 'telltale sign that the licensor was using the licence to project its 
monopoly beyond the patent period'. ... Second, the agreement required Pitney Bowes to pay 
royalties at the same rate and on the same basis after the patent expires that it paid while the patent 
was in effect. Assuming that the value of the agreement to Pitney Bowes was not as high after the 
patent expired, it is reasonable to assume that at least some part of the post-exp~tion payment 
constituted an effort to extend payments for patent rights beyond the patent penod. Thus we 
conclude that the Vertical Collator Agreement is unenforceable under BruJott.e." See also Veltman 
ct aI. y. Norton Simon. Inc .. et al. 194 USPQ 168 (DC SDNY 1977), per Pollack, District Judge. 
at pages 170-71. Under the agreement, the licensee was obliged to pay a royalty of 5% of the 
annual net sale of the patented product. It was specifically provi~ that th~ ~n!B8e royal!>' 
would remain at 5% even if both the patents involved were to expIre. The pl81ntiffs tried to avoid 
the holding of BruJotte by characterising the disputed royalty as payment for not only the use of 
their patented composition but also their know-how. The court held that this was not ~ out, 
since they had failed to establish what part, if any, of the percentage royalty was allegedly mtendcd 
to be compensation for consideration other than the patent licence. 
Veltman ct III. y. Norton Simon. Inc.. ct aI. 194 USPQ 168 (DC SDNY 1977). per Pollack. 
District Judge. at page 169. 
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An obligation may sometimes be imposed on the licensee that royalty payment should still 
be made despite a finding of patent invalidity by the court. This will fall under the Brulotte 
doctrine. There is also an express provision in the Act covering this situation. It is provided 
in section 46 of the Act that, where before the expiration of the licence contract, the patent is 
declared invalid, the licensee is no longer required to make any payment to the licensor. and 
shall be entitled to repayment of any payment already made. However, the licensor may not 
be required to make any repayment if he shows that such repayment is inequitable under all 
the circumstances of the case, as when the licensee has effectively profited from the licence. 
6.5.3.c.(ii). Royalty rate based on percentage of selling price of manufactured goods 
Another situation where the licensor may seem to extend his patent monopoly beyond the 
scope of his patent rights occurs when the licence agreement calls for a royalty rate based 
on the licensee's total sales, and not merely on the actual use of the patent. Such a scheme 
may be a very convenient device for computing the amount due to the licensor without the 
necessity of close and painstaking analysis of the licensee's product. In the leading case on 
this issue, Automatic Radio Mfg Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd, the petitioner acquired 
permission to use, in the manufacture of its "home" products, any or all of the patents 
which the respondent held or to which it might acquire rights. The petitioner was not, 
however, obligated to use the respondent's patents in the manufacture of its products. For 
this licence the petitioner agreed to pay the respondent royalties based upon a small 
percentage of the petitioner's selling price of complete radio broadcasting receivers, and in 
any event, a minimum of $10,000 per year. The US Supreme Court held that it is not per se 
a misuse of patents to measure the consideration by a percentage of the licensee's sales. In 
reaching that conclusion the court distinguished between the privilege of use and actual use, 
stating that royalties could be exacted for the former as well as the latter, and that "[s]ound 
business judgement could indicate that such payment represents the most convenient 
method of fixing the business value of the privileges granted by the licensing 
agreement. "211 Therefore, such a computation may not amount to patent misuse if it is 
voluntarily entered into by the licensee and is based on the commercial convenience of 
fixing royalty payment on such basis.212 The word "convenience" may imply that the 
convenience of the parties is the deciding factor. However, this is not so, since 
"convenience" is not a determinative factor in a finding that the patent has not been 
misused. The word "convenience" is merely used as a useful short-cut to denote a finding 
of fact that the patentee has not used its accumulation of patents "for exaction of tribute" and 
211 Automatic Radio Mfg Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950). pu 
Justice Minton, at page 380. 
212 Aytomatic Radio Mf~ Co. y. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950). per 
Justice Minton, at page 380. See also McCylloujih Tool Co. v. WeJJ Surveys. Inc. 145 USPQ 6 
(CA 10th Cir. 1965). per Hill. Circuit Judge, at pages 27-29; Zajicek v. Koolvent Metal AwnJO~ 
. C' . J d ' ""'9 Corp. of America 127 USPQ 227 (CA 9th Ctr. 1960), per Barnes. (rcUit u get at page -- . 
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to show that the reason for the royalty provision is sound business judgement and not for 
the purpose of enlarging the patent monopoly. 213 
An analysis of the decision in Automatic Radio shows that the test for whether there is 
patent misuse based on allegation of illegal royalty provision is the purpose and effect of the 
royalty provision. If its purpose and effect is to enlarge the patent monopoly and to restrain 
the free competition in unpatented items, then the patent has been misused.214 Therefore, 
the grant of a patent licence upon the payment of royalties based on manufacture of 
products which do not use patent in their production constitutes patent misuse. However, 
there is no misuse if the reason for employing royalty provision based on total sales is the 
mutual convenience of both parties, i.e., when it is used as a reasonable "metering device" 
rather than as leverage from which licensor can extract payment for manufacture of 
unpatented items.215 It is also not patent misuse when this method of calculating royalty is 
conceived and applied to accomplish simplified accounting.216 
This approach is reinforced by Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc, which 
contained a licence provision identical to the one in the Automatic Radio case. The US 
Supreme Court again stressed that the fact that royalty payment is imposed on products 
213 
214 
215 
216 
As explained in Valmont Industries. Inc. et aI. v. Yuma Manufacturin& Co. Inc. 161 USPQ 567 
(DC Colorado 1969), per Doyle, District Judge, at page 572. 
See also valmoDt Industries. Inc. et aI. v. Yuma Manufacturin& Co. Inc. 161 USPQ 567 (DC 
Colorado 1969), per Doyle, District Judge, at pages 572-572, where the court applied this 
approach. 
See also the similar approach of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Kai OUUD& 
v· Klee & Weilbach NS and Thomas Schmidt NS (case 320/87) [1990] 4 CMLR 915, at page 
922. 
The Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Butterfield 151 USPQ 83 (CA 9th Cir. 1966), per Ely, Circuit 
Judge, at page 87. See also Glen Mf& Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries. Inc. 169 USPQ 678 (DC SNY 
1969), per Levet, District Judge, at pages 681-682, "If the reason for employing a royalty 
provision which is based on total sales is the mutual convenience of both of the parties, rather than 
as leverage from which a licensor can extract payment for the manufacture of unpatented items, 
there is no patent misuse. ... [Therefore if] the royalty structure adopted was unnecessary and for 
the sole benefit of the plaintiff rather than for the mutual convenience of licensor and the licensee 
[there is patent misuse]."; The Ma&navox Co. et aI. v. Mattell. Inc .. et aI. 216 USPQ 28 (DC 
lllinois 1982), per Leighton, District Judge, at pages 59-60, "Patent royalties may be based upon 
any convenient measure of the business value of a patent licence, even if it includes royalties on 
items not embodying the patented invention or royalties on a percentage of the ~censee's ~ota1 
sales. Automatic Radjo, Zenith Corp., American PhotocQl!Y etc. The fact that royalties are paid or 
may be paid on unpatented goods is not the test of misuse; rather it is the business p~se Dl 
effect of the royalty provision. Zenith, Automatic Radio, General Tire & Rubber Co. v. ftrestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. 174 USPQ 427,436 (6th Cir. 1970) ... If the mutual convenience or efficiency 
of both the licensor and the licensee results in a royalty base which includes the licensee's total 
sales or sales of non-patented items, there can be no patent misuse. Zenith 161 USPQ at 592; 
HaRltine 85 USPQ at 381, Ohjo-Sealy Mattress Mfa Co. v. Sealy. Ipc. 200 USPQ at 350-51. 
One may use any basis for calculating patent royalties, even a base which in~ludes ~e li~nsee'~ 
total sales or sales of non-patented items, if the licence grant or royalty base IS not CO~tioned 
upon the payment of royalties on unpatented items, i.e., where the patentee refuses to lice~ce on 
any other basis. Zenith 161 USPQ at 591; Ohio-Sealy 200 USPQ at 349-351. If a ~cence 
agreement, including a royalty based upon the licensee's total sales or sales o~ ~o~-patented Items, 
resulted from good faith bargaining between the parties, there can be no conditionmg, and thus no 
misuse. Zenith 161 USPQ at 591; LeesonaCmp. v. vana Batteries. Inc. 213 USPQ 222, 252-53 
(SD NY 1981) ..... 
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which do not use the teaching of the patent does not automatically amount to a patent 
misuse. It would only amount to a patent misuse if the patentee directly or indirectly 
"conditions" or "coerces" his licence upon the payment of royalties upon unpatented goods. 
Such a "conditioning" would arise where the patentee refuses to licence on any other basis 
and leaves the licensee with the choice between a licence so providing and no licence at all. 
On the facts, the court held that patent misuse existed because the patent holder conditioned 
the grant of a licence upon payment of royalties based on a percentage of the total sales, 
regardless of whether the licensee used the patent. The evidence showed that the 
protestation of the licensee that some of his products were unsuited to the patent, or that for 
some lines of his merchandise he had no need or desire to purchase the use of the patent, 
was overridden by the leverage of the patent. His proposal that he was to pay only for 
actual use was rejected.217 The Court distinguished Automatic Radio, stating that its 
decision was not contrary to the holding in Automatic Radio since that decision "is not 
authority for the proposition that patentee have carte blanche authority to condition the grant 
of patent licences upon the payment of royalties on unpatented articles. "218 
In general, therefore, the courts have approved royalty bases on this nature on the theory 
that it is permissible to exact royalties for the privilege of use as well as for the actual use of 
the patent right. The decision in Automatic Radio, therefore, supports the proposition that a 
royalty based on a percentage of total sales, absent other circumstances, is not illegal. In 
reaching its decision, the Court observed that the presence of coercion might have produced 
a different result. This lack of "conditioning" or coercion was also the reason to reject the 
misuse defence in a suit for payment of royalty in Hull v. Brunswick Corporation. 219 Even 
the fact that the patentee inserts a clause calculating royalties "depending on the extent of 
unpatented products employed with the licensed product or process," for example, basing 
the royalty rates for a cartridge patent on the type and amount of fIlm used in the cartridge, 
will not necessarily amount to patent misuse. This is because a patent licence agreement is 
valid so long as royalties are based upon products which use the teaching of the patent. 220 
217 Zenith Radio Corp. y. Hazeltine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ 577 (US Sup. Ct 1969). per Justice 
White. at pages 591-593. See also The Plastic Contact Lens Co. y. W.R.S, Contact I&ns 
Laboratories. Inc. et al, 169 USPQ 684 (D.C,S.D. New York 1970). per Motley. District Judge. at 
page 685. 
218 Zenith Radio Corp. y. Hazeltine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ 577 (US Sup. Ct 1969). per Justice 
White. at page 592, 
219 Hull y. Brunswick Corporation 218 USPQ 24 (CA 10th Cir, 1983). per Logan. Circuit Judge. at 
pages 27-28. 
220 See Zenith Radio Cmp. y. Hazeltine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ 577 (US Sup. Ct 1969). at 591, 
See also OAF Cmpomtion y. Eastman Kodak Co. 213 USPQ 356 ~ S.D. New J~y 198,1). 
per Pierce. District Judge. at page 380. "OAF challenges Kodak's practice of calCUlating roy~tieS 
'depending on the extent of unpatented products employed with the licensed ~uct o.r process, As 
an example. OAF points to Kodak's practice of basing its royalty rates for Its cartri~ patent on 
the type and amount of film used in the cartridge. Patent licence agreements ~ va1i~ so long as 
royalties are based upon products which use the teaching of the patent Zemth BOlho C~. y. 
Hamttine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ S77. at 591. It is uncontro~ that all of OAFs ,licence 
agreements called for royalties only on products which used the teaching of one or ~ore licensed 
patents .... Tho fact that royalties were based on the selling price (i.e., CommeJClal value) of 
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However, Automatic Radio should not be read as sanctioning the charging of royalties on 
unpatented articles or the imposition of a royalty based on the licensee's total sales for the 
grant of a patent licence.221 As explained in Glen Mfg Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries. Inc., 
Automatic Radio is an exception to the general rule requiring a strict, limited royalty 
structure. In particular, it is not the standard in a case where the patented item involved is a 
single, simple, uncomplicated object. On the facts, the court found that the plaintiff had 
attempted to restrain competition in the toilet tank: industry by requiring royalties both on 
patented and unpatented toilet tank: covers produced by its patent licensee, Perfect Fit. Toilet 
tank covers are simple, uncomplicated items, therefore, it was both reasonable and proper 
to require strict royalty standards, since "strict royalty standards are required when no 
complexities of accounting dictate a variant course." Accordingly, the plaintiff was guilty of 
misuse which vitiated the licence agreement. 222 
6.S.3.c.(iii). Flat royalty rate 
A more difficult question to answer is whether the imposition of a flat royalty rate 
applicable to a single patent or to a group of patents will be construed as mandatory package 
licensing,223 even though the licensor is willing to licence less than the package, provided 
he gets his full royalty. In American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp. ,224 the court 
found that the plaintiff generally refused to license individual patents and that when the 
plaintiff did offer to license individual patents it demanded the same royalty rate as provided 
for in the group or package licence. The court concluded that this was a mere "catalyst" to 
compel Shatterproof to accept the package.225 It is relevant to note that the key feature of 
221 
222 
223 
224 
22S 
products which incorporated teachings of licensed patents does not render the licence agreement 
illegal. See Zenith Radio 161 USPQ at 591-592. Thus GAF's claim may not stand." 
Zenith Radio COJll. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ 577 (US Sup. Ct 1969), at page 592. 
Glen Mfa Inc. y. Perfect Fit Industries. Inc. 161 USPQ 688 (DC SDNY 1969), per Levet, District 
Judge, at pages 690-91, "Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine ... did little more than establish a 
reasonable method of calculating royalties in a situation where it was virtually impossible to 
determine whether each product manufactured by the licensee embodied any of the 570 patents or 
200 patent applications for electronic apparatus. Because of the complexities involved in the 
patents and the difficulties in determining whether the patented devices were used in the licensee's 
products, the court permitted the royalty structure in question. The Hazeltine rationale is, therefore, 
an exception to the general rule requiring a strict, limited royal~ stru~ture; it is by. no me~s the 
standard in a case such as the present where the patented Item IOvolved a slOgle, SImple, 
uncomplicated object..... Brulotte, in the very passage cited by the plaintiff, demonstrated the 
unique application of the Hazeltine rationale to situations where the patent usage is impossible to 
determine, and computation by formula is both convenient and reasonably necessary. .., By 
contrast, the royalty payment provisions of the licence agreement in the instant case are totally 
unnecessary for accounting or any other legitimate purpose." 
See supra, para. 6.5.3.b - Mandatory Packaging. 
American Securit Co. y. ShatteJl)roof Glass Com. 122 USPQ 167 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 
123 USPQ 589 (US Sup. Ct 1959). 
American Securi, Co. y. Shatteq>roof Glass Com. 122 USPQ 167 (3rd Cir. 1959), see. ~i~s, 
Chief Judge, at 174, "I thus find no significant difference between, on the one hand, condi~~nmg 
the granting of a licence under one patent upon the acc:eptance of another for an additional 
consideration, a practice the Supreme Court has condemned, and, on the other hand, as here, 
granting a licence only under all patents at a fixed rate, or under anyone patent at the same rate, 
which is, in effect, equivalent to apportioning the fixed rate amongst all the patents and then 
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this plan was that the same royalty rate was set for the package as for each individual 
patent. The court was, therefore, justified in holding that such a price disproportion 
amounts to another fonn of coercive package licensing. This rule from the Securit case 
follows the reasoning of the policy outlined in the Report of the Attorney General's 
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.226 
That such a flat rate royalty obligation could amount to a misuse is also shown in Rocfonn 
Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall. Inc. ,227 where it was held that a mandatory 
package licence may constitute a misuse when the agreement calls for the continuation of a 
flat rate royalty after the expiration of the patent constituting the most important 
consideration for the licence.228 Therefore, there has to be a caveat to the rule in Brulotte 
and Automatic Radio which allows a patentee to charge royalty up to the expiration of last 
patent. Where there is no right to terminate and no reduction in price after the most 
important patent expires, the condition may amount to a patent misuse. 
6.S.3.c.(iv). Royalty payments where package agreement is involved 
Where the licensing agreement relates to a package agreement229 involving several patents, 
then a condition that royalty is still payable after the last patent involved in the package has 
226 
227 
228 
229 
requiring the applicant to take a licence under all if he wishes to have a licence under one. In either 
case plaintiffs policy is inexorable." For a critique of this case, see Burns, J.W., "Does Package 
Licensing of Patents Violate the Antitrust Laws?", 41 JPOS 258 (1959). 
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955), at 239, 
"Yet we think that the courts have properly distinguished a package licence for reasons of 
convenience and made without coercion. Furthermore, we believe that strictures against package 
licensing should not be applied to frustrate good faith licence offers. Package licensing should be 
prohibited only where there is a refusal, after a request, to licence less than a complete package. 
Additionally, the licensor should not be required to justify on any proportional basis the royalty 
rate for less than the complete package, so long as the rate set is not so disproportionate as to 
amount to a refusal to license less than the complete package. For example, where a substantial 
group of patents are offered at a flat royalty rate, the deletion of one or several specified patents 
need not affect the rate. Rather the benefit to the licensee will lie in other factors such as exclusion 
of products subject to the several patents from the royalty computation. Moreover, where several 
'per piece' licences are requested and offered the mere fact that the sum of the 'per piece' licence 
royalties exceeds the package royalty rate should not of itself be considered a condition that all or 
no patents be taken, again, so long as the 'per piece' rate is not so disproportionate as to amount to 
a refusal to license less than the complete package." 
Rocfoxm Cor,p. y. Acitelli-Staruiard Concrete Wall. Inc. 151 USPQ 305 (CA 6th Cir. 1966), per 
Edwards, Circuit Judge, at page 307. 
Rocfoxm Corp. y. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall. Inc. 151 USPQ 305 (CA 6th Cir. 1966), per 
Edwards, Circuit Judge, at page 308, "The dissent also contends that a flat price for use of a 
number of patents is permissible practice up to the termination date of 'the last necessary patent' 
... We believe this is too broad a contention. We do not deal here (as did the Supreme Court in 
Brulotte) with the sale of a piece of machinery which incorporated a number of patents. Rather we 
deal with licensing agreement where one important patent (about to expire) is grouped with other 
longer duration for 'leverage' cf American Securit. We believe such a contract, when it contains no 
diminution of licence fee at the expiration of the most important patent and contains no 
termination clause at the will of the licensee, constitutes, in effect, an effort to continue to collect 
royalties on an expired patent Brulotte. American Securit ... " 
See supra, para. 6.S.3.b. 
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expired is a patent misuse and illegal.230 Ideally, the agreement should provide for royalties 
to be reduced in proportion to the importance of the right lost through expiry or 
. al'd'ty 231 H hi . 
mv 1 1. owever, t s IS not always so. Therefore, another question in this area is 
whether in every case, to avoid misuse, a flat royalty rate that has been stipulated for must 
be proportionately reduced as each patent expires. The court in the Securit case held that 
provisions in Securit's licence agreement that effectively extended royalty payments until 
the expiration of the last patent in the group constituted a patent misuse. The court cited no 
authority to support this holding, but merely stated that the expiration clause worked "an 
aggravating hardship" on the licensee in that it demanded the renunciation of all patents, 
"whether wanted or not. "232 This demand actually appeared to have been coupled with the 
package licence requirement and not the post-expiration royalties requirement. But the 
Securit holding seems to be inconsistent with the Automatic Radio case which upheld a flat 
royalty for 570 patents and 200 applications on 1 % of the licensee's sales, whether or not 
the product was covered by the patents. In fact, in Automatic Radio, the licensee used only 
10 of these patents. It is difficult to discern the difference between the collection of a royalty 
measured in part by the sale of products which are unpatented because the patent has 
expired, as in Securit, and the collection of a royalty measured by the sale of products 
which have never been covered by a patent, as in Automatic Radio. Brulotte, too, expressly 
approved the payment of royalties on all patents in a licence package until the expiration of 
the last patent in the package, without any intimation in the opinion that there should be a 
gradual lowering of royalty payments as each patent expires.233 It is true that the Supreme 
Court has shown its disfavour towards the extension of a monopoly by a contract covering 
an expired patent,234 but in the case of package licensing plans the same justification as in 
Hazeltine should apply to the problem of different expiry date. 
230 See also, Ar-Tik Systems. Inc. v. Dcrio' Queen. Inc. 133 USPQ 109 (CA 3rd Cir. 1962), per 
Forman, Circuit Judge, at 119. Note that the imposition of royalty that projects beyond the 
expiration date of the patent is unlawful per set Proof tha~ the patentee used co.ercion ~f its patent 
leverage is not necessary to establish Brulotte patent IDlsuse - compare ZeDlth RadJQ Com. V. 
Hazeltine Research. Inc., Ar-Tik etc.; and Veltman et aI. V. Norton Simon. Inc .. et aI. 194 USPQ 
168 (DC SDNY 1977), per Pollack, District Judge, at page 170. 
231 For example, in Daosk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab V. Snell (1908) 25 RPC 421, the 
contract provided for royalties to be reduced in proportion to the importance of the right lost 
through invalidity. 
232 American Securit Co. v. Shatteanvof Glass Coxp. 122 USPQ 167 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied. 
361 US 902, 123 USPQ 589, per Biggs, Chief Judge, at 174. 
233 Brulotte v. Tbys Co. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964), per Justice Douglas, for the Court, at 
pages 265-266. Justice Douglas, at page 266, also distinguished Automatic Radio Mf& Co. v· 
Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378. He said, "Automati, Radio is not in point. While so?,e 
of the patents under that licence apparently had expired, the royalties claimed were not for a penod 
when all of them had expired. That licence covered several hundred patents and the royalty ~as 
based on the licensee's sale. even when no patents were used. The Court held ~at the comp.utation 
of royalty payments by that formula was a convenient and reasonable deVIce. W,e ~line the 
invitation to extent it so as to project the patent monopoly beyond the 17-years penod. See also 
Automatic Radio Mfa Co. v. HBmJtine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 1950), 
Beclgnan Instruments. Ipc. V. Tecbpical Deyelopmept Coxp. 167 USPQ 10, at 14 (7th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied 169 USPQ 65 (US Sup. Ct 1971) and GAF Cor,poratiop y. Eastman Kodak Co. 213 
USPQ 356 (DC S.D. New Jersey 1981), per Pierce, District Judge, at page 380. 
234 See, for example, Scott Paper Co. y. Marcalus Mfl Co. 326 US 249 (US Sup. Ct 1945), Bruloqc 
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It is submitted, therefore, that the Automatic Radio principle (i.e., the charging of flat 
package licence rate until the last patent in the package has expired is permissible) should 
only apply where such an agreement is a bona fide convenient method of operation used to 
avoid troublesome question of infringement, complex bookkeeping, cost difference and 
similar practical considerations. If it is practically feasible to proportionately reduce the 
royalty rate as each patent or group of patents expires, it should be done. A quantitative test 
should be applied and the same "disproportion" rules followed as in the case of pricing 
individual patents before the licence is granted.235 
The effect of the relationship between a package and the individual royalty rates, regardless 
of intent, may also be objectionable. This result would follow should the sum of the 
individual rates be so disproportionate to the package rate as to amount to economic 
coercion designed to force the taking of the package. 236 A patentee may not, through the 
coercion of such disproportion in rates, discourage licensees from evaluating the individual 
merits of individual advances in science and the useful arts. The Supreme Court in Zenith 
affirmed the injunctive relief of the lower courts in restraining the patentee in that case 
"from continuing to coerce acceptance of its package licence through the mechanism of 
offering a much lower royalty rate for those licensees who take a licence on the entire 
package. "237 
The problems of establishing royalties in licensing patent package, it follows, suggest a 
careful selection of the patents involved, a realistic determination of an individual rate for 
each of the patented components, a reasonable discount off the aggregate of these individual 
rates in establishing the package royalty, and, if desired, a modest minimum amount to be 
paid regardless of the election by the licensee of an individual or package agreement. The 
mere fact that the sum of the "per piece" rates exceed the "package" rate should not of itself 
be objectionable so long as the former is not so disproportionate to the latter as to amount to 
a refusal to licence less than the package. 238 
6.S.3.d. Non-competition clause 
Such clauses are usually inserted with the intention of imposing restrictions on obtaining 
patents, know-how or trademarks from other companies with regard to the manufacture or 
v. Thys Co. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964). 
235 For similar views, see McCarthy, J.T., "A Patent Licensing Policy for Minimising Antitrust aOO 
Misuse Risks", 46 JPOS 547 (1964), at 566. 
236 Shea y. Slaw-Knox Co. 388 F.2d 761. 156 USPQ 481 (CA. 7th Cir. 1968); McCylloy~h Tool 
Co. v. Well Surveys. Inc. 343 F.2d 381, 145 USPQ 6 (CA 10th Cir. 1965). 
237 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc. 161 USPQ 577 (US Sup. Ct 1969), at page 590, 
footnote 27. 
238 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955). at 
page 240. See also Van Cise. 1.0., "Antitrust Laws and Patents", 52 JPOS 776 (1970). at page 
800. 
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sale of competing products, thus prohibiting the use of competing technology. In contrast 
to the tying cases, where the patentee uses the leverage of his patent to force the licensee to 
buy his unpatented goods, the present category involves the patentee using his patent 
monopoly to suppress the manufacture of possible competing goods not covered by his 
patent, by, for example, imposing a condition that the licensee would not manufacture any 
other product other than those covered by the patent licensed. However, the restriction 
would fall within the principle of the tying cases to the extent that the patentee is using the 
lawful monopoly granted by the patent as a means of suppressing the manufacture and sale 
of competing unpatented articles. Although the patentee is not creating for itself a monopoly 
for unpatented goods, it is attempting by means other than that of free competition to extend 
the bounds of its lawful monopoly to make, import, use and sell the patented device to the 
extent where such device would be the only one available to a user of such an article. This 
monopoly is obviously not covered by the patent. A patentee's right does not extend to the 
use of the patent to purge the market of competing non-patented goods except through the 
process of fair competition.239 
Such non-competition clause in a licence agreement is also caught by the patent misuse 
doctrine in the United States. The leading case on this area is The National Lock Washer 
Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.240 The court found that the presence of the non-competition 
clause in the agreement was enough to constitute patent misuse, the clause being regarded 
as an attempt by the patentee to use his patent monopoly to suppress competition from 
goods not covered by the patent. The patentee's infringement suit was ordered dismissed. 
The same approach was followed by the Ninth Circuit in McCullough v. Kammerer 
Cmll.241 Here, the licensee had agreed "not to manufacture or use or rent any device which 
will be in competition with the device or devices covered by this licence agreement." The 
Court agreed that "there is no difference in principle between extending the monopoly of the 
patent by suppressing the manufacture or use of competitive devices, patented or 
unpatented", and other devices previously held to constitute patent misuse.242 These 
239 See The National Lock Washer Co. v. GeorKe K. Garrett Co. 58 USPQ 460 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1943). 
The clause in question provided that, "Licensee agrees that, while this agreement is in forc.e, it will 
make and sell no form of non-entangling spring washers except such as are covered .by saId ?atent, 
and that it will not, either directly or indirectly, make or sell spring washers of the kind ~pecl~callr 
excluded from this licence under the provisions of paragraph frrst (a) thereof' See Goodrich, ClJ'Cwt 
Judge, at page 461. See also McCullouKh y. Kammerer ColP. 76 USPQ 503 (CCA 9th Cir. 
1948). 
240 The National Lock Washer Co. y. Geor&e K. Garrett Co. 58 USPQ 460 at 462 (CCA 3rd Cir. 
1943). 
241 McCulloUKh y. Kammerer Corp. 76 USPQ 503 (CCA 9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 79 USPQ 454 
(1948). 
242 McCulloUlb y. KammerexCorp. 76 USPQ 503 (CCA 9th Cir. 1948), at page 505, per Denman, 
Circuit Judge. See also at page 504, '''These covenants extend the monopoly of the patent by 
preventing competition with the patent of any other pi~ cutte~, ~nted ~r unpatented, 
manufactured, used or sold by the licensee, theretofore engaged 10 making pIpe cutting tools. The 
licensor to procure such extension of the monopoly area of its patent al~o b~nds itst:lf by a similar 
restrictive agreement. ... Its agreement to extend the patent monopoly IS aided by Its arrangement 
not to avail itself of the inventive genius of its employees in creating competitive devices which it 
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pioneer cases have been followed by numerous courts. In Berlenbach v. Anderson & 
Thompson Ski. Co. Inc., 243 the appellant court confmned the dismissal of a complaint 
because of plaintiffs misuse of his patent. Here the offensive clause provided that "Second 
party shall not manufacture or distribute in the United States and Canada any other safety 
type or automatic releasing ski binding other than that manufactured by First Party." 
Another complaint, where the licence agreement provided that "For the duration of this 
contract, [licensee] agrees not to manufacture, sell or dispose of any other shock absorber 
which is competitive with the shock absorbers covered by said patents", was similarly 
dismissed. 
Such agreements constitute patent misuse because they are contrary to public policy since 
they extend the scope of the patent beyond that permitted by the law. It is pertinent to note 
that in all the cases cited, the courts concluded that there was patent misuse because of the 
patentee's attempt to increase the scope of the monopoly afforded by his patent though the 
licence agreement. The approach relied upon is also consistent with the approach of the Act, 
which is to prohibit the undue extension of the patent rights beyond their legitimate scope. 
The proof of substantial lessening of competition is not a prerequisite to finding patent 
misuse in this situation.244 Similarly, where such a clause exists, it is immaterial that 
neither of the parties was harmed by the restriction, or that the clause may never have been 
enforced. What is important is the harm to the public.245 It is also not necessary for the 
can 'manufacture, sell, rent, licence, use or in any way do business with. lit In Trans.parent-Wrap 
Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), Justice Douglas, 
speaking for the Supreme Court, said at 152, "Protection from competition in the sale of 
unpatented material is not granted by either the patent law or the general law. He who uses his 
patent to obtain protection from competition in the sale of unpatented materials extends by contract 
his patent monopoly to articles as respect which the law sanctions neither monopolies nor restraint 
of trade." 
243 Ber1enbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski. Co. Inc. 141 USPQ 84 (CA 9th Cir 1964), cert. 
denied, 143 USPQ 464 (1964), Jertberg, Circuit Judge, at pages 85-86. 
244 Berlenbach y. Anderson & Thompson Ski. Co. Inc. 141 USPQ 84 (CA 9th Cir 1964). See 
Jertberg, Circuit Judge, at pages 85-86. 
245 McCullou&h y. Kammerer Corp. 76 USPQ 503 (CCA 9th Cir. 1948), per Denman, Circuit Judge, 
at page 505, "In this situation the contention is entirely irrelevant that neither party was harmed by 
the agreement. The question is, 'Was the public harmed?' We think the district court erred in 
holding it was not and are in accord with the Third Circuit that these restrictions are ~gainst the 
public interest and warrant a court of equity in refusing relief here sought." The National Lock 
Washer Co. y. GeorG K. GarrettCQ. 58 USPQ 460 at 462 (CCA 3rd Cir. 1943) was referred to. 
This stress on the harm to the public means that the agreement would be impugned even if bo~ 
the parties agree to it - see, for example, Stewart y. Mo-Trim. Inc. 192 USPQ 410 (S.D. Ohio 
1975), per Kinneary, Chief Judge, at page 413, "The court does not agree with plaintiffs assertion 
that such a defence is not available to one who is a party to the agreement. The defence of patent 
misuse 'is fully available, not only to one under licence with the patentee but to all parties wh~ are 
sued for infringement'. Automatic Radjo y. HazeJtine. Plaintiff argues that the clause was wntten 
into the agreement by defendants, who now seek to use that clause as a shield to avoid the~ 
obligation as licensees, and that it is inequitable to allow them to do this. For the purposes o~ this 
motion the court will assume that the agreement was drafted by defendants. If the patent Inlsuse 
doctrine were based solely on the equitable principle of 'unclean hands', plaintiffs argument might 
bear some weight. However, public policy requires the recognition of the defence. Even assuming 
that this clause is the creation of defendants, the defence of patent misuse is still valid." 
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defendant to show that he has suffered from the misuse.246 The fact that the prohibition 
against dealing in competitive goods is not absolute in nature, because of the presence of a 
provision permitting the licensee to get the permission of the licensor to deal with 
competing goods, is immaterial. Such a provision will not alter the character of an absolute 
prohibition against competition.247 
In contrast to the approach in the United States, such non-competition clauses are more 
leniently treated in the United Kingdom under the Common Law.248 
6.S.3.e. Grant -back clauses 
Sometimes a licence agreement may contain a grant-back clause. A grant-back clause has 
been defined as a clause in a patent licence which provides "for licence or assignment to the 
licensor of any improvement patented by the licensee in the products or processes of the 
licensed patent. "249 Such grant-back clauses may be of two main types. When the licensor 
246 
247 
248 
249 
Noll e1 aI. y. a.M. Scott & Sons Co. 175 USPQ 392 (CA 6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 177 USPQ 
545 (1973), Henley EQuipment Co. y. Esco COW. 155 USPQ 183, 189 (CA 5th Cir. 1967). See 
also, Stewart y. Mo-Trim. Inc. 192 USPQ 410 (S.D. Ohio 1975), at pages 411-412, where 
Kinneary, Chief Judge, reviewed the authorities dealing with non-competition clauses. 
See F.C. Russell Co. v. Comfort EQuipment CoIP. 93 USPQ 119 (CA 7th Cir. 1952), where 
such a clause was held to be a patent misuse - per Finnegan, Circuit Judge, at pages 122-123. See 
also Krampe y. Ideal Industries. Inc, 175 USPQ 688 (N.D. Ill. 1972), per Bauer, District Judge, at 
page 690. 
See Jones y. Lees (1856) 1 H. & N. 189, 156 ER 1171. A covenant by the defendant that he 
would, in return for a licence to work the patentee's invention for the whole term of the patent, 
undertake only to manufacture articles containing the patented invention, was upheld by the court 
as not being in restraint of trade, per Pollock C.B., Alderson B., and Bramwell B., at page 1173, 
Pollock C.B. noting that the restriction was only during the continuance of the licence and 
Bramwell B., noting that even though the restraint extended throughout the whole of England, but 
so did the privilege. See also Brownie Wireless Co.'s Application (1929) 46 RPC 457, per 
Luxmoore J., at pages 476-478, "The last objection is that the licence provides for the payment of 
royalties on non-patented articles. This again is not an unusual provision. It is to be found in a 
well-known book of precedents devoted to Patent Conveyancing. I refer to Morris's Patent 
Conveyancing, published in 1887, at page 212. The precedent in question contains a covenant by 
the licensee not to manufacture articles except with the application of the patented invention, and it 
is stated in the note to the precedent that such a covenant is of common occurrence where royalties 
are reserved. The note goes on to state that the covenant is occasionally extended so as to impose 
the prescribed royalties in articles manufactured in breach of the covenant, that is, on articles which 
have been made without the application of the patentee invention. Such a covenant has been held 
not to be in restraint of trade, for the restraint is not greater than the privilege conferred. (see 1Qm 
y. Lees ) In my judgement there is nothing unreasonable in a patentee saying to the proposed 
licensee: 'I will grant you a licence in respect of my patent, but I want your whole-hearted support 
in the development of my patent. I am only prepared to grant you a licence in such terms as will 
ensure such support, and if you want to be free to make articles which may possibly compete with 
those made under the patent, you must agree to pay the same royalty in respect of them as you pay 
in respect of articles made under the patent.' There is ... a further ground in which such a provision 
may be justified, and it is this: the article which the Brownie Company is making is one which 
mayor may not, according to the way in which it is used, constitute an infringement of the 
Marconi circuit patents, and as the manufacturer cannot control the use after the article is sold, it is 
not unreasonable to insist that the royalty shall be paid in respect of it at the only time when it can 
effectively be accounted for." 
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitnlst Laws (1955), at 227. 
See also Bergsten, B.B., "Legality of Grant-Back Clauses," 55 Mich. L. Rev. 697 (1957). Note 
that in such a grant-back, the licensee must grant back either a licence or an assignment on any 
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acquires full patent rights to the improvement patents, the grant -back is termed an 
"assignment-back". Where the licensee under the clause retains the patent rights to the 
improvement patents and the licensor is only given the right to use the improvement 
patents, for example, on a non-exclusive, royalty free basis, the grant-back is called a 
"licence-back." There are other variations of these two main types. For example, the grant 
back obligation may be with reference only to improvement patents relating to the original 
patent or patents in the licence agreement.250 On its face it would seem that the practice 
should be condemned as an attempt to extend the scope of the patent conferred, by the 
insistence on the transfer of the licensee's patent in return for the right to work the 
licensor's patent. Such a device would lead to an accumulation of related inventions in the 
hands of the licensor.251 It may be argued that if he wishes, the licensor could always 
purchase the improvement patents from the licensee by a separate and different transaction. 
This is true, but it misses the point that in this scenario, the licensee is always free to refuse 
to sell. On the other hand, by the inclusion of the clause in a licensing agreement, a licensee 
is forced to hand over the improvement patents. The patentee is thus using the leverage of 
his patent to "force" the sale of the improvement patents.252 
Therefore, it is surprising that such practices have not been regarded as a patent misuse in 
the United States jurisprudence. In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith 
CQ. ,253 the agreement contained a provision under which the exclusive licensee covenanted 
to assign to the licensor improvement patents applicable to the patented machine and 
suitable for use in connection with it. The licensee argued that this provision was illegal and 
unenforceable. The Court upheld the legality of the said covenant, noting that it would have 
been different had Congress allowed patents to be assigned only for a specified 
consideration. The Court agreed that a person who used his patent to obtain protection from 
competition in the sale of unpatented materials extended by contract his patent monopoly to 
articles as respect which the law sanctioned neither monopolies nor restraint of trade. 
However, an improvement patent, like the basic patent to which it related, was a legalised 
250 
251 
252 
2'3 
invention made as a result of operating under the licence. For a discussion of the competing 
considerations for and against grant-backs, see Harmon, R.L., "Antitrust and Misuse Implications 
of the Defined Field Licence", 45 JPOS 463, at pages 474-480. 
For a description of the background to, and the purpose of, grant-backs, see generally, S~hmalbeck, 
R., "The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements," 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
733 (1975), at pages 734-735. 
It is admitted, and the cases have shown, that the mere accumulation of patents, whether acquired 
by assignment or purchase rather than by original application or ~y ~on of the fact that the 
patents are contained in a number of grants instead of a single grant IS not Illegal. See for example, 
Brownie Wireless Co.'s AIullication (1929) 46 RPC 457, per Luxmoore J., at page 474. In the 
United States, see Automatic Radio Mfa CO. V. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US 
Sup. Ct 1950), per Justice Minton, at page 381. 
To quote Automatic Radio Mfa Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US Sup. Ct 
1950), per Justice Minton, at page 380, 'That which is condemned as against the public policy by 
the 'tie-in' cases is the extension of the monopoly of the patent to 'create another monopoly' (X' 
restraint of competition - a restraint not countenanced by the patent grant" . 
Tgnprent-Wrap Machine Cmp. v. Stokes &; Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947). per 
Justice Douglas, at page 152. 
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monopoly for a limited period. The law permitted both to be bought and sold. One who 
used a patent to acquire another was not extending his patent monopoly to articles governed 
by the general law. Whether the owner of a basic patent used a licence to obtain 
improvement patents or used the wealth which he accumulated by exploiting his basic 
patent for that purpose was immaterial. In other words, "he is '" using one legalised 
monopoly to acquire another legalised monopoly."254 It is pertinent to note that one of the 
reasons relied upon by the court was the fact that Congress had not made illegal the 
acquisition of improvement patents by the owner of a basic patent. Nor had Congress 
placed any limitation upon the types of consideration for which patents could be assigned. 
Thus the improvement patents must be viewed as simply a species of property given as 
consideration for the right to use the basic patent.255 As to the argument that such a device 
is illegal and would lead to a concentration of economic power, the Court held that such a 
possibility fell to be governed by the anti-trust laws.256 This approach has been followed 
by several lower courts.257 
It is submitted that the approach of Judge Learned Hand, when the Transparent-Wrap case 
was before the Circuit Court of Appeals is the preferred one. He was of the view that the 
principle of the tying cases was applicable to the case at hand, and that assignment-backs, 
like tie-in arrangements, had the effect of broadening the scope of the lawful patent 
monopoly. A patentee had no right to use the patent to force others "to buy of him things 
254 
255 
256 
257 
TranSParent-Wrap Machine Corp. y. Stokes & Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), per 
Justice Douglas, at page 153, "He is using his property to acquire a monopoly. But the monopoly, 
being a patent, is a lawful one. The general law would no more make that acquisition of a patent 
unlawful than it would the assignment of a patent for cash. Yet a patent is a species of property; 
and if the owner of an unpatented machine could exact that condition, why not the owner of a 
patented machine?" 
Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. y. Stokes & Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), per 
Justice Douglas, at page 153. 
Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 72 USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), per 
Justice Douglas, at page 153, "It is true that for some purposes the owner of a patent is under 
disabilities with which owners of some other property are not burdened. Thus where the use of 
unpatented materials is tied to the use of a patent, a court will not lend its aid to enforce the 
agreement though control of the unpatented article fall short of a prohibited restraint of trade or 
monopoly. Morton Salt Co. y. Syppi&er Co. There is a suggestion that the same course should be 
followed in this case since the tendency of the practice we have here would be in the direction of 
concentration of economic power that might run counter to the policy of the anti-trust laws. 'The 
difficulty is that Congress has not made illegal the acquisition of improvement patents. by the 
owner of a basic patent. The assignment of patents is indeed sanctioned. And as we have saId, there 
is no difference in the policy of the assignment statute whatever con~ideration may . be used ~o 
purchase the improvement patents. And apart from violation of the an~-trust laws whic~ we Will 
shortly advert, the end result is the same whether the owner of a basiC patent us~s. a lie;ence ~o 
obtain improvement patents or uses the wealth which he accumulate~ by explOiting hiS ~IC 
patent for that purpose. In sum, a patent licence may not be used ~oerclvely to ex~t a c~ndibon 
contrary to public policy. But what falls within the tenns of the asslgnme~t statu~ ~s plalDly not 
per se against the public interest." For an attempt to rely on the alleged anti-competitive effect of a 
grant-back, see Santa Fe-Pomeroy. Inc. y. P & Z Co. Inc. 197 USPQ 449 (CA 9th Cir. 1978). 
The attempt, however, failed. See per Jameson, District Judge, at pages 462-464." 
See, for example, hiicek y. Koolvent Metal Awoina Com. of America 127 USPQ 227 (CA 9th 
Cir. 1960), celt. denied 128 USPQ SS7 (1961), per Barnes, Circuit Judge, at page .23~. See also. 
Hull y. Bnmswick CoQ)Ol'Ation 218 USPQ 24 (CA 10th Cir. 1983), per Logan, Clrcwt Judge, at 
page 28. 
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outside its four comers". His reasoning assumed that there would be a period of time after 
the expiration of the original patent when the licensor alone would be able to exercise 
monopoly rights over the improvement patents. This, thereby, extended the duration of its 
original monopoly, and was a misuse of the patent.258 It is interesting to note that though 
the assignment-back was held to be illegal and unenforceable, he implied in dicta that 
licence-back would have been permissible, since the retention of the patent rights over the 
improvement patent by the licensee would prevent the licensor from extending the duration 
of its patent monopoly.259 It is submitted that this dictum has to be right since licence-back 
agreements, unlike assignment-back, involves no transfer of monopoly rights and hence 
there is no resultant monopoly expansion. 260 
It may be argued that the approach of the Supreme Court in the Transparent-Wrap case, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to the abandonment of the misuse doctrine. By 
analogy, if such a condition is permissible, then any every kind of consideration for the use 
of a patented invention should be legal. The approach fails to take into consideration the 
coercive effect on the prospective licensee of the need for the licence and the reality of the 
situation. In the case of a purchase of an improvement patent which is not tied to the grant 
of a licence, the two parties are acting on equal bargaining strength. In the case where a 
licence is eagerly sought after, or badly needed by the prospective licensee, and a licence is 
conditioned, in addition to other terms, on the grant of any improvement patents, it cannot 
be said that the parties are bargaining on equal terms. The US courts prefer to leave it to the 
antitrust legislation to cater for any potential anti-competitive effects. It is submitted that the 
proper approach should be that grant-back clauses should be regarded as invalid under the 
Act since they do not relate to the scope of the patent right. Seen from the point of view that 
the obligation to grant-back improvement patented is "forced" by the leverage of the patent 
in issue, it can be said that such an imposition is not derived from the rights conferred on 
the owner of the patent or necessary for the safeguarding of such rights. 
258 
259 
260 
Stokes & Smith Co. v. Iraosparent-Wrap Machine Corp. 69 USPQ 278 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1946). 
per Learned Hand, Circuit Judge. at page 282. Note that in the S~preme C~~ Black. R~tl~ge and 
Burton n., would affinn the judgement for the reasons set forth 10 the op101on of the C~Ult Court 
of Appeals. Mr Justice Murphy. in Iraosparent-Wmp Machine Corp. y. Stokes & SmIth Co. 72 
USPQ 148 (US Sup. Ct 1947), page 154, was of the view that the judgement below should be 
affinned. He believed that the Court's decision in this case "unduly ~nlarges ~e scope of patt:nt 
monopolies and is inconsistent with the philosophy enunciated 10 Mercotd Cor,p. y. Mid-
Coptinental ." and similar cases.,," It has to be noted that the U~~ State~ Justice ~t 
was unhappy with the 1'raQmarent-W11P decision and was of the oplDlon that It should be. modified 
significantly. See generally, Scbmalbeck. R., "The Validity of Grant-Back ~au~es 10 ~~nt 
Licensing Agreements," 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (1975), and DuDl!e: G.;., Anb-Competibve 
Considerations of Patent Accumulation By Licensee Grant-Back ProVIsIons, 57 JPOS 124 (1975). 
Stokes & Smith Co, y. Irarwparept-Wgp Machipe Corp. 69 USPQ 278 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1946), 
per Learned Hand, Circuit Judge. at page 282. 
See also Schmal beck, R., "The Validity of Grant-Back Causes in Patent Licensiq Agreements," 
42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (1975), at page 737. 
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Some support for this view may be derived from the opinion of Justice Douglas in the latter 
case of Brulotte v. Thys Co., where he said, "A patent empowers the owner to exact 
royalties for as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that 
leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an 
effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the sale or use of the patented articles 
to the purchase or use of unpatented ones. "261 Although the issue in that case was with 
regard to the legality of post expiration royalty payments, it is submitted that the rationale 
behind that statement, that projection of royalty payment beyond the life of the patent 
amounts to a misuse, is equally applicable to the obligation to assign-back improvement 
patents to the licensor. By reason of the ownership of the improvement patents, the licensor 
has now an extended monopoly. In the words of Bergsten, "the enforcement of the promise 
[to assign-back] would give the licensor control over other articles which, but for the 
patent, he would not possess" .262 The same author notes that the only legitimate purpose of 
the grant -back clause is to enable the licensor to have the benefit of the use of any 
improvement patents invented by the licensee, and to prevent his products rendered 
obsolete in the marketplace by an innovative licensee. A non-exclusive licence grant-back 
with power in the licensee to licence others would have been sufficient protection. To the 
extent the improvement grant-back exceeds this standard the assignments serves no 
legitimate ends.263 Therefore, it is submitted that assignment-back clauses should not be 
permitted and must be regarded as invalid under the section. However, non-exclusive 
licence-back clauses should not be objectionable. 
6.S.3.f. Price restrictions 
Such a restriction is concerned with price control exercised by a patent owner over one or 
more of its manufacturing or selling licensees. Such control may be exercised by fixing a 
minimum price at which the licensee may sell patented articles or by requiring the licensee 
to sell at the same price, or not less than the price, charged by the licensor in its own sales. 
This is a problematic area, and the law is still in a state of flux in the United States. An early 
example was ftxing the price at which the purchaser of the patented item could resell it. The 
courts reasoned that once the patent owner had given up title to the patented item his patent 
rights were at an end, and any further restriction on the purchaser would extend the patent 
261 Brulotte y. Tbys CQ. 143 USPQ 264 (US Sup. Ct 1964), per Justice Douglas, at page 266. 
262 Bergsten, B.B., "Legality of Grant-Back Clauses," 55 Mich. L. Rev. 697 (1957), at page 699. 
263 See Bergsten, B.B., "Legality of Grant-Back Clauses," 55 Mich. L. Rev. 697 (1957), at page 701, 
and Simmons, G.F., "Antitrust Aspects of Grant Back Clauses in Lice~ Agreements", 41 ~OS 
574 (1959). See also Report of the Attorney-General's National Comnuttee to Study the Anb~t 
Laws (1955), at pages 228-229, "If the grant-back is a licence, its reason~leness may depend 10 
some circumstances in whether the licence is exclusive or non-excluslve. A grant-back by 
assignment or an exclusive licence, which is in effect an assignment, should be subject to close 
scrutiny as a factor which may dull the grant back licensor's incentive to invent. On the o~r han~ 
grant-back of a non-exclusive licence, especially with au~ority to sub-~cence,. mal diffuse the 
benefits to all licensees and thus tend to encourage competitive use of the Innovation. 
360 
beyond its statutory bounds.264 However, an earlier US Supreme Court had approved the 
actions of a patentee in setting the price at which his licensee could sell the patented 
product.265 This holding was sustained in the leading case of United States v. General 
Electric Co. ,266 where General Electric licensed Westinghouse to manufacture and sell 
patented lamps at prices fixed by General Electric and based on the latter's own sales. 
Stressing that profit was one of the valuable elements of a patentee's exclusive grant, the 
Supreme Court held that the price fixing provision was "normally and reasonably adapted 
to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly". The court directed its attention to 
the effect of the price fixing provision involved and concluded that under the facts, the price 
restriction was both reasonable and necessary to protect the interests of the patent owner. 
Therefore, a patentee-manufacturer could legally license another to make and sell the 
patented product at fixed prices. It set down the classic test for the legality of licence 
restrictions: 
" ... the patentee may grant a licence to make, use and vend articles under the 
specifications of his patent for any royalty, or upon any condition the performance 
of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of patent is 
entitled. "267 
Another effort by a patentee to control the retail price at which others sold his patented 
product was dealt with in United States v. Univis Lens Co .. Inc. 268 Univis had a patent on 
a new type of bifocal lens for eye glasses. It sold unfinished lens blanks to wholesalers 
who sold to finishing retailers and prescription retailers. The fInishing retailer grinds lens 
blanks to prescription. Prescription retailers examine eyes, send the prescription to a 
fInishing retailer, then fit the finished glasses to the customer's face. Univis attempted to fix 
prices at both the retail and wholesale level on its patented lens and lens blanks. The lower 
court held that Univis could not fix prices which the prescription licensees sold the glasses, 
since the patent monopoly was exhausted when the licensee bought a fInished lens. The 
lower court held, however, that the patent monopoly was not exhausted when the 
unfinished lens was sold to the finishing retailer and that Univis could control the price 
charged by the fInishing retailer who completed the invention. On this point the Supreme 
Court overruled the lower court, applying the doctrine that the frrst sale exhausts the 
monopoly, This was because, "the patent law is fulftlled with respect to any particular 
264 See Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell 229 US 1 (US Sup. Ct 1913). In Standard Sanitary Mfa Co. y. 
United States 226 US 49 (US Sup. Ct 1912), the Supreme Court had held that a trade agreement 
involving price fixing and the suppression of a certain type of merchandise transcended. what was 
necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred upon It. 
26S Bement y. National Harrow Co. 186 US 70 (US Sup. Ct 1902). 
266 United States V. General Electric Co. 272 US 476 (US Sup. Ct 1926). 
267 United States V. General Electric Co, 272 US 476 (US Sup. Ct 1926), at page 489, per Chief 
Justice Taft. See also, SoIa Electric Co. V. Jefferson Electric Co. 55 USPQ 379. at 380 (US Sup. 
Ct 1942). where tacit recognition of the rule is found. 
268 United States v. Uniyis I as Co" Inc. 53 USPQ 404 (US Sup. Ct 1942). 
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article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of the invention by the sale of 
the article, and ... once that purpose is realised the patent law affords no basis for 
restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold. "269 This was another clear case where 
the patentee attempted to control prices of sellers with whom he was not competing. He 
was trying to control a segment of the industry for reasons not associated with his own 
efforts to profit from his invention. He was merely trying to protect his licensees from their 
own-price-cutting.270 Though the court was invited to reconsider the General Electric case 
it declined to do so, stating that there was no occasion to do so. However, the General 
Electric case was reconsidered in United States v. Line Material Co. ,271 where it was held 
that an arrangement whereby two or more competing patentees agreed that one of them or 
one of their licensees would fix prices for all transcended the limit of the patent monopoly 
and violated the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, however, split four to four on whether 
the holding in General Electric should be overruled. Therefore, the latter decision still 
stands.272 However, since the Line Material decision, the lower courts, reflecting the 
changing attitude in this area of the law, have repeatedly restricted the use of price fixing 
provisions making them illegal in all but a few situations. 
6.5.3.f.(i). Qualifications to the General Electric rule 
1. the licensor must vend the patent product in competition with its licensee. Price 
fixing is condoned in this area only on the theory that it serves to protect the sales of the 
licensor. Thus price control by a licensor who does not sell the licensed product at all, or 
who sells it but not in competition with the licensee would appear to be outside the scope of 
the General Electric doctrine.273 
2. The price established by the licensor must apply to the patented product only. The 
patentee may not require the licensee to price fIX a device where the licensed invention only 
269 United States y. Univis Lens Co .. Inc. 53 USPQ 404 (US Sup. Ct 1942), per Chief Justice Stone, 
at page 408. The court did not distinguish the situation where the patentee sells the c~pleted 
article from that where he sells a partly completed article, leaving it to the vendee to firush the 
invention. The court held that the reward reasonably attaching to the patent privilege must be 
gained from the first sale. 
270 Price restrictions may be imposed solely to protect the particular patentee and not licensees or other 
patentees - see the General Electric case. See also Stedman. "Patents and the Antitrust Laws", 31 
JPOS 14,21 (1949), and Farley, D.L. "Price Fixing and Royalty Provisions in Patent Ucences", 
34 JPOS 46 (1952), at pages 50-58. 
271 United States VI Line Material Co. 333 US 287 (US Sup. Ct 1948). 
272 In a concurring opinion written by Justice Douglas, and joined in by Justices .Blac~. Murphy~ am 
Rutledge, it was stated that the General Electric doctrine should be overruled, smce It w~ ~ pnvate 
perquisite written into the patent laws by judicial legislation, and patentees should ~ hnuted to a 
non-price-fixing royalty reward or to the manufacture and sale of the patented ~ubJec~ matter .by 
themselves at any price they chose. The opinion of the court supported only by ~ts .wnter, ~usbce 
Reed, upheld the Geperal Electric case but limited it strictly to its facts, distingwshing the IDs~t 
case on the presence of the cross-licensing. The three dissenting Ju~tices, Justice: B.urton, Chief 
Justice Vinson and Justice Fraokfurther, held that the General E1ectnc case was bIDding precedent 
and that the instant case should not be distinguished. 
273 Glen Rayep KpittiPI Mjlla y. SYsoP Hgajcxy Mjlls 189 F.2d 845 (CA 4th Cir. 1951). 
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constitutes a small part of the device. For example, a patent licence to make and sell a 
patented radio tube would not justify price fIxing the entire radio produced by the licensee. 
In this context, it must be remembered that at least a substantial and material part of the item 
licensed must be patented in order to impose restrictions that would be illegal in the absence 
of patent protection.274 Similarly, there is no justifIcation for a licensor's fIxing of the price 
at which the patented product is to be serviced or repaired by the licensee. 275 
Therefore, the rule in General Electric is strictly limited; it holds that a patentee who licenses 
another to manufacture and sell articles made under his patent may limit the price at which 
they are sold, provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure 
pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly. As subsequent cases have shown, there is 
emphatic insistence that any price restriction sought to be imposed under the protection of 
this rule must in fact tend to secure a reward for the patentee's legitimate monopoly.276 
From the above discussion, the general rule that can be drawn from the cases is that, 
according to the US law, the patentee, if he also manufactures the patented subject matter, 
can fix the price that his manufacturing licensee can charge, but he cannot fIx the resale 
price of the patented product. 
Under the common law, price restrictions were upheld as being part of the patentee's right 
to impose in return for a licence to exploit or use the patented article. This was vividly 
illustrated in Columbia Graphophone Co. Ltd v. Murray,277 where the patent owner was 
successful in his suit against the defendant for selling second-hand patented articles below 
the price fixed by the patentee. The court held that since the defendant had notice of such 
restriction, he was bound by it. However, such practices are now forbidden and controlled 
in the United Kingdom by Part IT of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976.278 
274 For example, in an action for accounting of royalties under a licence of patents on brick s~ttin~ 
machines and brick loading forks which fixed the prices of the bricks produced, the Sev~nth ClI'Cwt 
held that the entire licence contract was void and was not severable from the remamder of the 
licence contract - American Equipment Co. y. Tutbill Bld~. Material Co. 69 F.2d 406 (CA 7th 
Cir. 1934). 
275 Sylvania Industrial Com. v. Yiskin~ Cmporation 132 F.2d 947 (C~A 4th Cir. 1943); 
Consolidated Packa&in~ Machine[), Corp. v. Kelly 253 F.2d 49 (CA 7th Crr. 1958); see also Am 
Mfa Co. v. Convertible IO,p Replacement Co. 365 US 370 (US Sup. Ct 1961). 
276 According to Hollabaugh, M.A., "Patents and Antitrust Laws", 25 U. Cine. L. Rev. 43 (1956): at 
64, "The present scope of the Gerupl Electric doctrine is so narrow as to be of almost no ~ 
use to a patent owner and the dangers are too great to risk if the owner attributes any substantial 
value to his patents". 
277 Columbia Ggpho,phone Co. Ltd V. Murray (1922) 39 RPC 239 (Ch.D.), per Russell J., at page 
241. 
278 See generally, Raybould. D.M., Firth, A. Law of Monopolies - Competition Law and Practice in 
the USA, EBC, Oermany and the UK. Graham & Trotman, London, 1991, at pages 454-457. 
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6.5.4. Pennissible Restrictions - General 
Express qualifications to the above restrictions are provided. These qualifications are 
amplification of the section, and provide listed exceptions as to the type of limitations that a 
patentee can properly impose as a condition for granting a right of access to a patented 
invention. These qualifications are expressly intended to preserve the patentee's right to 
impose certain terms which are designed to curtail the rights of the licensee in the 
exploitation of the patented invention. Even in the absence of these specific exceptions, 
most of these exceptions would fall within the restrictions which would be regarded as 
being derived from the patent rights or necessary to safeguard the rights. Hence they would 
be valid and enforceable. 
The section specifically provides that the following clauses are not deemed to be invalid: 
a. Restrictions concerning the scope, extent or duration of exploitation of the patented 
invention, or the geographical area in, or the quality or quantity of the products in 
connection with, which the patented invention may be exploited.279 
b. Obligations imposed upon the licensee to abstain from all acts capable of prejudicing 
the validity of the patent.280 
The exclusive rights of a patent owner may be divisible and exploited in several ways 
recognised by the Act. Under the Act, the patentee may separately license the right to make, 
import, sell or use the patented invention to different people. The Act provides that in the 
absence of any provision to the contrary in the licence contract, the licensee shall be entitled 
to do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and subsection (3), 
of section 36 within the whole geographical area of Malaysia without limitation as to time 
and through any application of the invention.281 This means that the patentee can, by means 
of the grant of limited licence, restrict the right to exploit the patented invention in the 
various ways to a limited specified geographical area, and for a specific duration. The 
patentee is also pennitted to confine exploitation of the invention to a specific application 
out of the various application to which it could be put to. 
The following part of this section will examine and analyse this proviso in greater detail to 
determine whether the general statement made above is subject to any other limitations. As 
in the earlier part of the analysis dealing with impennissible clauses, reference will mainly 
be made to United States case law to detennine the extent to which the US misuse doctrine 
is, or is not, applicable. 
279 
280 
281 
Section 4S(a) of the Act. 
Section 4S(b) of the Act. 
See Section 43(1) of the Act. 
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6.5.4.a. The proviso Ca) exceptions 
6.5.4.a.(i). Field-of-use restrictions 
Field-of-use licensing is common where the patented invention may be capable of use in 
different applications. Where this is so, the patentee may decide to licence the different 
applications separately to maximise his returns from the use of the patented invention.282 
The Act seems to allow a condition in the licence contract which restricts the licensee to a 
particular technical field-of-use. This type of restraint is arguably within the term 
"restrictions concerning the scope and extent of the patented invention" in the section. 
Proviso (a) to section 45, read together with the section 45 qualification that the clauses are 
imposed on the licensee "in the industrial and commercial field" would seem to reinforce 
this argument. Further, section 43( 1) of the Act provides that in the absence of any 
provision to the contrary in the licence contract, the licensee shall be entitled to do any or all 
of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and subsection (3), of section 36 
within the whole geographical area of Malaysia without limitation as to time and through 
any application of the invention. Read in this light, the permissible clauses allowed under 
proviso (a) in section 45 would allow field-of-use restraints. 
This fonn of restriction will be particularly important when an invention is capable of 
different uses or applications within several different and distinct fields of industry. For 
example, a particular drug may have curative effects both in human and livestock. To cater 
for the different scope of exploitation, the patentee may decide to license an animal feed 
company to make, use and sell exclusively for the animal medication field, and an ethical 
pharmaceutical company to make, use and sell for human consumption. This will lead to 
more effective exploitation of the patent, since the patentee, or a particular licensee, may not 
have sufficient resources to practise the invention in all fields. The licence in Farwick et aI. 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,283 for example, involved a licence for driving 
clutches. This right was limited, however, to the field of marine service. An exclusive field-
of-use licence gives the particular licensee the right to exclude others from making, selling 
or using the patented invention, but only with respect to the designated "field-of-use". The 
defined field may be expressed either positively, enumerating the applications to which the 
article may be put, or negatively, enumerating the forbidden applications. A patent owner or 
a licensee thereof can grant licences under the patent extending to all uses of a patented 
product or limited to use thereof in a defined field. 
282 See, for example, Bowden Brake Co. Ltd v. Bowden Wire Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 561. and La Societe 
Anonyme Pour La Fabricatioo P'Appareils D'Ec1aira~c v. The Midland Li~btin~ Co. (1897) 14 
RPC 419. 
283 Farwi(,:k et ai. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 162 USPQ 185 (US Tax Court, 1969), rcv'd. 
168 USPQ 324 (6th Cir. 197/). 
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Field-of-use and geographical restrictions are, similarly, not regarded as patent misuse in 
the United States. The leading case in the United States in this area is General Talking 
Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.284 The respondent, American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. owned several patents for inventions in vacuum tube amplifiers which had 
been used in wire and radio telephony, talking motion pictures, and other fields. Amplifiers 
having these inventions were used in different fields. One, known as the commercial field, 
included talking picture equipment for theatres. Another, called the private field, embraced 
radio reception, radio amateur reception, and radio experimental reception. There was never 
any argument or doubt as to the legality of the field-of-use restriction present in the 
agreement. The only issue in contention was the enforceability of the provision restricting 
the licensee to sell to certain purchasers for certain purposes only.285 
6.S.4.a.(ii). Geographical restrictions 
Just as the licence to make, use and sell a patented invention can be split up into different 
technical or commercial uses, so too is the right to practise a patent in any geographically 
specified part of the country. In the case of a patent licence with a geographical restriction, 
the licence grants to the licensee the right to exclude others, including even the transferor, if 
the licence is exclusive, from making, using or selling all forms of the patented invention 
within the designated geographical area.286 Sometimes, the licence may contain both field-
of-use and geographical restrictions.287 The possibility of a geographical restriction, 
limiting the licensee to a defined territory is expressly contemplated by the Act.288 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
General Talkin& Pictures Com. v. Western Electric Co. 304 US 175, 37 USPQ 357 (US Sup. Ct 
1938), affrrmed on rehearing, 305 US 114; 39 USPQ 329 (US Sup. Ct 1938). 
See infra, para. 6.5.4(a)(iii) - customer restrictions. 
For example, in Fuel Economy Co. Ltd v. MUIlJlY (1930) 47 RPC 346 (English Court of Appeal) 
the licence was limited to a specific area, i.e., the countries of Lincoln, Northumberland, Durham 
and part of York. 
For example, in Rouyerol y. Commissioner of Inland Revenue 141 USPQ 419 (US Tax Court, 
1964), Rouverol invented a new type of variable speed transmission called a multiple ball 
transmission. Potential application of the invention was recognised in several different 
technologies, including vehicular propulsion, engine accessories, industrial drives. and i~strum~nt 
drives. Rouverol obtained patents in several different countries. In order to explOIt the lDventIon 
more efficiently, Rouverol entered into patent licensing agreements with t~o co~rations. The 
first agreement he granted to H the exclusive right to make, use and sell the lDventIon throughout 
both North and South America, subject to specific exclusions. These exclusions included "main 
power transmissions for industrial prime movers or for propelling air, land or. water. vehicles". The 
second agreement granted to G the exclusive rigbt to make, use ~ sell ~e lDvention throu~out 
Europe in the area of flight stimulation test equipment of the "multIple-axIS type or the centrifuge 
or rate or tum type." 
The possibility of splitting up patent rights according to territory is expressly sanctioned under the 
US law - see USC 35, section 261. Therefore, as a matter of law a patent owner's use of 
geographical restrictions in a licensing agreement to divide territories con~titutes a ~a~ 
application of the rigbts derived from the patent. Therefore, the patent nususe doc~ IS 
inapplicable to licence agreements containing territorial restrictions - see, for example, Mil.lGl 
Insituforma y. Insituform of North America 225 USPQ 1232 (D.C.M.D. Tenn. 1985), per 
Wiseman, Chief Judge, at page 1235, aff'd, 4 USPQ2d 401 (CA 6th Cir. 1987), per Gilmore, 
District Judge, at page 1465. 
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6.S.4.a.{iii). Customer restrictions 
The above two forms of restrictions will invariably involve customer restrictions. 
However, while field-of-use and geographical restrictions are permitted under the Act, this 
does not necessarily mean that such restrictions run with the goods produced under such a 
limited licence and that purchasers of such products are bound by the terms of the licence 
on pain of infringement actions for breach. How such goods are treated under the Act is 
analysed in Chapter 7. 
6.S.4.a.{iv). Quantity restrictions 
A quantity or quota provision in a patent licence agreement may relate either to the minimum 
number of articles that the licensee must make or to the maximum number of articles that the 
licensee may make. Such a restriction would not fall foul of the misuse doctrine in the 
US.289In the Malaysian context, this type of restriction is specifically allowed by the Act. 
6.S.4.a.{v). Temporal restrictions 
A patent is given protection for a period of fifteen years from the date of the grant. 290 
Although proviso (a) allows for restrictions concerning the duration of exploitation of the 
patent, this does not mean that all obligations relating to the exploitation of the patented 
invention can be imposed for any duration of time. In this context, it is important to bear in 
mind the distinction between the duration of a licence and that of the agreement between the 
parties. Although a licence in respect of exploitation of a patent, and obligations under it, 
cannot endure beyond the statutory life of the patent, contractual obligations in the 
agreement granting the licence can run for longer. 291 Any attempted restrictions on 
exploitation of the patent beyond the statutory fifteen years will be invalid under the section, 
as will be an obligation to continue to pay for use of the patent rights after the patent has 
expired.292 
6.S.4.a.{vi). Specific use or desi~n 
A licensor may restrict the licensee's manufacture of the patented item to a specific use or 
design. This will be regarded as a reasonable step to maintain individuality between 
manufacturers and to allow the owner or other licensee to concentrate on other use or 
designs and to serve different markets. However such a clause or condition is only 
289 
290 
291 
292 
See, for example, American Eguipment Co y. Tuthill Buildioe Material Co. 21 USPQ 198 (CCA 
7th Cir. 1934), per Evans, Circuit Iudge, at page 200. 
Section 35(1) of the Act. 
See, generally, Byrne, N., Licensing Technology - Drafting and Negotiating Agreements, 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1994, Chapter 14, The Scope of a Licence. 
See para. 6.S.3.(c)(i), supra. 
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pennissible if the restriction is limited to the manufacture of articles covered by the claims 
of the patent in suit.293 If this is so, then it will not be regarded as an unreasonable exercise 
of the patent rights or against the public interest. 
6.5.4.a.(vii). Quality 
Clauses relating to quality control are specifically mentioned in the proviso.294 It is also 
arguable that a clause requiring replacement parts to be purchased only from the licensor or 
a nominee is permitted, provided there is a valid technical reason for doing so, for example, 
to ensure the quality or efficient working of the patented invention.295 
6.5.4.a.(viii). Provision of guarantee 
Since the section permits any conditions concerning the quality of the product in connection 
with which the patented invention may be exploited, a condition in the licence agreement 
which serves to control the quality of the product manufactured by the licensee will not fall 
within the prohibition. The same result would seem to apply to a clause in the licence 
agreement which conditions the patentee's guarantee of efficiency, durability or fitness for a 
particular purpose of the patented article on use of products of the patentee's manufacture. 
Such a clause was found not to be a patent misuse by a United States District Court.296 
6.5.4.a.(ix). Best endeavours 
Such clauses had been held valid in decided cases and it is difficult to see how it could be 
argued that, in itself, it could be construed as attempts to enlarge the scope of the patent 
293 Bela Seatine Co. Inc. y. Poloron Products. Inc. 168 USPQ 548 (CA 7th Cir.), cert. deoied, 404 
US 922, 170 USPQ 65 (1971). See Kiley, Circuit Judge, at pages 552-553. See also VulCan Mf& 
Co. y. Mayme Co. 23 USPQ 96 (CA 8th Cir. 1934), and Hull v. Brunswick COQXUjltioo 218 
USPQ 24 (CA 10th Cir. 1983). Contrast McCullou&h v. Kammerer Corp. 76 USPQ 503 (CA 9th 
Cir. 1948), where the licensor restricted the licensee from making competitive articles which fell 
outside the claims of the licensed patents. 
294 The quality control proviso to section 45 in the Act seems to reflect the US business arxl 
technological theory exception to the patent misuse by tying arrange~ents. - see, for e~ample, 
Dehydratioe Process Co. y. A.O. Smith Corp. 292 F.2d 653 (CA 1st CII'. 1961), cert. denied 368 
US 931 (1961)- discussed earlier under tying arrangements. 
29S Refer to para. 6.5.3.(a) for the exceptions to the misuse doctrine as regards tying arrangements. 
296 See Bissell Inc. y. E.R. Waper Mfe Co. 133 USPQ 469 (DC ED. Wisconsin, 1962), ~r Grubb, 
District Judge, at page 480. The patents in suit related to . an apparatus f~r appl.yin~ detergent to 
rugs and the like, commonly called a rug shampoo appbcator. In a smt for lDfringe!Dent, the 
defendant, Wagner, alleged that Bissell had misused its patents. One of the grounds of DllSuse ~ 
that the plaintiff conditioned the "guarantee" of the efficiency, durability, ~~ c1.eaning results of Its 
applicators on the use of Bissell shampoo. It was held that the conditiomng of guaran~ of 
patented applicator upon use of shampoo manufactured by the patentee and known to It as 
possessing qualities necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the applicator was not patent 
misuse but a reasonably necessary practice where other available shampoos were known to have 
deleterious effects on applicator and surfaces to be treated. 
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rights.297 However, if the "best endeavours" clause is construed as an implied prohibition 
against sale of competitive products, then it will fall foul of the section. The "best 
endeavours" obligation could be important to protect the interest of the licensor, especially 
when an exclusive licence has been granted. This is to insure the licensor that the licensee 
will make a sincere and genuine effort to develop and exploit the invention. There may be 
many reasons for not promoting the invention by the licensee, such as when the exclusive 
licence is obtained and used purely to keep other competitors from using it.298 
6.5.4. b. Proviso (b) exceptions 
6.5.4.b.(i). No-challenge clause 
Proviso (b) to section 45 permits obligations imposed upon the licensee to abstain from all 
acts capable of prejudicing the Validity of the patent. This would mean that express 
restrictions requiring that the licensee not contest the validity of the patent involved, a no-
challenge clause, would not be regarded as invalid. However, it is unlikely that a no-
challenge clause that purports to prevent the licensee from challenging the Validity of the 
patent even after the expiry of the licence agreement would fall under the proviso. This is 
because on the expiration of the licence agreement, the licensee should be placed in the 
position of a member of the public, or a competitor, who is free to question the validity of 
the relevant patents. 
The provision seems to reflect the common law position.299 At common law, the licensee 
estoppel rule prevents a licensee, when sued for royalties in respect of a licensed patent, 
trying to show that the patent is invalid in order to avoid his contractual liabilities.30o 
297 
298 
299 
300 
For example of cases where the best endeavours clause had been upheld despite arguments that such 
a clause fell to be construed as a clause prohibiting sales of competitor's products, see, Tool Metal 
V. Tun~sten Electric (1955) 72 RPC 209, Fichera v. Flo~ates [1984] RPC 257 (CA), ard 
Iraosfield Pty. Ltd v. Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83; [1981] RPC 141, High Court, 
Australia. 
See generally, DorI, R.I., Strategy for Patent Profits, Noyes Development Corporation, U.S.A., 
1967, at page 28. 
See, for example, Lyle-Meller V. A. Lewis & Co. CWesttninsterl Ltd (1955) 72 RPC 307, at 313, 
per Lloyd-Jacob J., "Plainly as between these two parties 'currently valid' must mean 'subsisting', 
because as between themselves the licensee was not in a position to contest the validity of the 
specification." For a discussion of whether the licensee estoppel rule is still good law, see 
Robertson, A., "Is the Licensee Estoppel Rule still Good Law? Was it ever?", [1991] 10 EIPR 
373. 
The rule was explained by Luxmoore J., in fuel Economy Co, Ltd v, Murray (1930) 47 RPC 346 
(CA), at page 353, "There is, of course, a well recognised rule that a licensee cannot ~ttack the 
validity of a patent which is the subject of licence ... The reason why a licensee can~ot di~pute the 
validity of the patent in respect of which a licence is granted arises out of the relationship of the 
parties, the licensor and the licensee, and estoppel arises out of the relationship. Estoppel can 
operate only in the same transaction as that in which it arises. In an action under a lease~ the lessee 
cannot challenge the lessor's title to that which is included in the lease, because the title to ~ 
included in the lease is not in issue; and the case of a licensee who has a licence to work a patent IS 
analogous to that of a lessee under a lease. A licensee cannot challenge the validity of a patent in 
an action under the licence, the licence being admitted by the licensee, because the title is not in 
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However, the licence is not a complete estoppel against the defendant alleging invalidity in 
all circumstances. The estoppel applies only when the action relates to the licensee's 
obligations under the licence. It does not apply when the action falls outside the terms of the 
agreement, for example, when the licensee is sued for infringement when the licence has 
been determined, 3 0 1 or when no licence had yet been granted under the agreement between 
the parties.302 Further, although the licensee may not attack the Validity of the licensed 
patent, he is free to attack or dispute its scope.303 In Fuel Economy Co. Ltd v. Murray, 304 
the plaintiffs were owners of certain patents in respect of improvements in steam boilers 
and had licensed the defendant to work the patents and use the trade name "Bowden-
Jackson" upon boiler joints, made in accordance with the patents, within a certain specified 
area. The plaintiffs subsequently brought an action against the defendant for infringement 
and passing off, alleging that he had sold and installed boiler-joints outside the specified 
area and had wrongfully applied the name "Bowden-Jackson" to boiler-joints. The 
defendant admitted that he was a licensee within the specified area, but denied infringement 
and alleged that the patents were invalid. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, to strike out those 
paragraphs of the defence which alleged invalidity, on the ground that a licensee was 
estopped from so pleading. It was held that estoppel could only operate in the same 
transaction as that in which it arose. Since the action so far as the patentees were concerned 
was for infringement and not under the licence at all, no estoppel arose. In dismissing the 
appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the licence was not a complete estoppel against the 
defendant alleging invalidity in all circumstances, and that he was not to be prevented at this 
stage of the action from doing so.305 Further, it would seem that, though such a clause can 
validly be inserted in a licence contract, it could not extend beyond the period of the 
licence.306 
issue." 
301 See, for example, Basset v. Graydon (1897) 14 RPC 701 (HL), per Lord Herschell, at page 709. 
302 See Henderson y. Shiels (1907) 24 RPC 108, per Parker J., at page 115. 
303 See for example, a decision in the US, prior to the Lear y. Adkins ruling - The Plastic Contact 
Lens Co. y. Butterfield 151 USPQ 83 (CA 9th Cir. 1966), per Ely, Circuit Judge, at page 86, 
citing Westio&house Elect. & Mtj Co. y. Fonnica Insulation Co. 266 US 342 (US Sup. Ct 
1924). 
304 Fuel economy Cg. Ltd v. MUI11lY (1930) 47 RPC 346 (CA). 
305 Fuel Economy Co. Ltd y. Murray (1930) 47 RPC 346 (CA), per Luxmoore 1., at page 353, ''The 
fact is that the action does not relate to anything which has been done under the licence, nor does 
the defence set up the licence as an answer to the claim for infrin~ement. ..: Estop~l ~ operate 
only in the same transaction as that in which it arises. ... But m an aCllon. for mfringement. a 
different set of circumstances arises altogether. It is not an action under the licence at all, and m 
such a case ... no estoppel arises. If this were an action under the licence, for example, to ~ver 
royalties in respect of articles made under the patent in the limited area, o~ course, .the lice~ 
defendant would be estopped from challenging the Validity of the paten~ the li~nce bemg admitted 
by him, no matter how obviously invalid the patent may be. But, 10 my Judgement, such an 
estoppel cannot arise in an action for infringement." See also Lord Han~~rth M.R., ~t ~es 358-
360, where after reviewing the cases, his Lordship agreed with the deciSion o~ th~ tn~ ~ ani 
stressed that the licence was not a complete estoppel against the defendant allegmg mValidity In all 
circumstances. 
306 See the doubt expressed in Y,P. Ltd v, BostOn Deep Sea Fishin& & Ice Co, Ltd (1935) 52 R~C 
303 at 331-332, per Clauson 1., ''The defendants in the infringement action did not counterclaun 
for revocation. Of this circumstances two explanations were given .... The second was that the 
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This rule was also recognised in the United States.307 However, in 1969 it was overruled 
by the Supreme Court in Lear v. Adkins, 308 on the basis that, because licensees have 
greater incentive than third parties to challenge licensed patents, provisions barring a 
challenge should not be enforced in the public interest. 
6.S.4.b.(ii). Right to institute infringement suit 
Another possible clause which could be permitted under this proviso is one requiring that a 
licensee shall not institute any proceedings for any infringement of the patent without the 
express consent of the licensor. Under section 61 of the Act, any licensee may request the 
owner of the patent to institute court proceedings for any infringement of the licensed 
patent. If the patent owner fails to institute infringement proceedings within three months of 
receiving the request, the licensee may institute the proceedings in his own name. 
However, this right is subject to any provision to the contrary in the licence agreement.309 
Therefore, the Act expressly allows for provisions in a licence agreement which might 
negate the right of the licensee to institute infringement proceedings. This section, read 
together with proviso (b) to section 45, would mean that a clause requiring the exclusive 
licensee to inform the patentee of any infringing activity known to the licensee, but 
reserving the right, at the licensor's absolute discretion, to institute infringement 
proceedings is enforceable. Since an infringement action could prejudice the Validity of the 
patent, a clause giving a right to the patentee, at his sole discretion, not to sue will fall 
307 
308 
309 
defendants had in their licence covenanted in general tenns not at any time to dispute the validity of 
the patents. Such a provision has, no doubt, in recent years become common. It would seem, 
however, to be very remarkable, if a court which is bound by the provisions of the Statute of 
Monopolies can be called upon to give effect to a covenant between individuals, that that which 
may by reason of the statute tum out to be an invalid monopoly and an illegality shall be, as 
between the parties, held to be valid and legal. Under modem conditions the question seems to be 
to be so important that it is best that, as it has not been argued out before me, I should say 
nothing more about it." 
See, for example, Automatic Radio Mf~ Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co. Ltd 85 USPQ 378 (US 
Sup. Ct 1950), per Justice Minton, at page 381. 
l&ar y. Adkins 395 US 653; 162 USPQ 1 (US Sup. Ct 1969), at pages 7-8, per Justice Harlan. 
See also comments in Windsurfin& International Inc. v. European Commission [1986] 3 CMLR 
489; [1988] FSR 139, Court of Justice of the European Communities, at para. 77 of the 
judgement, "The Commission comments that the 'no challenge' clause is different from the c~~ 
prohibiting the use of the applicant's trademark. The acknowledgement of a trademark's validity 
logically implies that no attempt will be made to establish its invalidity and this is contrary to 
Article 85. Furthennore, an undertaking to that effect is foreign to the licensing agreement ~ a 
whole," and "On the basis of those considerations, it must be concluded that the clause reqwnng 
the licensee to acknowledge Windsurfing's international trademarks was of such a. ~ature as to 
restrict the licensee's competitiveness and, therefore, satisfied the first of the conditions for the 
application of Article 85". See also The Rose Case [1985] OJ L3699 (13 December 1985) -
paragraph 23(b) of the proceedings, "The restrictive nature of this second provision lies in the ~ 
that it denied the licensee the opportunity open to any third party of removing an o~tacle to his 
economic activity by means of a petition for revocation". Therefore, the ECJ had virtUally ruled 
that a no-challenge covenant was prohibited per se. However, see BAY« & Hennecke v, Sullbof~ 
[1988} 4 CMLR 881 (Court of Justice of the European Communities) - where the approach now IS 
that an assessment must be made by the national court to see whether, having regard to ~ 
position of the parties on the relevant market, the covenant restricts or does not restriCt 
competition. 
See section 61(1)(a) of the Act 
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within proviso (b), though it may result in the licence being of questionable value to the 
licensee, especially an exclusive licensee. 
6.5.5. Observations 
The statutory attempt in the section to control restrictive practices not warranted by the 
exclusive rights granted by a patent, while commendable, suffers from several obvious 
weaknesses. The section confers enormous discretion upon the judiciary in deciding what 
specific practices are prohibited. However, no guidance is provided, other than those in 
subsection (b), to assist the court in the determination of what is permissible exercise of the 
patent rights. Further, no strong sanction is provided if an illegal practice is found to exist, 
other than declaring that the impugned clause is invalid and hence unenforceable. It may be 
questioned to what extent this may act as a deterrent to prevent these undesirable practice. 
The most that could be said is that an unscrupulous patentee may decide to take his chance 
and still insert these illegal clauses into the contract. If the licensee, whether through 
ignorance, or through his unequal bargaining position, is not in a position to challenge 
these restrictions, and hence makes no complaints against them, the patentee is able to enjoy 
the fruits of the unwarranted extension of his patent rights. If there is a challenge against the 
clauses, the worse that could happen is that the clauses are not enforceable. In either case he 
is not adversely affected. He stands to gain if successful in his attempt and loses nothing if 
he fails. Such a provision is thus of little value as a safeguard against illegal extensions of 
patent rights. 
It would seem, therefore, that more teeth should be put into the section. One possibility is 
to introduce the sanction found in the other Commonwealth patent statutes whereby a 
patentee who is found to have abused his patent rights by the introduction of improper 
restrictions in patent agreements under the relevant provisions would not be able to enforce 
his rights even against third party infringers until it is shown that the improper practices 
have been abandoned. However, there are arguments against the introduction of this fonn 
of sanction. In the fIrst place, the penal nature of the law may deter judges from applying 
the spirit of the law rather than the strict letters of the law, as has been seen in the Tun&sten 
case. Secondly, it does seem to "reward" a person who is not a party to the agreement 
rather than focus on relief to the party who is adversely affected by the illegal restrictions. A 
fairer theoretical basis should be that the law should compel a patentee to pay for any 
damages inflicted by him for his attempt to widen the scope of his exclusive rights, but at 
the same time it should not place a premium on an infringer's wrongdoing. Therefore, to 
provide a more effective and fairer middle path, the provision could be modified by 
providing that a breach of the provision is a defence in any claims for breach of the license 
agreement. The licensee can also counter-claim for the return of any payment made under 
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an invalid obligation and for any damage suffered arising from the presence of the invalid 
clauses. 
It is also evident from the discussion on the misuse doctrine, and its application in the 
context of the Malaysian statutory scheme that there is no clear dividing line between 
misuse and lawful terms in licences. In view of the fact that all the earlier reviewed practices 
caught by the prohibitions against unfair extensions of the patent rights may be beneficial, it 
is not viable to have the inflexible and imprecise rule as presently found in the Act. To 
borrow the expression of Justice Posner, such a "vague formulation, taken seriously ... 
would put all patent rights at hazard. "31 0 Therefore, it is undesirable and unfair to adopt a 
black and white or "per se illegality" approach in the construction of the provisions. Some 
tying arrangements, for example, may be desired and willingly entered into by the licensee. 
The licensor may have provided a viable and fair alternative arrangement to the tying 
arrangement. The arrangement is not intended, nor has the effect of extending the scope of 
the licensor's patent rights. In such a case the terms should be deemed valid and 
enforceable. To hold otherwise would be unfair to the licensor. 
The cases have shown that misuse occurs when there is coercion and the licensee is 
deprived of a viable choice. Hence, it is proposed that the section be further amended to 
declare certain clauses invalid only in the absence of a reasonable alternative term or terms, 
or in the presence of coercion. The onus of proving that the alternative terms are available 
and reasonable, that there is no coercion, and that they are reasonable as not tending to 
extend the patentee's rights beyond the scope of the patent coercion should be placed on the 
licensor. It might also be useful to add a non-exhaustive list of clauses which, in the 
absence of a reasonable alternative, would be held to violate the section. The fact that the 
agreement is entered into, or that the agreement is still subsisting or not terminated, is not 
conclusive of voluntariness or reasonableness of terms. Such an approach would be in the 
best public interest, and might, indeed, serve to inject a measure of certainty into this area 
of the law. 
310 USM Corp. y. SPS TechoolQlies. Inc. 216 USPQ 959 (CA 7th Cir: 1982), per P~sner, Circuit 
Judge, at pages 963-964, "The doctrine of patent misuse has been descnbed as an eqw~le ~ 
designed to prevent a patent owner from using the patent in a manner contrary to pubbc po~cy, ... 
This is too vague a formulation to be useful; taken seriously it would put all ~atent n~ts at 
hazard; and in application the doctrine bas largely been confined to a han~ of specIfic ~~ti~ by 
which the patentee seemed to be trying to 'extend' his patent grant beyond Its statutory limits. 
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6.6. The Industrial Co-ordination Act 
Another regulatory regime to control the abuse of intellectual property rights is provided by 
the Industrial Co-ordination Act (the leA)}11 The objective of the leA, as set out in the 
preamble, is "to provide for the co-ordination and orderly development of manufacturing 
activities in Malaysia. "312 Under this Act, a person who wishes to engage in any 
manufacturing activity needs a licence granted by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry.313 A failure to comply with this requirement would result in criminal 
sanctions.314 In issuing the licence, the licensing officer may impose such conditions as he 
may think fit in furtherance of the objectives of the leA.315 As a condition for the grant of 
the licence all draft agreements involving the licensing and transfer of technology with a 
foreign partner have to be submitted to the Ministry for prior written approval. The perusal 
of the licence agreements is made by the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA) a Government agency under the Ministry. The aim of this policy is to ensure that 
such agreements do not contain provisions that "impose unfair and unjustifiable restrictions 
or handicaps on the licensees or that would be prejudicial to the national interest with regard 
to the transfer of industrial technology". When payments of fees are involved, it is the 
policy that such fees should be commensurate with the level or type of industrial technology 
to be transferred.316 The technology transfer agreements involved may cover licence rights 
over specific processes, formulae or manufacturing technology, which may be patented or 
unpatented, as well as other knowledge and expertise necessary for the setting up of a plant 
or the production of a particular product. In addition, such agreements normally include the 
provision of various technical assistance and supporting services. The types of agreements 
which are involved include joint venture agreements, technical assistance agreements, 
311 The Industrial Co-ordination Act, 1975, Act 156, as amended by Acts A 401 and A 462. 
312 Basically, the purpose of the ICA is to make the granting of licences conditional on compliance 
with the National Economic Policy guidelines. For the impetus which gave rise to this Act, see, 
Bowie, A., Crossing the Industrial Divide - State, Society, and the Politics of Economic 
Transformation in Malaysia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, at pages 100-109. 
313 See section 3(1), The Industrial Co-ordination Act, 1975, Act 156 (as amended by Acts A 401 am 
A 462). Under regulations made under the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975, manufacturing 
industries employing less than 75 full-time paid employees and with s~arehol~ers' fund of less ~ 
two million and five hundred thousand ringgit are exempted from thIS reqwrement, see Industnal 
Co-ordination (Exemption) Order, 1976 (P.U. (A) 136, 1976), as amended br Industri~ ~o­
ordination (Exemption) (Amendment) Order 1976 (P.U. (A) 214, 1976), Indus~al Co-o~n~on 
(Exemption) (Amendment) Order, 1985 (p.U. (A) 543, 1985)., and the Indus~al C~nBt!0n 
(Exemption) (Amendment) Order, 1986 (P.U. (A) 456, 1986). Under the IndustrIal Co-ordination 
(Exemption)(No. 2) Order 1976 (P.U. (A) 327, 1976), manufacturing activities relating. to the 
milling of oil palm fresh fruits into crude palm oil and activities relating to the production Ri 
processing of raw natural rubber are also exempted. 
314 See section 3(2) of the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975, which provides that any pe~n who 
fails to comply with the provision of subsection (1) is guilty of an offe~ ~ IS hable on 
conviction to a fine not exCNding two thousand ringgit or to a term of Impnsonment ~ot 
exceeding six months and to a further fme not exceeding one thousand ringgit for every day dunng 
which such default continues. 
31S See section 4(4) of the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975. 
316 See Malaysian Industrial Development Authority - Policy and Guidelines on Transfer of Industrial 
Technology, Guideline 2. 
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know-how agreements, patent licence agreements, trade mark agreements, management 
agreements and turn-key contracts.317 
The screening of the agreements will involve perusal of the various terms in the agreements 
including those relating to the technological content and the principal features of the 
technology or process being acquired, remuneration for the technology acquired, duration 
d al 318 d . . I: •• 
an renew, an provIsIons lor adequate trammg. In agreement involving patents 
whose life span extends beyond the agreement, arrangements should be made for the 
continued use of the patents after the agreement expires. 3 19 Another important clause that 
would be scrutinised closely is that relating to sales territory. The local company should be 
free to sell its products (manufactured with the licensed technology) in the whole of 
Malaysia and all other countries except where the foreign technology supplier is 
manufacturing directly or where he has given exclusive rights to others or where he is 
legally not empowered to allow sales based on his technology. 320 However, the Patents 
Act is not referred to to ensure that the agreement does not contain any of the prohibitions 
under section 45. If the screening officer is not satisfied with the proposed terms, he will 
suggest changes to the terms, with the licensor suggesting counter proposals. No proposed 
agreement has been rejected because the parties will normally come to a compromise on the 
terms. Since technology transferors are now more well-informed of the MIDA Guideline, 
usually only minor changes are required. 3 21 
This form of control, involving a special approval procedure, is thus a form of 
administrative control as it does not entail any legal sanctions resulting in the terms of the 
agreement being declared void and unenforceable. If a manufacturing licence is granted and 
the agreement is not submitted for approval, or if the terms of the licence are varied without 
the prior approval of the Ministry, this may lead to the withdrawal of the licence since the 
term of the manufacturing licence is that the draft agreements must be submitted to MIDA 
for approval. There is no monitoring system in place to assess and evaluate the progress of 
317 
318 
319 
320 
321 
See Malaysian Industrial Development Authority - Policy and Guidelines on Transfer of Industrial 
Technology, Guidelines 3 and 4. 
As a rule the Ministry normally approves an initial period of 5 years and any renewal the~r is 
subject to the prior written approval of the Ministry. This is to enable the Ministry to reVIew axi 
make an evaluation as to how the local company has acquired and benefited from the transfer of 
technology during the period of the agreement, whether the fees paid commensurate with ~ 
technology transferred and also whether the technology ~ferred d~ng .!!,e first five years IS 
conducive to the country's industrial development - see Gwdeline 5(d)(l) to (w). 
See Guideline 5(0. 
See Guideline 5(j). 
Personal communication from officials of MIDA. In fact, according to the source, the need b 
prior Ministerial approval of the agreements improves the bargaining position ~f the I~ party to 
the agreement. For an account of the types of onerous terms imposed on the licensee P'?Of to the 
implementation of the regulatory scheme, and its impact on transfer o~ ~hnolo~, ~ Lim, C. P., 
"Regulating the Transfer of Technology: An Analysis of MalaYSia s Experience , Journal of 
Contemporary South East Asia, June 1985, page 13. 
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transfer of technology. Nonnally if there is a request for renewal after the fIrst fIve years, 
the vetting office will ask the licensee about the progress of the transfer oftechnology.322 
6.7. Proposals for Change 
In accordance with the views expressed and observations made regarding ways whereby 
the various provisions discussed in this chapter could be improved, it is proposed that 
certain provisions of the Act need to be amended. Section 42 of the Act relating to licences 
of right should be revised to clarify the provisions and to make the scheme more attractive. 
It is proposed that section 45 be substantially revised to lay down more substantial 
guidelines as to what constitute restrictions which are prohibited in licensing agreements. 
The penalty for breach of the section should also be amended to make it a more powerful 
weapon to use in the control of abuses of patent rights. For the protection of the patentee, it 
is proposed that section 49(1) be amended by the addition of the word "interested" to 
qualify persons who may apply for a compulsory licence. The phrase "within the country" 
should also be added to section 49(1)(a) to clarify that production of the patented product 
should be within the country to escape being subjected to compulsory licensing. New 
subsections (3) and (4) need to be inserted to place the burden of showing that the patented 
invention is being worked in Malaysia on the patentee. A new ground for compulsory 
licences based on the inter-dependence of patents is proposed to be added to section 49 A. It 
is also suggested that the scope of compulsory licences be extended to the act of importation 
where circumstances warrant it. Utility innovations should also be subject to compulsory 
licensing. This will involve amendment to section 17 A. Finally, section 84, relating to 
Government use of a patent should be amended to clarify when the Government is entitled 
to rely on the section. 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identifIed in this Chapter are 
set out in Chapter 8. 
322 For the effectiveness of this regulatory scheme, see Lim, C.P., "Regulating the Transfer .of 
Technology: An Analysis of Malaysia's Experience"! Journal. of ~ntemporary South East AsI~ 
June 1985, page 13; Tan, C.K., "Experience and PraCtices of Licensing and Technology Transfer I~ 
Malaysia", Intellectual Property in Asia and the Pacific, Dec. 198?-Feb. 1988., No. 20, page 33, 
Khaw, L.T., ''The Effectiveness of the Legal and Regulatory Regune Regarding the Transfer of 
Technology", paper presented at the 7th Law and Society Seminar, 10-12 May. 1994, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 7: Exceptions, Limitations and Loss of Rights. 
7. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the various statutory exceptions and limitations to the rights of a 
patent owner, as well as circumstances leading to the loss of patent rights. The question of 
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of rights has been introduced, and if so, the scope of its 
application, is examined. The common law doctrine of implied licence to repair is also 
analysed to ascertain the extent of its application. Further limitations on the rights of a 
patent owner include rights derived from prior use and rights derived from use after a patent 
has lapsed and before it has been reinstated. These limitations are treated separately. In 
discussing these issues, the jurisprudence of the countries adhering to the common law 
principles are relied upon. The various grounds under which a patent can be invalidated are 
examined. With regard to the various best mode issues, special reliance will be placed on 
the case law of the United States since it is best developed there. Further, as the various 
statutory limitations are, except for minor variation, in pari materia with those suggested in 
the WIPO Model Law, reference will be made to the commentary on these provisions for 
guidance in the construction of these provisions. 
Although the Act refers to the various categories of exceptions and limitations as limitation 
of rights, for ease of discussion, these statutory limitation to the rights of a patent owner 
will be divided into two main categories, the fIrSt category, the exceptions will be confmed 
to the limitations laid down in section 37(1) and (3); while the second category will 
encompass limitations provided by section 37(2) and (5), sections 38 and the newly 
introduced section 35A of the Malaysian Act 
7.1. Exceptions to Rillhts 
The statutory exceptions laid down in section 37 of the Act can be divided. iJlt9 two classes, 
i.e., (i) acts of a non-commercial nature and use in scientific research, and (ii) use of the 
patented invention in vessels etc. temporarily in Malaysia. 
The odIer common law defences of laches. acquieacallCe and estoppel will not be discussed in this 
chapter. For. ctiacussion of these defences. see ClPA Guide to the Patents A~ 4th Ed.. 1995. at 
pile SIS. 
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7.1.1. Acts of a Non-Commercial Nature. and Use in Scientific Research 
The Act provides that "the rights under the patent shall extend only to acts done for 
industrial or commercial purposes and in particular not to acts done only for scientific 
research".2 The tenn "industrial and commercial purposes" is not defined, so whether it is 
carried out for such a purpose depends on the facts of each case. 
It is clear from this provision, however, that any use of the patented invention by a person 
for his private and personal purposes will not amount to an infringement of the patent 
owner's rights.3 Such acts will not be deemed to be acts done for industrial or commercial 
purposes and hence do not require the consent of the patent owner. Further, since the 
section emphatically states that the rights under the patent "shall extend only to acts done for 
industrial or commercial purposes", it is arguable that even use of the patented invention for 
educational purposes will be covered by the limitation, unless it is use in connection with an 
industrial or commercial purpose. In this respect it may be that a distinction would have to 
be made between a government educational institution and a private one. It is arguable that a 
government run-educational institution is not set up for a commercial purpose,4 whereas a 
privately-run institution could be deemed to be set up for a commercial purpose, and hence 
subject to the rights of the patent owner. Based on this reasoning, it would appear that a 
government -run school, for example, could use or provide infringing apparatuses for the 
purpose of experimentation by the students without fear of being involved in infringement 
suits. It is worth noting that in the only known reported case in the UK where reliance on 
the teaching exception was attempted, but rejected by the court, the defendant was carrying 
on a business.5 It has to be noted, too, that while educational uses in a non-commercial or 
2 
3 
5 
Section 37(1) of the Act. This limitation is exactly the same as that suggested in the WIPO Model 
Law, see section 136(1) and commentary at pages 85-86. Compare this with the equivalent 
provision in the UK Patents Act 1977, section 6O(5)(a) and (b), which is framed so as to be in 
confonnity with the corresponding provisions of the Community Patent Convention. Section 
6O(5)(a) of the 1977 Act, UK, provides a defence for acts which are done privately and for purposes 
which are not commercial, while subsection (5)(b) exempts from infringement action acts which 
are done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention. See Appendix. 
Note that the provisions of Alternative B of Article 19 (3)(ii) - (iv) of the proposed Patent Law 
Treaty are similar to the UK provisions. For further references to the Patent Law Treaty. see 
Introductory Chapter. footnote 11. 
In fact under the common law, it had been held that if the defendant had merely made the 
infringing article "for his own amusement, or as a model", there would not be an infringement -
see Jones y. Pearce 47 ER 1049; 1 WPC 120 (1826), at page 125, per Patteson J. 
Note that in relation to section 6O(5)(a) of the 1977 Act of the UK (see footnote 2. infra), Cornish, 
W.R., Intellectual Property, 1996, at page 214, states that while activitie~ of govem~ntal. 
educational and charitable organisations may not be commercial. they are n~t hkel~ ~~ be pnvate. 
'Therefore, becallse of the use of the conjunctive "and" in the subsecbon, actiVlbes of such 
orpnisations will not be exempted. 
See The United Telephone Co. y. Shu:ples (1885) 2 RPC 28 (ChD). In that case. the plaintiffs 
were the proprietors of two patents relating to tel~n.ic ap~tus. TIM: ~endant Sharples. who 
was carrying on the business of a chemist and electncWl. admitted havlDg Imported from am.i 
certain infrinaiaa appara1US. TheIe was in evidence a corresponda.ce between Sharples IIId the 
foreip supplier of the instruments compIIined of, in which SMrpIes sbIIed thIt he w.-I the 
instruments for exponatioa. Sharples claimed that he IICtUaIly ~ .... the i!'lb'Ulnellts for use by 
his pupils. so • to awid the use by them of the parenttd 1IticIes.. which were much more 
expensive. 1be court rejected this alternative defence and held thIII even If the story was true. usc by 
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industrial context may not be regarded as infringing acts, the suppliers of the patented 
products to such institutions would be caught by the provisions on contributory 
infringement.6 Therefore, such educational uses are likely to be de minimis, and unlikely to 
be regarded as unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of the patent owner. 7 
It is submitted that a convenient test to adopt in deciding what is a "commercial purpose" is 
that used for determining whether the offence of applying a false trade description "in the 
course of trade or business" for the purpose of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1972, has been 
committed.8 This phrase has not been judicially considered in Malaysia. However, the 
House of Lords, on the construction of the equivalent UK provisions,9 held that the words 
"in the course of trade or business" are intended to limit the application of s.l (1) of the UK 
Trade Descriptions Act to transactions which have some degree of regularity so that they 
form part of the normal practice of a business. The House of Lords went on to say that the 
need for some degree of regularity does not, however, mean that a one-off adventure in the 
nature of trade, carried through with a view of profit, would not fall within s.l (1), because 
such a transaction would itself constitute a trade. lOIn this connection, the tax cases may be 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
the pupils would have been an infringement of the patents. Kay J., at pages 31-32, said, "The 
alternative story is this: ... Sharples says, 'We used them for the purpose of experiment; the cost of 
them was so small that we could afford to allow our pupils to pull them to pieces, or to 
experiment with them.' Now they had, as he says, a number of so-called royalty-paid instruments; 
they were more costly, and he says ... , 'We could not afford to let our pupils use those; we could 
not allow them to be pulled in pieces or experimented with, and therefore it was that we bought 
those which were very much cheaper, in order that our pupils might experiment with and use those 
instead of using the more expensive instruments.' And I am asked to say that that was not a user in 
this country. What does a pupil mean? They say that the pupils are persons who do not pay 
anything for being taught, but, on the contrary, that after they have been a certain while in the 
business they ... receive some payment; but the very word "pupils", and this evidence which is 
given, shows me plainly that they are young persons who are admitted into this business for the 
purposes of learning the business, and, whether they payor not, it is obvious enough that they are 
paid very much less than an ordinary assistant would be paid who did not want to learn the 
business. They are admitted upon the terms that part of the remuneration they shall get for their 
services shall be instruction in the business. That is apparent on the very face of this statement; 
and to say that to buy a telephone which is an infringement of a patent in this country for the 
purpose of instructing your pupils who are learning the business ... for the purpose of saving the 
expense of using the patent telephone ... is not a user in this country, is a thing which I cannot 
accede to. It seems to me plainly a user .... .. 
Contrast this with the US case of Ruth v. Steams-RoKers Mfi Co. 29 USPQ 400 (DC D. 
Colorado, 1935), where it was held that the supply of parts for machines used in the Colorado 
School of Mines did not amount to contributory infringement This was because the parts were for 
use in laboratory machines used for experimental purposes (the machines were all used in 
laboratory and were cut up and changed around from day to day). and consequently did not 
contribute to an infringing use - see per Phillips, Circuit Judge, at page 408. 
See Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights. at para. 4.8. 
See Part fi, Section 5, Article 30 of the GAIT TRIPS Agreement. 
Section 3 of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1972, Act 87. Malaysia. provides that "Any person who. 
in the course of a trade or business - (a) applies a false trade descripdon to any goods; or .(b) 
supplies or offers to supply any aoods to which a false trade description is applied. shall be aualty 
of an offence." 
See section 1(1), Trade Descriptions Act 1968. UK. as amended by the Consumer Protection Ad 
1987, of the UK. 
See Dug y. Sumner (1984) I WLR 1301, per Lord Keith, at page 1lOS. 
The Commentary to the WJPO Model Law. at ... 86, sugests thIl a chlritable orpniution will 
commit ... infrin ..... t if k sells a patcnIed product .without the ~ of the 0wneI' of ~ 
patent. even if that sale is n.te on only one occasIOn and does not. In~ve .... y. profit. It IS 
submittal that this may not necessarily be corrett. as a single sale In thiS situation may not 
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of assistance. In Rutledge v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 1 1 Clyde (Lord 
President), held that the question whether a particular adventure is "in the nature of trade" 
or not must depend on its character and circumstances. If the purchase is made for no 
purpose except that of a re-sale at a profit, there would be little difficulty in arriving at the 
conclusion that the deal is "in the nature of trade", even though it may be wholly 
insufficient to constitute by itself a trade. 1 2 
Acts done only for scientific research are specifically covered by the limitation. 1 3 The 
import of this is not very clear. While use of the patented invention for scientific research 
II 
12 
13 
necessarily turn that sal~ into one carried out fo~ co~mercial purpose, especially. as in the 
exa~ple, when no.p~ofit IS made. In the example given m the WIPO commentary, since there is 
no view to pro~t, I~ IS. arguable th~t the act will not be an infringement. Take, for example, that I 
~ere t? buy an mfrmgmg product 10 a country where there is no patent protection for the patented 
mvention. If, after I have Imported and used It for a few years, I decide to seIJ it to a friend, it is 
unlikely that my activity will be considered as an infringement of the patent rights. 
Rut1ed~e v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1928-1929) 14 Tax Cases 490. The question 
for decision was whether, in a one-off transaction involving the purchase, and subsequent resale of 
the whole consignment of a large quantity of paper at considerable profits, the profits were liable to 
tax. The decision of the Commissioner that the profits in question were liable to assessment to 
Income Tax, Schedule D, and to Excess Profits Duty as being profits of an adventure in the nature 
of trade within the meaning of section 237 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, was upheld on appeal. 
See Clyde (Lord President), at pages 496-497. Lord Shand, at pages 497-498, said, "The nature and 
quantity of the subject dealt with exclude the suggestion that it could have been disposed of 
otherwise than as a trade transaction. Neither the purchaser nor any purchaser from him was likely 
to require such a quantity for his private use. Accordingly, it appears to me quite a reasonable view 
for the Commissioner to have taken that this transaction was in the nature of trade. From 
beginning to end the intention was simply to buy and to re-sell. Your Lordship in the Chair has 
indicated that there may be cases of purchase and re-sale at a profit where the transaction cannot be 
said to be in the nature of trade. In particular, this may be the case where there is no definite 
intention of re-selling when the purchase is made. But I do not think that we can regard what was 
done here as other than an "adventure ... in the nature of trade" within the meaning of the Act.". 
See also Martin y. Lowor [1927] AC 312 (HL), per Viscount Cave L.C., at page 315. 
The Commentary to the WIPO Model Law suggests that the fact that the act is committed on a 
large or small scale does not play any role in its qualification as an infringement. Further, the 
identity of the person committing the act is equally immaterial in this regard - see page 86 WIPO 
Model Law. It is submitted that this view has to be right 
Unlike the provisions of the United Kingdom patent statute, there is no specific mention in the 
Act of exemption for acts done for experimental purpose. However, it would seem that such 
experimental activities would fall under the scientific research exemption. In fact, under the 
common law, an experimental use was regarded as a pennitted act which would not infringe the 
patentee's rights. In Frearson y. Loe (1878) 9 Ch.D. 48. Jessel M.R. at page 66, said that "if a 
man makes things merely by way of bona fide experiment, and not with the intention of selli~g 
and making use of the thing so made for the purpose of which a patent has ~n ~ted, but ~Ith 
the view of improving upon the invention the subject of ~e p~tent, or With th~ VI~W of seemg 
whether an improvement can be made or not, that is not an mvaslon of ~ excl~lve n~~ gran~ 
by the patent. Patent rights were never granted to prevent persons of mgenulty exetClsmg their 
talent in a fair way .... " Similarly, Bristowe V.C. in Proctor y. BilYley & Son (1888) 6 RPC 106. 
at page 109, agreed with the proposition that it was not infringeme~t if a per:son took a. ~ted 
article for the purpose of seeing whether he could improve upon It, not ~smg the article In a 
practicaI_se, but testing and cryiq from it whether be could invent so~ng better. 
Although the US patent statute does not specifically provide for an expenmental use defenc::e.. such 
a defence has been recognised by the courts since the case of Wbittemore v' Cu~ 29 Fed. Cas. 
1120 (CC D. Mass. 1813), See per Justice Story, at page 1121. For the US expenmental defence. 
see further, Chisum. Vol. 4, at para. 16.03. See also Gilat. D., Experimental Use and Patents. DC 
Stucliel Vol. I~ 1995; Bee, LB.. "Experimenw Use • an Act of Patent Infrinaa:nent" •. 39 JPOS 
357 (1957); Eisenbera. R.S .• "Patents IIId the Propess of Science: exclUSive Rights ~ 
Experimetdal Use", 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1919); Grossman. S.J .• "Experimental Use or Falr 
Use as a Defence to Patent Infringement", 30 IDEA 243 (1988-89). 
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carried out by a person for his own private and personal interest is clearly covered by this 
limitation, if not by the first part of section 37(1), what if the scientific researches are 
carried out in a commercial or industrial setting? It may be that a distinction has to be made 
here between using the patented invention for industrial and commercial purposes and one 
that was merely used for research in a commercial and industrial situat:on 14 Ho . 
u. wever, It 
would seem that as the section does not qualify the type of scientific research exempted 
from the owner's control, even researches conducted for industrial and commercial 
purposes will be covered. Therefore, it should cover research carried out on the patented 
invention to improve on the invention or to discover new uses of the product. I 5 A 
distinction, however, has to be made between research carried out on a patented invention 
for the above-mentioned purpose and one carried out in connection with exploitation of the 
patented invention in mind. This is clearly set out in Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co. and anor, 16 where a distinction was made between researches carried out to investigate 
the patented invention and one carried out with the future commercial exploitation of the 
patented invention in mind, as for example, trials carried out in order to demonstrate to a 
third party that a product works or, in order to amass information to satisfy a third party, 
whether a customer or a regulatory body. I 7 In fact, the New Zealand High Court held that 
14 
15 
16 
17 
This distinction was made by Aldous J. in considering the scope of the section 6O(5)(a) exemption 
under the UK Act. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v. Evans Medical Ltd [1989] I 
FSR 513, at page 517. 
The WIPO Commentary envisages that such a situation would be covered by the limitation. See 
also Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v, Eyans Medical Ltd [1989] 1 FSR 513, where 
Aldous J. would have allowed such a situation under the provision of section 6O(5)(b) of the UK 
Act. In Monsanto Co. y. Stauffer Chemical Co. and anor [1985] RPC 515, Dillon L.J., at page 
538, held that the experimental purposes contemplated in section 6O(5)(b) might encompass 
experiments on the patented invention with a commercial end in view. He cited the Canadian case 
of Micro-Chemical Ltd v. Smith Kline and French Inter-American Ltd (1971) 25 DLR 79, where a 
limited experiment to establish whether the experimenter could manufacture a quality product 
commercially in accordance with the specification of a patent, as being covered by the words "for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention. 
Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. and anor [1985] RPC 515. 
MonsaotoCo. v. StaufferCbemicalCo. andanor[l985] RPC 515, per Dillon LJ., at page 542. 
See also Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd & anor v. Dou&las Phaonaceutica1s 114 [1991] 
FSR 522 (CA N.Z.), per Cooke P., at page 524. The same approach is followed in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. In Ethofumesat, noted in OJ EPO 3/1991, at 196, the Federal Court of 
Justice held that a patent was infringed if during its term a patented product was examined in field 
trials by plant protection agencies or their test departments at the request of a tbi~. party wi~ a 
view to obtaining the evidence required for licensing a plant treatment agent conwnlDg the active 
substance. The court held that the patent owner may require that the interference with his rights 
caused by the patent's infringement be removed, the said interference consisting in the fact that the 
infringer can market the plant treatment agent containing the active substance as .soon as the pa~t 
has expired, which be would not be able to do if be waited for the patent's expuy before carrr-ng 
out the field trials needed for licensing the agent. The resulting adverse effects on the ~btled 
party's competitive position can be removed by prohibiting the infringer. for whalever period he 
would need after the palent's expiry in Older to obtain the test results .-rived at by infringing the 
patent, from using those results in support of an application for the licensing of a plant trea~t 
agent by the Federal Biological Research Centre for Agriculture and Forestry. For the approach In 
the US. see Poppepbusen V. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co. 19 Fed. Cas. 1059 (CC S.D.N.Y. 
1858). ~r Jnaersoll. District JudJe. at page 1063. "The next question is: Has Ihere been a 
violation or infriftICIIICIIII? It is Slid, .11 Ihat Ihere has not been. for the reason dill we.ewr UIe 
~ made of it wu an experimental use - • use merely !« experiment, and ~ wi .... view to 
profit; and when there .. been no profit and no sale. it will not make a party h~bIe. because the 
patentee would not be injured by it. But where II. it is done as a matter of business. where the 
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the field testing carried out by the defendants, being designed to obtain data necessary to 
obtain permission for commercial user in New Zealand, did not fall within the pennitted 
experimental use defence. 18 
In the Malaysian context, it could be argued that as the subsection contains a qualification in 
the form of the word "only" before the words "for scientific research" and it is further 
qualified by the words "industrial and commercial purposes" at the beginning of the 
subsection, then scientific research for commercial purposes would not be allOWed. If this 
construction is correct, then the only research covered will be non-industrial or commercial 
research. The problem with this construction is that it renders the second part of section 
37(1) unnecessary, since non-commercial research would have been covered by the frrst 
part of section 37(1). It is submitted, therefore, that the approach shown by the case law of 
the various Commonwealth jurisdictions discussed earlier has to be the right approach to 
adopt. A contrary reading of this limitation would stifle progress since the researcher would 
then have to wait for the patent to expire before any commercial research could be carried 
out. 
7. 1.2. Use of the Patented Invention in Foreign Means of Transportation 
Section 37(3) provides that "the rights under the patent shall not extend to the use of the 
patented invention on any foreign vessel, aircraft, spacecraft or land vehicle temporarily in 
Malaysia". This subsection is meant to implement the obligation contained in Article 5ter of 
the Paris Convention of which Malaysia is a member. 19 The purpose of this limitation is to 
18 
19 
., . ~ 
product of that experiment has been thrown into the market, to compete with the products of the 
plaintiff although he may call it an experiment, yet, if it is a matter of business, and thrown into 
the market for the purpose of being sold, and is sold with his other products, why, that will be 
such a use as will make the party liable. II See also PQllpenhusen v. Falke et ale 19 Fed. Cas. 1048 
(CC S.D.N.Y. 1861), per Shipman, District Judge, at page 1049. 
See Monsanto CO. V. Stauffer Chemical Co. lNZ) [1984] FSR 559 (H. Ct NZ), per Eichelbaum 
J., at page 567, stressing that by this testing, the defendants had derived some advantage from the 
patented invention, and that it was a stepping stone towards a full commercial launch. At page 
570, the Judge observed that a patent monopoly not only entitles the holder to exploit the 
invention without competition during the period of patent protection, it also enables him to 
approach the period after the monopoly ceases in a strong position in the market pl~. This 
attitude is also reflected in the opinion of Dillon LJ., in Monsanto Co. y. Stauffer Cbemlcal Co. 
[1984] FSR 574, at page 586, where in granting interlocutory injunction against the defendants' 
activities, His Lordship said that, "if no interlocutory injunction is granted now and the de~ts 
proceed with the marketing of Touchdown in this country, they will by October 1987. have bUIlt 
up a market for Touchdown in this country which will be an extremely valuable bridgehead or 
springboard for them if they then elect to take a licence of right. " 
Note that Alternative B of Article 19(3Xiii) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty allows the 
possibility of a country exempting from infringement actions acts carried ou~ for ~ purposes of 
seeking regulatory approval for marketing. See also Chapter 3 - The ExclUSIve Rights, footnote 
112. 
for • commentary of the hillOrical development and purpose or this article,.see aeneraJly. LIdIs. 
Patents TrademaIb. and .,...", Riahts - National and Inlanational Protecuon, Vol. I, .. peces 
416-420. See also Bodent.usen. Ouide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property t at pages 82-84. 
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prevent inconvenience in the freedom of international transportation. Its intended effect is to 
guarantee that an enterprise can cross borders and go back with its vehicle which is 
pennanently stationed abroad, unhindered by patents granted in Malaysia. It has to be noted 
that the limitation applies only to foreign vessels etc. and not to those registered in 
Malaysia.20 Further, the presence in Malaysia must be temporary. 2 I 
Compared to the provisions of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention and section 136(3) of 
the WIPO Model Law, there is no amplification as found in these two provisions that the 
limitation applies if "the patented invention is used exclusively for the needs of the vessel or 
in the construction or operation of the aircraft, spacecraft or land vehicle". It may be that 
this may not be crucial, as the Malaysian provision, bearing in mind the purpose of this 
limitation, may be construed as to limit the use of this provision only in cases where the 
patented invention is used for the purpose of the vessel etc. and not, for example, to allow 
sale in the ports of articles produced on board the vessel etc. as such activities cannot 
reasonably be considered as being for the use of the vessel etc. Further, infringing cargoes 
transported on board such vessels etc. will not be covered by the exemption from 
infringement. 2 2 
Of greater significance is the fact that the word "accidentally" is left out in the Malaysian 
provision. A vessel etc. could, by accident, be in Malaysian territory for a long period of 
time, and hence its presence there could not be tenned temporary. It would seem that in 
such a situation, its distress could be further compounded by possible patent infringement 
suits. To ensure that the Malaysian provision be in line with the obligations under the Paris 
Convention, it is proposed that the word "accidentally" be added to this subsection. 
20 
21 
22 
Note that the Act may not be applicable to vessels merely because they are Malaysian registe~ -
see discussion on this point in Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights. at para. 3.4.2. Further. unh.ke 
the obligation of Article 5ter. which extends this protecti?n only !o. vessels etc. of ~ther countries 
of the Union. there is no such limitation in the Malaysian proVISIOn. So ~>: f~lp vessel etc. 
satisfying the conditions provided in the subsection can take adVanIaF of this bmitaUOll. 
Temporary entrance will include periodic entranceS - see Bodenhausen. ~. cit. at paae 83. In 
"Can:yiol Cans for plants" 21 fiC 99 (1990). Decision of the Hanseab~ Court o~ Appeals. 
Hamburg February 18. 1988 - case No.3 U 159187. involving the construcuon of secbon 7(4) of 
the Germ~ Patent Act. which is similar to the provision of Article 5~r. the ~ heIc! ~t the 
•• .1:.1 not apply -- the owner of the vehicle lost COIIIIOI of the vehICle Within the provIsion wu uw_ • • _ • ..-1. '" • .h-. the jurisdiction and could no Ionaer parantee that it would come back. Since In ..... a Sl~. 
vessel could not be said to have entered the country temporarily - see page 101. 
For the discussion of this point. see. Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Riahts. para. 3.4.1. 
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7.2. Limitations of Rights 
This part of the chapter discusses the various limitations to the rights of a patent owner. The 
limitations are those resulting from the statutory exhaustion principle, limitations brought 
about by grants of compulsory licences or Government use, the acquisition of prior user 
rights, and those brought about by the restoration of lapsed patents. 
7.2.1. Statutoty Exhaustion 
Under the common law, the patent owner is subject to the doctrine of implied licence.23 
According to this doctrine, when a patented article had been sold without any conditions 
attached to the sale, the purchaser is deemed to have an absolute and unrestricted right to 
deal with the article as he pleases.24 However, since this doctrine is based on the implied 
consent of the patentee, if the restrictions on further dealings with the article are made 
known to the purchaser at the time of the sale, such restrictions would nonnally be binding 
on the purchaser.25 This principle was applied by the Privy Council in National 
Phonograph Co. of Australia Ltd v. Menck,26 where the position was summarised thus: 
1. that it is open to the patentee, by virtue of his statutory monopoly, to make a sale 
sub modo, or accompanied by restrictive conditions which would not apply in the 
case of ordinary chattels, 
23 
24 
2' 
26 
For a more detailed account of the doctrine of implied licence, see Rothnie, W.A., Parallel Imports, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, Chapter 3, para. 3.2. See also Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the 
European Community, nc Studies Vol 13, 1993, para 12.1.3. 
Crane v. Price I Web. P.C. 393 «1842), at 413; 4 HPC 107, at 127, per Tindal CJ. See also 
Betts v. Willmott LR 6 Ch. 239 (1871), per Lord Hatherley, at page 245, ..... when a man has 
purchased an article he expects to have the control of it, and there must be s?me clear and explic.it 
agreement to the contrary to justify the vendor in saying that he ~as n~t glve~ the purchaser hiS 
licence to sell the article or to use it wherever he pleases, as agamst himself. See also, Cotton 
L.J., at page 9, in The Societe Anonyme drs Manufactures de GJaces v. Tilehmao's Patept Sand 
Blast Co. (1884) 25 L.R. Ch. D. 1 (CA), adopting Betts v. Wmmott LR 6 Ch. 239 (1871), 
though the case was distinguished on its facts. 
See, for example, Ipcapdescept Gas Co. y. Brogden (1899) 16 RPC 179; Solar ThomsoP 
Epeipeerip& Co. Ltd y. Bartoo [1977] RPC 537. per Graham J . .' a~ page 547. For examples ~ 
when restrictions were made known to the purchasers and hence bmdIng on them, see Ipgmdc;tp;p 
Gas Compapy Ltd y. Captelo (1895) 12 RPC 262, Duplop Rubber Co. y. LoPelife B,RrrtY Dqx>t 
[1958] RPC .73, per Uoyd-Jacob J., at page 476, and Sterlipe Drue Iocoqmtcd y. C.H. Ant 
Ltd apd apor [1972] FSR 529, per Graham J., at page 531. This statement is subject to the 
provision of the Act on invalid clauses in licence contracts - see Chapter 6 - Statut0l! Control. of 
the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights, at para. 6.5, for a discussion on sectIOn 45 which 
deals with such invalid clauses. 
Natiopal Pbongarapb Co. ofA",F«pIja Uri y. Mende (1911) 28 RPC 229, fNr Lord Shaw, at paaes 
246-248. See also the Singapore case or Sig Darby Sipppon; I Jd &: ors v. 8m;bam Grogp lJd 
[1968] 2 MU 161, at pages 16S-167,perWeeCJ. (Fed. Ct Singapore). 
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2. that the imposition of these conditions in the case of a sale is not presumed b t 
, u, on 
the contrary, a sale having occurred, the presumption is that the full right of 
ownership is meant to be vested in the purchaser, 
3. the owner's rights in a patented chattel will be limited, if there is brought home to 
him the knowledge of conditions imposed, by the patentee or those representing the 
patentee, upon him at the time of the sale, 
4. restrictive conditions do not run with the goods. 
This doctrine of implied licence is adopted in Malaysia in Smith Kline & French v. Salim. 27 
In that case it was held that a parallel importer of a patented drug bought from the patentee's 
licensee in the United Kingdom, and subject to a condition against resale outside the United 
Kingdom, was nevertheless not in infringement of the patent when he sold the drug in 
Malaysia. However, once he had been notified of the restriction, he would be liable for 
infringement if he were to carry on with his parallel importing activity. 
The above case was decided under the pre-1986 law, before the Act came into force. 
Section 37(2) of the Act now provides that the rights under the patent shall not extend to 
acts in respect of products which have been put on the market by the owner of the patent, 
the person entitled to exercise a prior user right,28 a licensee of the patent owner,29 or the 
beneficiary of a compulsory licence.30 The provisions of section 37 thus need to be 
analysed to determined whether they are meant to be a mere re-enactment of the common 
law rules or whether these provisions go further, and are intended to introduce the principle 
of "exhaustion of rights", and if so, whether domestic or international exhaustion is 
intended. 
There is a major difference between the doctrine of implied licence and the doctrine of 
exhaustion. As noted by Schatz,3 1 if the purchaser's freedom to deal with the goods he 
purchases in any way he wishes is based on a presumed consent of the patentee, the latter 
can limit his consent at will, thereby retaining his ability to restrict the freedom of 
competition and of trade in any way he chooses, right down to the ultimate consumer. The 
implied licence doctrine is based on a presumed acceptance of restrictions made known to 
the purchaser at the time of the sale, breach of which condition amounts to a patent 
infringement. The doctrine of exhaustion, however, focuses on the rights derived from the 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3. 
Smith Kline & French y. Salim (1989) 2 MLJ 380; [1989] FSR 407, per V.C. George J., High 
Court of Malaya. 
See infra, para. 7.2.3, on prior user rights. 
See Chapter 3 - The Exclusive Rights, para. 3.7. . 
See Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rigbts, paras. 6.2 
and 6.3. 
Schatz, U., "The Exhaustion of Rights in the Common Market", 2 DC 1 (1971). 
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patent monopoly. As was stated by the court in Centrafann v. Sterling Drug,:l2 "[i]n 
relation to patents, the specific subject matter of the industrial property I'S th th 
e guarantee at 
the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an 
invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and puttl'na th . . I' 
e em Into ClrcU alIon 
for the first time, either directly or by grant of licences to third partl'es as w II 
, e as to oppose 
infringement. ,,3 3 
According to the principle of exhaustion of rights, after the first distribution of a product. 
the rights owner will no longer be entitled to make use of his exclusive rights to prevent 
further distribution of the product in the domestic market. The concept of the "first sale" 
doctrine in the United States,34 or the exhaustion of rights doctrine Europe, was developed 
. 13 
34 
Centrafann v. Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147. This is the first case in which the exhaustion of 
rights principle was applied to patented goods in the European Community . 
In the same vein, it was stated in Brandt Consolidated Inc. v. Agrimar Com. 24 USPQ2d 1341 
(C.D. Ill. 1992), at pages 1347-1348, that "An incident to the purchase of any article, whether 
patented or unpatented, is the right to use it and sell it. The purpose of the patent law is thus 
fulfilled with respect to any particular article once the patentee has received the reward for the use of 
his invention by selling that article. Once that purpose is realised, the patent law affords no basis 
for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold." 
Though it has generally been believed that the "first sale" or exhaustion doctrine has long been a 
fixture of United States patent law, an examination of the cases does not seem to bear this out. The 
cases on the right of a patentee to control further dealings with the goods purchased seem to swing 
between the implied licence theory and the exhaustion doctrine. It was held in Bloomer v. 
MiIlin~er 68 US 340 (US Sup. Ct 1864) that "when a patentee has ... constructed the machine and 
sold it, or authorised another to construct it and sell it, or to construct and use and operate it, and 
the consideration has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that extent parted with his 
monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so authorised to be 
constructed and operated.". See also Bloomer y McQuewau 55 US 539 (1852) and Wilson v. 
Rousseau 45 US 646 (US Sup. Ct 1846); in Adams y. Burke, 84 US 453, at 456 (US Sup. Ct 
1873), it was held that "when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or 
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with 
the right to restrict that use."; United States v. The Univis Lens Co. Inc. et al. 53 USPQ 405 (US 
Sup. Ct 1942), per Stone C.J., at page 408, "The full extent of the monopoly is the patentee's 
'exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery'. The patentee may surrender his 
monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying his 
invention. His monopoly remains as long as he retains the ownership of the patented article. But 
sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his 
patent, control the use or disposition of the article."; cf Met-Coil Systems Corp. v. Komers 
Unlimited. Inc. et aI. 231 USPQ 474 (CAFC 1986), per Nies, Circuit Judge, at page 476, "A 
patent owner's unrestricted sales of a machine useful only in performing the claimed process and 
producing the claimed product plainly indicate that the grant of a licence should be inferred. ... 
absent any circumstances tending to show the contrary, we see no error in the district court's 
holding that Met-Coil's customers enjoyed an implied licence under the patent." There was some 
uncertainty as to whether, in the absence of illegal tie-ins or price-fIxing, the patentee could 
impose other conditions on the sale of his products which might restrict the use of the product. 
This question seems to have been settled in Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc. 24 USPQ2d 1173 
(CAFC 1992), where Newman J., after reviewing the cases, said at pages 1178-1179, "The 
principle of exhaustion of the patent right did not turn a conditional sale into at.' unconditi~ sale. 
II. Vicwina the entire group of these early cases. it appears that the ~ Simply applied. to a 
variety of factual situations, the rule of contract law that sale may be conditioned. Admm y. Budce 
and its kindred cases do not stand for the proposition that no restriction or condition may be placed 
upon the sale of a patented product. It was error for the district cow:' to ~ve that proposition from 
the precedent. Unless the condition violates some other law or polICY (In the patent field. notably 
by the misuse or anti-trust law, e .•• , United SIMa y. Uniyjs l,4;ns Co. 316 US 241 (US Sup. Ct 
1942), private parties ldain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale." 1had'~ the 
"restriction on reuse" was held enforceable undeI'the patent law. For a commentary on thiS C8Se. 
see Stem, R.H., ''The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US Patent Law", (19931 
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as a means of reconciling the exclusive rights of the owner of the intellectual . property With 
the need to promote the free movement of goods. The exhaustion of rights doctrine, first 
developed by the German Supreme Court in 1902, was based on two foundations: 
( 1 ) the patentee, by manufacturing and selling the protected product, or consenting to 
these acts, without any need to compete with third parties, has had an Opportunity to 
avail himself of the advantage granted by the patent, and his exclusive rights in 
respect of that product are thereby exhausted. 
(2) exhaustion of rights ensures the public interest in the freedom of trade in products 
protected by patents, as it prevents the patentee from splitting the national market 
and obstructing the free movement of goods therein.3 5 
Hence the aim of the application of the exhaustion principle is to prevent further restrictions 
on the movement of the products once they have been first lawfully put on the market. The 
effect of the doctrine means that violation of such restrictions does not constitute patent 
infringement. In other words, once the goods have been lawfully put on the market, the 
patent owner's right of further control over such goods has been "exhausted" and the goods 
are freed from his exclusive control, despite any reservation at the time of sale. 
7.2.1.a. Domestic exhaustion 
Section 37(2) expresses in traditional language the application of the "first sale" or 
"exhaustion of rights" principle.36 It is substantially based on the provisions of the WIPO 
Model Law which are intended to introduce the doctrine of exhaustion.37 Further, section 
37(2) is similar to the provisions of Articles 28 and 76 of the Community Patent 
35 
36 
37 
12 EIPR 460. See also Kobak. J.B., "Contracting Around Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About the 
CAFC's Mallinckrodt Decision", (1993) 75 JPTOS 550, for a critique of the decision. However, in 
another case after the Mallinckrodt decision, Intel CoW. y. ULSI CoW. 27 USPQ2d 1136 (CAFC 
1993). at 1138. it was held that "The law is well settled that an authorised sale of a patented 
product places that product beyond the reach of the patent ... The patent owner's rights with respect 
to the product ends with its sale ... and a purchaser of such a product may use or resell the product 
free of the patent ... This long-standing principle applies similarly to a sale of a patented product 
manufactured by a licensee acting within the scope of its licence". In other words, there seems to 
be a swing back to an exhaustion doctrine approach. For more detailed discussions on the US "first 
sale" doctrine see Rothnie, W.A .• Parallel Imports. Sweet & Maxwell. 1993, Chapter 3, para. 
3.3 .• and BenYamini. A., Patent Infringement in the European Community. IIC Studies Vol 13. 
1993. para 12.1.4. See also Stern. R.H., "The Exhaustion of Patent Rights - A US Commentary". 
EIPR, January 1980. 5. 
See Benyamini. A .• Patent Infringement in the European Community, nc Studies Vol 13. 1993. 
Chapter 12, page 287-288. 
Note that Alternative B of Article 19(3)(i) of the proposed Patent Law Treaty allows a member 
State to implement the concept of national or regional exhaustion. For further references to the 
Patent Law Treaty, see slIpra. footnote 2. 
See section 136(2). WIPO Model Law. and the Commen~ thereto. at page 8S. Then: ~ two 
differences in the relevant provisions of the Act. The first IS ~ absence of.the ~ ~n the 
country" to qualify "products which have been put on the ~~ . The ~ IS the omission of 
any reference to aoods put on the market by virtue of the provIsions on nghts of Government. 
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Convention, which lay down, in legislative fonn, the case law of the European Community 
on Community exhaustion.3 8 The exhaustion principle as applied in the European 
Community is based on the provision of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome,39 the 
concept of free movement of goods within the countries of the European Union, therefore. 
the case law of the European Union o~ the exhaustion principle will be most helpful. From 
the principles enunciated in Centrafann v. Sterling Drug, it can be said that the patentee 
who imposes any restriction on the use of a product after sale will not be able to institute an 
infringement action against the purchaser. This is so even if the purchaser is aware of and 
agrees to the restrictions on use imposed by patentee when he makes the sale. Under the EC 
exhaustion doctrine, a rights owner cannot limit his consent to the marketing of a protected 
product in a Member State. Thus, even if the rights owner contractually bans a party from 
marketing a product other than in a Member State, the EeJ will not permit him to exercise 
his rights against a parallel importer importing products so marketed into another Member 
State.40 
Since there is no mention of any conditions qualifying the application of the limitations in 
the section, it would appear that the intention of the legislature is to introduce the doctrine of 
exhaustion. The freedom from the patentee's control in relation to any acts in respect of 
products put on the market by the owner of the patent is not qualified in any way by the 
Act. Hence it would appear that even if the patent owner were to impose restrictions on 
further dealings with the goods at the time of the sale, such restrictions would not bind the 
purchaser. In this connection, it is worth noting that the exclusive rights granted by the Act 
are, inter alia, to "sell" the patented product. There is no mention in the Act of the right to 
control further use of a patented product after a lawful sale. Therefore, the right to control 
the condition of further sale or use in not part of the exclusive rights. This submission is in 
accord with the concept of exhaustion.4 I 
38 
39 
40 
41 
See generally, Tritton, G., Intellectual Property in Europe, 1996, chapter 7, . Oliver, ,P., Free 
Movement of Goods in the BEC, 2nd Ed., 1988, at pages 231-252, and Johet, R. t 'Patented 
Articles and the Free Movement of Goods Within the BEe", (1975) Current Legal Problems 15. 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957, and which came 
into force on January I, 1958. 
Dansk Sypennarked y. ImeJm [1981] ECR 181, [1981] 3 CMLR 590. 
For example, in relation to the application of the exhaustion principle to copyright works in 
Germany, the court in "PhonQmPh Record Rental" (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany, 1986), 18 nc 834 
(1987), at page 836, said that, "According to the exhaustion principle, the exhaustion of. the 
distribution right under copyright law depends alone on whe~ or not the owner of the nght 
consented to put the wort into circulalion by way of sale. There IS no need for the consent to ~ 
the manner of further utilisation - such as rental and hire: for it is by the first transfer of ownership 
that the owner of the right surrenders control over die copy of the w~rk: it thereby becomes ~ for 
any further distribution. This release serves the interest of the explOIters and ~ ~ pubbc to 
keep the respective works merchantable. ... If, after be bas ~ ~ ~ or liven hiS ~?t ~o 
sell, the owner of the riaht could SliD i~ in the further ~butlOn .of ~ work. prohibit It. 
or make it subject to any conditions, Ibis would constitute an Intolerable Impediment to fiee trade. 
... The possibility of restrictinl the exhaustion efI'ect - simply by a unilateral statement - would 
run counter to the exhaustion principle and its underlying purpose." 
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7.2.l.b. Applicability of the exhaustion principle to goods sold by licensees 
The rest of section 37(2), i.e., subsections (2)(ii) to (iv) are intended as limitations on the 
application of section 37(2), and sets the parameters within which the exhaustion principle 
is to apply. In the context of domestic exhaustion, however, the limitations imposed by 
section 37(2)(ii) and (iv) are not pertinent, and is a mere restatement of what is implicit 
from the provisions of the Act permitting a prior user to continue use, and a compulsory 
licensee to exploit the patented invention under certain conditions. As long as the prior user 
and the compulsory licensee are acting within the scope of their statutory rights, their 
exploitation of the patented invention cannot be prevented by the patent owner, and 
logically, neither should further dealings in goods produced by them be prevented. These 
provIsIons are however, important when the question of international exhaustion is 
considered. 
More germane, in the context of domestic exhaustion, is the prOVIsIons of section 
37(2)(iii), which provides that the rights of the patent owner do not extend to goods put on 
the market "by a person having the right referred to in section 43". Section 43 refers to the 
rights of the licensee in the absence of any provision to the contrary. By the combined 
effects of sections 43 and 45, the patent owner can impose restrictions on the scope, extent 
or duration of exploitation of the patented invention, or the geographical area in connection 
with which the patented invention may be exploited. Therefore, it would appear that while 
the Act allows for market division within the territories of Malaysia, the extent to which the 
patentee could divide his market territorially is curtailed by the provision of section 
37(2)(iii). This is because as long as the licensee has lawfully put goods on the market in 
accordance with the terms of the licence, the patent owner has no further right to prevent 
further distribution of the goods. Assuming that the patent owner gives an exclusive licence 
to manufacture and sell his patented products throughout the whole territory of Malaysi~ 
then upon such a lawful putting of the goods on the market, the patent owner's rights to 
control further circulation of the goods would be deemed to be exhausted. On the other 
hand, if the owner were to grant to one licensee the right to manufacture and sell the 
patented goods in the states of Peninsular Malaysia, and to grant to another licensee the 
exclusive rights to exploit the invention in East Malaysia, sale by one of the licensees in 
breach of the territorial restriction will not exhaust the owner's rights over the goods. In 
this situation, it can be argued that any products manufactured or sold by the licensee in 
breach of the licensing condition will mean that the patentee has not parted with that part of 
his monopoly reserved, and such goods are not deemed to have been lawfully put into 
circulation.42 Since sllch a consent is lacking, the patentee's rights are not exhausted. and 
42 See, for example, "pboooJrapb Reoord Reptal" (Fed. Sup. Ct Germany. 1986). 18 DC 834 (1987). 
II pace 836 "As Ionl _ the ftJqUiIemenIs of section 17(2) CopyriJht Act (19M) lie fulfilled. 
_hausdon ;m occur t repnllas of whether the previously granted util.isa!ion right ..• WM or WM 
not subject to restrictions. Consequently. exhaustion. as a matter.of pnnclple, ~ be. ~ only 
by a restriction which conc:erns the manner in which the product IS fint placed Into CirculatIOn; for 
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therefore, such a sale will amount to a patent infringement The ll"censee "h " 
" In suc a case WIll 
be ~uilty "of patent infringement if he were directly to sell his products outside the given 
temtory m breach of contractual territorial restrictions. Such goods are also not "freed" 
goods in the hands of purchasers from the licensee. To this extent, the restriction imposed 
by section 37(2)(iii) reflects the same approach adopted under the common law.43 
However, in contrast to the common law position, it would appear that as long as the 
licensee has lawfully put the goods on the market in his licensed territory, any purchaser of 
the goods in that territory could then bring it out of the licensed territory and resells it in 
another state of Malaysia. Such an act of the reseller will not amount to a patent 
infringement. In other words, licensed prohibitions against selling the goods outside a 
certain territory do not run with the goods if the goods were originally lawfully put on the 
market. This is true even if notice of the prohibition on further dealings with the goods is 
brought to the notice of the purchaser prior to the sale, as for example, by means of a notice 
attached to the goods. If such notices are allowed to be effective, it will subvert the 
intention of the Act.44 
7.2.l.c. International exhaustion 
The next question is whether the doctrine of international exhaustion is applicable under the 
ACt.45 Could goods lawfully put on a foreign market by the patent owner or with his 
consent be parallel imported into Malaysia without the consent of the owner of the patent in 
Malaysia? 46 As mentioned earlier, even though section 37(2) is modelled along the 
43 
44 
4' 
46 
if this restriction is disregarded, the respective product was not placed into circulation with the 
consent of the owner of the right." 
See The Societe Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Tilihman's Patent Sand Blast Co. (1884) 
25 L.R. Ch. D. I, per Cotton L.J., at page 9. See also the High Court of Kenya's decision in 
Beecham Groyp v. International Products [1968] RPC 129, per Rudd J., at page 134, aOO 
Minnesota Minine & Manufacturine Co. & anot v. Geqpres Europe Ltd [1974] RPC 35, per 
Graham J., at page 40. See generally, Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights - National 
and International Protection, Vol. I, at pages 396-402. In relation to the Common Markel 
exhaustion doctrine, this is the approach favoured by Roudard, I.. "Direct Export in Community 
Law", Patent World. May 1989,34, though she admits that there is no clear solution yet. 
Therefore. Smith Kline & French y. Salim (1989) 2 MU 380; [1989] FSR 407. seems to be 
statutorily overruled in this respect 
The application of the concept of international exhaustion is not fore~gn to Malaysian intel~eclual 
property law - see for example, sections 36(2) and 39(2) of the Copynght Act 1987, MalaYSIa, ~ 
332. Section 32(2) of this Act provides that the commercial importation into Malaysia of an article 
protected by copyright amounts to an infringement where the importer knows ~r ought reasonably 
to know that the making of the article was carried out without the .consent or hcense of the owner 
of the copyright . .. . . 
The TRIPS Agreement fails to prescribe the concept of international ex~USbOn and a prohlbi~ 
on restricting parallel import from one sipatory state to another. prefemng a compronuse solutiOn 
by leaving the possibility of the application of such exhaustion p~nciple open .- see footnote 6. to 
Article 28 TRIPS. In fact Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement proVides that the ISSue of exha~~n 
cannot be the subject of dispute settlement under the ~men~ It is ~Ie that ~ Pf?vlSIOn 
tOr the application of international exhaustion of npts will not be an conflICt With the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement For the arpments that a territorial regime of exhaustion is 
no longer justir..,1e in view of the incIeasins globalization of the world economy, the efforts for 
greater liberalisation of international trade. and the drive towards the establishment of 
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provisions of section 136(2) of the WIPO Model Law unlike the WIPO . . 
, provISIOns, the 
words "in the country" is absent in the Malaysian provision. According to the WIPO 
Commentary, the rights of the owner are not exhausted with regard to any patented product 
which has been put on the market in a foreign country, even if it is the owner himself or 
one of the other persons enumerated in the subsection who so puts it on the foreign market. 
In view of the absence of the words "in the country" it is subnu'tted that th '" 
, e prOVISIon IS 
intended to apply a fonn of the doctrine of international exhaustion in Malaysia and hence 
permit the parallel importation of goods protected by parallel patents.47 This is reinforced 
by the provisions of section 37(2)(ii) and (iv). These two subsections would be tautologous 
if only domestic exhaustion is envisaged by the Act. Having provided for prior user rights 
and compulsory licensing in other parts of the Act, it is implicit that the patent owner's 
rights would be subjected to them. Hence a proper construction of section 37(2) would be 
to read these two subsections as cutting down the application of international exhaustion. 
It is submitted, therefore, that international exhaustion applies in Malaysia, albeit in a 
restricted form.48 Where the owner of the patent holds a parallel patent in the country of 
47 
48 
internationally uniform standards of intellectual property protection and their incorporation into a 
GAIT-based international trading system, see Yusuf, A.A., and Moncayo von Hase, A .• 
"Intellectual Property Protection and International Trade - Exhaustion of Rights Revised", 16 
World Competition, September 1992, 115, at pages 127-129 See also Soltysinski, S .• 
"International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights under the TRIPS, the EC Law and the 
Europe Agreements". GRUR Int. 1996. Heft 4,316, at pages 318-320; Bronckers, M.C.EJ., "The 
Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries", 31 CML Rev. 1245 
(1994). at pages 1266-1269; and Ullrich, H., "TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade; 
Adequate Competition Policy", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 153 (1995), at 192-193. For 
the argument against. see Cottier, T., "The Prospect for Intellectual Property in GA TI", 28 CML 
Rev. 383 (1991), at pages 399-400. 
It is noteworthy that in a recent case in Japan, the Tokyo High Court adopted the principle of 
international exhaustion and held that where a patent owner has manufactured and distributed its 
products in Germany under its German patent, the corresponding Japanese patent is exhausted with 
respect to such goods. Therefore, a parallel importer can lawfully import the products into Japan 
without infringing the Japanese patent. See BBS Krafifahrzeuetechnik AG v. K.K. Racimex .Japan 
~ Tokyo High Court, 23rd March, 1995, noted in [1995] 9 EIPR 0-255. For an analysis of 
this case, see Naoko, N., Twhiro, K, et al., "Decisions on Parallel Imports of Patented Goods", 
36 IDEA 567 (1996). 
Contrast sections 38(1)(a) and 58 of the Act, where the word "Malaysia" is specified. and section 
49(l)(b), where the word "market" is qualified by the word "domestic". For the same view, see 
Wong, S.F., "The Treatment of Parallel Imports under the Malaysian Patent Law", Intellectual 
Property in Asia and the Pacific, JUly-September 1987, No. 18, page 64, at pages 77-78. Wong, 
however, bases his argument on the fact that the term "market" is not defined and accordingly its 
ordinary dictionary meaning must be given. It, therefore. must mean a foreign market ~ well as 
the domestic market in the country of registration. It is interesting to note that the Workmg Paper 
on Patent Law Revision - prepared for the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, June 
1976 (Canada), at page 141. recommends that, in order to prevent encouragement of the 
establishment of inefficient industry in Canada. and also to minimise the practice of international 
price discrimination to the detriment of Canadians. the patent right will permit free importation 
into Canada of goods originating with the patentee or persons related to him, once ~ ~ ~ve 
been marlteted anywhere in the world. See also the Proposed Patent Law ~ In conJu~ 
with the Working Paper on Patent Law Revisions, section 25 to incorporate thiS recomme~ation. 
In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the new Sing~re ~atents ~ct ~Iso pro~ldes for 
international exhaustion. Unlike the Malaysian Act, Ihere IS specific menuon In the Smgapore 
provision that the word "patent" includes a patent ... 1Ied in any country ~ Siftppore. 
Further, the exhaustion doctrine Ipplies inespective of whether the COftsent to the putting of goods 
on the maet is conditional or otherwise. See section 66(2)(g). Patents Act 1994. No. 21 of 1994. 
Singapore, in Appendix. 
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export,49 the goods originating from the country of export are manufactured by him, and 
the patent owner has not granted an exclusive licence to exploit the patented invention in 
Malaysia,50 the conditions for its application are satisfied. It would seem that the same 
conclusion is reached in the case where the Malaysian patent owner does not hold a parallel 
patent in the country of export. It is arguable that as long as the goods were put on the 
market by the him, the situation is directly covered by the section, and hence the doctrine of 
exhaustion will apply. 
There is no guidance in the Act as to when a related entity is to be regarded as the owner of 
a patent. 
5 
I This may be important when there are parallel patents owned by associated 
subsidiary or connected companies in other countries. However, under the common law 
concerning parallel imports, it has been held in the trade mark case of Revlon v. Cripps that 
each member of a multinational group must be deemed to have consented to the marketing 
of products by other members.52 It may be that the court will apply the same rule when it 
has to determine whether goods put on the market in a foreign country are to be deemed to 
be goods originating from the owner of the patent in Malaysia to bring the exhaustion 
doctrine into play. 
Under the above construction,. however, the patent owner of the parallel patents can, by 
assignment, split his rights geographically. By virtue of the assignment, the owner in 
Malaysia is divested of any rights in the patent in the country of assignment. Hence the 
goods originating from the assignee cannot be regarded as goods put on the market by the 
owner in Malaysia.5 3 Therefore, if the patent owner has assigned his rights for the foreign 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Under section 3 of the Act, "Owner of the patent" is defined as "the person for the time being 
recorded in the Register as the grantee of the patent". 
This "intermediate approach" is regarded as an acceptable compromise by Beier, F-K., "Industrial 
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market", 21 DC 131 (1990), at 
page 158. "An intermediate solution as is provided for by section 17 of the German Copyright Act. 
which relies on whether the protected products - whether nationally or abroad - were put into 
circulation by the person who holds the exploitation right for the country of importation appears to 
me to be an acceptable compromise solution also for patents, utility models and industrial designs. 
which I would prefer to the prevailing theory in German patent law which depends entirely upon 
the question whether the goods have been put into circulation" inside ~r outside the .country of 
importation. See also comments of Cohen Jehoram, H., Internabonal Exhausbon versus 
Importation Rights: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law", GRUR Int. 1996, Heft 4, 280. 
at page 282 and 284. 
Compare CPC Article 76(2), which extends the exhaustion doctrine to products .put on th~ m~ 
by an owner of a parallel patent in another Contracting State who has economIc connecbon WIth 
the patent owner in the first Contracting State. For this p~se, "two perso~~ sh~l be deemed to 
have economic connection where one of them is in a position to exert a deciSive I~fluence ~n . the 
other, directly or indirectly, with regard to the exploitation of a patent, or where a third party IS ID a 
position to exercise such an influence on both persons". 
Revlon V. CrilP [1980] FSR 8S (CA), per Buckley LJ., at pages 105-106. But see Col ... 
Palmolive Ltd &: anor v, Markwell Finance iJd &: aoor (1989) RPC 497, where Revlon wu 
distinguished as a case based on its special factual situation. . . 
Tritton, in relation to Community exhaustion, argues that by virtue of the ~Ignment. the owner 
could be deemed to ha~ consenkId to the rn.tcetinl of the pmcIucts by the assignee. ~ hence the 
exhaustion principle should lppIy to such goods - Tritton. G., Intellectual Property In ~ 
1996, at pages 305-307. However, it is submitted that by virtue of t~ absence of the words or 
with his consent" in section 37(2)(i), such a construction may not be Viable. 
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countries to third parties, he is again deemed to be in a position I'n th Mal . 
, e ayslan marke~ to 
ban parallel imports. 
Similarly, it would appear that international exhaustion will not apply to goods put on the 
market by a licensee in the country of export. Since section 37(2)(iii) contains a reference 
back to section 43, which deals with contractual licences in Malaysia, it is arguable that the 
exhaustion principle is not meant to be applied when the licence agreement does not relate to 
a Malaysian granted patent, and the licensee is a foreign licensee. However, where the 
licensee it not an independent undertaking, then it may be that the earlier discussion about 
associated subsidiary or connected companies may be relevant. 
The international exhaustion principle does not apply to goods put on the market by a prior 
user and a compulsory licensee. In these two situations, it is important to note that the 
patentee's inability to exercise his rights is limited only to goods put on the market by a 
prior user or compulsory licensee entitled, under section 38 or Part X of the Act, 
respectively to exercise rights in derogation of the patentee's exclusive rights. So goods put 
on the market by a person claiming prior user rights against the patentee in respect of vested 
rights outside Malaysia are not covered by the exhaustion principle.54 The same principle 
applies to goods put on the market by a compulsory licensee granted rights to exercise the 
patented invention by the relevant authorities by virtue of foreign laws.5 5 
7.2.l.d. Observations 
It seems clear that the cumulative effects of section 37(2) is to introduce the doctrine of 
domestic exhaustion and a limited form of international exhaustion. However, because of 
the way the provisions have been worded, certain amendments may have to be made to 
exclude the possibility of misinterpretations of section 37(2). As mentioned earlier, the 
application of the doctrine of international exhaustion does not extend to goods put on the 
market by a prior user or compulsory licensee outside Malaysia. If there is no mention of 
goods put on the market by virtue of the exercise of the rights of the Government,S6 this 
omission may be construed as extending the application of international exhaustion to 
54 
55 
Compare Boesch et aI. y. Graff et aI. 133 US 697 (US Sup Ct 1890). The inventors, who were 
Gennans, bad obtained patents in Gennany on the invention for an improved lamp burner. They 
later received a US patent for the same invention. Boesch, the defendant, denied infringement of the 
US patent on the basis that he bad purchased the lamp burners in Gennany from a party. Hecht, 
who had a right to sell such burners based on a prior user right recognised under German law. The 
US Supreme Court held that "the ript which Hecht had to make and sell the burners in Ocnnany 
was allowed him under the laws of that country, ... pRhasa's from him could not be bnby 
authorised to sell the articles in the United States in defiance of the rights of patentees under a 
United States patent" - per Fuller CJ., at page 703. 
Compare the ruling of the European Court of Justice in Pbannon y. tfnr&hM [1985] ECR 2281. 
that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply in the case where the product ~ put on the m.td ~ a 
compulsory licensee. Note that Article 76(3) of the CPC specifically provides that "The ~, 
paragraphs shall not apply in the case of a product put on the m~et under ~ ~puIsory hcence. 
See Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of HIS exclUSive Rights. para. 6.4. 
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goods put on a foreign market by virtue of the exercise of the rl'ghts f th 
o e government 
under foreign laws. It is unlikely that this is what is intended by the Legislature. Therefore, 
a new subsection 2(v) to section 37, relating to the rights of Government, should be added 
for the avoidance of doubt. 
Ultimately how far the doctrine of international exhaustion is to be applied is a matter of 
policy. The present Malaysian approach is to apply a modified form, and to respect 
exclusive licensing arrangements. However, this principle could be circumvented, and 
international division of markets and differential pricing policy possible, by the device of 
licensing and assignment. If it turns out in practice that this results in Malaysia being turned 
into a "high-price island",57 the Government may have to reconsider the compromise 
approach to international exhaustion.5 8 
7.2.2. Rights Limited by the Grant of Compulsory Licences. Government and 
Concurrent Use 
Section 37(5) provides that "the rights under the patent shall be limited by the provisions of 
section 35A, the provisions on compulsory licences as provided in section 51 and 52 and 
by the provisions on the rights of Government or any person authorised by the Government 
as provided in section 84." The provisions of section 35A refers to rights acquired by a 
third party after a patent has lapsed and before it has been reinstated.59 Sections 51 and 52 
specify the procedure for obtaining a compulsory licence,6o whereas section 84 provides 
for the right of the Government to make, use, exercise or do any act which would 
otherwise be an infringement of the rights of a patent owner.61 Section 37(5) does not seem 
to take the matter very far. It does not appear to add anything new, as, having provided for 
such rights in the Act, it is implicit that the patentee's rights would be limited by these 
provisions. However, since, they are specifically mentioned in section 37(5), it would be 
pertinent to allude also to section 31(2A), relating to grants of concurrent patents,62 and 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Bronckers. M.C.E.l .• "The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing 
Countries''. 31 CML Rev. 1245 (1994). at page 1268. 
For a summary of the competing claims made on behalf of both intellectual property owners and 
those who would promote parallel imports. see Rothnie. W.A., Parallel Imports, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1993. at pages' 562-567. See also Soltysinski. S.. "International Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property Rights under the TRIPS. the Ee Law and the Europe Agreements". GRUR 
Int. 1996. Heft 4.316. at page 321. where he argues that the dispute over intc:rnational. exhaustion 
relates to the issue of control over exclusive sales territories rather than assunng the nghts owner 
the best conditions of "making his innovation". 
See in/m, para. 7.2.4. 
See Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights. at paras. 6.1 
to 6.3. 
See Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of His Exclusive Rights. at para. 6.4. 
See section 31(2A) of the Act. By virtue of this section. where twO or ~. persons ha\4e 
separately and independently made the same invention and each has made .an ~I~ for a .patent 
having the same priority date. a patent may be granliCd on each apphcahon. The InclUSion of 
section 31 (2A) in section 37(5) would cover goods put on the market by the other patentee of the 
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section 38, which confers on a prior user certain rights to continue use of a patented 
invention. 
7.2.3. Prior User Rights 
7.2.3.a. General 
In a first-to-file system,63 there could sometimes be a situation in which the applicant who 
files for a patent for an invention may not be the first person to conceive the invention. 
Prior to the filing, there could, for example, be someone who has been using the invention 
the subject-matter of an application, who decides either to keep the use secret, or to take 
advantage of the grace period provided by the Act. Such a use by the first person 
necessarily would not have been a public use, because if such has been the case the 
applicant would not have been entitled to a patent, since the knowledge would have been in 
the public domain and hence novelty-defeating. Provisions, therefore, need to be made to 
safeguard the position of the first user to allow him to continue, to some extent, his 
previous use of the invention, and to limit the rights of the patent owner.64 There may also 
be situations where the prior user may not have been the first to conceive the invention. He 
may have independently conceived the invention after the applicant. Nevertheless, he has 
invested time, money, resources and efforts to get the product on to the market. He should 
also be entitled to rely on the prior user right. So, strictly, the purpose of the prior user 
rights provisions is to safeguard the investment so that it will not be jeopardised by the 
applicant who later files a patent application. 
63 
64 
same invention, so that one concurrent owner cannot prevent further circulation of the goods 
legitimately put on the market by the other concurrent owner. 
In fact, even under the US first-to-invent system, a restricted fonn of prior user right system was 
present in section 7 of the Patent Act of 1839 of the US, which provided that anyone who tm 
purchased or made any "newly invented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter before the 
inventor filed a patent application" had the right to use and sell them without liability to the 
inventor. This defence remained in the Patent Act of 1870, in section 37. However, explicit 
provisions for prior user rights were repealed in the Patent Act of 1952. See generally, Harriel, K., 
"Prior User Rights in a First-to Invent Patent System: Why Not?", 36 IDEA 543 (1996). For 
further references, see infra footnote 64. 
Note that neither the TRIPS Agreement, nor the Paris Convention, addresses the issue of prior user 
rights. The proposed Patent Law Treaty contains provisions on prior user rights which are 
substantially similar in effect to the UK provisions. One alternative provi~ for ~
inclusion of such provisions in national legislation, whereas the other alternative leaves It at the 
option of the Contracting State - see Article 20. 
See generally, Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights, National and International 
Protection, Vol. I, at pages 413-416. See also the discussion on the pri~ ~ ~aht in the work 
on patent law hannonisation of the World Intellectual Property OrganisabOil In PaaenbelJ. J .• 
"The WIPO Treaty". 19 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1991). For a discussion of ~ p,?posaI for a prior user 
right in the United States. see Quillen. C.D.. "Proposal for the Simplification and Reform of the 
United Slates Patent System" 21 A1PLA QJ. 189 (1993), at pages 200-201. Morico. P.R •• "Ale 
Prior User Ri ..... Consistent ~th Federal Patent Policy?: The US Considers Lelislation to Adopt 
Prior User RiJIds". 78 JPTOS S72 (1996). See also aenenIly. Kupferschmid. K.M •• -Prior l1Ier 
Rights: The Inventor's Lottery Tacket", 21 AIPLA QJ. 213 (1993) for an excellent account of the 
pros and cons of having a prior user right system. 
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TIle absence of a prior user right would act as a disincentive or create a climate of 
uncertainty for manufacturing activities. Since there is no early publication under the 
Malaysian system, details of the patented invention being made available only after the issue 
of the grant for a patent,65 a prior search would not have revealed anything to put the prior 
user on notice of possible impediments on his activities. Hence it would be unfair to 
deprive him of protection. Although the number of such instances may be very small,66 the 
harm done to the person involved is real. Thus there is a need for a workable provision to 
cater for such an eventuality, where a proper balance can be found to protect the interest of 
both parties. 
Section 38 of the Act provides such a limitation to the rights of the owner of the patent if 
certain conditions are satisfied.67 The conditions are that, at the priority date of the patent 
application, the person relying on this provision is in good faith, in Malaysia, making the 
product or using the process which is the subject of the invention claimed in the 
application.68 Alternatively, such prior user rights can be claimed if it can be shown that he 
has in good faith, in Malaysia, made serious preparations towards the making of the 
product or using the process which is the subject matter of the invention claimed in the 
application.69 Since only the acts of making the product and using the process are 
mentioned in the provision, it is clear that the prior act of importing the product would not 
give the prior importer a prior user right to continue the importation after the patent has been 
granted.7o 
7.2.3.b. Construction of the provision 
In the construction of this section, several questions have to be considered. How these 
questions are resolved will decide the viability of the provision to achieve a workable 
balance between the prior user and the patent owner. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
See section 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Act 
See Osterborg, L., ''Towards a Hannonised Prior Use Right Within a Common Market Patent 
System", (1981) 12 ne 447. ... . 
This provision is in pari materia with the prior user provIsion In section 137 of the WlPO Model 
Law. 
Section 38(1)(a) of the Act. 
Section 38( I)(b) of the Act .. . 
This would normally not be a problem, since the occurrenc:e of pnor Importauon of ~ . product 
into the country would mean that the product is part of the state of the art before the ~onty dale. 
Of greater difficulty. however. would be the case of importation of a product made directly by a 
particular process. If the process is used secretly. it would not form part of the Stale of the. art. 
Hence the lppIicant would be able 10 apply for a patent for it. On grant. ~ would hPe the nPt. 
not only 10 prevent anyone else from using the process. but also the npt to prevent an~ 
exploiting a product obtai~ directly by ~eans of the process. The problem of such pnor 
importers is discussed later 1ft para. 7.2.3.b.(III). 
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7.2.3.b.(i). The source of the prior user's information 
The prior user's source of the technical information involving the relevant invention could 
arise from several sources. He may have independently devised the invention himself, or 
from someone who has independently devised it. Alternatively, he could have learnt about 
it from sources emanating from the patent applicant. In the second situation, there are two 
possibilities. The first is that the information is derived from sources in the public domain 
caused by the voluntary acts of the patent applicant. The second arises from information 
obtained in breach of confidence owed to the patent applicant. 
It is generally accepted that, in fairness, any exploitation of the source of information 
regarding the invention through, for example, breach of confidence, should not give rise to 
a prior user right. The unfairness of obtaining the knowledge through information derived 
from products put on the market by the applicant which is not from any abuse of 
confidentiality is, however, debatable. Take an example of an applicant who, within one 
year prior to his filing a patent application, has marketed a product incorporating the 
invention. The alleged prior user, through reverse engineering, learns about the principles 
involved in making the product. Using that idea, he markets similar products. If he has not 
infringed any copyright, registered designs or trade mark of the applicant, he cannot be said 
to be acting in bad faith. Since the product is not protected by any intellectual property 
rights, he is free to use the idea which is in the public domain. He is what is called a 
"legitimate appropriator". However, though he cannot be accused of acting in bad faith,71 
he has not contributed any independent inventive input of his own in making the product. 
Neukom argues that although strictly he should not be entitled to exercise the prior user 
right, such rights should, however, be made available to him because of the need for a 
counterweight by which to prevent the grace period from becoming a system of "frrst-to-
publish,,72 or "first-to-disclose".73 Without such a counterweight, a publication before 
making the patent application would be "forbidden fruit for its readers", with the 
consequential effective lengthening of the duration by the time between publication and 
filing. A more compelling argument is the fact that since the information has been put in the 
public domain, it is infonnation freely available to be used. Any member of the public who 
has put such infonnation into use in reliance of its "free nature" should not later be 
penalised by a prohibition on further use on a patent being granted. Admittedly this will, to 
some extent, diminish the right of the patent owner, but the potential loss suffered by the 
prior user also needs to be taken into account. However, it would amount to giving with 
71 
72 
Section 38(I)(a) and (b) of the Act makes it a precondition that the prior act must be done in good 
faith. 
See Neukom, J., "A Prior Use Right for the Community Patent Convention", [1990] 5 ~R 165, 
at peae 166 and Neukom, J., "A Prior Use Ript for the Community Patent Convenbon: An 
Update", [1991] 4 BIPR 139, It paaes 140-141. 
See Yin Xintian, "On Question of Prior User's Right", (1994) China Patents & Tradenwb 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, page 25, at page 27 .The writer is also of the same opinion as Neukom. 
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one hand and taking away with the other. Since a grace period of one year is given to the 
applicant, it would not seem fair that acts done within this period may eviscerate his 
proprietary rights later. A compromise might be to insist on a prior reservation of right, as 
in the German system.7 4 At least, after being warned of the possibility of a patent claim in 
the future, the prior user will not be able to claim that he has relied on the free availability of 
the infonnation. The potential user during this period will then have a choice, to go ahead 
and take the risk that a patent may later issue or to wait for the grace period to lapse before 
venturing into exploitation of the information. 
The question of whether the prior user rights will arise if the knowledge of the information 
does not originate from the prior user, but is derived from the applicant does not arise in 
Malaysia.75 It is provided by the section that reliance on the section can only be claimed if 
the knowledge of the invention was not derived from a disclosure arising from the 
circumstances laid down in section 14(3)(a) to (C).76 The section just referred to provides a 
grace period of one year for novelty purposes, within which time any disclosure arising 
from, inter alia, either any acts of the applicant or any abuse of the rights of the applicant 
will not be novelty destroying. This means that in Malaysia, the prior user right can only be 
invoked if the prior user has derived his knowledge independently of the applicant.77 
7.2.3.b.(ii). Meaning of "serious preparation" 
There is no precondition that the making or use, or preparation in relation to such activities 
must be done for commercial purposes. One consequence of this is that a prior user who 
had been making or using the process for non-commercial purposes may be able to later 
rely on the prior user right to commercialise the product or process. Construing the 
provision in this way is fair, since there is no reason why a prior non-commercial user 
should be prevented from doing what he has previously been doing just because he now 
decides to put his knowledge to profitable use. It is submitted that this construction should 
be adopted. In contrast to the phraseology of the Malaysian provision, under the prior user 
provision of the 1977 Act of the UK, the prior act referred to in section 64 is qualified by 
the words "which would constitute an infringement of the patent if it were in force". Hence, 
74 
76 
77 
Though, according to Neukom, J., "A Prior Use Right for the Community ~nt .Convention: An 
Update", [1991] 4 EIPR 139, at page 140, a majority of the member ~nlries .. n ~ ~
Union are not in favour of the Gennan approach in discussions on the pnor user nght m relation to 
the Community patent. . . 
For a discussion as regards this problem in China. see Yin, Xintian, "On Question of Prior User's 
Right", (1994) China Patents &: Trademarks Quarterly, Vol. 4, page 25. 
See proviso to section 38( 1) of the Act . 
Under Article 20 of the propoaed Parent Law Treaty, it is left to naoo.-. ~ n:P-I 1aw to 
determine whether a prior uae baaed on information obtained from a non~ cIiIcIosuIe naIe 
during the grace period will constitute a use in good faith - see Notes on the Basic Paapoal, WJP() 
Doc. PLT/DC/4. 
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in the U~ it may be that a prior non-commercial user may not be able to rely on the prior 
user right if he later decides to utilise his prior knowledge commercially.78 
The absence of the qualification in the Malaysian provision also prevents the problem 
mentioned by Boff from arising in the Malaysian context. According to Boff/ 9 the 
presence of this qualification could give rise to unfairness to a prior user in certain 
situations. He gives the example of a company, "A", who makes a lubricant intended for 
low temperatures and incorporates a known antioxidant material in it. Unknown to the 
company, the additive has beneficial effects on low temperature performance of the 
lubricant. Later, Company "B" independently discovers the effect of this additive and 
obtains a patent for the use of the additive in lubricants for the purpose of promoting low 
temperature performance. Boff argues that Company "A" has no right to continue use of 
this additive after the grant of the patent to Company "B". This is because its prior use of 
the additive would not have constituted an infringement of the patent if it had been in force 
because it did not have the requisite knowledge or purpose. Hence its prior use cannot fall 
within the rights given by section 64 of the UK Act. However, once the new use is made 
known to Company "A", it cannot but have the required purpose when adding the additive 
to the lubricant. In these circumstances Company "A" will now infringe and will not have 
the benefit of section 64 to protect them. Since the Malaysian provision does not have this 
qualification, it would appear that as long as there is a prior use, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, the user has the right to continue the use. 
Whether a person has already been making a product or using the process the subject matter 
of the invention claimed can easily be determined. The same, however, cannot be said of 
the question of whether the person had made serious preparations towards such activities. 
There is no definition of what is meant by serious preparation. Before a product can be 
made or a process used, several preparatory steps need to be taken.so 
The key word in the phrase "having made serious preparations towards the making of the 
product or using the process" in the section is "preparations". It would seem that a mere 
wish or idea, however strong it is, and however advanced it is, would not be enough. 
Further, the mere possession or knowledge of the inventive concept is insufficient8 • It has 
been argued that even the submitting of a preliminary budget, market research and 
personnel allocation is not enough.8 2 More has to be shown, and it is submitted that they 
78 
79 
80 
I. 
12 
Similarly with Article 20 of the proposed Patent Law Treaty, which qualifies the prior use by 
reference to "for the purpose of his enterprise or business". 
See Boff, J.C. "Letter to the Editor - Section 64 - The Patents Act 1977". (1990) 19 CIPA 377. 
See Yin. Xintian, "On Question of Prior User's Right", (1994) ~ina Paten~ cl Trademarks 
Quarterly. Vol. 4, pap 15, where there is a good discussion of. the v~ ~ InvoiWJd. 
In France ....... poaasion of the invention sutTaces to obtain a pnor user nJht - lee 0IIeItIcq. 
L, "Towards.1brmoIIiIed Prior Use Right Within a Common Markd Patent System-, (1981) 12 
DC 447, at.,..e 441. ....1 
See Yin, Xintian. "On Quation of Prior User's Right", (1994) anna Patents cl Trademancs 
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must relate to physical and technical preparations. For example, the making or buying of 
the relevant equipment, developing of moulds or dies, getting the materials ready, 
producing the part drawings and assembly drawings etc. In The Lubrizol Corp. and anor v. 
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd and ors, 8 3 it was held that "preliminary planning for the 
manufacture of the product", involving consideration of all that was involVed, including 
any necessary plant modifications, but without any decision to actually manufacture, was 
insufficient to constitute "serious preparation". Further, the fact that two customer trials 
were carried out did not add anything to the judge's finding, since "they were undoubtedly 
serious but hardly a 'preparation"'. 
Further, there needs to be a causality between the preparations undertaken and the making 
or using of the product or process. Acts like the buying of real estate and the installing of 
equipment for basic utilities, which could be used for other purposes WOUld, therefore, be 
insufficient.84 If the making of the product is still at an experimental stage, it would seem 
that the prior user right does not attach.8 5 This has to be right, since it cannot then be said 
that the alleged prior user had made the product or was making serious preparation to make 
the product. 
Further, as Yin pointed out,86 there could be great disparity in terms of the complexity and 
technical difficulty of the technology involved. In some situation, the preparatory steps may 
be very simple and relatively inexpensive, whereas in others the preparations may be very 
complex and expensive. Therefore, judgement should only be made after considering all 
relevant factors.8 7 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Quarterly, Vol. 4. page 25. at page 28. 
The Lubriml Corp. and anor v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd and ors (Patents Court. CH 1989 L 6370. 
13th Nov. 1996. as yet unreported). per Jacob J. at pages 36 and 44 of the transcript 
See Yin. Xintian. "On Question of Prior User's Right". (1994) China Patents & Trademarlcs 
Quarterly. Vol. 4. page 25. at page 28. 
See Helitune Ltd v. Stewart HuShes Ltd [1991] FSR 171. at 206. per Aldous J .• at pages 207-208. 
"At the priority date of the, patent, the defendant bad not sold an active tracker. It bad, however. 
produced a prototype of an active tracker using a laser with ~ view to its ~urtber development The 
position had not been reached where the defendant bad decided to sell acllve trackers. and by the 
priority date its efforts were concentrated on producing ~ passive ~ker. I do not ~ieve the 
defendant had reached the stage of making effective and senous preparatiOos to sell an acbve tracker. 
and, therefore. section 64 does not give it a defence to the action." 
Yin, Xintian. "On Question of Prior User's Right". (1994) China Patents & Trademarks Quarterly, 
Vol. 4. page 2S, at page 28. 
In this respect. the factors listed in the Report of the United States Advisory Commissi~n on 
Patent Law to Congress, 1992. (mentioned in Yin, Xintian. "On Question of Prior User's Right". 
(1994) China Patents & Tradenw'ks Quarterly. Vol. 4, page 25. at page 28) that shouI~ be 
considered may be helpful in making the determination of whdher there had been senous 
preparation. They are: . . cia f the and the 
a. The cost incurred by the prior user as of the earliest .eff~l1ve fihng te 0 patent 
b. 
c. 
d. 
proportion of the costs in relation to the total explOitallon ~t of the ~~ technology. 
The amount of time spent by the prior user as of the earliest effecti\1e ~hnl dIIe o~ the 
patent ... the proportion of the time in relation to the toW amount of time neceR.., to 
exploit the patented technCJlo&y. • 
The complexity of the ~ns needed to exploit. the paten~ technCJlo&y. and 
The diligence of the prior user in the process of maklDg preparatIOn. 
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7.2.3.b.(iii). Prior act of importation 
The Act is silent on this point. If the provision is to protect any prior investment as regards 
the relevant invention, then it would seem fair that the right should also extend to prior act 
of importation, preparation to import, or even prior sale. The contrary argument is that the 
provision is only meant to preserve the rights of a person who has made a local industrial 
investment rather than to protect any investment per se. This is, nevertheless, a moot point, 
since any prior act of importation or preparation to import would presuppose that some 
manufacturer somewhere in the world has been manufacturing the product in question. In 
that case, since the standard of novelty required for a valid patent is universal novelty, the 
patent would not have been valid anyway. Hence in this case there is usually no need to 
rely on a prior user right. A difficulty that could arise is in the case of a non-public use of a 
process. Since the rights of a patentee of a process patent extend to product directly made 
by means of the process, he would be in a position to prevent any further importation of 
such product. Another situation is where a prior available product is allowed to be patented 
because information about the product is not deemed to be available to the public because 
the prior manufacture is a "non-informing" public use. Any such imported product already 
in hand and unsold, as well as any contracted for products could not be sold. This could 
cause hardship to the importer. Therefore, statutory provision should be made to cater for 
this situation to allow the importer the freedom to sell off any such product. 88 
7.2.3. b. (i v). The scope and extent of the prior user rights 
The section provides that where the conditions are satisfied, the prior user shall have the 
right, despite the grant of the patent, to exploit the patented invention. Two preliminary 
points will be mentioned fIrSt. One is that the right to continue to make the product or use 
the process is confined to activities in Malaysia.89 Such rights are not capable of being 
assigned or transferred except as part of the business of the person concemed.90 
This right is potentially very wide, since the defmition of exploitation of a patented 
invention under section 36(3)(a), in the case of a product, includes making, importing, 
offering for sale, selling and using the product.91 From the wording of the section, it may 
fIrSt appear that where the prior use is the making of a product, his right to "continue use" 
of the patented invention is not confined to his prior act of making the article. He has the 
II 
89 
90 
91 
See infra, para. 7.5. . ., . 
See proviso to section 38( I) of the Act Nothing much turns on this J'!OVISO S!~ ~. pnor user 
could hardly expect to be able to enforce his rights under the Act outsl~ the Junsdic~on ~f t~ 
Malaysian courts. He has to rely on the respecti~e provisions of the foretgn patent legislation, If 
any, to claim his prior user rights in these countnes. . ' 
Section 38(2). This provision is in line with the practice aenerally .... In most countrIeS to 
prevent the abuse of the prior user riahL . . 
See section 36(3) - acts of exploitation of a patent. and 0uIpter 3 - The exclUSIve Rights. paras. 
3.1 and 3.2. 
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further right to sell, import and use the product. 92 However in vI'ew of the ' 
. 'provIso to 
sectIon 38{ 1) mentioned earlier, which provides that the product I'n tI' , d' ques on IS rna e m 
Malaysia, this rules out the act of importation.9 3 
The Act is silent as to whether the prior user, in regard to exploitation of the patented 
invention, is restricted quantitatively or qualitatively by his prior activities. Two pertinent 
issues arises here: 
Quantitative scope of exploitation 
Assuming that the prior user has been manufacturing a certain volume of the product before 
the priority date. Is he restricted to manufacturing the same quantity that he has been 
manufacturing or making serious preparation to manufacture, or can he later expand his 
production capacity? If he is allowed to increase his production volume, should a ceiling be 
imposed? It is submitted that to limit him to the original scale that he is manufacturing 
would be unfair and unrealistic.94 Since the right to exploit is not confined to the particular 
act, it might be possible to argue that his right is not so limited. Hence he would be free to 
expand production. There should, therefore, be no quota imposed.9 5 
Qualitative scope of exploitation 
Has the prior user the right to further technically improve or modify his product or process 
to make it more marketable and in tune with the needs of the market demand? In relation to 
92 
93 
94 
Contrast section 64 of the United Kingdom Patents Act 1977, and see the comments of Aldous J. 
in Helityne Ltd v. Stewart Hu&hes Ltd [1991] FSR 171, at 206, "Section 64(2) confines the 
statutory licence to the right to continue to do or to do 'that act', namely the act which the person 
had done or had made effective and serious preparations to do. Thus. the right is limited to the 
particular act of infringement done or for which effective and serious preparation had been made. 
That conclusion can be illustrated by considering a person who in good faith imported an 
infringing product The section enables him to continue to import the product but not to sell it 
unless the importation amounted to an effective and serious preparation to sell it" 
Similarly, Article 20 of the proposed Patent Law Treaty. by the use of the words "continue such 
use" and "use the invention as envisaged in such preparations", is to the same effect. 
Since a prior act of importation does not give rise to a prior user right. excluding importation from 
his right to exploit the patented invention would be consistent with the implied policy of the 
section which seems to be to protect prior local manufacturing activities. If the prior user is also 
allowed to import the patented product this would negate the implied policy of this section. 
For similar opinions, see Jones, H., "'Made Available' - The Effects of Use of an Invention on the 
Subsequent Rights of the User and the General Public". (1986 ) IS CIPA 342, at 347 a1 
Neukom. J., "A Prior Use Right for the Community Patent Con~ention". [I~J"S EIPR 165,. at 
166. Contrast the view of Yin, Xintian, "On Question of Prior User's Right. (1994) China 
Patents &. Trademarks Quarterly. Vol. 4, page 2S at 29. 
The patent laws of a number of countries. e.g., Gennany, do not impose limits on the scope of 
exploitation of an item of patented technology by a person enjoying the prior user right The ~S 
Commiaee leIpOIISibie for n:visin. the .. tent law of the country has also proposed dud "The ~ 
user should be able 10 wasonably expBI the prior use to meet reasonable market ...... within 
the Unilled S~ rather than being ratricted only to the pre-filing volume of use." - see SIIpITI. 
footnote 87. 
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the United Kingdom provision, it has been held in one case that he could.96 This was 
however, doubted in The Lubrizol Corp. and anor v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd and (N ' 
97 • • • ors o. 
1) . ObvIOusly, If the Improvement is inventive it could be patented by th· B 
- e pnor user. ut 
what happens if it falls within the claims of the patent owner? As Neukom rightly points 
out, ~f the prior u~er's product has t~ remain unchanged it is tantamount to "extinguishing 
the nght by creepmg obsolescence with the passage of time". He lists five possible options 
that could be chosen.9 8 They are: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
96 
97 
98 
no more than modifications for updating In line with advances In relevant 
technology. 
the substitution of any part by an equivalent. 
any variation within claims of the patent which the prior use, had it been published, 
would invalidate. 
See HelituneLtd v. Stewart Hughes Ltd [1991] FSR 171, at 206. per Aldous J., "Section 64(1) 
relates to acts which constitute an infringement and not to any particular product or process. As I 
have sta.ted the act~ ar~ th.ose covered by a pa~en~ as set out in section 60. Thus provided a person 
has carned out an mfrmgmg act before the pnonty date, he can continue to carry out that act even 
though the product or process may be different to some degree. This can be illustrated by 
considering a person who uses an infringing process. The fact that he alters that process after the 
priority date does not matter. The section states that the doing of that act, namely using an 
infringing process, shall not amount to an infringement." 
The Lubrizol Corp. and anor v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd and ors (No. I) [1992] RPC 281. at page 
295, per Hugh Laddie Q.C~, "However, I think it is only right to say that I have some doubts. 
with great respect to Aldous J. as to whether Helitune is correct. The act which the alleged 
infringer is entitled to continue to conduct by virtue of section 64(2) is the act which he was 
committing before the priority date. It was not an infringement then. It was an act of commerce. It 
is that specific act of commerce which he is entitled to continue. I have difficulty in accepting that 
by, for example, manufacturing product A before the priority date, he was thereby given a right to 
manufacture any product after the priority date. In my view, section 64 is intended to safeguard the 
existing commercial activity of a person in the United Kingdom which is overtaken by the 
subsequent grant of a patent. It is not meant to be a charter allowing him to expand into other 
products and other processes." The opinion has, however, to be treated as obiter, since it was an 
action to set aside an order to serve out of jurisdiction. On appeal, this issue was not discussed -
see The Lubrizol Corp. and Mor v. Esso Pettoleum Co. Ltd and 0[5 <No. 1) [1992] RPC 467 
(CA). At the trial of the action, Jacob J. agreed with the approach of I.aIdie J. (as he now is). See 
The Lubrizol Corp. and anor y. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd and ors (patents Court. CH 1989 L 6370. 
13th Nov. 1996, as yet unreported), at page 43 of the transcript. However, Jacob J. clarified Laddie 
J's reference to "existing commercial activity" to mean an "activity which is substantially the same 
as the prior act or act for which substantial and effective preparations were made". He died ~ in 
deciding whether the activity is substantially the same, all the circumstances must be considered. 
and both technical and commercial matters must be taken into account. This is because if the 
protected act has to be exactly the same as the prior act, then the protection given by the section 
would be illusory. The section is intended to give a practical protection to enable a man to 
continue doing what in substance he was doing before. 
See Neukom, J., "A Prior Use Right for the Community Patent Convention". [I~] 5 ~IPR 165, 
at 167-168 for a discussion of the possible options. See also Davis, I., Cohen, S., Section 64 of 
the UK Patents Act 1977: Right to Continue Use Begun Before Priority Date", [1994] 6 ~R 
239, where at page 241, the authors are of the opinion that an inability to. improve a. product l~ne 
with general development in the industry might well result in the protecbon ~f sectIOn 64 be~nl 
lost for all practical purposes. Yin, Xintian, "On Question of Prior U5C!"s Rlgh~". (19?4> China 
Patents cl Trademarks Quarterly, Vol. 4. page 25, at page 29. while agreeang.that In the anteresl of 
the prior user and the country. the prior user should be al~~ to ~ ImproV~ Ihe product. 
discua. the difficulty .wlved when the prior act falls within an indepaldelat c1..... but not a 
dependellt claim. He sugests that in this situation. the prior user ~Id not be allowed • -
licence to make products falling within the dependent claim. as an exception to the theory or patent 
infringement. 
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iv) free run of the whole of the invention as patented, hence effectively a free licence 
under the patent. 
v) the combination of the prior use right with the right to a compulsory licence for such 
aspects of the patent not covered by the prior use right. 
Again, section 38 does not, unlike the UK provision, place any limitation on the right to 
exploit the patented invention. Therefore, it would seem that the provision may legitimately 
be construed to allow the prior user the right to further develop and improve on the product, 
even if it falls within specific claims of the patent. While agreeing that some rights should 
be given to the prior user, to allow him a free run of the invention, even to specific 
embodiments actually shown in the patent, would seem harsh on the patentee. Neukom 
suggests that option (iii) mentioned above should be adopted since a determination of how 
much of the patent would have been invalid, had the prior use been published "treads 
ground that is more familiar" and hence "legal certainty in the interpretation of the scope of 
the right is facilitated" .99 Therefore, the prior user right to update his product extends only 
to that which is obvious having regard to his prior manufacture or use. This would allow 
him, for example, to make continuous workshop improvements to his products or process. 
A fairer balance may be to allow the prior user the right to improve or modify his product 
by the use of equivalents and the further right to a compulsory licence for aspects of the 
patent not covered by the prior user right. At the very least, the owner would be 
compensated by the payment of some royalty. 
7.2.4. Ri&hts after Reinstatement of Lapsed Patents 
Prior to the 1993 Amendment Act, there was no provision in the Act regulating what is to 
happen if the patent owner fails to pay the renewal fee to keep the patent in force. 1be only 
provision was the allowance of a period of grace of six months within which be can still 
pay the renewal fees. I 00 In theory, therefore, the patent could still be deemed to be a valid 
patent despite the failure to pay the renewal fees. A new subsection (3) of section 3S now 
provides that a failure to pay the annual fee within the prescribed time will result in the lapse 
of the patent. Upon such a lapse, the Registrar shall cause a notice to be published in the 
Gazette. I 0 I Under the newly introduced section 3SA, the owner of a patent or his successor 
in title or anyone who would have been entitled to the patent ,had it not lapsed, can, within 
two years from the date on which the notice of the lapsing of the patent was published in 
the Gazette, apply to the Registrar to have the patent reinstated. I 02 The ground for 
99 
100 
101 
102 
See Neukom. J .• "A Prior Use Right for the Community Patent ConY~ntion". [1990] 5 ~ 165. 
at 167. and also Neukom.I •• "A Prior Use Right for ~ Community P~t Conveabon: An 
UpdIIe", [1991] 4 BIPR 139 •• 141 and Neukom.l .• "Prior Use Once Men • (1991) 9 EIPR 350. 
See section 35 of Ihe Act. 
See Secdon 3S(c) which was introduced by section 23(b) 01 the Pllents (Amendment) Ad 1993. 
This section was Idded by section 2S of the Patents (Amendment) Act 1993. 
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reinstatement that can be relied upon is that the non-payment was due to accident, mistake 
or other unforeseeable circumstances.' 03 Upon a reinstatement, the Registrar shall cause 
notice of the reinstatement to be published in the Gazette. '04 
Since there could be a significant lapse of time from the time notice of the lapsing of the 
patent is published in the Gazette and the time when a patent has been reinstated, interested 
third parties could have started exploiting the supposedly lapsed patent.' 05 Therefore, it is 
specifically provided that the reinstatement of a lapsed patent shall not prejudice the rights 
acquired by third parties after it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has lapsed and 
before it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has been reinstated.' 06 It is important to 
note that the right is acquired only during the specified duration. For example, if a third 
party has commenced his exploitation of the expired patent prior to official notification that 
the patent has lapsed, the section is inapplicable, and he can be sued for infringement upon 
reinstatement of the patent. ' 0 7 
The rights acquired are not specified 10 the Act. However, section 35A(5) gives the 
Minister the power to make regulations to provide for the protection or compensation of 
persons who have exploited or taken definite steps, by contract or otherwise, to exploit a 
patent after it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has lapsed and before it is notified in 
the Gazette that the patent has been reinstated. However, the power to provide protection to 
third party does not extend beyond such exploitation of the lapsed patent as such persons 
have availed themselves of, or have taken definite steps to avail themselves of.' 08 It is 
submitted that this may not be fair. What if the third party, despite knowing of the huge 
expenses in retooling and in the knowledge that merely working the said patent in a 
particular way will not bring him profit, still goes ahead with the venture for long term 
prospects - i.e., he has planned also to do other things with the patented invention besides 
the present use or planned used. To permit him only the present use could result in heavy 
loss of his investment. The argument about "creeping obsolescence" mentioned in the 
section on prior user rights comes to mind. However, be that as it may be, under regulation 
33B of the Patents Amendment Regulations 1994, the affected third party may apply to the 
Registrar for the grant of a licence to exploit the patented invention. If such an application is 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
101 
See section 3SA(2)(b). Compared to the United Kingdom provision, which provides that the 
Comptroller must be satisfied that the proprietor had "taken ~onable care" to see ~hat the re~waJ 
fee is paid and that the fee . was not so paid "because of cU'Cumstances beyond hiS control. the 
Malaysian conditions seem to be less onerous. 
See section 3SA(3) of the Act . 
Note that unlike the provision of section 28{2A) of the Patents Act 1977 of the. UK, ~ IS • no 
provision requiring the Registrar to publish any notification of the fact that there IS an appbcauon 
to apply for a reinstatement of a lapsed patent. 
See section 3SA(4) of the Act . 
This II the effect of section 3SA(6) of this Act. The result is simi" under aectIOn ~A of the 1977 
PatenlS Act. UK, although under section 28A(3)(a) of ~ UK ~ct. the act of a thinI s-tY would 
only amount to an infriqement if done at a time when It IS possible for the patent to be renewed. 
See section 3SA(S) of the Act. 
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granted, a licence must be granted on such terms as the Registrar thinks reasonable. It 
would seem that this regulation is inconsistent with the power granted to the Registrar 
under section 35A(5), which allows him only to grant protection to the extent of the actual 
exploitation or planned exploitation. The regulation, on the other hand, by the use of the 
words "exploit the patented invention" seems to imply that there is no limit to the type of 
exploitation that could be granted a licence. 
Another inconsistency arises from a comparison of section 35A(4) and (5). Section 35A(4) 
seems to imply that reinstatement of a lapsed patent is subject to the rights acquired by a 
third party. Hence the third party is free to continue his exploitation of the patent without a 
licence from the patent owner. I 09 However, from the combined effect of section 35A(5) 
and regulation 33B, it appears that upon acquiring the rights, the third party does not have 
free use of the patented invention to the extent allowed by the Act, but has to apply to the 
Registrar for a licence to exploit the invention. 
To remove this inconsistency, and to provide a better balance between the rights of the 
patent owner and a third party in the situation envisaged by section 35A, it is proposed that 
section 35A(4) be amended to clarify that a third party acquiring rights under the section 
shall have the right to continue with his present use free from the effects of the patent. The 
existing section 35A(5), with some modification, can then be used to cater for the problem 
of "creeping obsolescence" mentioned earlier. The amendment to this subsection will 
provide that if the third party wishes to further exploit the patented invention beyond what 
he is allowed by virtue of section 35A( 4), he may apply to the Registrar for a licence to do 
so. In this way, the position of a person who has acquired rights to use the patent before 
reinstatement of a lapsed patent will then be nearer to the position of a prior user. 1 10 
109 
110 
The position of the thinl party would then be similar to that provided for in the UK statute. see 
section 28A(4)(a) and (b) of the 1977 Act. UK. . and that ( 
Under the approach adopted in the United KinacSc>m. the rights acquired by a pnor user . 0 a 
third befcft.......,.... of • IIpsed patent ~ similar. The pmpoaed ~ will "?' 
be in ~f1ict with the provision of Article 5bis of the Paris Conva.'t~. ~. Will .it be In 
conflict with Article 48 of this Convention. which relates to the prohibition of gaVlnl thlnl party 
ri,hts durin. the priority period. 
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7.3. The Common Law Exception - Implied Licence to Repair 
Flowing from the implied licence to use in the absence of any restriction, I I I is the implied 
licence to repair. Under the common law, the purchaser of a patented article has the right to 
use the article until it is worn out or destroyed. I 12 He can, therefore, repair I I 3 and maintain 
that article so that it will be fit for his use. He is not obliged by law to have repairs in the 
nature of reconditioning done by the patent owners or an agent authorised by them. I I 4 In 
this context, it is useful to refer to Judge Ford's opinion in Hazel Grove (Superleague) Ltd 
v. Euro-League Leisure Products Ltd & anor. 115 With regard to the right to repair, Judge 
Ford preferred to look at it from the question of whether it is an act which is statutorily 
prohibited. Since there is no prohibition against repairing a patented article in the 
infringement provisions of section 60 of the 1977 Patents Act of the UK, the act of 
repairing is not prohibited. As long as the repair does not amount to a "making" of the 
patented invention, there is no infringement. There is no need to rely on the doctrine of an 
III 
112 
113 
114 
liS 
See supra, para. 7.2.1. 
Lord Bridge in British Leyland Motor COW. Ltd and ors v. Armstron2 Patents Co. Ltd [1986] I 
All ER 850; [1986] RPC 279, at page 358, explained it thus, "Letters patent, on their face, always 
granted to the patentee the exclusive right "to make, use, exercise and vend" the invention. A lite;al 
application of this language would lead to the absurdity that a person who acquired the patented 
goods would infringe the patent if he used or resold them. To avoid this absurdity the courts tm 
recourse to the doctrine of implied licence. In the field of repair it is clear that a person who 
acquires a patented article has an implied licence to keep it in repair, but must stop short of 
renewal.." The seminal case on this area in the United States is Wilson y. Simpson 50 U.S. 109: 
13 L. Ed. 66 (US Sup. Ct 1850). Here the defendant lawfully obtained a planing machine covered 
by the plaintiffs patent. Without the authority of the plaintiff, the defendant replaced cutting 
knives, which normally wore out after sixty to ninety days of use. The Supreme Court held that 
such replacement was within the category of permissible repair rather than that of impermissible 
reconstruction. Mr Justice Wayne said, at page 123, "[R]epairing partial injuries, whether they 
occur from accident or from wear and tear, is only refitting a machine for use. And it is no more 
than that, though it shall be a replacement of an essential part of a combination. It is the use of the 
whole of that which a purchaser buys, when the patentee sells to him a machine; and when be 
repairs the damages which may be done to it, it is no more than the exercise of that right of care 
which every one may use to give duration to that which he owns, or has a right to use as a whole." 
See also Mitchell v. Hawley 83 U.S. 544; 21 L. Ed. 322 (US Sup. Ct 1872). See generally. 
Chisum, Vol. 4, paras. 16.03[2] to 16.03[3]. 
A good definition of repair is given by Colt, Circuit Judge, in Goodyear Shoe MachineD' Co. \'. 
Jackson 112 F. 146 (CCA 1st Cir. 1901), at page 150, "Repair is 'restoration to a sound, good, or 
complete state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction.' Reconstruction is 'the act of 
constructing again.' Reproduction is 'repetition,' or 'the act of reproducing.' 1bese definitions are 
instructive in bringing home to the mind that repair ~ with it ~ idea ?f ~~n ~ 
decay, injury, or partial destruction, and that reconstruction or reprodUCbon carnes With It the idea 
of a complete construction Qr production over again." 
In fact, the theory underlying this implied licence to repair was explained ~y !udge Wayne in 
Wilson v. Simpson 50 U.S. 109 at 123; 13 L. Ed. 66 (US Sup. Ct 1850), It IS the use of the 
whole of that which a purchaser buys, when the patentee sells to him a .machine; ~ when he 
repairs the damages which may be done to it, it is no more than the exa'C~ of that npt of ~ 
which every one may use to give duration to that which he ow~s, or.has a nght to. use as a ~le. 
See also L. Hand, A. Hand, and Chase, Circuit Judges. ~r curuurt, an The EIC!cqjc ApIQ-IM Co. 
v. P. " D. ManufacturiOI Co. Inc. 44 USPQ 377 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1940), at page 379. "The theo~· 
on which repair of a patented article is allowed at all is that the P;ltentee int~s the buyer to have a 
longer use of it than the life of the shortest-lived part •... " The nght to repair or replace worn out 
partS. however, does DOt apply if the puts lie sepll'lldy pmnted - see. for eumpIe. Wi ... v· 
SimpsoD 50 U.S. 101} (18SO). per Mr Justice Wayne, at 123; 14IJIIPO Pndm 1ge. y. Dmken-
Detrpit Axle Co. 45 USPQ 48 (CCA 6th Cir. 1940), per Simons. Circuit Judae. II paae 49. 
H'Rt Grpye CSYP"e"k=aam) I 1ft y. Eum-I AM Leisure Products I Jd " anor (1995] RPC 529. 
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implied licence, nor on the principle of exhaustion of rl'ghts 116 Ho de . thi 
. wever, spIte s 
seemingly "new approach", the common law authorities on reparr' and modifi tI' lca ons, even 
though decided on the basis of an implied licence, are still useful as guidance in the 
determination as to what constitutes permissible repairs as contrasted with "impermissible 
repairs" amounting to a "making". 1 17 
While the principle is clear that the purchaser of a patented article has the right to repair to 
keep it in working order, but not the right to reconstruct or make anew the patented article, 
the distinction between permissible repair and impermissible reconstruction is blurred in 
some situations. The problems relating to this issue involve mostly or invariably 
combination patents, where the invention lies in the inventive combination of old parts 
which are unpatentable in themselves. If all the parts are made and assembled by someone 
without the licence of the patent owner, it is without doubt an infringement. But what if 
only certain parts are replaced by the purchaser?l 1 8 
116 
117 
118 
Hazel Grove (Su.perlealWe) Ltd v. Euro-Leawe Leisure Products Ltd & anor [1995] RPC 529, per 
Judge Fo.rd, at page. 539. See also Benyamini, A., Patent Infringement in the European 
Commumty, IIC Studies Vol 13, 1993, at pages 103-114, which was referred to by Judge Ford. 
Hazel Groye (Syperleawe) Ltd v. Euro-LeaKYe Leisure Products Ltd & 800r [1995] RPC 529, per 
Judge Ford, at page 540. 
Though the question of permissible repair is closely allied to the issue of contributory 
infringement, in that both kinds of infringement relate to making a part of a patented invention, as 
distinguished from making the whole, there are, however, differences. This is clearly explained by 
Colt J. in Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson 112 F. 146 (CCA lst Cir. 1901), at pages 
147-150, where he made the distinction between a direct infringement and a contributory 
infringement. He also made the distinction between an ordinary infringement and infringement by 
reconstruction. He said that, "To prove contributory infringement it is only necessary to show a 
partial infringement in aid of an unlawful complete infringement, while in the case of a direct 
infringement a substantially full and complete infringement must be established. In this sense, a 
purchaser stands in no different position from an ordinary infringer, except in the circumstance that 
he has bought a patented machine, and, consequently, his infringement does not consist in the 
construction of a wholly new machine, but in the reconstruction of such machine after it is worn 
out or substantially destroyed. The essence of the infringement is the same in both cases. In other 
words, the ordinary infringer makes the entire patented machine; the infringing purchaser begins 
with what remains of the patented machine, and rebuilds it. To show infringement in the case of an 
ordinary infringer, where the patented invention comprises several elements in combination, it is 
necessary to prove that the alleged infringing machine contains all the elements (or their 
equivalents) which make up the combination, although some of the elements may not be material, 
or of the essence of the invention. To show infringement by the purchaser in such a case, the same 
strictness of proof is not required, for the reason that it may not be necessary for him to make the 
immaterial or unessential elements of the patented combination, because they may not be worn out 
or destroyed in his machine when the work of reconstruction begins. A practical reconstruction of 
the patented machine, and not necessarily a literal reconstruction of the patented combination, is all 
that is required to constitute infringement by the purchaser .... In approaching the question of 
infringement by the purchaser of a patented machine, it is important to bear in mind what the 
patentee sold and the purchaser bought. The patentee has parted with his machine and the 
monopoly that goes with it, and the purchaser has bought the machine with ',he ?ght to use the 
patented invention until the machine is worn out or destroyed. When the machine IS worn. out, <"! 
substantially destroyed, his right to use the patented invention ceases; and when he rebwlds his 
machine, and thereby makes substantially a new machine, it becomes subject to the patentee's 
monopoly, the same as in the case of any other person who unlawfully makes the patented 
machine. When the patented machine has passed outside the monopoly by a sale and purchase, ~ 
patentee has no right to impose any restrictions on its use for his own benefit. He ~not forbid 
the further use of the machine because it is out of repair in consequence of the weanng out or 
breaking of some of its parts, and so oblige the purchaser to buy a new .machine. The ~
machine has become the individual property of the purchaser, and is lIke any other piece of 
property which he owns. He may sell it, or he may use it so long as its usefulness lasts, and then 
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This part of the chapter will analyse the scope of the implied licence to repair from the 
decided cases from various common law jurisdictions to determine whether a satisfactory 
test can be arrived at to determine the boundary between repair and reconstruction. The 
rights of the various parties who may be involved in the repair, the purchaser, contractor, 
and supplier of parts required for repair, will be examined. Because of their special fact 
situation, production line method of repair and conversion of patented articles will be 
discussed under separate headings. 
7.3.1. Persons Who Can Carty Out Repairs 
7.3.1. a. The purchaser and the repairman 
As far as repair by the purchaser himself is concerned, this is not much of a problem. The 
case law shows that he can carry out repairs provided it does not amount to a 
reconstruction. 1 19 This statement, however, has to be qualified, because under the Act, acts 
carried out for non-industrial and commercial purposes will not amount to an 
infringement. 12o Therefore, it would seem that, in the case of a private purchaser, he is 
allowed even to make a new patented article provided it is for his own private and personal 
use. Flowing from this, even if his repair efforts amount to making anew the patented 
article, and hence, prima facie, an infringement, he personally is exempted from an 
infringement suit. 
At the same time, the purchaser is allowed to contract out this right to repair to a third party 
contractor to carry out such repairs for him. For, as Buckley L.J. said in Solar Thomson 
En&ineerin& Co. Ltd v. Barton, "the implied licence must be as transferable as the patented 
article and must include permission to authorise an agent or contractor to carry out whatever 
the owner of the article could himself do under the licence, had he the required skill and 
equipment. ,, 1 2 I Therefore, to the extent that the purchaser of the article is allowed to carry 
out permissible repairs, the same type of repairs could be entrusted to a third party. 
119 
120 
121 
throw it away. or dispose of it for junk. He may prolong its life and useful.n~ss by repairs more. cr 
less extensive. so long as its original identity is not lost. He is ~nly p~hiblted from c~ns~ctmg 
a substantially new machine. He cannot, under the pretext of reparrs. budd another machine. 
See, for example, Dunlo.p Pneumatic 1)'re Co. Ltd v. Holborn '[yre Co. Ltd (190 I) 18 RPC 222; 
Dunlop Pneumatic T.yre Co. Ltd v. Neal [1899] 1 Ch. 807; (1899) 16 RPC 247 and SWIl 
Thomson Enaineerina Co. Ltd v. Barton [1977] RPC 537. In Canada, see Rucker Co. ct Ii. v· 
Gavel's yulcanizioa Ltd 7 CPR(3d) 294 (1985). following the United Kingdom cases. 
Section 37(1) of the Act. See infra, 7.1.1. . 
SolV Thomson Eoaineerioa Co. Ltd v. Bartoo [1977] RPC 537. at 555. ~ee also ~a~ploQ 
Spvk Plua Co. y. Jack Emeoer 32 USPQ 152 (DC B.D. Mich. 1936), "The nght to ~pa1I' IS n~t 
limited to purchasers from patentee and those deriving tide from such purchaser. ~t nght to ~ 
survives abandonment of the article and is possessed by any subsequent owner, fMr MOlDet. 
District, Judge, at page 159. 
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The problem of the extent of repair that could be carried out by the repainnan when he is 
carrying out repair work for a private purchaser is slightly more problematic. Can he carry 
out such a substantial repair that it amounts to a reconstruction? On the principle that what a 
person can do lawfully, he can lawfully authorise his agent to do on his behalf, it can be 
argued that a repairman is not liable even for carrying out reconstruction work. An 
argument against this is that the repairman's activities are not regarded as acts in the non-
industrial and commercial sphere. Therefore, he is liable for infringement if the repair is so 
extensive as to amount to a reconstruction, even though the private purchaser could, if he 
so wishes, carry out reconstruction on his article. It is submitted that this is the better 
approach, since to adopt the first approach will tantamount to emasculating the patentee's 
right to such an extent that his exclusive rights are practically non-existent. So the agency 
argument should not be allowed to be stretched so far as to allow a third party contractor to 
make infringing articles for private use. After all, the exemption from infringement actions 
for acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes is merely to save the user from 
infringement actions, it does not give him a positive right to make the invention. 
7.3.l.b. The sUllPlier of spare parts 
The propriety of the supply of parts for the purpose of repairs was first alluded to in a 
United Kingdom case in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and 
mlQI. 122 In the course of the judgement, Cozens-Hardy L.J. said that "there may be a third 
class of cases, in which the supply by the defendants might be perfectly lawful, I mean for 
the purpose of repair." I 23 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. WallinfUon Weston & Co. :24 was 
also a supply case. The patent in issue was a combination patent consisting of a rim and 
tyre. The rim was the subject of a separate claim. The defendants have supplied a new 
rubber tyre , and inserted it into an old rim of the plaintiffs to replace the old tyre worn out. 
The plaintiffs contended this was an infringement of their patent. Relying on the case of 
Dunlo.p Pneumatic Tyre Co., Swinfen-Eady 1. held that the supply of parts for the purpose 
of repair did not amount to an infringement. I 25 The law in the United States follows the 
same line. I 26 
122 
123 
124 
12S 
Dunlo.p Pneumatic ~ Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (1904) 21 RPC 53 and 274, 
at 278-282; [1904] 1 Ch. 164 and 612. The case was argued mainly on the point that the 
defendants had infringed their patents by manufacturing and selling the outer tyre or cover (one of 
the elements of the combinations) with the intent that it should be used by the purchaser for the 
purpose of making one or other of the combinations. 
Dunlop Pneumatic lYre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons Ltd and anor (1904) 21 RPC 53 and 274, 
at page 282. 
Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. WaJUni\On Weston &. Co. (1905) 22 RPC 257; (1907) 24 RPC 539 
(HL). It is notable that Sirdar Rubber is the fmt case where the House of Lord approved the 
doctrine of repair. In the course of counsel for the plaintiffs' submission,. Lord ~alsbury, at page 
S43, said, ''The principle is quite clear although its application is sometuoes difficult; you. ~y 
prolong the life of a licensed article but you must not make a new one under the cover of repa1l'. 
Sjrdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. WaJlini\On Weston &. Co. (1905) 22 RPC 257, ~t pages. 26~-2~. N~ 
that by virtue of section 60(2) of the United Kingdom Patents Act, 1977, 10 certalD SltuaUODS, It 
may be an act of contributory infringement to supply certain component parts of a patented 
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7.3.2. The Test Ap,plied 
In one of the earlier cases on the extent of the implied licence to repair in the United 
Kingdom, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. Neal,127 the patent in suit was for a 
combination patent relating to a rubber or elastic tyre having the form of a saddle or arch in 
section lined with canvas, in combination with two wires or sufficiently inelastic cores for 
securing the same to the rims or tyres. The defendant substituted for the old canvas and 
rubber new canvas and rubber, but used the old wires. It was argued that this was a mere 
repair and hence not infringement of the patent. In holding the defendant guilty of 
infringement, it was held that the only licence or authority given by the sale was that they 
could be used until they were worn out. Further, any simple repairs,128 might be done by a 
person without any licence from the manufacturer. However, the mere fact that the wires 
had been used in an article made by the plaintiffs did not mean that there was a licence to 
use them for any article of any kind with which they could be used. 1 29 
In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. Holborn Tyre Co. Ltd, 130 the defendants had bought 
up old patented tyres. The canvas and old rubber thread were taken off and the wires were 
cut and the end joined by screws. Furthermore, the canvas out of old tyres was taken, and 
from the parts not worn long strips of fabric were made for the purpose of being made up 
into tyres. This was again found to be an infringement of the patent. Kekewich J. proposed 
two tests that could be applied. Under the first test, the question to ask is, "In the alleged 
repair has the workman so employed the patent as that in doing it he has taken an essential 
part of the patent and infringed it?" However, he went on to propose a second and more 
satisfactory test, the "broad test" which asks the question "Is it substantially, in common 
parlance, honestly, a new article, or is it an old article repaired?131 In view of the bad 
condition of the tyres, the extensive nature of the repair, the fact that the old tyres were 
invention to a person not entitled to work the invention. See Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement am 
Unauthorised Indirect Exploitation of Rights. 
126 See, for example, Electric Auto-lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturin& Co. Inc. 26 USPQ 284 (CCA 
2nd Cir. 1935); General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Corp. 27 USPQ 261 (CCA 2nd 
Cir. 1935); Lempco Products, Inc. v. Iimken-Petroit Axle Co. 45 USPQ 48 (CCA 6th Cir. 
1940); Am Manufacturin& Co. Inc. et aI. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. Inc. 128 USPQ 
354 (US Sup. Ct 1961). See also Chapter 4 - Patent Infringement and Unauthorised Indirect 
Exploitation of Rights, para. 4.4. 
127 DunlOJ) Pneumatic Iyre Co. Ltd v. Neal (1899) 16 RPC 247. 
128 This expression was clarified by Buckley L.1. in Solar Thomson En&ineerin& ~o, ~ v .. Bartoo 
[1977] RPC 537, at 555, where he said, "To say that .~e owner of a paten~ arllcl~ IS entitled to 
carry out 'simple repairs' to it ... does not in my opID10n help ~o solve this questiO~, unl~s, ~ 
possibly may have been the case, North J. meant by that. expression t~ refer to an~ng ~hich IS 
no more than what can properly be described as ~ re~. An 0?Crabon. ~ay, I ~1Dk. ~n some 
circumstances be quite properly described as a repa1I' notwithstanding that It IS complicated. 
129 DunloP Pneumatic Iyre Co. Ltd v' Neal (1899) 16 R.PC 247, pe, North J., at page 250. 
130 DunlOJ) Pneumatic Iyre Co, Ltd v' "olborn Iyre Co, Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 222. See also infra, text 
accompanying footnote 155 for the discussion on "production line" situations. . 
131 DuploP Pneumatic Iyre Co. Ltd y. "olborn Iyre Co, Ltd (1901) 18 RPC 222, pe' iCekeWlCh J" 
at page 226. 
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pulled to pieces and parts from the old tyres used to make new merchantable tyres, he held 
that the work amounted not to repairs but infringement of the patent. I 32 
The question whether the work carried out could fairly be regarded as a repair is always a 
question of fact in each case. The case of Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. Wallington Weston & 
CO. I33 is instructive. Swinfen-Eady J's judgement contains several factors which could be 
taken into consideration in deciding whether what takes place amounts to permissible repair 
or impermissible remaking anew. They are: the nature of the invention, the inventive 
concept, the perishable nature of the part replaced and the determination of what is a fair 
period for the use of the article as a whole. 134 Similarly, in Solar Thomson Engineering 
Co. Ltd v. Barton, the Court of Appeal held that whether the work carried out is 
permissible repair is always largely a question of degree, depending on the nature of the 
patented article and the character of the work carried out upon it. 1 3 5 The fact that some parts 
of the original article are used, does not prevent it from being a reconstruction. I 36 
Prior to the case of Aro Manufacturing Co. Inc. et al, v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 
Inc. ,13 7 the test in the United States was substantially similar to the one in the United 
Kingdom. The seminal case on this area is the case of Wilson v. Simpson, 138 where the 
Supreme Court formulated several basic rules that could be used in the determination of 
whether the work carried out amounts to a permissible repair or an infringement. The main 
principle is that if, "as a whole, the article should happen to be broken, so that its parts 
could not be readjusted, or so much worn out as to be useless, then a purchaser cannot 
make or replace it by another, but he must buy a new one. The doing of either would be 
entire reconstruction." 1 3 9 
132 Dunlo.p Pneumatic lyre Co. Ltd V. Holborn Iyre Co. Ud (1901) 18 RPC 222, per Kekewich J .• 
at page 227. 
133 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd V. Wallington Weston & Co. (1905) 22 RPC 257; (1907) 24 RPC 539 
(HL). 
134 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. Wallington Weston & Co. (1905) 22 RPC 257. at pages 265-266. per 
Swinfen-Eady J. 
13S Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd v. Barton [1977] RPC 537, per Buckley L.J., at pages 554-
555. 
136 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd v. Wallington Weston & Co. (1905) 22 RPC 257, per Swinfen-Eady J., ~ 
page 265' DunlQP Pneumatic lyre Co. Ltd v. Neal (1899) 16 RPC 247; Pellareed v· Pelkin 
[1988] FSR 329, per Falconer J., at page 345; SQ1ar ThomsQn Engineering Co. Ltd v· Barton 
[1977] RPC 537, per Buckley L.J., at 554. 
137 Am Manufacturing Co. InC. et gI. v. COnvertible Io.p Replacement Co. Inc. 128 USPQ 354 (US 
Sup. Ct 1961). 
138 WilSOn v. SimpSOn 50 U.S. 109 (US Sup. Ct 1850) - for the facts, see supra, footno~ 112. See 
also Bloomer v. McOuewan 55 U.S. 539 (US Sup. Ct 1852); Cbaffee v· BostOn Belting Co. 63 
U.S. 217 (US Sup. Ct 1859); Mitcbell V. Hawley 83 U.S. 544 (1872); Adams v· B~ 84 U.S. 
453 (US Sup. Ct 1873); Paper-By Machine Co. v. NiXon \ NiXOn v· Paper-Big MacblQe Co. 105 
U.S. 766 (US Sup. Ct 1881); Morpn Enyelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co. 152 U.S. 425 (US Sup. 
Ct 1894); L«4s &: Catljp Co. v. Victor IaJking Machine Co. <No.2) 213 U.~. 325 (US Sup .. ~t 
1909); Heyer v. Dyplicetgr Mfa Co. 263 U.S. 100 (US Sup. Ct 1923); Uruted States v· Urum 
las Co. Inc. 316 U.S. 241 (US Sup. Ct 1942) 
139 Wilson V. Simpson 50 U.S. 109; 13 L. Ed. 66 (US Sup. Ct 1850), per Justice Wayne, at page 
124. 
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" 
From the judgement, several rules could be discerned: 
1 . the owner is allowed to replace parts which are liable to be often worn out or to 
become inoperative for their intended effect, which the inventor contemplates would have to 
be frequently replaced anew, during the time that the machine, as a whole, might last.14o 
2. If the course of repairing partial injuries, whether they OCcur from accident or from 
wear and tear, involves the replacing of an essential part of the combination, it is still 
regarded to be within the ambit of permissible repair. 14 1 
It is interesting to note that Justice Wayne was of the opinion that the right to replace certain 
elements is not so much because of its perishable nature but that it was in the contemplation 
of the parties. 142 It is submitted that though the perishable nature of the elements may not 
be the reason for giving the right to repair, it could be used as a useful indicator to help 
determine the contemplation of the parties. Therefore, the perishable nature of the parts in 
juxtaposition with other more durable parts could indicate that the patentee intends that such 
parts need to be replaced as and when required so as to maintain the use of the whole. It is, 
140 
141 
142 
Wilson v. Simpson 50 U.S. 109 (US Sup. Ct 1850), per Justice Wayne at page 125. For 
examples of application of this principle, see, Electric Auto-lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturini 
Co. Inc. 26 USPQ 284 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1935); El Dorado Foundry. Machine & Supply Co. v. 
Fluid Packed Pump Co. 28 USPQ 436 (CCA 8th Cir. 1936), per Thomas, Circuit Judge, at page 
439; The Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra 36 USPQ 453 (DC W.D. Penn. 1937), per Schoonmaker, 
District Judge, at page 456; General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Com. 27 USPQ 
261 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1935), per Manton, Circuit Judge, at page 262; GiUelte SafelY Razor Co. v. 
Standard Safety Razor Co. 17 USPQ 397 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1933), per Manton, Circuit Judge, at 
page 398-299; The Bowdil Co. v. Central Mine EQuipment Co. 56 USPQ 98 (DC E.D. Missouri 
1942), per Moore, District Judge, at page 100; National-Standard Co. v. UQP. Inc. 205 USPQ 590 
(CA 7th Cir. 1980), per Swygert J. at page 591; 
Wilson y. Simpson 50 U.S. 109 (US Sup. Ct 1850), per Justice Wayne, at page 123. For other 
cases rejecting the "essential element" or "distinguishing part of the invention" test, see General 
Motors Com. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Corp. 27 USPQ 261 (eCA 2nd Cir. 1935), per 
Manton, Circuit Judge, at page 262; Porter. et al, v. Fanners SUpjlly Services. Inc. 229 USPQ 
814 (CAFC 1986), per Markey, Chief Judge, at page 816; Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co. 448 US 176, at 217, 206 USPQ 385, at 405 (US Sup. Ct 1980); National-Standard Co. 
y. UOP, Inc. 205 USPQ 590 (CA 7th Cir. 1980), per Swygert J., at page 591. 
Wilson y. Simpson 50 U.S. 109 (US Sup. Ct 1850), per Justice Wayne, at pages 125-126. ''The 
right of the assignee to replace the cutter-knives is not because they are of perishable materials. but 
because the inventor of the machine has so arranged them as a part of its combination, that the 
machine could not be continued in use without a succession of knives at short intervals. Unless 
they were replaced. the invention would have been but of little use to the inventor or to others. The 
other constituent parts of this invention, though liable to be worn out, are not made with reference 
to any use of them which will require them to be replaced. These. without having a definite 
duration. are contemplated by the inventor to last so long as the materials of which they are formed 
can hold together in use in such a combination. No replacement of them at intennediate intervals is 
meant or is necessary. They may be repaired as the use may require. With such intentions, they me 
put into the structure. So it is understood by a purchaser, and beyond the duration of them a 
purchaser of the machine has not a longer use. But if another constituent part of the combi~ .is 
meant 10 be only tempcxwy in the use of the whole. and to be hqualdy replaced. becallSe It Will 
not last as long as the other pans of the combination. its inventor cannal complain, if he sells the 
use of his machine. that the purchaser uses it in the way the inventor meant it to be used. and in 
the only way in which the machine can be used." 
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therefore, submitted that the "perishable nature of the part replaced" is a factor to be taken 
into account in considering the intention of the parties. I 43 
Aro Manufacturing Co. Inc. et oJ. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. Inc., 144 hereinafter 
referred to as ARO 1, was seen by some commentators and judges as changing the rules on 
the repair-reconstruction doctrine. 145 By a majority, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decisions of the lower courts and held that the replacement of the fabric tops was to be 
treated as repairs. This case is significant because the majority seems to have rejected the 
"broad test" previously used in favour of a "narrow test". 14 6 
Justice Whittaker, after declaring that the leading case in the Supreme Court that dealt with 
the distinction between repair and reconstruction was Wilson v. Simpson, then referred to 
the "distilled essence of the Wilson case" as stated by Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa 
case, 14 
7 that 'The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from ... 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
See, for example, Micromatic Hone Corp. v. Midwest Abrasive Co. 83 USPQ 409 (CA 6th Cir. 
1949), per Miller, Circuit Judge, at page 411; General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire 
Corp. 27 USPQ 261 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1935), per Manton, Circuit Judge, at page 262 (although he 
further mentioned that the part replaced "were relatively perishable and wore out before the device as 
a whole was worn." Other indicators would be when the patentee sells the replacement parts or 
publish a suggested price list of renewable parts - as in Westin~house Electric & Mf& Co. v. 
Hesser 56 USPQ 347 (CCA 6th Cir. 1942), per Simons, Circuit Judge, at page 350, or, as in El 
Dorado Foundry. Machine & Supply Co. v. Fluid Packed Pump Co. 28 USPQ 436 (CCA 8th Cir. 
1936), per Thomas, Circuit Judge, at page 439 - That the replacement of worn tubes is regarded by 
the appellee as a repair only is shown by the statement in their catalogue about maintenance and 
replacement of parts. 
Aro Manufacturiol: Co. Inc. et aI. y. Convertible Top &placement Co. Ioc. 128 USPQ 354 (US 
Sup. Ct 1961). The patent in suit related to a "Convertible Folding Top with Automatic Seal at 
Rear Quarter" for use in a car. One of the components for this combination was a piece of flexible 
top material or fabric cover. The components of the patented combination were usable for the 
lifetime of the car but the fabric cover had a much shorter life. The petitioner manufactured and sold 
replacement fabrics cover designed to fit the models of cars equipped with tops embodying the 
combination covered by the patent and was sued for contributory infringement. The liability of the 
petitioner depended on whether such a replacement by a purchaser of a convertible top would 
amount to an infringement or a permissible repair. 
See also Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuthur 141 USPQ 703, at 704 (US Sup. Ct 1964), where Mr Justice 
Douglas seems to have some doubt about the new approach. He said, "Whatever view may be 
taken of the holding in the first Aro case, the majority believe that it governs the present case." 
Justice Whittaker for the Court, and Justice Black in his separate concurring judgement advocated a 
narrow test. Justice Brennan, although finding no infringement. agreed with the minority 
dissenting opinion that a broad test should be adopted. Justice Harlan, together with Justice 
Frankfurter and Justice Stewart, dissented and favoured the broad test 
United States v' Aluminium Co, of America et aI. 65 USPQ 6 (CCA 2nd Cir. 1945) (The Alml 
case), at page IS. However, as was rightly pointed out by Hildreth, R.B., "~tri~tory 
Infringement" 44 JPOS 512 (1962), at page 538, the AJgm case was not concerned With the Issue 
of reconstruction versus repair; therefore,· the8forementioned statement ~rein, ~hich ~ the 
basis of the narrow test, was really obiter. In fact the ~ case was one IDvolvlDg a SUit by the 
government against Alcoa . for breach of the Sherman Act. The statement qUOfed by Justice 
Whittaker was made in relation to whether Alcoa had a monopoly of the relevant market. The full 
quotation is set out below: . 
per L. Hand, Circuit Judge. at page 15. "The competition of '~ndary' mus~ therefore, be 
disn:prded. as soon as we consider the position of "Alcoa" over a period of years; It was as much 
within "Alcoa's" control. wu the production of the "virgin" from which it hid been derived. This 
can be well illustrated by the case of a lawful monopoly; e.g., a paaent or • copyriJht. The 
monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from reselling at whaIeYer ,prices they please ••• 
Nor can he prevent their reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they In fact make • new 
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reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they in fact make a new artic1e,'148 and 
concluded that "reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented elements, is 
limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to 'in fact make a new article', after the 
entity, viewed as a whole, has become spent. In order to call the monopoly, conferred by 
the patent grant, into play for a second time, it must, indeed, be a second creation of the 
patented entity.,,149 Taken at its face value, the "spentness of the entity as a whole" test is 
unremarkable and is in line with the Wilson approach. I 50 However, Justice Whittaker went 
on to say that "mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of 
the same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of 
the owner to repair his property." 15 1 
In contrast to this "simple and plain test", Justice Harlan and Justice Brennan favoured the 
broad test which is based upon consideration of several factors. The factors listed by 
Justice Brennan were: 
148 
149 
150 
1'1 
article. Wilson v. Simpson ... At any moment his control over the market will, therefore, be 
limited by that part of what he has formerly sold, which the price which he now charges may bring 
upon the market, as second hand or reclaimed articles." 
Aro Manufacturinl: Co, Inc. et al. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. Inc. 128 USPQ 354 (US 
Sup. Ct 1961), per Justice Whittaker, at page 358. 
Aro Manufacturinl: Co. Inc. et al, v. Convertible TQP &placement CQ. Inc. 128 USPQ 354 (US 
Sup. Ct 1961), at page 359. Based on this "plain and practical test", the court held that the factors 
taken into consideration by the lower courts, like cost, durability of the part replaced, the parties' 
intention, and the essentialness of the element replaced, were not determinative of the question to 
be determined - per Justice Whittaker, at pages 358-359. See also Justice Black, in his separate 
opinion at pages 362-363, "None of this Court's case relied upon by my Brothers Harlan arxl 
Brennan justifies adoption of the supposed guides and standards referred to in their opinions. 
Deciding whether a patented article is 'made' does not depend on whether an unpatented element of 
it is perishable, or how long some of the elements last, or what the patentee's or purchaser's 
intentions were about them ... The holding of prior cases in this court have not actually rested on 
such minor and insignificant factors in determining when an article has been 'made' and when it has 
not. A case in which only a minimal component has been omitted from a 'making' of the 
combination, such as the extreme example of omission of a single bolt from a patented machine or 
a button from a patented garment, might call upon the Court to articulate some rather obvious 
refinement to this simple test of 'making'. But this is by no means such a case and it is 
dangerously misleading to suggest that so clear a case as this one requires the application of a 
Pandora's flock of insignificant standards, especially when it is recognised, as it must be upon 
analysis, that consistent application of the standard suggested would actually change the basic test 
from 'making' to something not satisfactorily but indisputably different. And surely the scope of a 
patent should never depend upon a psychoanalysis of the patentee's or purchaser's intentions, a test 
which can only confound confusion." 
See also Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuthur 141 USPQ 703, at 704 (US Sup. Ct 1964), per Justice 
Douglas, "These four machine were not spent; they had years of usefulness remaining though they 
needed cleaning and repair." 
Aro Maoufacturine Co. Inc. et oJ. V. Convertible Io.p Re.placement Co. Inc. 128 USPQ 354 (US 
Sup. Ct 1961), at page 359. Taken to its extreme, this can could be read to mean that it is only 
when the entire entity is rebuilt at one time that there would be impermissible reco~struction (ani 
this was so read by Mr Justice Harlan in his dissenting judgement, at page 3~9). This could result 
in absurd result. As was rightly observed by Conti J., in FMC CoQl. v· UJ7Riaht Inc. 26 USPQ2d 
1173 (DC N.D. California 1993), at page 1177, after referring to the ARO 1 quotation hereinbefore 
mentioned, "This is not to say, however, that no amount of successive replacement of worn parts 
can constitute reconstruction. At some point, the overhauled head begins to resemble the 
apocryphal axe, of which the owner brags: 'This is my great-grandfatber's original axe, although 
the handle has been replaced five times, and the head twice. Itt 
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1. the life of the part replaced in relation to the useful life of the whole combm' tI' a on, 
2. the importance of the replaced element to the inventive concept, 
3 . the cost of the component relative to the cost of the combination 
, 
4. the common sense understanding and intention of the patent owner and the buyer of 
the combination as to its perishable components, 
5. whether the purchased component replaces a worn-out part or is bought for some 
other purposes, 152 
6. other pertinent factors. 
It is submitted that the crucial question to be asked in the repair or reconstruction situation 
is, "Is the patentee entitled to another royalty?" The answer to this question depends on 
whether the purchased article as a whole has fulfilled its useful life, i.e., "spent". If it is 
spent, the purchaser would have to buy a new article, i.e., the patentee is entitled to 
payment of an additional royalty on a new sale of the article. Whether or not the article as a 
whole is "spent" has to be considered in relation to several factors. It is submitted that the 
minority test should be adopted as opposed to the narrow test of the majority. 1 53 The broad 
test is more in line with the approach in Wilson and of the United Kingdom courts. After 
all, there is a need to bear in mind Colt 1. 's statement in Goodyear Shoe MachineIY Co. v. 
Jackson that "It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule on this 
subject, owing to the number and infInite variety of patented inventions. Each case, as it 
arises, must be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances presented, and with an 
intelligent comprehension of the scope, nature, and purpose of the patented invention, and 
the fair and reasonable intention of the parties. Having clearly in mind the specification and 
claims of the patent, together with the condition of decay or destruction of the patented 
device or machine, the question whether its restoration to a sound state was legitimate 
repair, or a substantial reconstruction or reproduction of the patented invention, should be 
determined less by definitions or technical rules than by the exercise of sound common 
sense and an intelligent judgement" 154 
1S2 
1S3 
IS. 
See, for example, Lm1s & Catlin Co. y. victor Ialkio& Machine Co. (No.2) 213 U.S. 325: 53 
L. Ed. 816 (US Sup. Ct 1909) where the parts supplied were not meant to repair worn-out parts 
but in order to increase the repertory of tunes available to the purchasers. 
Further, the narrow test does not cater satisfactorily to the "one-shot" 01' single use situation • 
found in American Cotton Tie Co. y. Simmons 106 US 89 (US Sup. Ct 18821 fmmbsq.lnc. y. 
Thornhill ct tie 137 USPQ 84 (CA Sth Cir. 1963) and fmmber& Inc. y. Gross Manufacturjn& Co" 
S. 140 USPQ 641 (CA 9th Cir. 1964). For a critique of the ABO I decision. and the cases 
following the post-ABO 1 era. see Sease, EJ., "Patent Law: Repair-Recooltruction - A Review. 
Analysis, and Proposal", 20 Drake Law Review 8S (1970). 
QmIyr« Shoe MAinay Co. y. lAP 112 F. 146 (CCA 1 st Cir. 90 I). per Colt, Circuit 
Judge. at page ISO. 
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7.3.3. Production Line Situations 
In contrast to the situations discussed earlier, where the repair was carried out either by the 
purchaser or by a third party contractor at his request, in a "production line" situation, there 
is nonnally no pretence that the repair work is being done on behalf of a particular 
customer. The worn out articles are dissembled and the component parts are cleaned and 
sorted. Those that can be reused are salvaged and put into separate bins. Then using a 
production line method, the articles are assembled, using as many parts from the bins as 
possible. When there are insufficient parts in the bins, new parts are used. There is no 
attempt to return the same parts taken from a particular article to that article. This is in 
contrast to the repair and return rebuilder, where the article to be repaired is dissembled and 
the same usable parts are used in assembling the repaired article. 
The nearest, and only case in the United Kingdom resembling a production line situation is 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. Holborn Tyre Co. Ltd. 155 Kekewich J., applying the 
"broad test" held that the work amounted not to repairs but infringement of the patent. More 
production line cases were litigated in the United States. In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. 
Jack Emener,156 the defendant purchased used and discarded patented spark plugs made 
and sold by the plaintiff, repaired them and sold them as "used". It was held that this was 
not an infringement of the plaintiffs rights but a mere repair. The right to repair is not 
limited to purchasers from patentee and those deriving title from such purchaser. The right 
to repair survives abandonment of the article and is possessed by any subsequent 
owner.157 However, it has to be noted that the spark plugs involved were not totally or 
substantially totally, destroyed or were considered unfit for reconditioning. No additions 
were made to the spark plugs. The defendant merely cleaned and reconditioned them. 
Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Precision Rebuilders. Inc. I 58 involved patented shock 
absorbers. The defendant bought up used shock absorbers, processed them and sold them 
in the replacement market. The used shock absorbers so purchased had been discarded and 
abandoned by the owner of the car from which they had been removed and were considered 
as being useless as shock absorbers, to be thrown away or sold as junk or scrap. 1be 
defendant's nonnal processing of these absorbers involved cleaning and degreasing the 
outside of the core, cutting one end off, removing and cleaning all parts, replacing any 
defective parts, including the valves, replacing the seal, reassembling, refilling, rewelding 
and repainting of the absorbers. The court agreed with the plaintiff that this amounted to a 
rebuilding of the article, and hence an infringement of the combination patent. In coming to 
155 Dunlqp PneymatiC '[yre Co. LId v. Hal born lyre Ca, lJd (190 I) 18 RPC 222. See supra. 
footnote 130 and accompanying text. 
156 C_pion Spark PIU Cq y. Jack EmenGr 32 USPQ 152 (DC ED. Mich. 1936). 
15' Champjpn Sprk PlMI Cp. y. Jack F.megcr 32 USPQ 152 (DC E.D. Mich. 1936). pn Moinet. 
District Judp. at paae 159. 
158 Monroe Auto EgYipmentCg. y. Precision RcbyiJders. Ioc. 141 USPQ 626 (DC D. Kan~ 1964). 
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its decision, the court took into consideration several factors, including the fact that Monroe 
did not intend that its shock absorbers be repaired,159 that the construction of the absorber 
pennitted no access to or severance of the working elements by any ordinary method of 
detachment, that the defendant's processing of used absorbers was effected only be cutting 
and later rejoining of the absorber in a manner violative of and unintended by the shock 
absorbers' construction and design, that the seal which was replaced in all cases, was 
intended to last the life of the shock absorber and normally did so, and was not a temporary 
part, and that at the time the shock absorbers were processed, they had fulfilled their 
intended purpose and had been substantially destroyed as intended and were considered 
junk.160 
In Hydril Co. et aI. v. Crossman Engineering. Inc. et aI. ,16 I the patent in suit related to an 
annular packer or closure element for use in a blowout preventer. The packer consisted of a 
massive annulus of rubber in which was embedded a number of steel inserts or ribs. Each 
steel insert included a steel flange or plate at its upper and lower ends. The defendants 
obtained worn out Hydril packers, not only as trade-ins on packers they sold, but also by 
purchase from junk dealers and others. All of these packers were worn out and incapable of 
further use for their intended purpose. The defendants then burned away all of the rubber 
material, leaving only the set of steel inserts. The inserts were then cleaned and 
sandblasted. Any inserts which might be broken or unfit for use were replaced with steel 
inserts taken from other worn out packers of the same size. The inserts were then arranged 
in a mould in a circular pattern called for in the patent claims in suit, and the rubber annulus 
shaped as defined in the claims, was moulded around them to form a rebuilt packer. The 
packer was a new product in all respect, except that salvaged metal parts instead of newly 
cast metal parts were used. The court held that the defendants did not repair the packers but 
rather reconstructed or rebuilt them, utilising worn out Hydril packers simply as a source of 
supply of the salvaged steel inserts. The accused packers made by the defendants were, in 
fact, new articles and not merely repaired packers. 162 
159 
160 
161 
162 
Monroe Auto Eguipment Co, v. Precision Rebuilders.lnc. 141 USPQ 626 (DC D. Kansas, 1964), 
per Brown, District Judge, at page 631, "In the present case, when the automobile ~wner abandoned 
his used Monroe shock absorbers, the garage or whomever thereafter first appropriaIal them. took 
the owner's right to whatever usefulness as shock absorbers they had remaining , .. like the owner, 
the garage then had the licence to repair; also, it could convey the ~ shock absorbers and the 
right to their use, and the licence to repair to third persons. But, agalD lake the owner, the garage 
neither had nor could it convey to others, a right to recons~ct the ,shock a~, ':' Lastly, 
though Precision could acquire from its supplier of cores the btle WhIC~, ~y appropnatiOn of the 
abandoned shock absorbers, they had therein, if the parties so intended, It IS c~ and we, have so 
found that the parties intended merely to sell the cores as junk. As a result PrecISIon acquiRd only 
the right to destroy the cores, not to use them." 
Monroe Auto EguipmentCo, y. Precision Bebuildeq.lnc. 141 USPQ 626 (DC D. Kanus, 1964), 
per Brown, District Judge. at page 630. He went on to say, "On all the facts of the ~ the 
conclusion is inescapable that, far more than maintaining the "use of the w~1e" of the LI!iIld 
Monroe shock absorbers which it processes, Precision ~ them from the limbo of useless 
junk Mel accomplishes aleCORd aation of abe patented entity." 
RY*i1 Co. ct" y. Qpymee Enliwtinl'loc. " •. IS2 USPQ 171 (DC B.D. Tex .. 1966). 
Hydril Co. " .. y. Qns5!MD F.nlinminl. Inc. " .. 1 S2 USPQ 171 (DC ED. Tex.. 1966), ~ 
page 174, per Sheehy, Chief Iuctae. See also the Canadian case of Rucker Co. ct 4. y. 0ayeI s 
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However, the Court of Appeal in TSC Industries. Inc. v. International Harvester Co. ,163 
relying on Am 1 came to a different decision. Here the patent related to a doffer 
construction used in cotton picking machines. The doffer consisted of a metal carrier plate 
to which a rubber annulus had been moulded. The improved doffer had a useful life of one 
full season of use. The plaintiff purchased worn out doffers for a nominal sum. After 
reclaiming the plate from the worn out assembly by removing the moulded rubber parts, the 
plaintiff carried out additional steps which were identical with those performed by the 
defendant patentee. The plaintiff claimed that this "rerubbering" process was merely a 
permissible repair and, therefore, not any infringement. Applying Aro 1, the court agreed 
and held that there was no infringement.164 
In General Electric Co. v. United States,165 the patent in suit related to a weapon control 
system. The Navy instituted a programme for maintenance of their weapon system called 
the Ordnance Replacement Programme at the Naval Ordnance Station in Louisville. Under 
this system the Navy overhauled their patented gun mount by employing a production line 
method. When the gun mounts were sent to the station, they were dismantled, the major 
components were separated and sent to different areas. There the components would be 
reduced to their smallest readily separable parts and placed in a spare parts pool. All the 
parts would be cleaned and inspected. Parts which were worn, scored, broken or corroded 
beyond reasonable use would be replaced. The major components were then reassembled. 
However, in carrying out these operations, no attempts were made to see that the original 
major components were reassembled. The plaintiffs alleged that this amounted to 
infringement of their patent. The Court of Claims held that there was no infringement; what 
the navy had done was regarded as permissible. The Court took into consideration the 
following significant facts - most of the elements of the patented combination used for 
replacement of worn out parts were supplied by General Electric, General Electric had also 
sold to the defendant a large number of new components which were stockpiled and used 
as possible spare parts in overhauling the gun mounts, approximately 60% of the gun 
mounts forwarded to the station were in condition to be overhauled, while about 40% were 
scrapped with the components, whenever possible, going to a spare parts pool. There was 
no evidence that during the overhauling process, any new elements not manufactured by 
163 
164 
165 
Yulcanjzjnl lid 7 CPR(Jd) 294 (1985). which involved the same patent The court there also held 
that the defendants' activities amounted to impennissible reconstruction. 
ISC Industries. Inc. y. IntematiopaJ Haryester Co. 160 USPQ 34 (CA 7th Cir. 1968). 
ISC Industries. Inc. y. International HaryesterCo. 160 USPQ 34 (CA 7th Cir. 1968). per Duffy, 
Senior Circuit Judge, at pages 36-37. This is a surprising conclusion in view of the fact that the 
judge had described the doffers bought by the plaintiff as "worn and spent". Further the ~ WC?t 
on to describe the plaintiffs initial activity as "destroying what was left of ~ patented doffer . I~ IS 
submitted that the court was too overly influenced by the ARO 1 test, boldlnl that reconstrucUon 
occurs only when the entire entity was rebuilt at one time. This could be evidenced br the judge's 
statement that. "In view of the Supnne Court's decision in Am. we find no. altaftllive ~ 10 
hold lhat the plaintifl'l eo-c:aIled infringing reconslnlCtion of the dofJer was, In fllCl, a pennllllble 
repair." (at paae 37). 
GeocnJ Electric Co. y. Unital $talC!& 198 USPQ 65 (US Ct Cis 1978). 
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General Electric were used. In fact the last factor was held by the court to be crucial to its 
decision. The Court held that in paying the plaintiff for those components, the defendant 
impliedly obtained a licence to use the combination and further, it was unlikely that General 
Electric would have sold 15 out of the 17 elements in the combination without implicitly 
authorising the latter to use the combination so long as the General Electric-supplied 
elements were able to be used and were in fact used. 166 
Finally, in Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co. Inc., 167 the defendant used the 
production line method to rebuild worn out clutch made under the plaintiffs patent and sold 
them as rebuilt clutches in competition with the plaintiffs new, unused clutches. Dana did 
not contend that replacement of the parts in the repair clutches constituted a reconstruction. 
On the contrary Dana conceded that if a repair and return rebuilder individually rebuilt 
clutches using the same new parts used in the production line method, there would be no 
direct infringement. It was also not in dispute that Dana intended that its clutches be 
repairable. It sold repair parts and published a repair manual. Therefore, Dana's argument 
hinged upon its attempted distinction between the two processes for rebuilding clutches and 
the determination that the production method entails a voluntary and complete destruction of 
the patented clutches. However, the CAFC agreed with the District Court that use of a 
production line method cannot convert what Dana conceded to be permissible repair to 
impermissible reconstruction. 16 8 
Should a production line situation be allowed as a fair repair or should it amount to 
infringement? Such production line methods are simply speedier, less expensive, more 
efficient and more effective means of refurbishing old articles. This reason alone should not 
in itself make it an infringement. Therefore, what is paramount in this situation is the 
condition of the article to be dealt with. If the article as a whole is still capable of use as a 
unit, then repair by production line method should still be considered permissible repairs. 
However, if the articles used are considered as only fit for scrap, then any work carried out 
on them should be deemed an infringement or else it will amount to a non-patentee being 
allowed to manufacture the patented articles without the permission of the patent owner, 
under the guise of repair. 
166 
167 
168 
General Electric Co. y. United States 198 USPQ 65 (US Ct CIs 1978). at page 98. 
Dana Corp. y. American Precision Co. Inc. 3 USPQ2d 1852 (CAFC 1987). . 
Dana Corp. y. American Precision Co. Inc. 3 USPQ2d 1852 (CAFe 1987). per Markey. Chief 
ludge, at page 1855, citing General Electric Co. y. United States 198 USPQ 65 (US Ct ~~ 1978). 
See also the South African case of Dana Corp. y. Rbobrake (13 November 1992~ ~omm.tsslon~r of 
Patents) noted in [1993] 5 EIPR 0-111, where the court, after reviewing the decISIOns on. repaur of 
patented articles under the United Kingdom and United States law. concl~ that. there IS no real 
difference in the approach, and concluded that the defendants production bne method of 
reconditioning used clutch plate assemblies was not an infringement 
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7.3.4. Conversion Cases 
7.3.4.a. The United Kingdom jurisprudence 
The frrst reported conversion case in the United Kingdom is Dellareed v. Delkin. 169 The 
plaintiffs' patent related to a bite indicator for fishing lines. In the products sold, the sensor 
comprised a light-emitting diode and a photoelectric cell and the beam of emitted light was 
intersected by a shutter disc mounted on the axle of the pulley wheel so as to indicate that 
the line had moved and the speed at which it was moving. The defendants modified the bite 
indicators purchased from the plaintiffs by changing the method of sensing of line 
movement. In the modified product, the defendants had completely replaced the original 
circuit board by a new board on which only the light -emitting diode and the photoelectric 
cell from the plaintiffs' board were used. The defendant also introduced a magnet mounted 
on the axle of the pulley wheel which co-acted with a metal reed to form a switching device. 
Movement of the line on the pulley wheel caused this device to switch on the photoelectric 
circuit, after which the sensor operated essentially as in the unmodified product. In the 
absence of the magnet, however, the modified product would not have worked. They also 
advertised that they were willing to carry out such modifications. 
On the issue of whether the modification amounted to a repair or infringement of the 
plaintiffs' patent, it was argued that under the general law , the implied licence to purchasers 
of the plaintiffs' patented indicator gave to the purchaser the right, if he so wished, to sell 
the article or repair or modify it, and if so minded, sell it after modification. Falconer J., 
however, agreed with the plaintiffs' submission that in converting the plaintiffs' bite 
indicators, the defendant was essentially building a new bite indicator falling within the 
scope of the plaintiffs' claims. The fact that a few of the original components were retained 
in the rebuilt indicator did not make it any less an infringement. He further held that under 
the implied licence acquired by the pw:cbaser of a patented article, the position as to 
modification of that patented article is analogous to that of repair of the article. In other 
words, a "modifier should not be allowed to do more than a repairer may do under the 
general law as to the ambit of the implied licence." Since the fundamental principle 
underlying the repair cases is that the purchaser may not, under the guise of repair, make 
what is essentially a new product falling within the claim or claims of the patent, the same 
fundamental principle should apply to modification of a patented article. 170 On the facts, he 
held that what the defendant had done was to build substantially a new article which fell 
within the claims of the patent, and since it was done for commercial purposes, there was 
infringement of the patent. 17 I 
169 
110 
111 
Del"," y. Delldp (1988) fSR 329. 
I'lrfIenat y. Drdkjp [1988] FSR 329,IM' Falconer J., at ... 346. 
Dd .... y. Delkjn (1988] FSR 329.,-, Falconer J., at pqe 347. Note that the judae had IIIady 
held that the defendant had brokea • JRvious undertaking not to modify the parented product. 
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Judge Ford in Hazel Grove (Superleague) Ltd v. Euro-League Leisure Products Ltd & 
anor,l72 also had to deal with a conversion or modification case On th t" f 
---- . e queslon 0 
whether a modification carried out on a patented device, in this case, a pool table, amounted 
to an infringement, Judge Ford, while in agreement with the correctness of the decision of 
Falconer J. in the Dellareed case, preferred to refer to German authorities on the point due 
to the paucity of English cases. From the German cases, he concluded that if the inventive 
concept is still being used in the modification, there would be an infringement by "making"" 
Since the modifications in the case at hand involved the use of certain new parts which fell 
within the claims of the patent in suit, and since the parts "cooperated functionally" with the 
other structures in the patented pool table, Judge Ford held that the defendants had made a 
new patented product and had thus infringed the patent. 1 7 3 
7 . 3.4. b. The United States jurisprudence 
7.3.4.b.(i). Cases where conversions were allowed 
In Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Railway Specialty Co. et ale ,17~ the 
combination covered by the claims of the patent in suit consisted in an electric railway 
having an overhead conductor. One key element in the combination was the "trolley stand" 
which provided the means by which the trailing arm was hinged and pivoted to the car with 
a capacity for lateral and vertical movement, and was pressed upward by some suitable 
spring. No particular form of stand was included in the invention, for anyone of a number 
of forms would answer the purpose. The defendant manufactured a particular fonn of the 
trolley stand, which it had advertised for sale, and had also, in its advertisements, 
represented itself as a dealer in trolley poles and overhead trolley equipment. The District 
Court issued an injunction against them. On appeal, the defendant admitted that it had sold 
trolley stands, directly or indirectly, to electric companies which purchased their equipment 
originally from the complainant's licensees, either by way of repair, or because the 
purchasers wanted an improved stand. It was argued, however, that the order which was 
granted was capable of too sweeping an interpretation, because it had a right to supply 
purchasers, who have acquired the right to use the patented combination, with its trolley 
stands, either by way of repair, or because the stands which were furnished to them were 
not adapted to the needs of the cars upon which they were placed. 1 7 5 
172 
173 
174 
175 
Hazel Grove (SugerleaM> Ltd y. fium-I tape Leisure Products Ltd &. anor [1995] RPC 529. 
Hazel Grove (Syperlrap> lId y. Bum.! tllue Leisure Products Ud &. angr [1995] RPC 529, per 
Judge Ford, at pages 54 I -542. 
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric RaHway Specialty Co. ,t d. 75 F. 1005 (CCA 
2nd eire 1896). 
1be de ..... inwked the principle enunciated in CbatTee y. Beltinl Co. 63 ~S ~ 17 (US S~. Ct 
1159), which ItIIed dill "When. penon teaally acquiIa. title to that ~ IS ~ subjeCt of 
letters patent. he .... y CCMtinue 10 ute it until it is worn out. or he may ~ It ~ Improve upon 
it as he pleases, in the same manner as if dealing with property of any other kind. 
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In modifying the injunction, 17 6 Shipman, Circuit Judge said, 
"The defendant also says that, in order to obtain the use of an improved trolley 
stand, purchasers from the complainant are sometimes willing to discard its stands, 
and substitute another form, which had its own advantages. For example, the 
trolley stand which is sold by the defendant is said to be less elevated above the top 
of the car than the stand of the complainant, and therefore it is said that the Norwalk 
Street-Railway Company found it necessary to change the stands which were 
furnished by the complainants, because of the low bridges recently constructed by a 
steam railroad over the tracks of the street electric road. A refusal to pennit such a 
substitution is equivalent to a declaration that the street-railway company cannot be 
permitted to improve its stands, except by the consent of the complainant. If a 
purchaser from the complainant chooses, the day after his purchase, to substitute a 
stand which is better made, and better adapted to his peculiar needs, he has the right 
to do so." I 77 
Although the ratio expressed in the opinion was based on the right of the purchaser to 
substitute a different element from the one originally bought from the patentee, it seems 
implicitly from the judgement that a purchaser has the right to modify a patented article for 
his particular needs. 
The first and only conversion case heard by the US Supreme Court was in Wilbur-Ellis Co. 
v. Kuthur. 17 8 The respondent, who owned a combination patent covering a canning 
machine, authorised the sale of machines made thereunder designed to pack fish into "1-
pound" cans. The petitioner company bought four of these machines second-hand, three of 
them rusted, corroded and inoperable, and all four requiring cleaning and sandblasting to 
become usable. The machines were reconditioned and six of the 35 elements of the patent 
combination were resized to enable the machines to pack "5-ounce" cans. 1be Supreme 
Court reversed the lower courts finding of infringement, holding that those four machines 
were not spent since they had years of usefulness remaining though they needed cleaning 
and repair. Adapting the machine for use on a different-sized commodity was within the 
patent rights purchased and was not an infringement. The court also held that in adapting 
the machines to a related use and lengthening the useful capacity of the old combination on 
which royalties were paid, the petitioners were closer to pennissible "repairing" than 
176 
177 
"'1 
The order was modified by adding the words: "It is not intended to enjoin the defendant against the 
sale of trolley stands by way of replacement of broken stands, or stands worn ~ use, ~ 
substitution for trolley stands pn:viously sold by the complainant. to ~~ from It. but thiS 
permission does not live authority to reconstruct or rebuild a combination which has been sold by 
the complainant." 
Ihgmaop-HmIllM &sri' Co, y. ICcIcx F.IGcgjc RailwaY SpecialLY Co, ct 4, 75 F. 1005 (CCA 
2nd Cir. 1896), _ ... 1010 
Wilbur-Bms Co, y, Kulhur 377 U.S. 422; 141 USPQ 703 (US Sup. Cl 1964). 
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-infringing "reconstructing." The fact that the adaptation made the machines fl' 
more use u did 
not make it a "reconstruction." Finally, the petitioner's license to use the mach' Illes was not 
for "I-pound" cans only, as they were sold outright and with no restrictions. I 79 
7 .3.4.b.(ii). Cases where the conversions were not allowed 
However, in three other cases, the court held against the modifications carried out by the 
purchasers. In George Close Co. v. Ideal Wrapping Machine Co. ,180 the appellant was the 
owner by purchase of several patented machines for wrapping caramels of a certain size. 
After a time the trade favoured caramels of a larger size. The appellant requested the owner 
of the patent to change over the machines so that they would wrap caramels of a larger size. 
This was refused. It appeared that machines to wrap the larger size caramels were in use 
under an exclusive licence from the owner to a third party. The appellant thereupon had the 
necessary changes made in his machines by a machinist. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the trial court in holding that the reconstruction of the machines amounted to an 
infringement. The court held that "such sale carries the right to use the machine sold; but the 
right does not ... give to the purchaser the right to rebuild the purchased machines into 
other machines embodying the patent invention." 
Similarly, in Miller Hatcheries et ale v. Buckeye Incubator Co. et ale ,18 I the patents in suit 
related to incubators and improvements in trays used in the incubators. The defendants took 
the incubators which they had bought from the plaintiff and rearranged the interior, 
inserting 12 trays in the space where 9 had been in the incubators as purchased. To carry 
out the alteration, numerous alterations had to be made, including making or purchasing 
additional tray rails and trays and enlarging the ventilators. The defendants not only used 
the incubators so modified but advertised them to the trade and had sold at least one before 
the present suil The purpose of the alteration was to increase the capacity of each incubator 
and thereby reduce the number necessary to be bought. It was held that the defendants' act 
amounted to an infringement since the reconstruction was such as to destroy the identity of 
the incubators as they were received from the hands of the original vendor. By reason of 
the reconstruction they had become incubators of greatly increased capacity, but which 
embodied all the elements of the two patents. 18 2 
179 
110 
III 
182 
Wilbur-Ellis Co. y. Kuthur 377 U.S. 422 (US Sup. Ct 1964), at pages 424-425. Note the above 
case was heard in the Court of Appeals and reported as I tllPoer et tie y. Kutbur 136 USPQ 332 
(CCA 9th Cir. 1963), where the majority held that there was impennissible ~onstruction. 
Geoqe Close Co. y. Ictal Wqppina Machipe Co. 29 F. (2d) 533 (CCA 1st Car. 1928). 
MUJer H.,dpjr§ ct de y. Buckeye Ipcubator Co. "ti. 5 USPQ 489 (CCA 8th eir. 1930). 
Miller Hatcheries,t 4. y. Buckeye Ipcubator Co. ,,4. 5 USPQ 489.(CCA 8th ~ir. 1930),. ~r 
Booth, Circuit Judge, at page 493, "Applying the principles announced In the .~ ... au~tJes 
to the case at bIr it is clear that the changes made in the incubators wae not Juslified • repaus or 
repIKeme_ b replin or replacements .. not neceswy. The incubllon wae !leW. Nor .. 
the chan;' .;... in onIer to mike the incua.tors IdaptabIe to a special use of ...... ~ such 
special ... exilled. Nor cId the c:t.aaa caMist in maely makin. use of a ..... IIticIe or 
commerce in connection with the incubators; the new tray rails and the new trays wae not staple 
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Finally, In re certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus and Components Thereof, the U. S . 
International Trade Commission also held that the conversions that 'ed 
were cam out 
amounted to impennissible reconstruction rather than permissible rep<:l;r The 1 . 
<u • comp runant. 
Morgan Construction Company was the holder of the '871 patent, the patent in suit. The 
respondents were a group of interrelated corporations and individuals, located in the United 
States, England and Germany, who were engaged in various enterprises related to the steel 
industries. The respondent Ashlow Limited was the manufacturer of the accused 
apparatus. 
One of the respondents, Georgetown Steel Corporation (GSC), was the purchaser of the 
that apparatus. 
The complainant initiated the investigation, filing a complaint seeking relief under section 
337, alleging that the respondents were engaged in the importation or sale of steel rod 
treating apparatus covered by the claims of the '871 patent. 
The GSC controlled cooling line in controversy was originally built in 1971 pursuant to a 
licence granted by the plaintiffs. The GSC ordered what is known in the trade as a 
"revamp". It modernised GSC's two existing production lines so that they could handle 
larger rod coils at increased mill speed. The respondents argued that the revamp was a mere 
"repair" of an existing machine rather than a new apparatus. 
In holding that the revamp was.a reconstruction rather than a repair, the Commission noted 
that the elements being replaced were not worn out and had to be replaced in the ordinary 
course of business to preserve the fitness of the apparatus. It fact, the apparatus was 
described as obsolete. The revamp involved extensive replacement of existing parts with 
new part which formed the components of the patented apparatus, although some parts 
were cannibalised parts from the old apparatus. Wholly new component parts were also 
added and some existing components were rearranged and placed in other locations in the 
apparatus. All these parts were specially designed and built to order by Ashlow. The total 
cost of this work amounted to several million dollars or approximately four times the cost 
of the original apparatus. The modification involved more engineering and more 
sophisticated machinery than the standard revamp. Further, the changes would significandy 
alter the capacity of the system and improve the tensile strength and ductibility of the rod 
produced. Applying Am 1, therefore, the Commission held that since the original apparatus 
would cease to exist upon disassembly of the existing system, this indicated that an 
"apparatus rendered obsolete would be dissolved and a new entity resurrected in its place." 
articles of co~ but were made specially for use in these patented incu~ors. Moreover the 
reconstruction was extensive and consisted in rebuilding the tilting racks to receive more ea trays. 
These egg tray racks were a vital element in the patented combination ~f patent 1.2~2860. and wae 
specifically CXMRd by the patent 1263138. The ra:onstnlCtion was, In our opI~~ such as to 
destroy the ideality of die incubator as they were received from the ~ of che on~ wndor. ~ 
IaIOns of the ftICOftstrucdon they hid become incubators of peady IWelled CIpIdtJ'. but which 
embodied all the embodiments of the two Smith .,...15. We think the ftlCOnICI'Ut1iO demy 
constituted infrinaemenL" 
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This case could, therefore, be distinguished from Aro I and Wilson on the ground that the 
alleged infringement involved far more than the replacement of a single worn out, short-
lived element. Nor was this case the mere readjustment of a machine to handle a different 
size of product as was the case in Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther. 183 
7.3.4.b.(iii). Analysis of the decisions 
In deciding whether conversion amounts to an infringement, three basic principles need to 
be taken into consideration and reconciled if necessary. They are: 
1. The patent owner has the exclusive right to make and use his invention. 
2. The purchaser of a patented article sold unconditionally, acquires an unrestricted 
right to use the article purchased. This right includes the right to carry out repairs 
and also to modify it according to his special needs. 
3. The patentee is only entitled to one royalty for each sale of a patented article. 
The general tendency of the courts seems to be to treat conversion cases the same way as 
repair cases. In principle this has to be right, although repairs and conversions are 
conceptually different. In the case of repairs, the aim is to restore a damaged article to 
working condition. In the case of conversion simpliciter, the article converted is normally in 
good working order, and the purpose of the modifier is not to restore it to its original 
condition. For various reasons the owner of the article decides to modify or adapt it to serve 
a different purpose or function. Admittedly, certain conversions result from modifications 
which have to be made to damaged articles to enable the articles to be put to some use 
instead of having to be discarded. 
Some other instances of conversion simpliciter may obviously result in an infringement. 
The obvious case would be the case of an infringer taking the inventive concept of the 
patentee and modifying the concept to produce a competing product. He does not work 
with the patentee's original product, but originates the product from his own manufacture. 
The modification may involve the substitution of equivalents. On the other hand, the 
modification could also involve the input of some inventive addition to the original concept. 
In both cases, there would still be infringement, since the patented inventive concept had 
been taken. 
However, in the case where the original article is lawfully purchased from the patentee, the 
rule that the purchaser, in the absence of any enforceable restrictions imposed upon him al 
the time of sale, has absolute freedom to deal with the article in any way he pleases, should 
113 Ig m cortem &on' ROO Tmerinl A ...... " and Components 11Jmpf 21S USPQ 237 (U.S. 
International TJ'ldeCommission, 1981), at pages 2S9-260. 
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also allow him to modify the article. On sale of the article, the exclusive privilege in respect 
of that particular article is at an end. Therefore, the purchaser may "use it or improve upon 
it in whatever manner he pleases; in the same manner as if dealing with property of any 
other kind." 184 His dealing with this particular physical manifestation of the patented 
inventive concept does not make him an infringer. Since a royalty had already been paid on 
the first sale, no harm had been occasioned to him. It will be different if, as a result of the 
modification, the plaintiff may lose a potential sale, as for example, when originally two 
articles would have been bought, because of the modification, only one is purchased. In 
this situation, the plaintiff could rightly complain because of the harm done to him for the 
lost sale. This rule is based on the principle that if the modification results in the use of 
another inventive concept which is not already physically manifested in the purchased 
product, then his modification would amount to a "making" of the another patented 
product. In other words, in modifying the article, the purchaser can not infringe another 
claim of the patent which is not incorporated in the article. 1 85 
So it is submitted that while conversion cases may be conceptually different from repair 
cases in most situations, the test should remain the same, Le., the key question always is 
whether there has been a "making" of a patented product, and hence a violation of one of 
the exclusive rights. In other words, the test should be on a "lost sale or not" basis. 
Therefore, in the inquiry as to whether the conversion can be considered as a remaking of 
the article in competition with the patentee, i.e., whether it amounts to impennissible 
conversion, the questions should be - "Has any harm been done to the patent owner by the 
conversion? I 86 Is the situation such that the patent owner should be entitled to a new 
royalty?" The question of whether it is a repair or a reconstruction is irrelevant. As was 
stated by Douglas J. in Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuthur, 187 "The idea of "reconstruction" in this 
context has the special connotation of those acts which would impinge on the patentee's 
right "to exclude others from making ... the article. " If this test of harm to the patent owner, 
or "lost sale or not" is adopted, then conversions involving the resizing of article bought so 
that they have increased capacity may be an infringement of the patent, like the Geome 
~ and Miller Hatcheries situations. 
184 
lIS 
116 
117 
Crane y. Price 1 Web. P.C. 393, at 413; 4 HPC 107, at 127 «1842), per Tindal CJ. 
This is fact was the reasoning adopt by the German Supreme Court in Spjelautomat D (reported in 
Annual of Industrial Property ~w, 1975, at page 170). The court stated ,!,~t the patent holder ~ 
govern in which embodiment the patented article shall be COmmerclal~ and used. If ~IS 
embodiment is remodelled by a third party without permission, ~n the ~ ~ enaoacnes 
upon the manufacturing right left with the patent owner. If the modified em.~nt IS ~o longer 
identified to that initially commercialised by the patent own,:r, although achie~Dg.the objeCt upon 
which the patent was based in an equivalent manner, then thiS amounts to an mfri~t ~ 
is no mention in PrlJarmd y. Delldp [1988] FSR 329 as to whether the converted bite .ndiClllJr 
fell within any claim of the plaintiff's patent It if did. the decision would have been conectIy 
decided - see sup~ text accompanying footnote 169. . 
WOp L SlmDD' 50 U.S. 109; 13 L Ed. 66 (US Sup. a 1850). per ~ J~ Wayae. • ~ 
123 "And what .... is cIoM to the patentee in the use of his right of InventiOn. wheIIlbe ~ 
and 'replacement of a ..... iIIjury are confined lO the machine which die purduIIer _1Jouahlr 
Wjlbyr-Bllis Co. y. ICyIhur 377 U.S. 422. at 424; 141 USPQ 703 (US Sup. Ct 1964). 
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7.3.5. Application of the Repair Doctrine in the Malaysian Context 
The court's adoption of the principle of implied licence in the case of Smith Kline & French 
Sall 1 88 ld . di . v. m wou seem to ill cate that the doctnne of the implied licence to repair under 
the common law could be a part of Malaysian jurisprudence. However, even accepting that 
. d .. f Mal . I 1 89 this octnne IS part 0 ayslan aw, there would be problems in its implementation. 
The replacement of parts of a patented article for the purpose of repair would involve artistic 
works which would attract copyright protection under the Malaysian Copyright Act 
1987. 190 To what extent would the implied licence to repair also extend to an implied 
licence to copy drawings of parts protected by copyright? 
The question of copyright in engineering drawings in relation to repair was considered in 
Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd v. Barton, 191 where infringements of both patent and 
copyright were alleged. The Court of Appeal rejected both claims, holding that what was 
done amounted to no more than repair of the patented machinery and that the manufacture 
of a replacement part which prima facie infringed the copyright in one of the patentees' 
working drawings, having been ordered from the defendant by the owner of the machinery, 
was protected by the owner's implied licence. Buckley L.J. said: 
"If I am right in the view I have expressed about the existence here of an implied licence 
under the patent to repair pulleys by replacing worn rubber rings, it must ... follow that 
purchasers of Polyrim pulleys are also impliedly licensed to infringe the plaintiffs' 
copyright in their drawings to the extend necessary to enable such repairs to be carried out. 
To hold otherwise would be to allow the copyright to stultify the implied licence under the 
patent It Seems to me that consideration of business efficacy strongly support the view that 
this should not be the case. If it were, any purchaser of a patented article might fmd himself 
deprived of his ostensible right to repair that article by the existence of a copyright of which 
he would probably be ignorant when he made the purchase." I 92 
118 
189 
190 
19. 
"2 
Smith Kline &: French y. Salim [1989] FSR 407; [1989] 2 MU 380, per George J., at pages 383-
384 - see supra, footnote 27. 
Or even if the Malaysian courts were to follow the lead of Judge Ford in Haml Gmye. (Sgpcrk;a~) 
Ltd y. Bym-IApe l&isure Products Ltd &: anor [1995] RPC 529, that on the question of ~rs. 
there is no necessity to rely on the doctrine of implied licence - see footnote 115 and accompanyIng 
text. . ' H G 
For a discussion of the extent of protecti~n given to dra~~gs of spare ~, ~ Lim, MU 
"Copyright in Functional Drawings? The Linatex case and Bnush Ley!and reVISIted [1994] I 
xc, and Ida, M.A. "Slurry Pumps and the Obscurity of Artistic Copynght Works - Peko Wal1send 
Operations Ltd v. Linatex Process Rubber Bhd", [1994] 3 ElPR 123. 
Solar Thomson EnajpeeriOI Co. Ltd y. Bartoo [1977] RPC 537. . ., 
SgI_11pn_ Eg,;'yaiDI <A I Jd y. Banpp [1977] RPC 537. at .... S60-S6I. TbiI JI'1napie 
was followed in r ... A Sop, lid y. Paul SyW <)poiation LId [1981] FSR 281, ICC ptF 
283-284 per Poster J •• and Weir Pumpa lid", QI$ y. CML Pumps IJd "'" (II (1984] FSR 33, see 
IMr Whitfonl J •• at pqes 53-56. 
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This, however, does not solve the problem since it has been held that this implied licence to 
breach copyright for repair purposes does not extend to third party supplier of spares so as 
to enable them to make parts ready for sale. 1 93 This problem was solved in the United 
Kingdom by the introduction of the doctrine of non-derogation from grant. 194 1be 
Malaysian courts have, however, declined to accept the doctrine of non-derogation from 
grant. 1 95 
The only other solution is if the Catnic defence as propounded by Whitford J. in Catnic 
Components Ltd and anor v. Hill & Smith Ltd 1 96 applies. According to this defence, "by 
applying for patent and accepting the statutory obligation to describe and if necessary 
illustrate embodiments of his invention, a patentee necessarily makes an election accepting 
that, in return for a potential monopoly, upon pUblication, the material disclosed by him in 
the specification must be deemed to be open to be used by the public, subject only to such 
monopoly rights as he may acquire on his application for the patent and during the period 
for which his monopoly remains in force, whatever be the reason for the determination of 
the monopoly rights. If this is correct, ... upon publication, the plaintiffs must be deemed 
to have abandoned their copyright in drawings the equivalent of the patent drawings.,,197 
What are the chances that the Malaysian courts will adopt this defence? It is submitted that 
in view of the unsettled status of this defence, it is indeed very unlikely that the courts will 
accept such a controversial doctrine. 1 98 Therefore, to give effect to the implied licence to 
repair, the relevant provisions in the Copyright Act 1987 need to be amended. 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
Hoover pIc v. Georl:e Hulme (Stockport) Ltd [1982] FSR 565, per Whitford J., at page 588. See 
also British Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd and ors v. Armstron~ Patents Co. Ltd [1984] FSR 591, at 
pages 611-612, per Oliver L.J., in the Court of Appeal. 
See British Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd and ors v. Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd [1986] RPC 279. 
See Peko Wallsend Operations Ltd & ors v. Linatex Process Rubber & another actiop [1993] 1 
MLJ 225, the reasoning being that it was a concept of English law land which bad not been 
imported into Malaysian law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court's decision was held 
to be correct - Unreported, June 1994. 
Catnic CQIDPonents Ltd and anor v. Hill & Smith Ltd [1978] FSR 405. 
Catnic CQlDPonents Ltd and anor v. Hill & Smith Ltd [1978] FSR 405, at pages 427-428. This 
opinion was neither affIrmed nor reversed in appeals from this decision sin.ce it was. not necessary 
to do so. See Buckley Lol., at page 628 in Catnic Components Ltd v. Hill & S~th Ltd [1979] 
FSR 619 (CA). See also RQse Plastics GmbH v. William Beckett & CQ. (PlastIcs) Ltd & anor 
[1989] FSR 113, at page 123, where Whitford J. again reiterated the proposition. 
See, for example, Wbam-Q Manufacturin~ CQ. et oJ. v. Lincoln Industries Ltd [1982] RPC 281, at 
298, Justice Moller, after referring to, inter alia, Werner MQtors Ltd v. A.G. Gam_ Ltd (1904) 
21 RPC 621 and William Ed&e & SQns Ltd v. William Nicholls & SQPs Ltd (1911) 28 ~ 58~, 
said, "I have come to the decision that the Catnic defence, is, as a matter of law, not aVailable 10 
cases such as this." See also GardexlJd v. SQDlta Ltd [1986] RPC 623. at pages 641-~5, .where 
Falconer J. declined to decide on the correctness or otherwise of Whitford J. 's con~lusl~n In the 
Catnjc case, on the ground that in the case at band, the drawings in the patent specdicatio~ could 
not be regarded as being equivalent to the drawing relied on in support of ~ ~tI.on. for 
infringement of copyright For a view of this defence in the other Commonwealth JwisdiCUODS, 
see: Omen Industries Ply. Ltd v. KIS (Australia) Ltd [1983] FSR 619. at 635. Kc:amey 1.. after 
reviewing the cases, concluded. "On this basis I would have to conclude ~at something mo~ m:: 
the existence of the patent would be required to deprive a patentee of his conc~nt C~yn~~ 
Moreover, to extend the patentee's abandonment of copyright to subsequent ~ drawmgs • 
incorporated in the patent specification seems to me to run coun~r to accepted noUons of copyngbt 
entitlement:' Dennison Manufacturjna Co. &; BOor v. PresU&e Co. &; qs, (1980, H. Ct., 
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7.4. Loss of Rights 
7.4. 1 . General 
Under the Act, any aggrieved person may institute court proceedings ag' t h 
runs t e owner of a 
fi . aI'da' f th 199 patent or mv 1 non 0 e patent. The grounds for invalidation be . 
can grouped Into 
four main heads: 
7.4.l.a. Substantive grounds 
The substantive objections under this head are that what is claimed as an invention in the 
patent is not an invention within the meaning of section 12, or is excluded from protection 
under section 13 (non-patentable inventions), or subsection (1) of section 31 (the 
performance of any act in respect of the claimed invention would be contrary to public 
order), or is not patentable because it does not comply with the requirements of sections 11 
199 
Auckland, noted [1981] 3 EIPR D-62. In rejecting the ~ defence, Speight J. said, "I find this 
proposition difficult to understand, especially in the absence of any quoted authority, and I note that 
in the Court of Appeal the proposition was but briefly referred to as 'interesting' .... "; Haliburton 
Co. etal. v. Northern Drillstem Testers Ltd et ale (1982) 63 CPR(2d) 187, at 188. per Addy J .• 
'There appears, however, to be an arguable case that the copyright might have been given up in 
applying for the patent. This is the sort of question which should be decided at trial after all the 
facts have been determined ... "; Burnaby Machine & Mill EQuipment Ltd v. BerKlund Industrial 
Supply Co. Ltd et al, (1984) 81 CPR(2d) 251, per Walsh I., at pages 253-254, after reviewing the 
cases, and after referring to the statement of Addy I. in Haliburton ... said, "I fully agree with this 
conclusion. The appropriate time to decide such an important legal question is not on a motion 
seeking further answers on discovery .... "; Rucker Co. et ale V. Gavel's VulcanjzjnK lJd 7 CPR(3d) 
294 (1985) (Canada). where Walsh I .• at pages 310- 313, discussed this defence and the 
applicability of this defence in various Commonwealth countries. He then concluded. at pages 312-
313. "In the present case it would appear from the evidence that the drawings registered for 
copyright are not even identical with those in the patent. However. to give the wide interpretation 
sought by the plaintiffs to copyright protection for the drawings would defeat the time limitation 
provided for by the Patent Act. Most mechanical patents have drawings in connection therewith and 
the drawings are readily copyrighted. but when the patent infringement protection is no longer 
available to the owner of the patent it is not desirable that he should be able to extent this 
protection by application of the Copyright Act to the drawings from which the physical object 
covered by the patent was constructed, and thereby prevent anyone else from manufacturing the 
same device, even without the use of the drawings. I strongly believe that it was not the intention 
of Parliament nor from a practical view is it desirable that the Patent Act. the Copyright Act, and 
the Industrial Design Act should be interpreted so as to give overlapping protection. Something 
suitable for industrial design cannot be registered for copyright, as that statute states. IDI 
something for which a patent is granted should not also be given double protection for an extended 
period of time by registering for copyright drawings from which the patented object was made. 
Moreover. in the present case the patent has not yet expired .... I. therefore, conclude in the 
unsettled state of Canadian jurisprudence on the issue that. while plaintiffs may have ~id 
copyrights they should not on the facts of the present case be aI!ow~ to ~Iy on COPYl'!ght 
protection. and their claim for copyright infringement is. therefore, dismissed. sance the copynght 
can be extended to cover the physical object made from it as in the Baylincr case and ocher 
decisions to the same effect, it should not be extended to cover objects protected by patents." 
From the above, it appears that only the Canadian courts seem to have some sympathy for the 
defence. 
See section 56 of the Act, as amended by section 32 of the Patents (Amendrnc:nt) ~t I ~3. Note 
that Section 60(3) povides thIt "The defendant in any proceedin~ i~led to ID Ibis ~ may 
request in the same proceedinp the invalidation of the patent, In which case the pIOVlJIOftI of 
subsection (2) and (3) of IIeCtion 56 shall apply". So section 56(2) and (3) can be used as a "iCe 
as well as an attack. 
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(definition of a patentable invention), 14 (novelty), 15 (inventive step) and 16 (industrial 
application).20o 
7.4.l.b. Procedural objections 
The ground under this head is that the description or the claim does not comply with the 
requirements of section 23 or that any drawing which are necessary for the understanding 
of the claimed invention have not been furnished. 2 0 I This ground is discussed in greater 
detail in para. 7.4.2. 
7.4.l.c. Wrongful claim to ownership 
A person who can prove that he has a better right to the patent apply to invalidate the patent 
on the ground that the right to the patent does not belong to the person to whom the patent 
was granted.202 This ground is subject, however, to the proviso that the court will not have 
the power to invalidate the patent if the patent has been assigned to the person to whom the 
right to the patent belongs. 2 03 
7.4.1.d. Fraud on the Patent Office 
The fourth ground applies when there is a fraud on the Patent Office. Under this head if 
incomplete or incorrect information has been deliberately provided or caused to be provided 
to the Registrar under subsection (4) of section 29A by the person to whom the patent was 
granted or by his agent, the patent shall be invalidated. Section 29 A( 4) refers to the 
documents that need to be submitted when requesting for a substantive examination. These 
include, inter alia, supporting documents concerning prior filing of an application for a 
patent with a national, regional or international property office, and the result of any search 
or examination carried out be an International Searching Authority.204 There is no 
corresponding provision in the WIPO Model Law. It would appear that this ground is 
based on the need for good faith on the part of the applicant when applying for patent 
rights.2oS 
200 
201 
202 
203 
204 
205 
Section 56(2)(a) of the Act. 
Section 56(2)(b) and (c) of the Act. 
Section 56(2)(d) of the Act. See Chapter 2 - Ownership of Patent Rights Inter Se. paras. 2.. ani 
2.3. 
See section 56(2A) of the Act. . 
See section 56(2)(e) of the Act. See Chapter 1 - Historical Development of the Malaysaan Patent 
System, para. 1.5.4. 
This pound of i"ftlidity appe8I'S to be t.ed on the US defence of fraudulent proaaemeat. Under 
this doctrine, .. appIicat for. patent is und« • duty of candour in dealing with ~ ~ Office. 
A breach or this duty consdtuaes "inequitable conduct" or "fraud". and may lead to Invalidllion of • 
patent. See aeneratly, Chisum, Vol. 5, para. 19.03. 
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7.4.2. Procedural Deficiencies - General 
Section 56(2)(b) states that one of the grounds for invalidation is "that the d "" 
escnptIon or the 
claim does not comply with the requirements of section 23" whl"ch l"n tu "d 
' rn prOVl es that 
every application for the grant of a patent shall comply with the regulations as may be 
prescribed by the Minister under the Act. 
The regulations that are related to the description and the claims are contained in regulations 
12, 13 and 14. Under regulation 12, several matters must be complied with: from 
specifying the technical field to which the invention relates, indicating the background art 
which can be regarded as useful for the understanding, searching and examination of the 
invention, giving a brief description of figures in the drawings, if any, indicating explicitly, 
when it is not obvious from the description or nature of the invention, the way in which the 
invention is industrially applicable, to sufficiency of description and the duty to provide the 
best mode.206 Similarly, the regulations relating to the claims concern guidelines on the 
way in which the claims should be formulated, including the use of Arabic numerals in the 
numbering of claims and the use of characterising portion in claims. A strict reading of 
Section 56(2)(b) would mean that non-compliance with any of these matters, however, 
trifling, could lead to invalidation of a patent. It is unlikely that the legislature intended that 
non-compliance with these should invariably lead to invalidation of an otherwise valid 
patent.207 
This part of the chapter will address two areas of procedural objections which could cause 
problems of interpretation, the grounds of insufficiency and that of best mode disclosure. 
In discussing how the two ~uirements could be construed by the Malaysian courts, 
guidance will be sought from jurisdictions having similar provisions, in particular to the 
United Kingdom best mode case law, and especially to the United States where the 
question of the best mode disclosure requirement has been most adjudicated upon.208 
206 
207 
208 
This sufficiency requirement was present in various pre-1983 statutes in Malaysia. See the Straits 
Settlements Inventions Ordinance, 1871, sections 4, 11 and 30; sections 5 and 28 respectively of 
the Inventions Regulation, 1896, Selangor, Inventions Order in Council, No.2 of 1896, Petak, 
Inventions Order in Council, 1896, Negri Sembilan, and Invention Enactment ~o. 5 of 1897. 
Pahang; Inventions Enactment 1911, Johore, sections 5 and 29; and The I.nvenbon~ Enac~ent, 
1914, Federated Malay States, sections 4, 11 and 26. All these statutes provided that insuffiCIency 
of a description was a ground for revocation. Although a description of the tJc:st ~ was .not 
specifically mentioned, it is likely that, in view of the case I~w of that p:"od In ~ ,!mted 
Kingdom, such a disclosure would have been held to be necessary If such a questiOn was adJuc:ticaIed 
upon in the courts of the various States. . 
See later, para. 7.5, infra. for recommendations. Section S6 of the .Act.is m~lIed on sectI~n 95 of 
the Sri Lankan Act. However, in the Sri Lankan Act, the duties In relauon to sufficiency of 
description and best mode are spelled out in section 6~(3) and (4) of. that Act, and one of the 
grounds for invalidation is non compliance with the requirements of secbOn 69(3) ~ (4). . 
In the United States, the history of the best mode requirement began in 1790 by virtUe of. IC'JCbOD 2 
of the 1790 Patent Act, although it was only by the Patent Act of 1870 what the ..... ement of 
disclosi ... the inventor's best mode was enacted. The 1.952 Pat~t Act. extends the best mode 
requirement from just mechanical inventions to all invenbons. For dISCUSSions of the de\<eIopment 
of the best mode requirement in the USA, see generally, McDougall. D.S., "The Courts 1ft 
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7.4.3. Sufficiency and Best Mode - General 
The early patents in the United Kingdom were granted to encourage inventors to establish 
new industries and also to teach the invention to craftsmen and apprentices. 209 It was only 
later, in the reign of Anne (A.D. 1712) that the filing of a specification was made 
mandatory. This requirement was originally not based on any legislative enactment but on 
the authority of the law officer of the Crown. It is probable that it was in Brand's Patent of 
1771,2 I 0 that Lord Mansfield first applied his doctrine of the patent specification. that the 
main consideration for the validity of a patent is not, as it had previously been, the actual 
working of the invention, but is the sufficiency of the description of it given in the 
specification. This represents a shift of the consideration of the patent grant from practice to 
disclosure.21 I Since 1712, there has been no requirement on a patentee to perfonn any act. 
the only requirement has been the preparation of a specification.2 I 2 However, it was only 
in 1852, by the Patent Law Amendment Act, that this requirement was made statutory. By 
that Act, the applicant had to "particularly describe and ascertain the nature of the invention, 
and in what manner the same is to be performed. ,,2 I 3 
Based on the doctrine of the specification, several theories have been put forward to justify 
invalidating the patent grant on failure to meet the mandated disclosure requirement. The 
inventor's disclosure of the invention is the consideration given by the inventor in exchange 
for his reward to a limited monopoly. The disclosure requirements assure that the public 
receives a quid pro quo. The quid pro quo is that the invention will be available to the 
public once the statutory period of the monopoly expires. In return, he has the duty to teach 
the public so that they are able to work the invention.2 14 Another theory is that since a 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
Telling Us: 'Your Client's Best Mode Must be Disclosed"', 59 JPOS 321 (1977); Herben, W.F., 
"Failure to Disclose the 'Best Mode': What the Public Doesn't Know Will Hun them", 64 JPOS 
12 (1982), at pages 14-15, and Carlson, D.L., "The Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in Patent 
Practice", 60 JPOS 171 (1978), at page 172. See also In re Honn 364 F.2d 454 n.7; 150 USPQ 
652 n.7 (CCPA 1966), where the legislative history and explanation provision of 35 USC 112 
was set forth by Kirkpatrick J. 
See for example, Buck's Invention (A.D. 1651, c. 2) 1 WPC 35. 
BW's Palent of 1771 (Noted in HPC Vol. 11, at page 626). 
See also IJanIet y. Johnson (1778) 1 CPC 35. at 37. per Lord Mansfield, and Hulme, E.W., "On 
the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" 18 ~R 280 (I~). Note 
that non-use may, however, lead to revocation of the patent or cause It . to be ~ubJect t~ a 
compulsory licence - see Chapter 6 - Statutory Control of the Patentee's Exercise of HIS ExclUSive 
Rights, para. 6.1. 
See American Cyanamid Company Wann's) Patent [1971] RPC 425 ~), at page 428. 
See generally, Davenport, N., The United Kingdom Patent System - A Brief History. Kenneth 
Mason, Hampshire, 1979. at pages 29-30. and Robinson. w.e., The Law of Patents, Vol. I, 
1890, at pages 62-63. 
See. for example. R y. Arkwriaht (1785) 1 WPC 64. at page 66, per Buller J .. See also.1n...s 
Nelson 280 F.2d 172; 126 USPQ 242 (CCPA. 1960). at pages 181-182 and 1~; S~ Oil Co. 
V. Montedison. Ssp.A. 212 USPQ 327 (CA 3rd Cir. 1981). at page 363 - comphance. With the full 
disclosure requirement of 35 U.S.C. @ 112. which facilitates subsequent free public ~ of. the 
invention is the qMid pm fill' for the grant of a limited patent monopoly on a patentable IDventiOn. 
This is al~ reflected in UnjyersaJ Oil Products Co. y. Globe Oil and Refinin. ~. 3~2 US 471, 
484. 61 USPQ 382. 388 (US Sup. Ct 1944). per Reed J., "As a RMMI for In~lIons IIId to 
encourage their disclosure. the United States otTers a seventeen-year monopoly to an Inventor who 
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patent gives a monopoly to the patentee, it is prima flacie against the p bl' . 
u IC mterest. To 
offset this, the public should be able to derive an advantage from it by the disclosure of the 
invention so that it can be practised on expiration of the patent. 2 I 5 
In relation to sufficiency, it was said that the purpose of the specification is to teach the art 
to the public so that on expiration of the patent monopoly the publl'c I'S "p t . . 
, U In possessIon 
of the secret" in return for the reward of a grant of the patent. 2 16 Sufficient disclosure of the 
invention would also contribute to the general wealth of technical knowledge2 I 7 which is of 
particular importance to a developing country. 2 I 8 
Th be d . 219· . e st mo e requIrement alms to prevent the applIcant from deliberately keeping back 
something known to himself with the intention that he gets a monopoly without giving the 
full consideration in terms of his knowledge,220 or to keep something of which he knows 
back so that the public will not get the full benefit of the invention which he has and for 
which he was granted a monopoly.221 In the words of Rich J., it is to prevent a "selfish 
21S 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or 
device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practise the invention once the period of 
the monopoly has expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the 
industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted." 
See Turner v. Winter (1787) I WPC 77, per Ashurst J., at page 80. 
See, for example, R v. Arkwri&ht (1785) I WPC 64, at page 66, per Buller J., and Turner v. 
Winter (1787) I WPC 77, per Ashurst J., at page 80. 
See In re Nelson 280 F.2d 172; 126 USPQ 242 (CCPA, 1960), page 181, per Rich 1. 
See WIPO Model Law, page 71. 
Although it was only in 1932 that there was a statutory requirement for a best mode disclosure in 
the United Kingdom Patents statute, such a requirement has long been mandated by case law. 1lte 
idea that a patentee was obliged to describe the best way he knew of performing his invention had 
already formed the basis of a decision by Lord Mansfield when he had invalidated Brand's Patent of 
1771 (Noted in HPC Vol. 11, at page 626) on the ground that certain material information was 
withheld from the specification by the patentee. See also, R. v. Arkwrieht (1785) 1 WPC 64, at 
66, per Buller J.; Turner y. Winter (1787) 1 WPC 77. at 80. per Ashurst J.; Bovil y. Moore I 
CPC 320 at 339, 1 Hayward's Patent Cases 618, at 637. per Gibbs C.J.; Wood v. Zimmer (1815) 
1 CPC 290, at 294, per Gibbs CJ.; SavoQ' v. Price (1823) 1 CPC 431. at 432. per Abbott C.J.; 
Crossley y. Beverley (1830) 1 WPC 106. at 117. per Bayley. J; British Dynamite Co. y. Krebs 
(1896) 13 RPC 190. at 195, per Lord Hatherley and Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd y. Leicester 
Pneumatic Iyre and Automatic Valve Co. (1899) 16 RPC 531. at 541. per Lord Macnaghten. 
Therefore, the statutory provision of 1932 was merely a restatement of the common law position. 
However, this requirement was removed by the Patents Act 1977, United Kingdom. Note that the 
requirement to disclose the best mode is allowed by Article 29( 1) of the GATT TRIPS Apeement. 
However, the Draft Patent Law Treaty only allows the imposition of a sufficiency requiJement -
see Article 3. 
See, for example, Graham J .• in Anuajcan Cyanamid y. Etbicop [1979] RPC 215. at page 269. 
"The Act is intending to protect the public against a patentee who deliberately k~ to himself 
something novel and not previously published which he knows o~ or has .f~ out lives ~ best 
results, with a view to getting the benefit of a monopoly Without ~Ivmg t~ the. pu~!IC the 
corresponding consideration of knowledge of the best method of perfonmng the InventIOn. • lYIbl 
Instruments Inc. y, AcviQUS Inc. 21 USPQ2d 1123 (CAFe 1991), per Nies J., at page 1126. See 
also Mopsanto Co. y. Maxwell Hart CLopdonl Ltd & apor [1981] RPC 201. per Graham J .• at 
page 242. "Further I emphasise that the word in the section is "known" and not. "gueaed". or 
"suspected" or "anticipated". In the case of a defence such as this which is bas~ly diIectrd ~nst 
clishonelt conduct ia withholding of information by a .. _tee from the publac.. die ~nl of 
such. WOld must not be construed in such. way as to be adwrse to or oppasIwe upon a 
patentee. " 
Turnc;r y. Wi- (1787) 1 WPC 77. IMr Buller J .• at pages 81-82; see also Sayory y. Price (1823) 
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desire on the part of some people to obtain patent protection without making full 
disclosure."222 It is "the price which the patentee pays for his patent, so that the public 
would be in a position to make it in the same way and with the same advantages as the 
patentee".223 The idea of fairness is also prominent. Therefore, he has to "play fair and 
square" by disclosing the best mode.224 Alternatively, it has also been said that the patentee 
must act towards the public uberri11Ul fide and, therefore, must give the best infonnation in 
his power as to how to carry out the invention. 2 2 5 Another basis is that non-disclosure of 
the best mode amounts to fraudulent concealment from the public and thus the patent is 
void.226 An alternative rationale is that the best mode requirement is intended to allow the 
public to compete fairly with the patentee following expiration of the patent. 227 
Once a specification is required in return for the grant, the question of whether the 
specification sufficiently describes the invention becomes important. The sine qua non of a 
valid patent being a full, clear, enabling description of the invention,228 failure of 
sufficiency and best mode disclosure, therefore, means that there is a failure of 
consideration. The result is invalidation of the patent granted.2 29 
The classic statement by Judge Rich in In re Gay,230 best explains the relationship and 
differences between the two requirements. He said: 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
"[A] The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
1 CPC 431. per Abbott C.I., at page 432. 
In re Nelson 280 F.2d 172 at page 184; 126 USPQ 242 at 253 (CCPA 1960). per Rich I. 
Wood v. Zimmer (1815) 1 CPC 290. per Gibbs C.l .• at page 294. 
Amaen. Inc .. y. Chul:ai Phaonaceutical Co .. Ltd. and Genetics Institute. inc .• 927 F.2d 1200; 18 
USPQ2d 1016 (CAFC 1991), per Lourie I., at pages 1209-121~. 
See Minerals Separation North American Com. v. NOmnda Mmes Ltd [1947] Ex. C.R. 306, at 
317, 6 Fox Pat C. 130, at 145, per Thorson I. See also Lido Industrial Products Ltd y. Tc'ab1M; 
Industries Inc. (1981) 57 CPR (2d) 29, leave to appeal to S.c.c: re~, 59 CPR (2d) 183. per 
Thurlow C.I., at pages 44-45; vidal Dyes Syndicate Ltd v. Levmstem Ltd (1912) 29 RPC 245, 
per Fletcher Moulton LJ., at 269; Sturtz v De La Rue (1828) I CPC 463. at 469; 38 ER 1048. at 
1050, per Lyndhurst, L.C.; Coles v. BAYlis. Lewis & Co. (1886) 3 RPC 178, at 180, per Bacon 
V.C.; Natural Colour KipematQmpb Co. Ltd v. Biochems. Ltd (1915) 32 RPC 256, at 268, per 
Lord Parker Franc-Strohmepaer & Cowan Inc. v. Peter Robinson Ltd (1930) 47 RPC 493, at 50 I. 
per Maugham I. 638 G'bb 
Bovill v. Moore I CPC 320, at 340; (1816) I Hayward's Patent Cases 618, at page ,per I S 
~~:tiansoD y. Colt Industries OJ?eratinl Corp. 10 USPQ2d 1352 (CA 7th Cir. 1989). per Flaum 
I., at page 1360, footnote 8. . Whi CmsgIjdMr4 
Kewanee Qjl Co. y. Bjcmo Corp. 181 USPQ 673, at 678 (US Sup. Ct 1974~tc QUef Judge. 
Ipdustries y. Yep Servo-Coottpl 218 USPQ 961, at 963 (CAFe 1983). per , 
See American Cyanamid Co. y. Ethjcon lid [1979] RPC 215, per Graham I., at ~ 269. in 
10 re Gu 309 F.2d 769, at 772, 135 USPQ 311. at 315 (CCP~ ~~~;~~h :;4~ 
SP"£'P-Pbpn Inc. y. C'.obcrc;nL Ig:. 827 F:2d 1 S24, 1 S32, 8 usPQic. 1692. 1696 
1987)' DaM Ceq. y. IPC Limital PannerdUp 860 F.2d 415. 419, CAFe 1991), per 
(CAR: 1988); and Wahl IMIIUmeoIS Inc. y. Acyjous Ig:. 21 USPQ2d 1123 ( 
Nies J., at page 1126. 
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terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and [B) shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. -
The essence of portion [A] is that a specification shall disclose an invention in such 
a manner as will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilise it. Separate and 
distinct from portion rA] is portion rBl. the essence of which requires an inventor to 
disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he executes the 
application, of carrying out his invention. Manifestly, the sole purpose of this latter 
requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time 
concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they 
have in fact conceived. (emphasis added). 
It is thus important to note that the two requirements are separate and distinct requirements. 
It is, therefore, possible to satisfy the enablement requirement without satisfying the best 
mode requirement. 23 1 
Although sufficiency or the need for an enabling disclosure applies to the question of 
compliance with the description in the specification, it is also closely related to the question 
of whether the invention has been anticipated by a prior publication. Both require the 
answer as to whether the description will teach the person skilled in the art the subject 
matter of the claim, therefore, the assessment in both situations is the sarne.232 However, 
while the sufficiency requirement is based on an objective assessment, the best mode 
requirement is based on a subjective assessment dependant on the contemporaneous state of 
knowledge of the patentee. 
7.4.4. Sufficiency of Description 
7.4.4.a. The Test as to whether the requirement is satisfied 
Compliance with the requirement of sufficiency is assessed from the state of knowledge of 
the person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains or with which it is most nearly 
connected.233 Similar to the corresponding provisions in the statutes of the other 
231 
232 
233 
See, for example, Cbemcast Com. y. Arco Industries Com. 913 F.ld 923, at 927-928; 16 
USPQ2d 1033, at 1037 (CAFe. 1990). per Mayer 1.. and Sgectta-Physics. Inc. y. Coherent. Jpc., 
3 USPQ2d 1737 at 1746 (CAFC 1987), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct 346 (1987). .. 
See ICIIPyridine Herbicides T2Q6!83 [1986] 5 EPOR 232, at 236. Hence the person skilled In the 
art is deemed to be the same for both purposes. Similarly. in Geneptr&b 1nc.'S P~nt [1989] RPC 
147 (CA), it was held that there is no mandate for applying a different ~C8Ill1!g to ~ ~ 
"skilled in the art" in section 72(I)(c) (sufficiency of description) from that In sec~o.n 3 (mventi~ 
step) of the 1977 Act, UK - per Purcbas L.J. at page 216. But see the contrary oplOlon of Musull 
L.J., at pages 278-279. 92 (HL) 
British ThomSOQ Houston Co. Ltd y. Comoa Lamp Works Ltd (1922) 39 ~ 49, at -
the specification must contain insttuctions which are sufficient to enable the skilled person to amy 
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J'urisdiction referred to, there is no definition of a person skilled in the art H fi 
. owever, rom 
the case law, the following attributes of such a person can be formulated. The addressee of 
the description is deemed to be the person skilled in the relevant art. He is only deemed to 
have common general knowledge at his disposal and not an awareness of the content of the 
whole state of the art.234 Whether the requirement is satisfied is always a question of fact. 
There may be gaps in the information provided, but if a person skilled in the relevant art is 
able, by following the instructions and using the common general knowledge which he is 
deemed to possess, and without the exercise of inventive skill, to work the invention, the 
requirement is satisfied.235 Therefore, the disclosure is not insufficient merely because 
some trial or experimentation not amounting to, or requiring invention would be required 
by a person skilled in the art. 2 3 6 
234 
235 
236 
out the invention without the exercise of inventive ingenuity, and the fact that knowledge arx:\ 
skill, and even some experimental tests, are necessary in putting an invention into practice is not 
sufficient to substantiate a charge of insufficiency. Samuel Taylor Pty Ltd v. SA Brush Co. Ltd 
(1950) 83 CLR 617, per McTiernan J., at 625, "In complying with the first condition, i.e., in 
describing the nature of his invention, the patentee does all that is necessary, if he makes the nature 
of his invention plain to persons having a reasonably competent knowledge of the subject. 
although for want of skill they could not themselves practically carry out the invention. In 
complying with the second condition i.e., in describing in what manner the invention is to be 
performed, the patentee does all that is necessary, if he makes it plain to persons having reasonable 
skill in doing such things as have to be done in order to work the patent, what they are to do in 
order to perform his invention. If, as may happen, they are to do something the like of which has 
never been done before, he must tell them how to do it, if a reasonably competent workman would 
not himself see how to do it on reading the specification, or on having it read to him." See also 
White Consolidated Industries v. VeKa Servo-Control. Inc. 218 USPQ 961 (CAFC 1983), at 963, 
per Markey, Chief Judge; In re Lundale 227 USPQ 90 (CAFC 1985), at 93, per Newman J.; ~ 
Gore & Assocs .. Inc. v. Garlock. Inc. 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220 USPQ 303, 316 (CAFC 
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851, 83 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1984), "This disclosure requirement is 
directed to persons 'of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application was filed.'" See also 
Randomex. Inc. v. Scopus Corp. and Dennis Haskamp 849 F.2d 585; 7 USPQ2d 1050 (CAFC 
1988), per Bissell J. 
In relation to the best mode requirement, though there is no mention of "a person skilled in the 
art", courts have enlisted his help in assessing whether there was such a discl~ure - sa:' "?r 
example, In re Nelson 280 F.2d 172 at 182; 126 USPQ 242 (CCPA, 1960), per Rich J.; Dhools 
Tool Works. Inc. v. Foster Grant Co. Inc. 192 USPQ 365 (CA 7th Cir. 1976), per Fairchild, 
Chief Judge, at page 372. See also American Cyanamid Company <Dann's) Patent [19?1] RPC 
425 (HL), per Lord Reid, at page 437, and per Lord Morris, at page 438. The level of skill of ~ 
person skilled in the art for inventive step and insufficiency is the same - see HaryardlFuSIOD 
Proteins T60/89 [1992] EPOR 320 - Reason for the decision - para. 3.2.5. 
See, for example, Molnlycke V. Procter & Gamble [1992] FSR 549, at 600, per Morritt J. The 
common general knowledge is nonnally represented by basic handbooks and textbooks on the 
subject in question - see IClIPyridioe Herbicides I206/83 [1986] 5 EPOR 232, at 237; ExxonlFuc;l 
om T409/9I, [1994] EPOR 149, at 152. Normally patent specifications. ~ not ~ of common 
general knowledge and cannot, therefore, cure insufficiency - see ICIIPyndlDe Hertncides I206183 
[1986] 5 EPOR 232, at 237. . 
R v, Arkwriaht (1785) 1 WPC 64, at page 66, per Buller J., "It has been ~Iy saad by the coun~:, 
that if the specification be such that mechanical m~n of common understanding can. ~Ibk 
to make a machine by it, it is sufficient; but then It must be .such. that ~ mechInics ~y . 
to make the machine by following the directions of the speclfi~ Without any new 1nvenuc:: 
or additions of their own." Note: The principle and limitation berewpclaid :;0 wen:: SOD : page 
Court of Exchequer in the case of Neilson v. Harfqd (1841) I , per e,., 
314. See also No fume v, Pitchford (1935) 52 RPC 29 and 231 (CAl. per Lord Uanwonh, MIt. at 
pap 238. fMr Ron. W ... paae 245. and fMr Maugham W., at page 248. ~ SismI 
Ocnptrb JIG,'I """" [1989] RPC 147 (CA), fMr Mustil~ W. at.,. c!:iJ:(I=> ';, CPR 
(l948J SCR I. 8 CPR 35; ParI" A Gamble Co, v, BnslQl-MY!' . ' out whit 
(2d) 145 aITd. 42 CPR (2d) 33. However, if too much experimentatJOn IS required to sort 
, 437 
7.4.4.b. How many embodiments should be disclosed? 
The question as to whether all possible embodiments of the I'nvent' be d . . Ion must escnbed IS 
answered in the Court of Appeal case of Biogen Inc v Medeva PI 2.n F th . . 
. . c. rom e case It IS 
clear that it is not necessary that all possible variants of the invention be described.2.' l' 
Similarly, it is also not true that in all cases only a single embodiment 's . d R d I requIre. egar 
has to be had to the "width and character of the invention claimed ,,239 H . d 
. ence 10 or er to 
fulfil the requirement of sufficiency in the description, the application as filed must "contain 
sufficient infonnation to allow a person skilled in the art, using his common general 
knowledge, to carry out the whole area that is claimed?40 A similar approach is also 
applied in the USA.24I 
7.4.4.c. Date at which sufficiency is to be assessed 
Biogen Inc. v. Medeva PIc. 242 also settles the question as to the date on which sufficiency 
is to be assessed. The question of the sufficiency of the specification of a patent under 
section 72 of the 1972 UK Patents Act falls to be assessed by reference to the state of the 
art at the date of the application. Where priority is claimed, then assessment will have to be 
237 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
will work and what will not, the patent is invalid - Ductmate Industries Ltd v. Exanno Products 
IJQ 2 CPR (3d) 289, 4 CIPR 51 (1984). Note that where the art to which the invention relates is 
in a complex area of technology, the person skilled in the art may be represented by a team - see 
for example, Genentech Inc.'s Patent. [1989] RPC 147 (CA), per Purchas L.J. at page 215. 
Boebrin&er Mannheim y. GenzYme [1993] FSR 716, per Aldous I. at page 727. 
BioGn Inc. v. Medeva Pic. [1995] FSR 4. 
See Bioien Inc. v. Medeva Pic. [1995] FSR 4, per Hobhouse L.J., at page 339. 
Bioien Inc. y. Medeva PIc. [1995] FSR 4. per Hobhouse L.I., at page 39. referring to Pottier's 
Application [1967] RPC 170. at 172, per Uoyd-Iacob I.; Eastman Kodak's ApJ)lication [1970] 
RPC 548. per Whitford I.; Genentech 1 (polypeptide expression) CI'292l85) [1989] OJ EPO 275. 
at 282. [1989] 1 EPOR I, at 7. 
Exxop/Fuel QUs T409/91, [1994] EPOR 149. at 152. quoted with approval by Hobhouse L.J., in 
BioGn Inc. v. MedevaPlc. [1995] FSR 4, at page 41. 
Note that under the amendments made to the Patents Regulations, 1986. if the description discloses 
an invention which requires for its evaluation and carrying out the use of a micro-organism which 
is not available to the public at its filing date. then a culture of the micro-o~anism has to be 
deposited in an internationally recognised culture collection not later than the fibng date - Patents 
(Amendment) Regulations 1994, Regulation 12A. Malaysia. 
See. for example. Christiansop v. Colt Industries OJ)eratini CoW· 870 F.2d 1292; 10 USPQ2d 
1352 (CAFe 1989), per Flaum J •• at pages 1357-58; Spectra-Physics. loc. v, Coherent. Ig: .• 3 
USPQ2d 1737. at 1742 (CAFC 1987). ''To determine whether the .discl~ i~ enabling. a two-
part analysis is employed. First we must delimit the scope of the clallned IDvenbOn •... ~nd. we 
must look to the disclosures made in the patent to ascertain whether. given that level of dlSCIos~. 
a person skilled in the art could successfully reproduce the clai.med in~tion in its entire scope. . .. 
Because only the claimed invention receives patent law protccti~. ~ ~Iosures need generally be 
no greater than the claim .•.• If the invention can be reproduced ID Its entire scope. then the patent 
specifications are enabling" (citations omitted).lIIipois Tool Works. loc, y, Foster Grant ~I ~. 
192 USPQ 365 (Fed. Cir. 1976), per Fairchild, Chief Judge. at paae 372~ "The relevant InqWry 
under the "how to" requirement ... is whether the scope of enablemenl provided .10 one of ~ 
skill in the art by the disclosure is commensurate in scope with the Pft*ClIOI' IOU'" by the 
claim." 
Bioaon Inc. VI McdeyaPic. [1995] FSR 4. 
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based on the state of the art at the date of filing the priority application. 24 3 Since the 
Malaysian provision is in pari materia, there is no compelling reason why the same 
approach should not be followed. 
7.4.5. The Best Mode Requirement 
The inquiry as to the requisite disclosure required focuses on two main questions. The first 
is whether, at the relevant time, the applicant knows of a mode for practising the invention 
that he considers to be better than any other.244 This is a subjective inquiry. If the first 
inquiry is satisfied, then the second inquiry is whether there is an adequate disclosure of 
such a method. The second stage is an objective inquiry which depends upon the scope of 
the invention claimed and the level of skill in the art.245 In deciding whether there IS 
compliance with the best mode requirement, several matters need to be considered. 
7.4.5.a. Meaning of "best" 
"Best" in this context means best in practice and not in theory.246 In this connection, it has 
to be noted that the operatives words here are "contemplated by the applicant". It would 
seem, therefore, that this aspect of the question of adequate disclosure has to be based on a 
subjective assessment. The test is whether the applicant has revealed the best mode of what 
he actually knows and not disclosure of what is objectively the best mode. This is borne out 
by the approach of the court in all the jurisdictions compared. In C. Van der Lely NV. v. 
Ruston's Engineering Co. Ltd, the court stressed that "In this context, the best method of 
performing the invention within section 4(3)(b) is the best example of the implement known 
to the applicant at the relevant time. ,,24 7 Similarly, in the US case of In re Gay,248 it was 
243 
244 
245 
246 
247 
241 
BiQ&en Inc. y. Medeya Pic. [1995] FSR 4, per Hobhouse LJ., at pages 44-45. 
As to what is the "relevant time". see infra, para. 7.4.5.f. 
See Cbemcast COl]). v. Arco Industries Col]). 16 USPQ2d 1033, at 1036-37 (CAFe. 1990). per 
Mayer J .• and E.1. pu Pont de Nemours y. Enka BV [1988] FSR 69. at pages 87-88. pu F~ 
J. See also Iransco Products Inc .. y. Perfonnance Contractip&. Inc. and Pa'!'onnang:; ~ncracbPe 
Group. Ioc. 32 USPQ2d 1077. at 1084 (CAFC 1994), per Rich J.; Appbed .Ma":"aIs Inc. y. 
Advanced Semicopductor Materials America Inc 32 USPQ2d 1865 (~ ND Cahfornla 1994). per 
Ingram J., at page 1880. Note that in pana COl]). y. IPC Ltd PanoersbiP 8 USPQ2d 1692 (CAFe 
1988). the court held that "the best mode requirement is not satisfi~ by ref~ to .the level of 
skill in the art." The court in Cbemcast at pages 926-927 hannoniscd DIna With pnor cae ~w 
and indicated that while the best mode requirement may not be met solely by refaaace to the pnor 
art, a high degree of skill in the art combined with implicit disclosure of the best mode by the 
tenns of the patent is sufficienl . 
C. yap dcJLeIy NY. y. Rustop's En,inecriPI Co. lid [1993] RPC 45 (CA), per NICholls W., at 
~ v!;., ely NY. y. Ruston's Eoaj"';PI Co. 'at [1993] RPC 45 (CA). pel' Nicholl. W •• II 
page 56. . J 
In re Gay 309 F.2d 769. 772. 135 USPQ 311.315 (CCPA 1962). per Rich . 
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held that there is no statutory basis for fiequiring that the mod d' I sed be ' 
e ISC 0 In fact "the 
optimum mode of carrying out the invention. ,,249 
7.4.5.b. Meanins of "known" 
As the consequence of a holding that there is a failure of disclosure of the best mode is 
serious, it has to be shown that such a mode was actually known to the I' I' app Icant. t IS 
insufficient if it is merely shown that the applicant has "guessed" or "suspected" or 
"anticipated" that there could be a better mode.25 0 
Where the applicant is a company, it has been held that the knowledge of the company at 
the relevant date must be the knowledge of the person who gives instructions for and 
controlled the application on the company's behalf. It would also seem that "in testing his 
knowledge it must be assumed he was in possession of the relevant information, whether 
he was in fact or not." This test assumes that such an agent had been properly 
instructed.25 I 
7.4.5.c. What must the disclosure relate to? 
The extent of the duty to disclose the best method of performing the invention depends on 
whether the invention relates to a product or a process. Where the invention is a product 
invention, the applicant has to disclose the best method of performing the invention, which 
means that the best example of the product known at the relevant date. Therefore, the best 
method of making that particular embodiment should be revealed.2S2 In the case of a 
process patent, the best way of carrying out the process has to be disclosed. However, in 
certain cases, "the distinction is without a meaningful difference, insofar as the best way to 
use the invention would have a significant bearing on what is the best exemplification of the 
invention: the best way to use the invention would affect the manner in which the 
implement which is the subject of the invention would be constructed. "25 3 
249 
2S0 
2S1 
2S2 
2S3 
See also Carter-Wallace. Inc. y. Riverton Labs .. Inc. 304 F. Supp. 357. at 373; 164 USPQ 73 
(SDNY 1969), per CannellaJ., "Furthennore, the inventor is not required to ~y designale,~ 
objectively best method of use, for even if there be a better method th~ .that which he stales. ~It] 
is enough that he act in good faith in his patent disclosure."'; CbnsbIQSOn y. CoIl Indusbjes 
Qperatin& eoq,. 10 USPQ2d 1352 (CAFe 1989), per Flaum J.. at page 1360, "The requirement 
contains a subjective standard; we will find non compliance. only if the pa~ntet: has ~. 
whether knowingly or unwittingly. his or her preferred embodiment of the clalDled Invenbon. 
See Monsanto Co. y. Maxwell Hart <London) Ltd & apor [1981] RPC 20 I. per Graham J .• at p8F 
242. 
Monsanto Co. y. Maxwell Hart CLnpdop) IJd & apor [1981] RPC 201, per~ J., at p8F 
242, referring to ICSCO lid y. Natrass [1972] A.C. 153. See also Falconer J., In 5.1. Du Pont <t 
Nemours y 5pka BY (1988) FSR 69, at page 89, following Monsanto. ..' 
RIc Du Ponl de NMIOIMJ y En", BY (1988) FSR 69, at paae 88, per Falconer J.. ~ to (I): Mr 
Aldous submitted. and ..... that wlwR die inftftbon claimed is • product die WOi.~ .... best 
method ofperformi"l it" (die invention) includes the best product and how to mike Il 
SeeCc 'Van _I&ly NY. y. Rustoo's MlincainlCo. W (1993) RPC 45. Court of Appeal. pIT 
Nicholls LJ .• at pqe 56. 
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Therefore, in considering the extent of disclosure that is required, reference has to be made 
to the scope of the claim or claims.254 However, discussion on the extent of disclosure in 
the UK has been clouded by the statutory phrase "and for which he is entitled to claim 
protection" in the best mode provision, hence it would be more instructive to consider the 
approach in the United States.255 The US approach, as stated in Benger Laboratories Ltd \'. 
R.K. Laros Co., is that "if he knows at the time the application is filed, of a better method 
to practice the invention and knows it for the best, it would make no difference whether or 
not he was the discoverer of that method.,,256 As was noted by the court in Chemcast C 
or1'. 
v. Arco Indus. Corp., most of the cases in which the court have held that the best mode 
requirement was violated addressed situations where an inventor failed to disclose non-
claimed elements that were nevertheless necessary to practice the best mode of carrying out 
the claimed invention.257 In the case where the applicant's trade secret is required to enable 
the invention to be made or used, such trade secret has to be revealed. This is justified by 
254 
255 
2'6 
2S7 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 10 USPQ2d 1352; (CAFC 1989), per Flaum J .• 
at page 1360, "... the focus of the best mode requirement. as it was with the enablement 
requirement, is on the claimed invention .... Thus before determining whether there was evidence of 
concealment, the scope of the invention must be delimited." 
In section 4(3)(b) of the 1949 United Kingdom Patents Act, it is provided that every specification 
shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to the applicant and for 
which he is entitled to claim protection. The effect of this phrase is difficult to determine (See 
comments of Nicholls L.J., in the Court of Appeal in C. Van Der Lely NV. v, Ruston's 
EDI~ineerim~ Co. Ltd [1993] RPC 45, at page 57). In E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v Enka BY (1988) 
FSR 69, it was argued that the omission of the best method could only be detrimental to the 
applicant if it was a method for which the applicant was entitled to claim protection. In other 
words, question of inventorship was fundamental and the omitted matter must be something which 
was part of the inventive idea of the inventor named in the patent, not that of a different inventor. 
There had to be a nexus between the particular subject matter and the inventor. This submission 
was accepted by the court. The defendants could only succeed on this objection if the method of 
performing the invention claimed was the work of-the inventor so that it could properly have been 
disclosed in the specification of the particular patent as a method of performing the invention of 
which the inventors are the named inventors - [1988] FSR 69, at pages 89-93. See also the various 
contentions in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1979] RPC 215, at pages 269-270. where 
the alleged non-disclosed best method of performing the invention involved the use of a .-:ncular 
apparatus which was not novel having been disclosed in cited prior art ~ therefore, so~ething for 
which protection could not have been claimed. apart from the fact that It was not devised by the 
inventor of the patented invention and Monsanto Co. v. Maxwell Hart <London> Ltd & anor [1981] 
RPC 201. See also C. Van der'Lely NY. v. Ruston's EnKineeriOK Co. LId [1993] RPC 45. Court 
of Appeal, per Nicholls LJ .• at page 58. . ' 
From the cases, it is evident that this phrase has caused confuSion as to the purpose fo~ which the 
best mode requirement is imposed. which is to teach the public the best way. of carI)'lng out the 
invention. So it should be irrelevant to the disclosure whether the method W.hlCh was found to be 
the best was not disoovezed by the inventor or that it was not new or that It n:lated to ~ method 
which was discovered and patented by another person. So it is just as well ,that thIS.~ IS absent 
in the Malaysian. as well as that of the United States, Canadian or Australian proVISIOns. 
Bema Labomtories Ltd y. R.Ke Lams Co. 135 USPQ 11 (E,D. Pa .. 1962); 137 USPQ 693. per 
K.irlcpauick Je, at page 15 (CA 3td Cir. 1963). See also CbeckpolQt System Inc. V· ~ 
Corporatioo 207 USPQ 157 (DC EDNY 1980). per Sifton. District Judge. at page 263 (unless It 
is not within the scope of the claim). 
Cbemcast Cm:p. v. Nco Indus. Com. 16 USPQ2d 1033 (CAFe 1990). per Mayer J •• at page 
1037. See, for example. Dana Com. V. IPC lId Pannersbip 8 USPQ2d 1m at 1695 (CAFe 
1988).1IICI Srsn-Pbysjcs. Iw;, y. Cptmpt. lac.. 3 USPQ2d 1737. at 1745 (CAFe 1987). ~ 
also Rc;ynoIcIs Urn' Co. y. Aqxn Bujldiol OunIzonMts. lac. 192 USPQ 737 (CA 6Cb elr. 
1977)./Mr Weick, Circuit Judge. at page 744. and Wbite CgnsolWM'" ' .. nun v· y_ Sam-
Control. Jg;. 218 USPQ 961 (CAFe 1983). at page 963. 
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.' 
the theoretical possibility that the applicant may extend the exclusionary rights beyond the 
statutory period.
258 
Where perfonnance of the best mode involves the use of a 
composition, fonnula or method of manufacture protected by the trade secrets of a third 
party, the best mode duty requires disclosure of the specific supplier and trade name of the 
preferred material. 259 
7.4.S.d. Commercial fonn 
Despite what is said above regarding the extent of disclosure, a distinction has to be made 
between modes which will enable the invention to perform better and modes which are 
implemented merely for manufacturing considerations. In other words, the commeocial 
fonn of an invention needs to be distinguished from the invention claimed. Controversy 
surrounding this issue centres on whether production details involved in getting a patented 
product into commercial fonn should be included in the specification. For example, if a 
commercial operation is known by the applicant before the date of his application, does he 
have to disclose it on pain of invalidation of his patent for non-compliance with the best 
mode requirement? The general rule in the United States is that the provision requires a 
disclosure that allows one skilled in the art to practise the invention and does not require a 
patentee to disclose every detail of his commercial operation.260 Applying a similar 
approach, the Canadian court in Lido Industrial Products Ltd v. Teledyne Industries Inc. 261 
rejected the best mode attack on the ground that the undisclosed features, though known 
prior to the priority date, were not improvements in the invention itself but merely 
"modifications devised to save manufacturing costs". 
Therefore, whether non-disclosure of particular materials or sources or of a particular 
method or technique selected for manufacture mayor may not lead to failure to disclose the 
258 
259 
260 
261 
See White Consolidated Industries v. Yep Servo-Control. Inc. 218 USPQ 961, at 963, per 
Markey, Chief Judge (CAFC 1983). 
Cbemcast COW. v. Arco Indus. Com. 16 USPQ2d 1033 (CAFC 1990), per Mayer J., at page 
1038. 
It has been explained that a patent disclosure is not a "production specifi~on", In. re Gay 135 
USPQ 311,316 (CCPA 1962). per Rich J.; Christianson v. Colt Industries ~nl Com. 10 
USPQ2d 1352 (CAFC 1989). per Flaum J .• at page 1360, "The best mode rcqu~t .8SSlftS that 
inventors do not conceal the best mode known to them when they file a .patent appbc~on. but the 
'best mode' is that of practising the claimed invention. It has notblDl to do "?th the mw 
. . . ( .. at phasis) ". s'-'-" production or sales to customers haYln& particular mgwrements. ongln em "'--" 
Physics. Inc. y, Coherent. Inc. 3 USPQ2d 1737. per Rich. Circuit Judge. at 1744-46; ED&cl 
Industries InC. y. The l.oclcfonner Co. 20 USPQ2d 1300 CAFC 199!, per Newman J .• at paps 
1302-1303. As explained by Nics J. in Wahl Instruments Inc, y, AcYl,:-Ipc. ~1 USPQ2d, 1,,23 
(CAFe 1991), at page 1128, "A step or material or source or ~~I~'.slr:.: 
manufacturing circumstance may have been .selected .for a non. '~i with 
manufacturing l'JIIuipment was on hand, certain matenals were avadable.. pn P f the 
-.. ha . th'ng to do With ~t 0 suppliers was satisfactory. or other reasons vlDg no I 
invention.· rtA) 29 Thurlow C J 
'm Iwtelllriel pnytygrs lid y, TrhdYDc;!nde"h'irsa Inc. (1981) 57 CPR,~ .,.. • ., 
at .,.. 47 - WhIn there \Wile improvements known IS o.f ~ fill. dille which =.:: 
discloaecl. but such improvements were merely to make a device e8SICI' to man~ 
to serve its purpose better. there is no failure to disclose the best mode. 
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best mode depends on whether the undisclosed manufacturing d w·) b . . 
" e s su stantlally Improve 
the operatIon or effectiveness of the invention. If they do "&"'1 d' 
, tal ure to ISclose such 
peripheral development may well lead to invalidation" 262 Howev't be 
. er, I must remembered 
that from the above, the important point is that such production details, to be excused from 
non-disclosure, must not be such as relate to the proper working f th· . 
o e lDventlon as 
such.263 
7.4.5.e. Any duty to specifically point out it is the best? 
From the cases it would appear that there is no duty to specifically point out in the 
description that a particular method that is described is the best mode contemplated by the 
applicant for carrying out the invention. The duty is satisfied if description of the best mode 
is disclosed in the specification.264 This rule of reason approach is also followed in the 
USA, where it was held that it did not follow that there was a proper basis for a best mode 
rejection under 35 USC 112 merely because the applicant did not "pinpoint within the 
specification some portion that represented a best mode, ,,265 or that it was not "labelled as 
SUCh"266 It had been emphasised that "the touchstone is the content, not its fonn. ,,267 In 
262 
263 
264 
265 
266 
267 
Wahl Instruments Inc. v. Acvious Inc. 21 USPQ2d 1123 (CAFC 1991), per Nies J., at page 1127. 
citing Spectra-Physics. Inc. v. Coherent. Inc. 3 USPQ2d 1737, at pages 1744-46. 
See Iransco Products Inc .. y. Perfoanance ContractinK. Inc. and Perfonnance ContractinK Groyp. 
lok.. 32 USPQ2d 1077 (CAFC 1994), at 1084, per Rich J., "However, the best mode requirement 
does not require an inventor to disclose production details so long as the means to carry out the 
invention are disclosed .... This includes providing supplier/trade name information where it is not 
needed ... Such supplier/trade name information must be provided only when a skilled artisan could 
not practice the best mode of the claimed invention absent this information. See Cbemcast Corp. 
y. Areo Indystries Cmp. 913 F.2d 923, at 927; 16 USPQ2d 1033 (CAFC 1990), per Mayer J. 
(patentee failed to disclose specific composition of p-eferred material or fact that it possessed a 
specific hardness, instead merely supplying a very general description of the material and a broad 
hardness range, thus effectively concealing the best mode) .... " See also Wahl Instruments Inc. \'. 
Acvious Inc. 21 USPQ2d 1123 (CAFC 1991), per Nies J., at page 1128. 
C. Van derLely NY. y. Ruston's EnKineeriDf: Co. Ltd [1993] RPC 45 (CA), per Nicholls L.J., at 
page 56, "Before us it was common ground that the applicant's obligation to disclose the best 
method of performing the invention known to him is satisfied by his disclosi~g ~ me~ as a 
method. He is not required to state that it is the best meth~ so long. as he fairly discl~ It .~ a 
method." See also Garlock's Application [1979] FSR 604, where Whitford J. held that. lD addltlon 
to the mere language of the patent specification, it was possible to a!low evidence to suppon the 
conclusion that the disclosure, in whatever terms it was made, was a disclosure of the best method. 
In re Bosy 360 F.2d 972; 149 USPQ 789 (CCPA 1966). per Martin J., at page 976. Raodomex. 
Inc. y. Sco.pus Corp. and Dennis Haskamp 849 F.2d 585; 7 USPQ2d 1050 (CAFe 1988) -. The 
requirement is satisfied by a disclosure that includes the best mode contemplated by the. app"~t 
for each making and using the invention even though the disclosure does not specify which 
embodiment is considered to be the best 
In re Honn 364 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1966), per Kirkpatrick J .• delivering the opinion of the court. II 
page 462. 
10 re SIpwogd 613 F.2d 809. at 817 (CCPA 1980). But see 8amdornp IQC: y. ~ ~' JIId 
Dennis Haskargp 849 F.2d 58S. at 591-S92 (CAFe 1988), per Mayer J. dlsseDUDI. "Thl~ IS the 
antithesis oflhe aood-fakh full disclosure dill is mandated by section 112's best mode reqwremenI 
... he buried his best mode in a list of less satisfactory ones ... if there is a best mode known to the 
inventor he must say so; he cannot require the public to hunt for it." 
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this context, it is also relevant to note that a patent specification may suffiCiently disclose the 
best mode by implication.268 
7.4.5.f. Date of knowledge. priority applications and the best mode requirement 
As the Malaysian system does not provide for a provisional specification the problem of 
whether the applicant has to describe the best mode known to him at the initial filing of the 
provisional specification or the filing of the complete specification does not arise. 
Therefore, it is clear that at the time of filing the application, there has to be compliance with 
the best mode disclosure.269 In the US, where the situation is the same, the courts have 
consistently stressed that the cut-off date for compliance is at the date of filing the 
application.27o 
However, a question arises as to whether, when relying on a convention priority date, the 
applicant is under a duty to disclose further improvements leading to a better mode of 
carrying out the invention discovered by him in the period between the first filing date in 
another country and the actual filing in Malaysia. It may happen that after the first filing in a 
Convention country and before the Malaysian filing, there is continuing research on the 
subject matter which gives rise to a better mode of carrying out the invention. Has the 
applicant to update his disclosure when filing in Malaysia on pain of invalidation for failure 
to do so? Until the Court of Appeal case in C. Van der Lely NV. v. Ruston's En&ineerin& 
Co. Ltd, this issue was not addressed in the UK. In Ruston's, counsel submitted that the 
relevant date was the priority date for the invention in question. This was, however, 
rejected by the court who held that the relevant date was the date of ruing the complete 
specification.27 1 
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269 
270 
271 
See Cbemcast cotp. v. Area Industries Cotp. 913 F.2d 923. at page 927. per Mayer J. who 
observed that the level of skill in the art is a "relevant and necessary" consideration in assessing the 
adequacy of disclosure. "If the patent is sufficiently descriptive that one skilled in the art would be 
able to practice the best mode. then the second prong of the test is met." citing. inter alia. ~ 
Gore & Associates Inc. v. Garlock. Inc. 220 USPQ 303 (CAFC 1983) and In re Sherwood 204 
USPQ 537 (CCPA 1980). See also Waui Laboratories Inc. V. Mitsubishi Electronics America Inc. 
32 USPQ2d 1641 (DC CD California 1994). per Davis J., at page 1645. ... 
See section 28 of the Act - to be entitled to a filing date. the application should contaln •. IDter aI~a. 
a description. Section 29(2) and Regulation 26(2) specify that there has to be comphance With 
these formal requirements. . . 
See. for example. Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. International Trade CommiSSion 10 l!Sp<?2d 
1257 (CAFC 1989), per Friedman J .• at page 1262; Hybritech. Inc. v. Monoclonal Anbbodies. 
Ink. 231 USPQ 81. 94 (CAFC 1986). . 
C. Van derl&ly NY. v. Ruston's EOiineerini Co. lid [1993] RPC 45. at page 57, ~r N!cholls 
W. Prior to Ruston's. this issue was confused and led to differing comments by v~ous Judps. 
See for example, American Cyanamid Co. v. Bert [1976] RPC 231 at 269, per Whitford J .• ..t 
Arncricab CYanamid v. Etbjcon [1979] RPC 215, per Graham J .• at page 268; MongolO Co7 y. 
Maxwell Hart CLoodool Ud " aoor [1981] RPC 201. per Graham J., at page 242; t'oY'liRn 
<;yanlJDjd's eDapn's> Plfcnt [1971] RPC 425 (HL); Anxjonnaz v. Rolls Royce ':*' [1967] RPC 
419. at 471. ,.,-1JoycI-J1COb I.; Dliooi. Tool Worts Inc. y. AUlglws Co 'Srais'!a!> '11 [I974J 
RPC 337. at 369. perOnham I. See generally. Linneker. J .• "Best Method RevocahOn ... the 
Patents Act 1949: C. van der (.ely NV v. Ruston's Engineering Co. lJd". [1991] II EIPR 423 -
Comment at pages 423-424. 
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This duty is not expressly provided for in the section How is the M 1 ' 
, a ayslan court to decide 
this issue? It is suggested that the UK approach should be ~ollo d' th 
11 we SInce at would also 
be the natural reading of the language of the relevant section It has t be ed th ' 
, 0 not at whIle 
section 27 of the Act gives a right to claim the filing date of an earll'e filed I' , " 
r 1 app lcatlOn In a 
Convention country as the priority date, this has to be read subject to section 29. which 
provides that an application which has a filing date shall be eXamJ'ned ~ I' , lor comp lance WIth 
the fonnal requirements as designated by the Act. If such formal requirements are not 
complied with, the application may be refused Regulation 26(2) in turn prov'd' I" 
, I es, Inter ala. 
that regulation 12 (which includes the best mode disclosure) shall be considered formal 
requirements for the purposes of the Act in accordance with section 29(2) of the Act. 272 
This clearly shows that a convention application has to comply with the best mode 
requirement under the Act. Due to the rather different statutory provisions regarding priority 
1·· . h U' d S 273 app lcatIons 10 t e mte tates and Canada, the position as regards the date of 
knowledge had been decided differently when compared with the United Kingdom.274 As 
272 
273 
274 
See provisions of section 29 of the Act. 
See 35 USC, Section 119 in Appendix. The corresponding provision in Canada under section 28 is 
almost in pari materia. 
In Re Hilmer 149 USPQ 480 (CCPA 1966) is relevant to the present discussion. Though not on 
the issue of the best mode requirement but on the relationship between 35 USC J02(e) [Section 
102(e) provides that a patent may not be obtained if the invention was described in a patent granted 
on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by 
the applicant] and 119, the court's comments on the purpose of section 119 is helpful. The Coun 
specifically stated that 35 USC 119 does not operate to give to a first foreign filed convention 
application the same effect as filing of a US application for all purposes, but that the effect of that 
section is to have the foreign application treated as a prior reduction to practice in the US in 
relation to any intervening acts which would affect the novelty of the invention in the country. In 
other words the CCPA determined that section 119 effects a legal defence against acts which would 
otherwise affect the novelty of the subject matter of a US application claiming convention priority. 
when those acts occur in the allowed interval between the first foreign filing and the US filing. No 
other effects or benefits are to be found in the operation of section 119. Based on an analysis of 
this case, Litman, in his article "Problems with the Best Mode Requirement of 35 USC 112 in 
Applications Claiming Priority under 35 USC 119 and 35 USC 120", 61 JPOS 431 (1979), 
argues that under 35 USC Section 119, the benefit of priority rights to a US application, obtained 
by reliance upon earlier filed applications under US patent laws, does not remove the necessity for 
compliance with substantive US laws for the later filed US applications. Hence the best mode 
requirement must be observed and updated at the time of filing the US application. However. in 
several cases where this issue has arisen, the court has held otherwise. See Standard on Co. 
andiMal et ct. v. Montedison S,p.A. 206 USPQ 676, at 696 (D.C. Del. 1980), affd. 212 USPQ 
327 (CA 3d Cir. 1981), per Wright, Senior Judge, at page 696, "Phillips's argument nevertheless 
ignores the clear language of the statute, which provides that the effective date of the subsequent 
American application is the date of Montedison's Italian filing. It is not. con~ that as o~ ~t 
date ... Montedison honeStly believed that its best catalyst was TIC. Since Montcdlson s 
subsequent American application accurately disclosed what Montedi~n ~t1.y believed as of that 
application's effective date, this court finds that Montedison's apphcallo~ sal1sfied the best mode 
requirements of section 112."; Tyler Refri&eration Corp. v. KYsor Industrial Corp. 22S USPQ 4?2, 
at 504 (D.C. Del. 1985), affiL 227 USPQ 84S (Fed. Cir. 1985), where the.Co~ follow!ng 
Standard Ojl held that the best mode disclosure need not be updaIrd when fibng a c:=on~nll~n 
application in the United States based on an earlier Japanese fili~g - per ~hum, ~mO!' Distnct 
Judge. at pages 503-4. However, it would seem that the earlaer filed foreagn ':PPI~?" must 
comply IS of its filing dale with the best mode requirement if the later US appliCatIon IS to be 
entitled 10 the benefit of 35 USC 119 - Tulor" de V. hOw 208 USPQ 275, at 277 (8d. Pat. 
InlY 1979). at page 277. Although the issue was diftdrd toWards the reIIIionship between ~ 
112 and IeCtion 120 (continuation applications), Stendwd Oil and Ixa wae rda~ to Without 
adverse comments by Rich J.t in Dweoo Products Inc .. v. Performance ConlnM:llQl· Inc. II!d 
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to the relevant date of knowledge, it is submitted that since the Act does not contain an 
equivalent provision to section 119 of the US Patents statute, the correct approach would be 
that of the UK court in Ruston's. Therefore, When a priority application is filed in 
Malaysia, the best mode disclosure needs to be updated if there is a better mode discovered 
between the original and priority filing. 
7.4.5.g. Is an "intent to conceal" required? 
Like the provisions present in statutes of the countries under discussion, the statutory 
provision in the Act is silent on whether violation of the best mode requirement is 
committed only on proof of an intention to conceal. In other words, must the element of 
wilful non-disclosure or fraud or dishonest conduct be proved? Graham J., in relation to 
this requirement in the 1949 UK Act, said that it was intended to protect the public against a 
patentee who deliberately did not disclose the best mode known to him.275 Two years later. 
he again emphasised that the section was basically directed against the "dishonest conduct" 
of a patentee in withholding information from the public. and that in the absence of 
improper conduct on the part of the patentee, the defence should not be used against 
him.276 Commenting on this statement, Falconer J. however, disagreed with this opinion, 
and held that the material wording of the objection in paragraph (h) of section 32( 1) "is apt 
to cover any case in which the applicant has not disclosed in his complete specification the 
best method known to him of performing the invention, whatever the reason for the 
omission. ,,277 
The US courts seems to have adopted the same approach propounded by Falconer J. on 
this issue.278 In Dale Electronics. Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics the Court held that 
275 
276 
277 
278 
Perfonnance ContractinK Group. Inc. 32 USPQ2d 1077, at 1082 (CAR: 1994). 
The same approach is followed in Canada where it was held that the relevant date for testing as to 
what the best mode was as known to the patentee is the filing dale of the application or the 
Convention priority date - Lido Industrial Products Ltd v. Teledyne Industties Inc. (1981) 57 CPR 
(2d) 29, per Thurlow C.J., ,at 45-46; AT & T TechnoloKies Inc. v. Mitel Com. (1989) 26 CPR 
(3d) 238, per Reed J., at 258-61. 
American CYanamid v. Ethicon [1979] RPC 215, at 269. 
Monsanto Co y Maxwell Hart (London) Jill [1981] RPC 201. at page 242. 
In E.I, Du Popt de Nemours y Enka BV [1988] FSR 69, at pages 88-9. See also Boyjll. v. Moore 
(1816) I CPC 320, at 348, 1 Hayward's Patent Cases 618, at 648 - In .reply to. a quesbon from a 
member of the jury that the failure to disclose the improved me~od might be Inadvertent and not 
fraudulent, Gibbs, LCJ said "Certainly; and if it was inadverte~t, I~ he ac~ly .knew. and meant to 
practise that mode, and inadvertently did not state the whole ID hiS specificatiOn, he must answer 
for his inadvertence." 
Writing in 1982, Herbert is of the opinion that the ~S courts.are sti.ll ~~ as to whcther~ 
showing of "intent" to conceal the best mode is n:quiRd to deDlai or IDvaiidatioD of • patalL . 
says that the United States Courts of Appeals have been applying .two dif!Cren~ :~h:; 
question. On the one hand, the best mode issue is ~ With a Strict 
cases following this approach only requires a showing that the Iftvenlor has knowIedF .of the best 
mode at Ihe lime of the application and has failed to disclose iL The reason for ~ • ~IUIe c;.~ 
intention. if any, behind it, is irrelevanL The more li~ second ~ ("tel ~:, btC 
standIrd. ~ illustration of the liberal approach, he Cites Canc;r-W n pc. y. 
S. 167 USPQ 656 (2nd eire 1970) and Beop l;etxqtoriesa [Jd Ya BeKe Lams Co. agI Cygcr 
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n[u]nintentional obtuseness or obfuscation might be a reason not to penalise 
someone; we 
do not see it as a reason for granting a seventeen year monopoly.,,279 The Dale reasoning 
was followed by Miller J. in Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp. Citing Dale, he 
said that "we are not persuaded that the failure to set forth the best mode contemplated by an 
inventor of carrying out his invention must rise to the level of active concealment or grossly 
inequitable conduct in order to warrant invalidation of a patent. ,,28 0 
Baldwin 1. in In re Sherwood, 281 while acknowledging that there is no objective standard 
by which to judge the adequacy of the best mode disclosure, held that only evidence of 
concealment, whether accidental or intentional, is to be considered. The quotation in 
Sherwood has been consistently relied upon by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 282 Flaum J. stressed that non-compliance will be found if the patentee has 
concealed, "whether knowingly or unwittingly", his preferred embodiment of the claimed 
invention.283 
Up to now, the US Supreme Court has not addressed this issue; and in several cases where 
the issue could have been addressed, the Court has denied certiorari.284 It is submitted that 
in Malaysia, as the Act does not qualify the provision with the word "fraudulently etc.", it 
must be assumed that it applies in every situations. 
7 .5. Proposals for Change 
On the whole, the relevant provisions discussed earlier in the ch~pter provide a proper 
balance between the rights of a patent owner and the public. However, there are areas 
279 
280 
281 
282 
213 
284 
Laboratories; Annour and Co. 135 USPQ 11 (E.D. Pa. 1962); 317 F.2d 455; 137 USPQ 693 
(1963). It has to be noted, however, that the Benf:er decision that was relied upon was ~e one 
decided by a District court. Further, since there was a fin~ng that the inventor had not faded to 
disclose the best mode because the best mode was not defirutely known, the s~tement ~ br tfl.e 
court that there had to be evidence of an actual intent to conceal was made obIter. The ~ Crrcwt 
upheld this finding as there was a real question as to which was. the best mode 10 . the mlOd ~f the 
inventor. In Carter-Wallace, there was again a fmding that the IOventor was not 10 POSse~lO~ of 
the best mode at the time of filing the application and hence was not in b~h of hi~ obli~ation. 
The court observed obiter that it would have been different "had the IOventor IDtentional~y 
concealed the facts"~ See H~rbert, W.F., "Failure to Disclose the "Best Mode"; What the PublIc 
Doesn't Know Will Hurt them", 64 IPOS 12 (1982), at pages 21-27. . 
Dale Electronics. Inc. y. R.C.L. Electronics 180 USPQ 225 (CA 1st Crr. 1973). at page 230. 
Upiop Carbide Corp. y. BOil-Warner Corp. 193 USPQ 1. at 7 (CA 6th Cir. 1976). 
In re Sherwood 613 F.2d 809, at 816; 204 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1980). . 
See, for example, PeGeor&e y. Bernier 768 F.2d 1318 (CAFC 1985), per Baldwm ~ .• at 1324, 
Spectra-Physics. Ipc. y. Coherept.lnc. 3 USPQ2d 1737. at 1745. (CAFC 198,!>,perRich J.; ~ 
Cm:;poratiop y. IPC Limited Pvtpership apd Internatiopal Packip& Corporabop 860 F.~ 4g; 8 
USPQ2d 1692 (CAFC 1988). per Archer J., at page 418, Cbemcast Corp. y. Arm Ipdustnes ~. 
913 F.2d 923 (CAFC 1990), Mayer J. t at page 926. 
Christianson v. Colt Industries QperatiP& Com. 10 USPQ2d 1352 (CAFC 1989), per Flaum J. t at 
page 13S9. F "F'I t Disclose the For a list of cases when this situation had occurred. see Herbert, W.., 81 ure ~ 
'Best Mode': What the Public Doesn't Know Will Hurt them", 64 JPOS 12 (1982), In footnote 13. 
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where the Act can be improved upon. An important arbiter of this bal . the . 
ance IS court. It IS 
hoped that the discussion herein will provide some form of asSI'stan & th 
ce tor e courts to 
achieve this. Based on the earlier analysis of the various grounds for the limitation and loss 
of rights, several recommendations can be made. 
The limitation with regard to foreign transportation in section 37(3) should be amended to 
include the word "accidentally" so as to be in compliance with the obligations under the 
Paris Convention. In the event that the present restricted version of international exhaustion 
is unsatisfactory and needs to be extended, two possible alternatives are proposed. This 
could be done by means of a new subsection (2A) to section 37.285 Another alternative is to 
adopt the CPC provisions relating to common ownership. The provisions of section 37(5) 
should be extended to include goods put on the market by concurrent patent owners under 
section 31(2A). The limitations should also apply to rights derived in the interval between a 
lapsed patent and its reinstatement. 
The prior use provision of section 38 is useful to prevent economic hann to an innocent 
prior user who has exploited the invention the subject of a patent application or patent. 
More importantly, it gives protection to domestic industry. To ensure that only deserving 
cases are granted such rights, the various factors mentioned in the earlier discussion need to 
be taken into consideration in deciding whether there are any "serious preparations". 
Further, some form of temporary protection should be given to persons who have been 
importing goods the subject matter of a later grant. To make it fairer to a prior importer, it is 
suggested that a new section 38A should be introduced. The proposed section would 
provide protection against infringement actions for any dealings with a patented product 
which has been acquired or contracted for before the grant of the relevant patent. 286 The 
rights of a person derived from dealing with a lapsed patent should be more on par with that 
of a prior user. Without such extended rights, such a person may be seriously prejudiced in 
terms of his industrial investment. 
There should be a paradigm shift in the treatment of conversion cases so that the focus is on 
the extent to which the patentee is adversely affected, as contrasted with the present 
approach of focusing on whether there is a loss of identity or destruction of the original 
article. Such a shift in approach will do better justice between the parties involved. Further, 
as mentioned earlier, the implied licence to repair is meaningless in the Malaysian context 
unless there is change in the law of copyright with regard to functional drawings. 
215 
216 
It is suggested that the phraseology employed in the Patents Act 1994, Singapore could usefully be 
~~. . b 
The inclusion of the word "contracted to purchase" in the proposed secbon would solve 
problem which arose in Wdo Industrial Products y. TeJecLvne Industries 57 ~R(2d) 29 (1981), 
where the court construed the prior user provision in section 58 of the Canadian Patent Act to 
exclude goods ordered, but not shown to be in existence yet at the relevant date - see page 54. See. 
however, the dissenting judgement of Thurlow C.J., at pages 33-40. 
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As regards compliance with the best mode requirement, intention is very difficult to prove. 
It is a matter of the applicant's words against the another person. Even if there is proof of 
knowledge of the undisclosed best mode, it can be brushed aside by a mere assertion of an 
accidental lack of disclosure. There is a further difficulty if intention is made an element in 
the question of invalidation for lack of disclosure of the best mode. What test is to be 
applied to determine whether there was an intentional decision not to disclose? Will it be a 
subjective or an objective test? If it is objective, it will defeat the purpose of requiring actual 
intent. So on balance the easier test to apply is not to require proof of intent. Mere proof of 
knowledge and non-disclosure, whether intentional or accidental, should be enough. 
Further, patents are valuable rights and they should be earned by those seeking patent 
monopolies. Insistence on a strict standard will act as an inducement to other applicants to 
observe the utmost good faith in complying with the requirement. 287 However, to put the 
applicant on notice of the serious consequence of a non-disclosure, the suggestion by 
Carlson,288 that the applicant should be asked to file an oath or declaration that he is aware 
of his duty to disclose the best mode contemplated by him of carrying out the invention at 
the time of the filing of his application, and that he has in fact disclosed that best mode, 
would appear to be a workable solution and should be implemented. 
In relation to the grounds for invalidation of a patent, it is suggested that the more relevant 
grounds should be set out in section 56(b) of the Act instead of a general provision that any 
non-compliance with the regulation would result in invalidation of a patent. This is more 
elegant and will cause less confusion as to the exact boundary of these grounds. 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are 
set out in Chapter 8. 
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R y. Arkwriaht (1785) I WPC 64. at page 66. per Buller 1.. "It ~ms to m~~e !~o: : 
question of the greatest importance; because, if you should be of ~PlruO~ upon Ie w:o I fm' 
the specification is not certain enough. it may have the ~ffec~ of mducmg peop tl :p ~Iic 
patents in future times to be more explicit in their specIfications. and, consequen y. 
will derive a great benefit from it" . " 60 JPOS 171 
See Carlson. D.L .• ''1be Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in Patent Practice , 
(1978), at pap 197. 
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusions and Proposed Amendments 
8.1. Conclusions 
From Chapter 1, it has been seen that though Malaysia has a comparatively long history 
where statutory protection for invention is concerned, there was a lack of awareness and 
interest in the patent system until the Patents Act 1983 came into force in 1986. The former 
statutory schemes in the various states were brought into existence as market protection 
measures. There were no attempts to educate the indigenous population on the working of 
the system and to encourage more local use. This state of affairs has to a certain extent been 
changed, and there is more local awareness and use of the patent system. The 
reintroduction of an indigenous patent system is, therefore, to be welcomed. Although the 
Act seeks to promote the interests of the patent owner while at the same time safeguards the 
rights of the public, a study of the Act reveals several weaknesses which could be rectified 
to strike a better balance between the patent owner and the public. 
In Chapter 2, the analyses of the relevant provisions of the Act regarding joint invention, 
joint ownership and employees' invention, show that there are problems with the present 
provisions. To rectify these weaknesses, several proposed amendments are suggested. To 
reflect the intention of the Act, proposals are made to clarify the provision on the right to a 
patent. This provision is amended to specify that the basic rule that the initial right to a 
patent belongs to the inventor is subject to the provisions on employee's invention. Where, 
however, there has been an assignment or transfer of this right, then the right to the patent 
shall belong to the assignee or transferee. As it is deemed useful to have a working 
definition of joint inventorship, a definition has been proposed which, it is hoped, will be 
of some assistance in the determination of joint inventorship. Provisions are also suggested 
to provide a mechanism for the resolution of inventorship disputes, and to give express 
powers to the couit to deal with them, and to make suitable orders in settlement of the 
disputes. A new provision is added to define the attributes of a patent or patent application. 
This clarifies the types of dealing which could be carried out in relation to them. To ensure 
a clearer and fairer allocation of rights between joint owners, formulations regarding the 
rights of joint owners are laid down in the proposed amendments. As the statutory scheme 
for employee inventions appears to be structured too much in favour of the employer, 
SUggestions are offered to provide an alternative scheme in relation to dependent inventions. 
In Chapter 3 the various exclusive rights granted under the Act are analysed. These rights 
are in accord with the required level under international obligations. Suggestions are offered 
as regards ways in which the provisions could be construed to provide satisfactory scope of 
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protection to the patent owner. However, several provisions are identified in the analysis 
which could be strengthened in favour of the patent owner only be means of statutory 
intervention. Two new definitions, relating to "offer" and "use", are suggested. In 
accordance with the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, there is a proposal to increase 
the duration of patent protection, and to provide protection for the interim period between 
the filing date and the issue of the grant. The discussion on process patents reveals the 
difficulties of providing a viable scheme to protect the interests of the patent owner and at 
the same time protect the public against undue interference from the exercise of the rights 
under the patent. The compromise proposal aims to provide a scheme whereby the patent 
owner is able to recoup the value which a patented process has imparted to imported goods 
which have benefited from the use of the process, but which are not deemed to be products 
directly obtained by means of a patented process. In view of the fact that Malaysian 
entrepreneurs are less "patent -conscious" as compared with their counterparts in the 
developed countries, and may not be in a position easily to determine whether the products 
they are dealing in are prohibited by the existence of a patent, it is proposed that a provision 
to restrict the award of damages in the case of innocent infringement be introduced. Several 
proposals are also made to encourage the recordation of transactions involving patents. 
Since it is felt that the present provision relating to the right of a licensee to institute 
proceedings is too cumbersome, proposals are made to improve the procedure. Finally, the 
licence of right provisions are clarified and amended to make them more attractive to the 
patent owner. 
In Chapter 4, it has been shown that it is not feasible to rely wholly on the common law 
approach to solve the problems of unauthorised indirect exploitation of a patented 
invention. Several weaknesses of the common law have been revealed. To overcome these 
weaknesses, express provisions to cater for indirect exploitation of a patent without the 
need to show a nexus with a direct infringement are proposed. The United Kingdom 
model, with modifications, could be adopted. To cater for the problem of the supply of 
unassembled parts of patented combinations, proposal is made to adopt the strategy used in 
the US statute relating to export trade. The proposed amendments are set out in a new 
section 58B, to reinforce the direct infringement section of section 58. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the harmful effects of unjustified threats of patent infringement 
proceedings against the receiver of such threats. The common law remedies have been 
found wanting and are too biased in favour of the patent owner. To achieve a proper 
balance between the right of the patentee to notify the public of his patent rights and to issue 
general warnings against infringement of his rights, and the need to ensure that such 
warnings do not exceed the boundary of fair practices to the detriment of his rivals, a 
threats provision has been proposed. The provision will go far towards deterring patent 
owners from engaging in such unfair practices. 
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The evaluation in Chapter 6 of the various provisions to control the ab f ' h 
use 0 patent ng ts 
highlights several areas which could be improved upon to make th ' , 
e prOVISIons more 
effective. The main proposals concern the revision of section 45 wI'th th ' , f e provIsIon 0 
more substantial guidelines as to what constitute restrictions which are prohibited in 
licensing agreements. It has also been proposed that the penalty for breach of the section 
should be amended to make it a more powerful weapon in the control of abuses of patent 
rights. In relation to compulsory licensing, several minor amendments are made for the 
purpose of clarification. A departure from the present practice is proposed to place the 
burden of showing that the patented invention is being worked in Malaysia on the patentee, 
A new ground for compulsory licence based on the inter-dependence of patents is also 
proposed. It is also suggested a compulsory licensee should be allowed, in specified 
situations, to import patented articles. It is further proposed that the compulsory licensing 
provisions be extended to utility innovations. Finally, the provision relating to Government 
use of a patent is amended to clarify when the Government is entitled to rely on the section. 
One of the major problems revealed in Chapter 7 is that relating to the statutory exhaustion 
of rights provisions, which are admittedly unclear. Interpretations are offered which would 
allow for the application of a restricted form of the doctrine of international exhaustion to 
Malaysia, as well as proposals for amending the statute to clarify the present ambiguities. 
With regard to the prior user provisions, several suggestions are made as to the way the 
provisions could be construed to protect the investments of the prior user, and to ensure 
that the protection offered is meaningful. Some form of temporary protection has been 
suggested which would provide a measure of protection to persons who have been 
importing goods the subject matter of a later grant. It has also been proposed that the rights 
of a person derived from dealing with a lapsed patent should be more on par with that of a 
prior user. No proposed amendment has been made with reference to the issues of repairs 
and conversions. However, suggestions on how the issues should be dealt with are made. 
Similarly, suggestions are made regarding the approach to take with respect to the question 
of sufficiency and best mode. However, to put the applicant on notice of the serious 
consequence of a non-disclosure of the best mode, it is proposed that the applicant should 
be asked to file an oath or declaration that he is aware of his duty to disclose the best mode 
contemplated by him of carrying out the invention at the time of the filing of his application 
and that he has in fact disclosed that best mode. In relation to the grounds for invalidation 
of a patent, it is suggested that the more relevant grounds should be set out in the Ad. 
instead of a general provision that any non-compliance with the regulation would result in 
invalidation of a patent. 
The proposed amendments to the Act to deal with the problems identified in this Chapter are 
set out in para. 8.2. of this Chapter. 
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8.2. Proposed Amendments 
In accordance with the views expressed and observations made regardin h b g ways w ere y 
the various provisions discussed in this thesis could be improved, it is proposed that the 
relevant provisions be amended as shown below. The words and phrases in italics and 
enclosed in square brackets denote the original versions which are to be deleted under the 
proposed amendments. Words and phrases in bold type denote the proposed additions to 
the Act. 
Section 3. Intemretation. 
Patents Act 1983 Malaysia 
Part 1 
Preliminruy 
"employee" means a person who works or has worked under a contract of employment, or 
who is in employment under, or for the purposes of, any individual or organisation; 
"employer" in relation to an employee, means the person by whom the employee is or was 
employed; 
"offer" includes advertisement for supply; 
"owner of the patent" or "owner of a patent" means the person for the time being recorded 
in the Register as the grantee of a patent; 
"patented invention" means an invention for which a patented is granted and "patented 
process" shall be construed accordingly; 
"patented product" means a product which is a patented invention or, in relation to a 
patented process, a product obtained directly by means of the process or to which the 
process has been applied; 
"process" includes an art or a method; 
"product" means any thing which appears in tangible form, and includes any apparatus, 
article, device, equipment, handicraft, implement, machine, substance and composition; 
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"staple commercial product" means a product generally available in 
commerce and commonly used in other non-patented prod ts uc or processes; 
"use" includes hire, lease or any other use of the patented product for the 
purpose of, or in relation to, trading in that product, but does not include 
the activity of a mere carrier, warehousemen, customs agent, or others in 
similar capacity. 
Section 11. Patentable Invention. 
Part IV 
Patentability 
An invention is patentable if it is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially 
applicable. 
Section 12. Meaning of "Invention". 
(1) An invention means an idea of an inventor which permits in practice the solution 
to a specific problem in the field of technology. 
(2) An invention may be or may relate to a product or process. 
Section 13. Non-patentable subject matter. 
(1) Notwithstanding the fact that they may be inventions within the meaning of 
section 12, the following shall not be patentable: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals, other than man-made living micro-
organisms, micro-biological processes and the products of such micro-
organism processes; 
(c) schemes, rules or methods for doing business, performing purely mental 
acts or playing games; 
(d) methods for the treatment of human or animal body by surgery or therapy, and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body; 
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Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to products used ill 
methods. any such 
(2) For the purpose of subsection 0), in the event of uncertainty as to whether the 
items specified therein shall be patentable or not, the Registrar may refer the 
ma~e~ to the Examiner for an opinion and the Registrar shall thereafter give a 
decISIon as to whether to include or exclude such items as being patentable, as the 
case may be. 
Section 14. Novelty. 
(1) An invention is new if it is not anticipated by prior art. 
(2) Prior art shall consist of -
(a) everything disclosed to the public anywhere in the world, by written 
publication, by oral disclosure, by use or in any other way, prior to the 
priority date of the patent application claiming the invention; 
(b) the contents of a domestic patent application having an earlier priority date 
than the patent application referred to in paragraph (a) to the extent that such 
contents are included in the patent granted on the basis of the said domestic 
patent application. 
(3) A disclosure made under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) shall be disregarded-
(a) if such disclosure occurred within one year preceding the date of the patent 
application and if such disclosure was by reason or in consequence of acts 
committed by the applicant or his predecessor in title; 
(b) if such disclosure occurred within one year preceding the date of the patent 
application and if such disclosure was by reason or in consequence of any 
abuse of the rights of the applicant or his predecessor in title; 
(c) if such disclosure is by way of a pending application to register the patent in 
the United Kingdom Patent Office as at the date of coming into force of this 
Act. 
(4) The provisions of subsection (2) shall not exclude the patentability of any 
substance or composition, comprised in the prior art, for use in a method referred 
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to in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of section 13, if its use in any such method is 
not comprised in the prior art. 
Section 15. Inventive Step. 
An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to any 
matter which forms part of the prior art under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of section 14, 
such inventive step would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art. 
S~tion 16. Industrial application. 
An invention shall be considered industrially applicable if it can be made or used in any 
kind of industry. 
Section 17. Definition. 
Part IVA 
Utility Innovations 
For the purposes of this Part and any regulations made under this Act in relation to this 
Part, "utility innovation" means any innovation which creates a new product or process, or 
any new improvement of a known product or process, which can be made or used in any 
kind of industry, and includes an invention. 
Section 17A. Application. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the provisions of this Act, subject to the 
modifications in the Second Schedule, shall apply to utility innovations in the 
same manner as they apply to inventions. 
(2) Sections 11, 12, 15, 16, 26, [Part X], and sections 89 and 90 shall not apply to 
utility innovations. 
Section 17B. Conversions from an $plication for a Patent into an Ap,plication for a 
Certificate for a Utility Innovation and vice versa. 
Section 17C. Patent and Certificate for a Utility Innovation Cannot Both be Granted for 
the Same Invention. 
456 
Part V 
Rights to a Patent 
Section 18. Right to a patent. 
(l) Any person may make an application for a patent either alone or jointly with 
another. 
(IA) A patent or an application for a patent lOS I persona propert~'. 
capable, inter alia, of being: 
a. assigned or transmitted, 
b. licensed, mortgaged or subject of a charge, 
c. used in satisfaction of the execution of a jUdgement debt. 
(2) Subject to section [19] 20, the rights to a patent shall belong to the inventor. 
(2A) Where the right to a patent has been assigned or transferred h~' 
succession, the right to the patent shall belong to the assignee or 
the successor in title. 
(3) Where two or more persons have jointly made an invention, the rights to a patent 
shall belong to them jointly. 
(3A) An invention shall be deemed to be jointly invented when two or 
more persons collaborate, either expressly or impliedly, to devise 
the patented invention, and through their mutual consultation and 
suggestions, contribute towards the complete inventive concept. An 
invention shall still be deemed to be a joint invention even though 
(1) the persons involved do not physically work together or at the 
same time, (2) each does not make the same type or amount 0 f 
contribution, or (3) each does not make a contribution to the subject 
matter of every claim of the patent. 
(4) If two or more persons have separately and independently made the same 
invention, and each of them has made an application for a patent. the right to a 
patent for that invention shall belong to the person whose application has the 
earliest priority date. 
(5) (a) The inventor or joint inventors shall have the right to be 
mentioned as such in any application for a patent or patent granted 
for the invention. 
(b) An inventor or joint inventor who alleges that he ought to ha,·l' 
been mentioned in any application for a patent or patent granted 
may, at any time, apply to the court for a declaration to that effect. 
(c) Where a person has been mentioned as sole or joint inventor in 
pursuance of this section, any other person who alleges that the 
former ought not to have been so mentioned may, at any time. appl~ 
to the Court for a declaration to that effect. 
Section 19. Judicial assignment of patent application or patent. 
( 1 ) Where the essential elements of the invention claimed in a patent application or 
patent have been unlawfully derived from an invention for which the right to the 
patent belongs to another person, such other person may apply to the Court for an 
order that the said patent application or patent shall be assigned to him: 
[Provided also that the Court shall not entertain an application for the assignment 
of a patent after five years from the date of the grant of the patent.] 
(2) A person who claims that he is entitled to be considered as a joint 
owner may apply to the court for a declaration to that effect. If the 
court is satisfied that such a declaration should be made, the court 
may also make such orders as it deems fit to do justice to the 
parties. 
(3) The Court shall not entertain an application under this section after 
five years from the date of the grant of the patent. 
Section 20. Inventions made by an employee or pursuant to a commission. 
s.20( I) In the absence of any provisions to the contrary in any contract of employment or 
for the execution of work, the rights to a patent for an invention made in the 
performance of such contract of employment or in the execution of such work 
shall be deemed to accrue to the employer, or the person who commissioned the 
work. as the case may be: 
Provided that where the invention acquires an econoffil'c \'alue m h th 
uc greater at 
the parties could reasonably have foreseen at the time of concluding the '-contract of 
employment or for the execution of work, as the case may be, the inventor shall 
be entitled to equitable remuneration which may be fixed by the Court in the 
absence of agreement between the parties. 
[5.20(2) Where an employee whose contract of employment does not require him to 
engage in any inventive activity makes, in the field of activities of his employe r, 
an invention using data or means placed at his disposal by his employer. the right 
to the patent for such invention shall be deemed to accme to the employer, in the 
absence or any provision to the contrary in the contract of employment: 
Provided that the employee shall be entitled to equitable remuneration which, III 
the absence of agreement between the parties, may be fixed by the Court taking 
into account his emoluments, the economic value of the invention and any benefit 
derived from it by the employer.] 
s. 20(2) (a) Where an employee whose contract of employment does 
not require him to engage in any inventive activity makes. in the 
field of activities of his employer, an invention using data or means 
placed at his disposal by his employer, the right to the patent for 
such invention shall be deemed to accrue to the employee. 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(a), the employer shall have an 
exclusive licence to exploit the invention in his field of activities, 
subject to payment of royalty to be agreed between the parties. In 
the absence of an agreement, either party may apply to the court to 
determine the proper rate. 
(c) The employee under this subsection shall, without de la y. 
notify his employer in writing about any invention created under 
this subsection to enable his employer to exercise his right under 
subsection (2)(b). Where the employer does not signif~' his 
intention to exercise the aforesaid right within a period of four 
months of the notification, such right shall lapse. 
s. 20(3) The rights conferred on the inventor [under subsection (1) and (2) ] under this 
Act shall not be restricted by contract. Howe,'er, the foregoing 
d t · f om any duty 0 f subsections shall not be construed as eroga lng r w • 
confidentiality owed to his employer b~' an emplo~'ee or a person 
commissioned to execute a work. 
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s. 20(4) Where any person is entitled under this section to apply for 
equitable remuneration, the application may be made at any time 
within a period of twenty years from the time when the invention is 
created. 
s. 20(5) An order for equitable remuneration made under this section 
may be varied, discharged or suspended, and any order so 
suspended may be revived, by the court on the application of any 
person interested under this section. 
Section 21. Inventions by Government employee. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3) of section 20, the provisions of that 
section shall apply to a Government employee or an employee of a Government 
organisation or enterprise unless otherwise provided by rules or regulations of such 
Government organisation or enterprise. 
Section 22. Joint owners. 
Where the right to obtain a patent is owned jointly, the patent may only be applied for 
jointly by all the joint owners. 
Part VI 
Awlication. Procedure for Grant and Duration 
Section 23. Reguirements of application. 
Every application for the grant of a patent shall comply with the regulations as may be 
prescribed by the Minister under this Act. 
Section 23A. Avplication by residents to be filed in Malaysia fIrSt. 
(1) No person resident in Malaysia shall, without written authority granted by the 
Registrar, file or cause to be filed outside Malaysia an application for a patent for 
an invention unIess-
(a) an application for a patent for the same invention has been filed. in ~ 
Patent Registration Office not less than two months before the application 
outside Malaysia; and 
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(b) either no direction have been issued by the Registrar under section 30A in 
relation to the application or all such directions have been revoked. 
Section 24. 
Section 25. 
Application fee. 
Withdrawal of application. 
Section 26. Unity of invention. 
Section 26A. Amendment of application. 
Section 26B. Division of application. 
Section 27. Right of priority. 
(1) An application may contain a declaration claiming the priority, pursuant to any 
international treaty or Convention, of one or more earlier national, regional or 
international application filed during the period of twelve months immediately 
preceding the filing date of the application containing the declaration by the 
applicant or his predecessor in title in or for any party to the said international 
treaty or Convention. 
(lA) The period of twelve months mentioned in subsection (1) may not be extended 
under the provisions of section 82. 
(2) Where the application contains a declaration under subsection (1), the Registrar 
may require that the applicant furnish, within the prescribed time, a copy of the 
earlier application, certified as correct by the office with which it was flIed or 
where the earlier application is an international application filed under any 
international treaty, by the International Bureau of the World International 
Property Organisation. 
(3) The effect of the declaration referred to in subsection (1) shall be as provided in 
the treaty or Convention referred to therein. 
(4) Where any of the requirements of this section or any regulations pertaining thereto 
have not been complied with, the declaration referred to in subsection (1) shall be 
deemed to be invalid. 
Section 27A. Priority Date. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the priority date of an application for a patent is the 
filing date of the application. 
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(2) Where an application contains the declaration mentioned in section 27, the priority 
date of the application shall be the filing date of the earliest application whose 
priority is claimed in that declaration. 
Section 30A. Prohibition of publication of information which might be prejudicial to the 
interest or security of the nation. 
Section 31. Grant of Patent. 
(1) The grant of a patent shall not be refused and a patent shall not be invalidated on 
the ground that the performance of any act in respect of the claimed invention is 
prohibited by any law of regulation, except where the performance of that act 
would be contrary to public order. 
(2) Where the Registrar is satisfied that the application complies with sections 23, 29 
and 30, he shall grant the patent and shall forthwith-
(a) issue to the applicant a certificate of grant of the patent and a copy of the 
patent together with a copy of the Examiner's final report; and 
(b) record the patent in the Register. 
(2A) Where two or more persons have separately and independently made the same 
invention and each of them has made an application for a patent having the same 
priority date, a patent may be granted on each application. 
(3) As soon as possible thereafter the Registrar shall-
(a) cause to be published in the Gazette a reference to the grant of the patent; 
and 
(b) make available to the public on payment of the prescribed fee, copies of 
the patent. 
(4) The patent shall be deemed to be granted on the date that the Registrar performs 
the acts referred to in subsection (2). 
Section 35. Duration of patent. 
(1) Subject and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, a patent grant 
shall take effect on the date on which the patent issues and shall 
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expire [fifteen years after the date of its grant] twenty years from the filing 
date of the application. 
(IA) Notwithstanding subsection (I) of section 35, the owner of a patent 
may institute proceedings after the grant of the patent in respect of 
acts committed before the grant of the patent against a person 
proved to have actual knowledge that his acts would amount to an 
infringement of the patent had the patent been granted on that date. 
(2) Where a patentee intends at the expiration of the second year from the date of the 
grant of the patent to keep the same in force he shall, twelve months before the 
date of expiration of the second and each succeeding year during the term of the 
patent, pay the prescribed annual fees. 
Provided, however, that a period of grace of six months shall be allowed after the 
date of such expiration, upon payment of such surcharge as may be prescribed. 
(3) If the prescribed annual fee is not paid in accordance with subsection (2), the 
patent shall lapse, and a notice of the lapsing of the patent for non-payment of any 
annual fee shall be published in the Gazette. 
Section 35A. Reinstatement of a lapsed patent. 
(1) Within two years from the date on which a notice of the lapsing of a patent is 
published in the Gazette -
(a) the owner of a patent or his successor in title; or 
(b) any other person who would, if the patent had not lapsed, have been 
entitled to the patent, 
may apply to the Registrar in the prescribed fonn to have the patent reinstated. 
(2) The Registrar may reinstate a patent on an application made under subsection (I) -
(a) upon payment of all annual fees due and of a prescribed surcharge for 
reinstatement; and 
(b) upon being satisfied that the non-payment of annual fees was due to 
accident, mistake or other unforeseeable circumstances. 
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(3) Where the Registrar reinstates a lapsed patent, he shall cau"e notice of the 
reinstatement to be published in the Gazette. 
(4) The reinstatement of a lapsed patent shall not prejudice the rights acquired by third 
parties after it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has lapsed and before it i" 
notified in the Gazette that the patent has been reinstated. Such persons shall 
have the right to continue to exploit the patent, but such right shall 
not extend beyond such exploitation of the lapsed patent as such 
persons have availed themselves of or have taken definite steps to 
avail themselves of. 
(5) The Minister may make regulations to provide for [the protection or compensation 
of persons who have exploited or taken definite steps. by contract or othenris('. to 
exploit a patent after it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has lapsed alld 
before it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has been reinstated. but any such 
protection shall not extend beyond such exploitation of the lapsed patent as such 
persons have availed themselves of or have taken definite steps to avail 
themselves oj] the application of licences to exploit the patented 
invention beyond what is permitted under subsection (4) of this 
section. 
(6) No proceedings shall be taken in respect of an infringement of a patent committed 
after it is notified in the Gazette that the patent has lapsed and before it is notified 
in the gazette that the patent has been reinstated. 
Part VII 
Rights of owner of patent 
Section 36. Rights of owner of patent. 
(1) Subject and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part, the owner of a 
patent shall have the following exclusive rights in relation to the patent: 
(a) to exploit the patented invention; 
(b) to assign or transmit the patent; 
(c) to conclude licence contracts. 
(2) 
(3) 
No person shall do any of the acts referred to in subsection (1) without the 
consent of the owner of the patent. 
For the purposes of this part, "exploitation" of a patented' , t' . ill \ en Ion means anv ot 
the following acts in relation to a patent; . 
(a) when the patent has been granted in respect of a product; 
(i) lei rna ng, importing, offering for sale or use, selling or using the 
product; 
(ii) stocleing such product for the purpose of offering for sale. selling or 
.... 
usmg; 
(b) when the patent has been granted in respect of a process; 
(i) using the process; 
(ii) doing any of the acts referred to in paragraph (a), in respect of a 
product obtained directly by means of the process[.]; 
(iii) in all other cases where the process has been used at any 
stage in relation to the manufacture of a product, the 
right only to recover from the importer, wholesaler. or 
retailer the value which the use of the patented process 
has imparted to any such product as a whole. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, if the patent has been granted in respect of a 
process for obtaining a new product, the same product produced by a person 
other than the owner of the patent or his licensee shall, unless the contrary is 
proved, be taken in any proceedings to have been obtained by that process. 
(5) In considering whether a party has discharged the burden imposed 
upon him by this section, the court shall not require him to disclose 
any manufacturing or business secrets if it appears to the court that 
it would be unreasonable to do so, or unless the legitimate interest 
of the defendant in protecting his manufacturing and busi ness 
secrets shall be taken into account, for example. by disclosure to an 
independent expert alone. 
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Section 37. Limitation of rights. 
(1) The rights under the patent shall extend only to acts done for industrial or 
commercial purposes and in particular not to acts done only f . "fi or SClentl IC research. 
(2) The rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of d h" h pro ucts \\" IC 
have been put on the market -
(i) by the owner of the patent; 
(ii) by a person having the right referred to in section 38: 
(iii) by a person having the right referred to in section 43; 
(iv) by the beneficiary of a compulsory licence within the meaning of section 48; 
(v) by any person exercising t~e right referred to in section 84. 
(Possible addition to section 37(2)) 
(2A) Subsection 2(i) above shall also apply with regard to a product put 
on the market by the owner of a patent, granted for the same 
invention in another country, who has economic connections with 
the owner of the patent referred to in subsection (2)(i). For the 
purpose of this subsection, two persons shall be deemed to have 
economic connection where one of them is in a position to exert a 
decisive influence on the other, directly or indirectly, with regard 
to the exploitation of a patent, or where a third party is in a 
position to exercise such an influence on both persons. 
(Alternative to Section 37(2) 
(2) An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an 
infringement of a patent for an invention shall not do so if it 
consists of the import, use, offering for sale or use or selling 0 f 
any patented product, or of any product obtained by means of a 
patented process or to which a patented process has been applied. 
which is produced by or with the consent of the owner of the patent 
or any person licensed b)' him, and for this purpose "patent" 
includes a patent granted in any country outside l"lala)"sia in respect 
of the same or substantiall)' the same invention as that for which a 
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patent is granted under this Act and "patented product", "patented 
process" and "licensed" shall be construed accordingly. This 
subsection shall operate notwithstanding conditions or limitations 
with respect to the sale of goods imposed upon a person by the 
owner of the patent or by any person licensed by him on 
introducing goods into the market or thereafter. 
(3) The rights under the patent shall not extend to the use of the patented invention on 
any foreign vessel, aircraft, spacecraft or land vehicle temporarily or 
accidentally in Malaysia. 
(4) The right to the patent shall be limited in duration as provided for in section 35. 
(5) The rights under the patent shall be limited by the provisions of section 
31 (2A), section 35A, section 38, the provisions on compulsory licences as 
provided in section 51 and 52 and by the provisions on the rights of Government 
or any person authorised by the Government as provided in section 84. 
Section 38. Rights derived from prior manufacture or use. 
(1) Where a person at the priority date of the patent application -
(a) was in good faith in Malaysia making the product or using the process 
which is the subject of the invention claimed in the application; 
(b) had in good faith in Malaysia made serious preparations towards the 
making of the product or using the process referred to in paragraph (a), 
he shall have the right, despite the grant of the patent, to exploit the patented 
invention: 
Provided that the product in question is made, or the process in question is used, 
by the said person in Malaysia: 
Provided further that he can prove, if the invention was disclosed under the 
circumstances referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (3) of section 
14 that his knowledge of the invention was not a result of such disclosure. 
(2) The right referred to in subsection (1) shall not be assigned or transferred except 
as part of the business of the person concerned. 
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Section 38 A. Ri&hts of previous purchasers. 
Every person who, before the grant of a patent, has purchased, contracted 
to purchase, or acquired any product or process' h· h . lor w IC a patent IS 
afterwards obtained under this Act has the right to us d t II e an 0 se to others 
the specific product or process so purchased contracted' . 
, lor, or acquired 
before the grant of the patent therefor, without being liable to the patentee 
for so doing. 
PartVIll 
Assignment and Transmission of Patent Applications and Patents 
Section 39. Assignment and transmission of patent applications and patents. 
(1) A patent application or patent may be assigned or transmitted. 
(2) Any person becoming entitled by assignment or transmission of a patent 
application or patent may apply to the Registrar in the prescribed manner to have 
such assignment or transmission recorded in the Register. 
(3) No such assignment or transmission shall be recorded in the Register unless-
(a) the prescribed fee has been paid to the Registrar; 
(b) in the case of an assignment, it is in writing signed by or n behalf of the 
contracting parties. 
(4) No such assignment or transmission shall have effect against third parties who 
have no knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, of such 
transaction, unless so recorded in the Register. 
Section 40. Joint ownership of patent applications or patents. 
[In the absence of any agreement to the contrary between the parties, joint owners of a 
patent application or patent may, separately, assign or transmit their rights in the patent 
application or patent, exploit the patented invention and take action against any person 
exploiting the patented invention without their consent, but may only jointly withdraw the 
patent application, surrender the patent or conclude a licence contract.] 
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(1) 
(a) 
(b) 
In the absence of any agreement to the contrar,' bet,a'e th . 
. "en e parttes. 
joint owners of a patent application or patent, shall hold the patent 
in equal undivided shares, and each may, 
separately exploit the patent for his or her own benefit without 
accounting to the others, 
without the concurrence of the others bring proceedings in respect 
of an act alleged to infringe the patent, but shall not do so unless 
the others are made parties to the proceedings; but any of the others 
made a defendant shall not be liable for any costs or ex penses 
unless he enters in appearance and takes part in the proceedings. 
(2) In the absence of any agreement to the contrary between the parties, 
joint owners of a patent application or patent may not: 
(a) separately assign their shares without first giving the other owners 
a right of first refusal on the same terms as is offered to the 
proposed buyer, or, if the right is not exercised by the other 
owners, after they have failed to nominate a person who is will i n g 
to purchase the share on the same terms; 
(b) withdraw the patent application, surrender the patent or conclude a 
licence contract without the consent of the other co-owners. 
(3) Any transaction in breach of section 40(2)(a) and (b) above shall 
have no effect whatsoever against the other co-owners. 
Section 40A. Directions to co-owners. 
40A(I) Where there are two or more patentees, the Court may, on the 
application of any of them, give such directions in accordance with 
the application as the Court thinks fit, being directions about: 
(a) a dealing with the patent or an interest in it; or 
(b) the grant of licences under the patent; or 
(c) . 40 in relation to the the exercise of a right under sectIOn 
patent. 
40A(2) If a patentee fails to do anything necessar~ to carr~' out a direction 
under subsection (1) within 14 days after being ask d . . . 
. , e In writIng to 
do so by anyone of the other patentees, the Court rna\", on the 
application of one of those other patentees. direct a perso~ to do it 
in the name and on behalf of the defaulting patentee. 
(3) Before giving a direction, the Court must give an opportunit~ to be 
heard: 
(a) in the case of an application by a patentee or patentees under 
subsection (1), to the other patentee or patentees; and 
(b) in the case of an application under subsection (2), to the 
defaulting patentee. 
(4) The Court in giving a direction must have regard to: 
(a) the existence of any rights or obligations of a trustee or of the 
legal representatives of a deceased person, or rights or 
obligations arising out of either of those relationships; and 
(b) give effect to the terms of any valid agreement between the 
parties. 
Section 41. 
Part IX 
Licence Contracts 
Meaning of licence contract. 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a "licence contract" means any contract by \\'hich 
the owner of a patent (the "licensor") grants to another person or enterprise (the 
"licensee") a licence to do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraphs {a) of 
subsection (1), and subsection (3), of section 36. 
(2) A licence contract shall be in writing signed by or on behalf of the contracting 
parties. 
(3) The fact that a licence contract has been concluded ma~' be recorded 
in accordance with the regulations and on payment of the prescrihl'd 
fee. 
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(4) Until an application has been made for recordation of the prescribed 
particulars of a licence contract: 
(a) 
(b) 
Section 42. 
the transaction is ineffective . as agamst a person acqUlrmg a 
conflicting interest in or under the patent without actual or 
constructive knowledge of it, and 
the court shall not award the licensee damages or order that he 
be given an account of profits in respect of any infringement 
occurring before the transaction is recorded unless:-
(i) an application to record the transaction is made within 
the period of six months beginning with its date: or 
(ii) the court is satisfied that it was not practicable for such 
an application to be made before the end of that period 
and that an application was made as soon as practicable 
thereafter. 
[Entry in the Register] Licences of Ri2ht. 
(1) A licensor may in accordance with the regulations as prescribed by the Minister 
apply to the Registrar for an entry to be made in the Register to the effect [that {{In' 
person may obtain a licence] that licences under the patent are to be 
available as of right. 
( 1 A) When the Registrar is satisfied that the licensor is not precluded by 
any contract from granting licences under the patent, he shall cause 
such an entry to be made. 
(2) At any time after an entry has been made in the Register any person may apply. to 
the licensor through the Registrar for a licence. 
(2A) Where such an entry is made in respect of a patent -
(a) any person shall, at any time after the entry is made. he 
entitled as of right to a licence under the patent on such terms 
as may be settled by agreement or, in default of agreement. hy 
the Registrar on the application of the owner of the patl'nt or 
the person requiring the licence: 
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(b) the Registrar may, on the application of the holder of an,' 
licence granted under the patent before the entry was mad~. 
order the licence to be exchanged for a licence of right 0 n 
terms so settled. 
(3) Where a licence contract is concluded between the parties, the contracting parties 
shall inform the Registrar accordingly and the Registrar shall record such fact in 
the Register. 
(4) Upon a request in writing signed by or on behalf of the contracting parties. the 
Registrar shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, record in the Register such 
particulars relating to the contract as the parties thereto might wish to have 
recorded: 
Provided that the parties shall not be required to disclose or have recorded any other 
particulars relating to the said contract. 
(5) Where a licence contract is terminated, the contracting parties shall inform the 
Registrar of the termination and the Registrar shall record such termination in the 
Register. 
(SA) The renewal fee payable in respect of the patent after the date of the 
entry shall be half the fee which would be payable if the entry had 
not been made. 
(6) The licensor may in accordance with the regulations as prescribed by the Minister 
apply to the Registrar for the cancellation of the entry made under subsection (1). 
(7) Where such an application is made and the balance of all renewal 
fees which would have been payable if the entry had not been made 
has been paid, the Registrar may cancel the entry. 
(8) The cancellation of the entry shall be without prejudice to any 
licence contracts entered into while the entry was in force. 
Section 43. Rights of the Licensee. 
(1) In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the licence contract, the licensee 
shall be entitled to do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of 
subsection (1), and subsection (3), of section 36 within the whole ge(Jgraphical 
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area of Malaysia without limitation as to time and through any application of the 
invention. 
(2) In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the licence contract, the licensee 
may not give to a third person his agreement to perform in Malaysia in respect of 
the invention any of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and 
subsection (3) of section 36. 
Section 44. Right of the Licensor. 
(1) In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the licence contract, the licensor 
may grant a further licence to a third person in respect of the same patent or 
himself do any or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and 
subsection (3), of section 36. 
(2) Where the licence contract provides that the licence is exclusive and unless it is 
expressly provided otherwise in such contract, the licensor shall not grant a 
further licence to a third person in respect of the same patent or himself do any of 
the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and subsection (3), of 
section 36. 
Section 45. Invalid clauses in licence contracts. 
(1) Any clause or condition in a licence contract shall be invalid in so far as [it 
imposes] the practical effect of it is to impose upon the licensee, lessee, 
or purchaser, in the industrial or commercial field, restrictions not derived from 
the rights conferred by this part on the owner of the patent, or unnecessary for the 
safeguarding of such rights: 
Provided that-
(a) restrictions concerning the scope, extent or duration of exploitation of the 
patented invention, or the geographical area in, or the quality or quantity of 
the products in connection with, which the patented invention may be 
exploited; and 
(b) obligations imposed upon the licensee to abstain from all acts capable of 
prejudicing the validity of the patent. 
shall not be deemed to constitute such restrictions. 
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(2) SUbject to subsection (3), the following clauses or conditions, 
among others, are deemed to be invalid under the section, that is to 
say, those that: 
(a) 
(b) 
make the purchase, hire or use of a patented article or 
invention conditional upon the purchase or use of other goods 
from the patentee or his nominee; or 
prevent the hirer or licensee from using certain d 
. goo s, 
materials or processes not supplied by the patentee or his 
nominee; or 
(c) make the grant of a licence under one or more patents 
conditional upon the acceptance and payment for additional 
patents not required by the licensee; or 
(d) impose upon the licensee the obligation to pay royalties for 
patents which have expired; or 
(e) prevent the purchaser, lessee, or licensee from buying, using, 
manufacturing, or otherwise dealing in, other products which 
are not covered by the licensor's patent; or 
(f) require the licensee to assign or to grant an exclusive licence to 
the licensor any improvement patented by the licensee in the 
products or processes of the licensed patent; or 
(g) attempt to impose upon the purchaser or licensee the price at 
which the patented product may be sold. 
(3) Clauses and conditions in a licence contract will not be invalid 
under this section if it is shown by the licensor that: 
. d ~ d f I entered ,Onto b.'-' the licensee (a) they were negotiate lor an ree y T 
without coercion, and 
(b) at the time of the making of the contract, the licensor \\ a s 
willing to grant a licence to exploit the invention to thl' 
licensee on reasonable terms specified in the licence and 
without any such clauses or conditions as are mentioned in 
subsections (1) and (2) above, and 
(c) in all the circumstances it is not an unreasonable exercise 0 f 
the licensor's rights. 
(4) The fact that the agreement has been entered into, or that the 
agreement is still subsisting or has not been terminated. IS not 
conclusive of voluntariness or reasonableness of terms. 
(5) In any proceedings to enforce an obligation under the licence 
contract, it shall be a defence for the licensee to proye that at the 
time of the breach there was in force a contract relating to the patent 
made by or with the consent of the licensor containing a clause or 
condition deemed invalid by virtue of this section. 
(6) The licensee, in an action under subsection (5). or in any other 
action, may also claim for the return of any payment made h~' yirtue 
of an invalid clause or condition, and may also claim for an~' 
damage directly caused by the presence of the invalid clause or 
condition. 
Section 48. Definition. 
Part X 
Compulsory licences 
"beneficiary of the compulsory licence" means the person to whom a compulsory licence 
has been granted in accordance with this Part; and 
"compulsory licence" means the authorisation to perform in Malaysia without the agreement 
of the owner of the patent in respect of the patented invention any of the acts referred to in 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and subsection (3), of section 36, 
Section 49. Application for compulsory licence. 
(I) At any time after the expiration of three years from the grant of a patent. .an~ 
person interested may apply to the Registrar for a compulsory licence If It 
appears at the time when such application is filed -
(a) that there is no production of the patented product or application of the 
. h· th t wI'thout any leoitimate reason: or patented process Wit In e coun r)' t:' 
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(2) 
(3) 
(b) that there is no product produced under the patent f al' < < 
or s e m an\ dome .... tlc 
market, or there are some but they are sold at unreasonabl\' h' h '. d 
. • 19 pnces or 0 
not meet the publIc demand \\"ithout any legitimate reason. 
The application for a compulsory licence shall be In 
compliance with the 
regulations as may be prescribed by the Minister. 
Where an application has been made under this section, the 
Registrar shall, by notice in writing addressed to the patentee 0 f 
any patent specified by him, or to his registered representative in 
Malaysia, and to any person who has a registered interest in the 
patent, require the patentee and every such person to transmit and 
deliver to the Registrar within sixty days from the date of the 
notice, a return stating: 
(a) whether the patented invention is being worked on a 
commercial scale in Malaysia, and the place where, and the 
name and address of the person by whom, the patented 
invention is being so worked; and 
(b) the reasons, if any, why the patented invention is not being 
worked on a commercial scale in Malaysia. 
(4) The failure of the patentee or his registered representative in 
Malaysia or that of any person having a registered interest in the 
patent to comply with the terms of the notice mentioned in 
subsection (3) shall be deemed to be an admission on the part of the 
patentee or the person, as the case may be, so failing, that the 
patented invention is not being worked on a commercial scale in 
Malaysia. 
Section 49A. Application for compulsory licence based on inter-dependence of patents. 
(1) If an invention claimed in a patent ("later patent") cannot be worked in Malaysia 
without infringing a patent granted on the basis of an application benefiting from 
an earlier priority date ("earlier patent"), [and if the invention claimed in the laler 
patent constitutes, in the opinion of the Board. all important technical advllnce in 
relation to the invention claimed in the earlier patent,] the Board. upon the reque"t 
of the owner of the later patent, the licensee of a licence contract under the laler 
patent or the beneficiary of a compulsory licence under the later patent. may grant 
a compulsory licence to the extent necessary [to a\'oid i1lfringl'11ll'llt of the earlier 
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patent.] for the working of his invention if the invention claimed in 
the later patent: 
(a) constitutes an important technical advance in relation to the 
invention claimed in the earlier patent; or 
(b) serves industrial purposes different from those served by the 
invention which is the subject of the earlier patent. 
(2) If a compulsory licence is granted under subsection (1)(a), the Board. upon the 
request of the owner of the earlier patent, the licensee of a licence contract under 
the earlier patent or the beneficiary of a compulsory licence under the earlier 
patent, may grant a compulsory licence under the later patent. 
Section 50. Request for grant of compulsory licence. 
(1) In an application for a compulsory licence under section 49 or section 49A, the 
applicant shall set forth the amount of royalty, the conditions of the exploitation of 
the patent and the restrictions of the rights of the licensor or the licensee, as the 
case may be, and a request for the said licence. 
(2) Where an application for a compulsory licence is filed pursuant to section 49 or 
section 49A, and this section, the Registrar shall notify the applicant, the licensor 
or the licensee, as the case may be, of the date the application shall be considered 
by the Board. 
(3) The licensor or the licensee, as the case may be, shall be furnished with a copy of 
the application as mentioned in subsection (1). 
Section 51. Decision by the Board. 
(I) In considering the application for a compulsory licence under section 49 or section 
49A, the Board may require the applicant, the licensor or the licensee. as the ca'ie 
may be, to appear before the Board to give a statement or to hand to the Board any 
document or any other item. 
(2) When the application has been considered by the Board and a decision has been 
made, the applicant, the licensor or the licensee. as the case may be, shall be 
notified of the decision. 
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(3) Where any of the grounds under section 49(1)(a) and (b) has been 
shown to exist, the Board may order a compulson I.·c d. 
. ence esplte 
the fact that the patentee is precluded by contract from granting any 
further licences. The exercise of such power by the Board shall not 
give rise to an action for breach of t t b con rac y an~' existing 
exclusive licensee against the patentee. 
Section 52. Scope of compulsory licence. 
(1) Upon the granting of the compulsory licence to the applicant the Board shall fix-
(a) the scope of the licence specifying in particular for what period the licence is 
granted and to which of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection 
(l), and subsection (3), of section 36 the licence extends except that, 
subject to subsection (2) below, it may not extend to the act of 
importation; 
(b) the time limit within which the beneficiary of the compulsory licence shall 
begin to work the patented invention in Malaysia; and 
(c) the amount and conditions of the royalty due from the beneficiary of the 
compulsory licence to the owner of the patent. 
(2) Upon a request by an existing compulsory licensee for a variation 
in the terms of the existing licence, the Board, where it is of the 
opinion that any of the objectives of section 49 could not be 
achieved without so extending the scope of the licence, may extend 
it to the act of importation. 
Section 53. Limitation of compulsory licence. 
The beneficiary of the compulsory licence shall not conclude licence contracts with third 
persons under the patent in respect of which the compulsory licence was granted. 
Section 54. Amendment. cancellation and surrender of compulsory licence. 
(1) Upon the request of the owner of the patent or of the beneficial), of the 
compulsory licence, the Board may amend the decision granting the compuhnry 
licence to the extent that new facts justify such amendment. 
(2) Upon the request of the owner of the patent, the Board shall cancel the 
compulsory licence-
(a) if the ground for the grant of the compulsory licence no longer exists; 
(b) if the beneficiary of the compulsory licence has, within the time limit fixed 
in the decision granting the licence, neither begun the working of the 
patented invention in Malaysia nor made serious preparation towards such 
working; 
(c) if the beneficiary of the compulsory licence does not respect the scope of the 
licence as fixed in the decision granting the licence; 
(d) if the beneficiary of the compulsory licence is in arrears of the payment due, 
according to the decision granting the licence. 
(3) The beneficiary of the compulsory licence may surrender the licence by written 
declaration submitted to the Registrar who shall record the surrender in the 
Register, publish it, and notify the owner of the patent. 
(3A) Where a compulsory licence has been granted in respect of a patent, the Registrar 
shall not accept or record the said surrender except upon receipt of a signed 
declaration by which the beneficiary of the compulsory licence consents to the 
said surrender. 
(4) The surrender shall take effect from the date the Patent Registration Office 
receives the declaration of the surrender. 
Part XI 
Surrender and Invalidation of Patent 
Section 56. Invalidation of patent. 
(1) Any aggrieved person may institute Court proceedings against the owner of the 
patent for the invalidation of the patent. 
(2) The Court shall invalidate the patent if the person requesting the invalidation 
proves-
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(a) 
(b) 
that what is claimed as an invention in the patent I· s not . . .. 
an InVentIOn wlthm 
the meaning of section 12 or is excluded from protection under section 13 or 
subsection (1) of section 31 or is not patentable because I·t d ~. I 
. . oes not comp y 
WIth the reqUIrements of sections 11, 14, 15 and 16; 
that the description [or the claim does not comply with the requirements of 
section 23;] does not disclose the invention in such terms that it 
can be understood and in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be evaluated and to be carried out 
by a person having ordinary skill in the art, or describe the 
best mode contemplated by the applicant for carrying out the 
invention; 
(c) that any drawing which are necessary for the understanding of the claimed 
invention have not been furnished; 
(d) that the right to the patent does not belong to the person to whom the patent 
was granted; or 
(e) that incomplete or incorrect information has been deliberately provided or 
caused to be provided to the Registrar under subsection (.f) of section 29A 
by the person to whom the patent was granted or by his agent. 
(2A) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the Court shall not invalidate the patent on the 
ground mentioned in paragraph (d) of subsection (2) if the patent has been 
assigned to the person to whom the right to the patent belongs. 
(2B) Notwithstanding subsection (2), in the case of joint inventorship. 
the Court shall not invalidate the patent on the ground mentioned in 
paragraph (d) of subsection (2). The said ground shall only be 
relied upon by a non-joined inventor in an entitlement proceedings 
under section 19. 
(3) Where the provisions of subsection (1) apply on only some of the claims or some 
parts of a claim, such claims or parts of a claim may be declared im'alid by the 
Court and the invalidity of part of a claim shall be declared in the form of a 
corresponding limitation of the claim in question. 
Section 57. Date and effect of invalidation. 
( 1) Any invalidated patent or claim or part of a claim shall be regarded as null and 
void from the date of the grant of the patent. 
(2) When the decision of the Court becomes final, the Registrar of the Court shall 
notify the Registrar who shall record the said declaration in the Reaister and cause 
b 
it to be published in the Gazette. 
Section 58. 
Part XII 
Infringement 
Acts deemed to be infringement. 
Subject to subsection 0), (2) and (3) of section 37 and section 38, an infringement of a 
patent shall consist of the performance of any act referred to in subsection (3) of section 36 
in Malaysia by a person other than the owner of the patent and without the agreement of the 
latter in relation to a product or a process falling within the scope of protection of the patent. 
Section 58A. Scope of protection of the patent. 
The claim or claims shall determine the scope of the protection. The 
description and the drawings may be used to interpret the claims. 
Section 58 B. Prohibition on indirect exploitation. 
(1) Subject to the following provIsIons of this section, a person (other 
than the owner of the patent) also infringes a patent for an 
invention if, while the patent is in force and without the consent 0 f 
the owner, he supplies or offers to supply in Malaysia a person 
other than a licensee or other person entitled to work the invention 
with any of the means, relating to an essential element of the 
invention, for putting the invention into effect when he knows, or it 
is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that those 
means are suitable for putting, and are intended to put, the 
invention into effect in Malaysia. 
(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply to the suppl)' or offer of a 
staple commercial product unless the suppl)' or the offer is made for 
the purpose of inducing the person supplied or, as the case may be, 
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the person to whom the offer is made to do an act which constitutes 
an infringement of the patent by virtue of section 58 above, or 
which apart from section 37(1), would constitute an infringement. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, for the purposes 0 f 
subsections (1) and (2) above a person who does an act in relation 
to an invention which is prevented only by virtue of subsection (1) 
of section 37 above from constituting an infringement of a patent 
for an invention shall not be treated as a person entitled to work the 
invention, but the reference in subsections (1) and (2) above to a 
person entitled to work an invention includes a reference to -
(a) a person involved in acts done only for scientific research. 
(b) a person entitled by virtue of section 31(2A) above, 
(c) a person who by virtue of section 35A or section 38 above is 
entitled to do an act in relation to the invention without it 
constituting such an infringement, so far as concerns that act, 
(d) a person entitled by virtue of Part X above, and 
( e) a peson so entitled by virtue of section 84 below. 
( 4 ) (a) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in 
or from Malaysia all or a substantial portion of the components of a 
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in 
whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of Malaysia in a manner 
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within 
Malaysia, shall be liable as an infringer. 
(b) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in 
or from Malaysia any component of a patented invention that is 
especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and 
not a staple commercial product, where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in part knowing that such component is so 
made or adapted and intending that such component will be 
combined outside of Malaysia in a manner that would infringe the 
patent if such combination occurred within Malaysia, shall be liable 
as an infringer. 
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Section 59. Infringement Proceedings. 
(1) The owner of the patent shall have the right to institute Court proceedings against 
any person who has infringed or is infringing the patent. 
(2) The owner of the patent shall have the same right against any person who has 
performed acts which makes it likely that an infringement will occur, which in this 
part is referred to as an "imminent infringement". 
(3) The proceedings in subsections (1) and (2) may not be instituted after five year 
from the act of infringement. 
Section 60. Injunction and award of damages. 
(1) If the owner of the patent proves that an infringement has been committed or is 
being committed, the Court shall award damages and shall grant an injunction to 
prevent further infringement and any other legal remedy. 
(2) If the owner of the patent proves imminent infringement the Court shall grant an 
injunction to prevent infringement and any other legal remedy. 
(3) The defendant in any proceedings referred to in this section may request in the 
same proceedings the invalidation of the patent, in which case the provisions of 
subsection (2) and (3) of section 56 shall apply. 
Section 60A. Innocent Infrin2ement. 
( 1 ) A court shall refuse to award damages, or to make an order for an 
account of profits, in respect of an infringement of a patent if the defendant 
satisfies the court that the defendant was not aware, and had no reason to 
believe, that a patent for the invention existed during such period. 
(2) If patented products, marked so as to indicate that they are patented 
in Malaysia, and accompanied by the number of the patent, were sold or 
used in Malaysia to a substantial extent before the date of the infringement, 
the defendant is to be taken to have been aware of the existence of the 
patent unless the contrary is established. 
(3) Nothing in this section affects a court's power to grant relief b)' way 
of an injunction. 
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(4) For the purposes of this section, the mere fact that the patent has 
been recorded in the Patent Register shall not constitute constructive 
knowledge of the existence of the patent. 
Section 61. Infringement proceedings by licensee and beneficiary of compulsory 
licence. 
(1) For the purposes of this section, "beneficiary" means-
(a) any licensee unless the licence contract provides that the provisions of this 
subsection do not apply or provide different provisions; 
(b) the beneficiary of a compulsory licence granted under section 51. 
(2) Any beneficiary may request the owner of the patent to institute Court proceedings 
for any infringement indicated by the beneficiary, who shall specify the relief 
desired. 
(3) The beneficiary may, if he proves that the owner of the patent received the request 
but refuses or fails to institute the proceedings within three months from the 
receipt of the request, institute the proceedings in his own name, after notifying 
the owner of the patent of his intention but the owner shall have the right to join in 
the proceedings. 
(4) Notwithstanding that the three month period referred to in subsection (3) has not 
been satisfied, the Court shall, on the request of the beneficiary, grant an 
appropriate injunction to prevent infringement or to prohibit its continuation if the 
beneficiary proves that immediate action is necessary to avoid substantial damage. 
(5) Notwithstanding the above, any licensee shall have the right to 
institute proceedings at any time on being given written 
authorisation to do so by the owner of the patent. 
(6) Where proceedings are instituted by a licensee, the owner of the 
patent shall be made a party to the proceedings, but if made a 
defendant shall not be liable for any costs or expenses unless he 
enters an appearance and takes part in the proceedings. 
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Section 61 A. Remedy for 2roundless threats of infrin2ement proceedin2s. 
s. 61A(I) Where a person (whether or not the proprietor of~ or entitled to 
any right in, a patent) by circulars, advertisements or in any other 
way (whether in oral or written form) threatens (or expresses a 
threat in relation to) any person with proceedings for any 
infringement of a patent, a person aggrieved by the threats (whether 
or not he is the person to whom the threats are made) may. subject 
to subsection (3) below, apply to the court for: 
(a) a declaration that the threats are unjustifiable; and 
(b) an injunction against the continuance of the threats; and 
(c) the recovery of any damage sustained by the applicant as a 
result of the threats. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall apply whether or not the person who made the 
threats is entitled to, or interested in, a patent or a patent 
application. 
(3) The court may, in its discretion, grant a plaintiff under this section 
the relief applied for unless: 
(a) the defendant proves that the acts in respect of which 
proceedings were threatened constitute or, if done, would 
constitute an infringement of a patent; and 
(b) the patent alleged to be infringed is not shown by the plaintiff 
to be invalid in a relevant respect. 
(4) a) Subject to subsection 4(b), proceedings may not be brought 
under this section for a threat to bring proceedings for an 
infringement alleged to consist of making or importing a product 
for disposal, or of using a process, or of the supplying of such 
aforesaid products by such manufacturer or importer and 0 f 
supplying parts used to make infringing products. 
b) i) For a threat to fall within this subsection, it must have 
been issued directly to the person mentioned in subsection 
(4)(a) and not to any other person. 
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ii) Subsection 4(a) applies only to threats by the patent 
owner or the "beneficiary" under section 61 of the Act. 
(5 ) It is hereby declared that a mere notification of the existence of a 
patent does not constitute a threat of proceedings within the 
meaning of this section. 
(6 ) A legal practitioner or a registered patent attorney is not liable to 
proceedings under this section in respect of an act done in his or 
her professional capacity on behalf of a client. 
(7) a) The defendant in proceedings under this section may apply, by 
way of counter-claim, for relief to which the defendant would be 
entitled in separate proceedings for an infringement of the patent to 
which the threats relate. 
b) Where the defendant applies by way of counter-claim, the 
plaintiff may, without making a separate application, apply in the 
proceedings for the invalidation of the patent. 
Section 62. 
Section 63. 
Section 64. 
Declaration of non-infringement. 
Part XIII 
Offences 
Falsification of Register, etc. 
Unauthorised claim or patent. 
(1) Any person who falsely represents that anything disposed of by him for value is a 
patented product or process commits an offence and, subject to the following 
provisions of this section, is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen 
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to 
both. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person who for value disposes of an article 
having stamped, engraved or impressed on it or otherwise applied to it the word 
"patent" or "patented" or anything expressing or implying that the article is a 
patented product, shall be taken to represent that the article is a patented product. 
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(3) Subsection (1) does not apply where the representation is made in respect of a 
product after the patent for that product or, as the case may be, the process in 
question has, expired or been invalidated and before the end of a period which is 
reasonably sufficient to enable that person to take steps to ensure that the 
representation is not made or does not continue to be made. 
(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section, it shall be a defence for any 
person to prove that he used due diligence to prevent the commission of the 
offence. 
Section 84. Rights of Government. 
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, when it is vital to the defence, 
economic or public health interests of Malaysia, or when action under Part 
X is ineffective to achieve the objectives of section 49 -
(a) the Government of the Federation or of any State, a Ministry or Government 
department or any person authorised by such Government, Ministry or 
Government department may make, use and exercise any invention registered or 
in respect of which exclusive privileges have been granted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act or do any act which would otherwise be an infringement of 
the privileges or rights mentioned in this Act. 
(b) the Government of the Federation or of any State, Ministry or Government 
department or person authorised by such Government, Ministry or Government 
department shall pay reasonable compensation for making, using or exercising the 
said invention or arising out of any act which would otherwise be an infringement 
of the privileges or rights mentioned in this Act. 
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Appendix 
Malaysia 
Civil Law Act. 1956 (Revised 1972) Act 67 
Section 3 Application of English law. 
(1) ~ave so f~ as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written law in force 
10 MalaysIa the Court shall-
(a) in ~e~t Malarsia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity as 
admlOIstered 10 England on the 7th day of April, 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, aI?pl~ the comm.o~ law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of 
general applIcatIon, as admlOIstered or in force in England on the frrst day of December, 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of 
gen~ral application, as administered or in force in England on the 12th day of December, 1949, 
subject however to subsection (3)(ii); 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general application shall 
be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective 
inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary. 
(2) Subject to the express provisions of this Act or any other written law in force in Malaysia or any 
part thereof, in the event of conflict or variance between the common law and the rules of equity 
with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail. 
Section 5 Application of English law in commercial matters. 
(1) In all questions or issues which rise or which have to be decided in the States of West Malaysia 
other than Malacca and Penang with respect to the law of partnership, corporations, banks and 
banking, principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, life and fire 
insurance, and with respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered shall be the 
same as would be administered in England in the like case at the date of coming into force of this 
Act, if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case other 
provision is or shall be made by any written law. 
(2) In all questions or issues which rise or which have to be decided in the States of Malacca, Penang, 
Sabah and Sarawak with respect to the law concerning any of the matters referred to in subsection 
(1), the law to be administered shall be the same as would be administered in England, in the like 
case at the corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in 
England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by any written law. 
Contracts Act. 1950 (Revised 1974) Act 136 
Section 28 
Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of 
any kind, is that extent void. 
Exception 1 - One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to re~~ fro'!l carrying 
on a similar business. within specified local limits. so long as the buyer. or any person denvmg tItle to the 
goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein: Provided that such limits appear to the Court 
reasonable. regard being had to the nature of the business. 
Exception 2 - Partners may. upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership. agree that some or 
all of them will not carry on a business similar to that of the partnership within such local limits as me 
referred to in the last preceding paragraph. 
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Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975. Act 156 (As amended by Acts A 401 and A 462) 
Section 2 Interpretation 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
"Council" means the Industrial Advisory Council established under section IIA' 
, 
"licence" means a licence issued under this Act to engage in any manufacturing activity; 
"licensing officer" means any public officer appointed to be a licensing officer under section 3A; 
"manufacturer" means a person who is engaged in any manufacturing activity; 
"m~ufacturin~ activity" wi~h its ~~matical va?ations and cognate expressions means the making, 
a~tenng,. blendmg, ornamentmg, fimshmg or otherwIse treating or adapting any article or substance with a 
vIew to It,s use, sale, tra~s~ort, delivery or disposal and includes the assembly of parts and ship repairing but 
shall not mclude any actIvIty normally associated with retail or wholesale trade. 
"Minister" means the Minister charged with the responsibility for industrial development; 
"product" means any article, thing, substance or service produced as a result of any manufacturing activity 
and includes a range of products. 
Section 3 Licence required for manufacturing activity. 
(1) No person shall engage in any manufacturing activity unless he is issued a licence in respect of 
such manufacturing activity. 
(2) Any person who fails to comply with the provision of subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and is 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding two thousand ringgit or to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding six months and to a further fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit for every day during 
which such default continues. 
Section 4 Application for and issue and conditions for licence. 
(1) An application for a licence shall be made in the prescribed form to the licensing officer. 
(2) One application may be made for one or more products manufactured in one or more places of 
manufacturing activity but a separate licence shall be issued for each place of manufacturing 
activity. 
(3) The licensing officer shall, in deciding whether an application for a licence should be approved or 
refused, consider whether the issue of a licence is consistent with national economic and social 
objectives and would promote the orderly development of manufacturing activities in Malaysia. 
(4) The licensing officer in issuing the licence, may, in furtherance of the aforesaid objectives impose 
such conditions as he may think fit and such conditions may be varied on the application of the 
manufacture or on the licensing officer's own motion after consultation with the manufacturer in 
respect of whom the conditions in the licence are to be varied. 
(5) Every licence issued shall be in the prescribed form and shall be subject to such fee as may be 
prescribed. 
Section 5 Existing manufacturers. 
Every person who on the commencement of this Act is engaged in any manufacturing activity may continue 
to do so but shall not later than one year from the date of the commencement of this Act apply for a licence 
in the prescribed form to the licensing officer. 
Section 8 Compliance with other laws. 
The issue of a licence shall not be deemed to relieve the manufacturer to whom a licence is issued from 
compliance with any other written law relating to the manufacturing activity for which the licence is issued. 
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Section 11 
The Minister may by order exempt any manufacturing activity from all Of any of the provisions of this Act. 
Trade Descriptions Act. 1972. Act 87 
Section 2 
"advertisement" includes a catalogue, a circular and a price list; 
Section 3 
Any person who, in the course of a trade Of business _ 
(a) applies a false trade description to any goods; or 
(b) supplies or offers to supply any goods to which a false trade description is applied, shall be gUilty 
of an offence. 
Section 8 
A person exposing goods for supply or having goods in his possession for supply shall be deemed to offer 
or supply them. 
Australia 
Patents Act 1990 - Australia 
Chapter 2 Patent rights, Ownership and Validity 
Section 13 Exclusive rights given by patent 
(1) Subject to this Act, a patent gives the patentee the exclusive rights, during the term of the 
patent, to exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the invention. 
(2) The exclusive rights are personal property and are capable of assignment and devolution by law. 
(3) A patent has effect throughout the patent area. 
Section 14 Assignment of patent 
(1) An assignment of a patent must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the assignor and assignee. 
(2) A patent may be assigned for a place in, or part of, the patent area. 
Section 15 Who may be granted a patent. 
(1) Subject to this Act, a patent for an invention may only be granted to a person who: 
(a) is the inventor; or 
(b) would, on the grant of a patent for the invention, be entitled to have the patent assigned to 
the person; or 
(c) derives title to the invention from the inventor or a person mentioned in paragraph (b); or 
(d) is the legal representative of a deceased person mentioned in· paragraph ( a), (b) or (c). 
(2) A patent may be granted to a person whether or not he or she is an Australian citizen. 
Section 16 Co-ownership of patents 
(1) Subject to any agreement to the contrary, where there are two or more patentees: 
(a) each of them is entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent; and 
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(b) 
(c) 
each of them is entitled to exercise the exclusive rights given by the patent for his or her 
own benefit without accounting to the others; and 
none of them can grant a licence under the patent, or assign an interest in it, without the 
consent of the others. 
(2) Where a patented product, or a product of a patented method or process, is sold by any of two or 
~?re patentees, the buyer, and a person claiming through the buyer, may deal with the product as 
If It had been sold by all the patentees. 
(3) This section does not. affect the rights or obligations of a trustee or of the legal representatives of a 
deceased person, or nghts or obligations arising out of either of those relationships. 
Section 17 Directions to co-owners 
(1) Where there are two or more patentees, the Commissioner may, on the application of any of them, 
give such directions in accordance with the application as the Commissioner thinks fit, being 
directions about: 
(a) a dealing with the patent or an interest in it; or 
(b) the grant of licences under the patent; or 
(c) the exercise of a right under section 16 in relation to the patent. 
(2) If a patentee fails to do anything necessary to carry out a direction under subsection (1) within 14 
days after being asked in writing to do so by anyone of the other patentees, the Commissioner 
may, on the application of one of those other patentees, direct a person to do it in the name and on 
behalf of the defaulting patentee. 
(3) Before giving a direction, the Commissioner must give an opportunity to be heard: 
(a) in the case of an application by a patentee or patentees under subsection (l) - to the other 
patentee or patentees; and 
(b) in the case of an application under subsection (2) - to the defaulting patentee. 
(4) The Commissioner must not give a direction that: 
(a) 
(b) 
Section 40 
affects the rights or obligations of a trustee or of the legal representatives of a deceased 
person, or rights or obligations arising out of either of those relationships; or 
is inconsistent with the terms of an agreement between the parties. 
Specifications 
(1) A provisional specification must describe the invention. 
(2) A complete specification must: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
describe the invention fully, including the best method known to the applicant of 
performing the invention; and . . . 
where it relates to an application for a standard patent - end With a chum or chums 
defining the invention; and . . . . 
where it relates to an application for a petty patent - ends With a smgle chum, or a smgle 
independent claim and not more than two dependent claims, defining the invention. 
(3) The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the 
specification. 
(4) The claim or claims must relate to one invention. 
Section 63 Joint patentees 
A patent may be granted to two or more nominated persons jointly. 
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Chapter 11 - Infrin~ement 
Section 117 Infringement by supply of products 
(1) If the use of a pro?uct b.y a. person would infringe a patent, the supply of that product by one 
person to ~other IS an mfringement of the patent by the supplier unless the supplier is the 
patentee or lIcensee of the patent. 
(2) A reference in subsection (1) to the use of a product by a person is a reference to: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
if the product is capable of only one reasonable use, having regard to its nature or design _ 
that use; or 
if the product is not a staple commercial product - any use of the product, if the supplier 
had reason to believe that the person would put it to that use; or 
in any case - the use of the product in accordance with any instruction for the use of the 
product, or any inducement to use the product, given to the person by the supplier or 
contained in an advertisement published by or with the authority of the supplier. 
Section 118 Infringement exemptions: use in or on foreign vessel, aircraft or vehicles 
s.118 The rights of a patentee are not infringed: 
(a) by using the patented invention on board a foreign vessel, in the body of the vessel, or in the 
machinery, tackle, apparatus or other accessories of the vessel, if the vessel comes into the 
patent area only temporarily or accidentally and the invention is used exclusively for the needs of 
the vessel; or 
(b) by using the patented invention in the construction or working of a foreign aircraft or foreign 
land vehicle, or in the accessories of the aircraft or vehicle, if the aircraft or vehicle comes into 
the patent area only temporarily or accidentally. 
Section 123 Innocent infringement 
(1) A court may refuse to award damages, or to make an order for an account of profits, in respect of an 
infringement of a patent if the defendant satisfies the court that, at the date of the infringement, the 
defendant was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that a patent for the invention existed. 
(2) If patented products, marked so as to indicate that they are patented in Australia, were sold or used 
in the patent area to a substantial extent before the date of the infringement, the defendant is to be 
taken to have been aware of the existence of the patent unless the contrary is established. 
(3) Nothing in this section affects a court's power to grant relief by way of an injunction. 
Part 3 - Unjustified threats of infrin~ement proceedings 
Section 128 Application for relief from unjustified threats 
(1) Where a person, by means of circulars, advertisements or otherwise, threatens a person with 
infringement proceedings, or other similar proceedings, a person aggrieved may apply to a 
prescribed court, or to another court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the application, for: 
(a) a declaration that the threats are unjustifiable; and 
(b) an injunction against the continuance of the threats; and 
(c) the recovery of any damage sustained by the applicant as a result of the threats. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the person who made the threats is entitled to, or interested 
in, the patent or a patent application 
Section 129 Court's power to grant relief 
The court may grant an applicant under section 128 the relief applied for unless the respondent satisfies the 
court that the acts about which the threats were made infringed, or would infringe: 
<a> a claim that is not shown by the applicant to be invalid; or 
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(b) rights un~er s~ti?n 57 in respect of a claim that is not shown by the applicant to be a claim that 
would be lDvahd If a patent had been granted. 
Section 130 Counterclaim for infringement 
(1) Th~ respondent in proceedings under section 128 may apply, by way of counter-claim, for relief to 
which the respondent would be entitled in separate proceedings for an infringement by the applicant 
of the patent to which the threats relate. 
2) Where the r~sp~ndent applies by way of counter-claim, the applicant may, without making a 
separate applIcatIOn under Chapter 12, apply in the proceedings for the revocation of the patent. 
(3) The provisions of this Act relating to infringement proceedings apply, with the necessary changes, 
to a counter-claim. 
(4) The provisions of this Act relating to proceedings for the revocation of a patent apply, with the 
necessary changes, to an application under subsection (2). 
Section 131 Notification of a patent not a threat 
The mere notification of the existence of a patent, or an application for a patent, does not constitute a threat 
of proceedings for the purposes of section 128. 
Section 132 Liability of legal practitioner or patent attorney 
A legal practitioner or a registered patent attorney is not liable to proceedings under section 128 in respect of 
an act done in his or her professional capacity on behalf of a client. 
Chapter 12 - Compulsory Licences and Revocationof Patents 
SectiQn 138 Revocation in other circumstances 
(1) The Minister or any other person may apply to a prescribed court for an order revoking a patent. 
(3) After hearing the application, the court may, by order, revoke the patent, either wholly or so far as 
it relates to a claim, on one or more of the following grounds, but on no other ground: 
(a) that the patentee is not entitled to the patent; 
(b) that the invention is not a patentable invention; 
(c) that the patentee has contravene a condition in the patent; 
(d) that the patent was obtained by fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation. 
(e) that an amendment of the patent request or the complete specification was made or 
obtained by fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation; 
(t) that the specification does not comply with subsection 40(2) or (3). 
Schedule 1 Dictionary 
"exploit", in relation to an invention includes: 
(a) 
(b) 
where the invention is a product - make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer. to 
make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of domg 
any of those things; or . 
where the invention is a method or process - use the method or process or do any act menboned 
in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use; 
"Supply" includes supply by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-purchase; 
"work", in relation to a patented invention, means: 
(8) where the invention is 8 product - make or import the product; or 
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(b) where the inv~ntion is a method or process use the method or process or do any act mentioned in 
paragraph (a) 10 respect of a product resulting from such use; 
Canada 
Patent Act RS.C. 1985. c.P-4 
Section 23 
No patent shall ext~nd to prevent the use of any invention in any ship, vessel, aircraft or land vehicle of any 
other country, ~ntenng Can~a temporarily or accidentally, if such invention is employed exclusively for the 
needs of the ShIP, vessel, arrcraft or land vehicle, and not so used for the manufacture of any goods to be 
sold within or exported from Canada. 
Section 56 
Every person who, before an application for a patent becomes open to the inspection of the public under 
section 10, has purchased, constructed or acquired the invention for which a patent is afterwards obtained 
under this Act, has the right to use and to sell to others the specific article, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter patented and so purchased, constructed or acquired without being liable to the patentee 
or the legal representatives of the patentee for so doing, but the patent shall not, with respect to other 
persons, be held invalid by reason of that purchase, construction or acquisition or use of the invention by 
the person first mentioned, or by those to whom that person has sold it, unless it was purchased, 
constructed, acquired or used before the date of filing of the application or, in the case of an application to 
which section 28 applies, before the priority date of the application, and in consequence whereof the 
invention was disclosed in such a manner that it became available to the public in Canada or elsewhere. 
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market 
(Community Patent Convention) 
Chapter IT - Effects of the Community Patent and the Euro.pean Patent application 
Article 25 Prohibition of direct use of the invention 
A Community patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent all third parties not having his 
consent: 
(a) from making, offering, putting on the market or using a product which is the subject-matter of the 
patent, or importing or stocking the product for these purposes; 
(b) from using a process which is the subject-matter of the patent or, when the third party knows, or it 
is obvious in the circumstances, that the use of the process is prohibited without the consent of the 
proprietor of the patent, from offering the process for use within the territories of the Contracting 
States; 
(c) from offering, putting on the market, using, or importing or stocking for these purposes the 
product obtained directly by a process which is the subject-matter of the patent. 
Article 26 Prohibition of indirect use of the invention 
1. A Community patent shall also confer on its proprietor the right to prevent all third parties ?ot 
having his consent from supplying or offering to supply within the territories of the Contrac~ng 
States a person, other than a party entitled to exploit the patented inventi~n, with means,. relabng 
to an essential element of that invention, for putting it into effect therem, when the third party 
knows, or it is obvious in the circumstances, that these means are suitable and intended for putting 
that invention into effect. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when that means are staple commercial products, except when the third 
party induces the person supplied to commit acts prohibited by Article 25. 
3. Persons perfonning the acts referred to in Article 27 (a) to (c) shall not be considered to be parties 
entitled to exploit the invention within the meaning of paragraph 1. 
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Article 27 Limitation of the effects of the Community Patent 
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(t) 
acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; 
acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention; 
the extemporaneous preparation for individual cases in a pharmacy of a medicine in accordance with 
a medical preparation or acts concerning the medicine so prepared; 
the use on board vessels of the countries of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, other than the Contracting States, of the patented invention, in the body of the vessel, in 
the machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories, when such vessels temporarily or accidentally 
enter the waters of Contracting States, provided that the invention is used there exclusively for the 
needs of the vessel; 
the use of the patented invention in the construction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of 
countries of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial property, other than the Contracting 
States, or of accessories to such aircraft or land vehicles, when these temporarily or accidentally 
enter the territory of Contracting States; 
the acts specified in Article 27 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 
1944, where these acts concern the aircraft of a State, other than the Contracting States, benefiting 
from the provisions of that Article. 
Article 28 Exhaustion of the rights conferred by the Community patent 
The right conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning a product covered by that 
patent which are done within the territories of the Contracting States after that product has been put on the 
market in one of these States by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent, unless there are 
grounds which, under Community law, would justify the extension to such acts of the rights conferred by 
the patent. 
Article 35 Burden of Proof 
1. If the subject matter of a Community patent is a process for obtaining a new product, the same 
product when produced by any other party shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have 
been obtained by the patented process. 
2. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of the defendant in protecting his 
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account. 
Chapter ill National rights 
Article 37 Rights based on prior use and right of personal possession 
1. Any person, who, if a national patent has been granted in respect of an invention, would have had. 
in one of the Contracting States, a right based on prior use of that invention or a right of personal 
possession of that invention, shall enjoy, in that State, the same rights in respect of a Community 
patent for the same invention. 
2. The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning a product covered 
by that patent which are done within the territory of the State concerned aft~r that product has .been 
put on the market in that State by the person referred to in paragra~h 1, 10 so far as the natIonal 
law of that State makes provision to the same effect in respect of natIonal patents. 
Chapter V Compulsory Licences in respect of a Community patent 
Article 45 Compulsory licences 
1. 
2. 
Any provision in the law of a Contracting State for the grant of compulsory licences in respect of 
national patents shall be applicable to Community patents. The extent and effect of compulsory 
licences granted in respect of Community patents shall be restricted to the territory of the State 
concerned. Article 28 shall not apply. 
Bach Contracting State shall, at least in respect of compensation under a compulsory licence, 
provide for a final appeal to a court of law. 
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3. 
4. 
As far as pr~ticable. national authorities shall notify the European Patent Office of the grant of any 
compulsory hcence 10 respect of a Community patent. 
~or t~e purpo~es .of this Convention, the tenn "compulsory licences" shall be construed as 
10cludmg officIal lIcences and any right to use patented inventions in the public interest. 
Article 46 Compulsory licences for lack of insufficiency of exploitation. 
~ com~ulsory licence. m~y n.ot be granted in respect of a Community patent on the ground of lack or 
1Osuffi~lency of explOltatiO~ If the p~oduct covered by the patent, which is manufactured in a Contracting 
State, IS put on the market 10 the temtory of any other Contracting State, for which such a licence has been 
requ~s~, in sufficient quantity to satisfy needs in the territory of that other Contracting State. This 
provIsIon shall not apply to compulsory licences granted in the public interest. 
Article 47 Compulsory licences in respect of dependent patents. 
An~ provision~ in the law of the Contracting States for the grant of compulsory licences in respect of 
earlIer patents 10 favour of subsequent dependent patents shall be applicable to the relationship between 
Community patents and national patents and to the relationship between Community patents themselves. 
Part vn Impact on National law 
Article 76 Exhaustion of rights conferred by a national patent 
1. The right conferred by a national patent in a Contracting State shall not extend to acts concerning a 
product covered by that patent which are done within the territory of that Contracting State after 
that product has been put on the market in any Contracting State by the proprietor of the patent or 
with his express consent, unless there are grounds which, under Community law, would justify the 
extension to such acts of the rights conferred by the patent. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall also apply with regard to a product put on the market by the proprietor of a 
national patent, granted for the same invention in another Contracting State, who has economic 
connections with the proprietor of the patent referred to in paragraph 1. For the purpose of this 
paragraph, two persons shall be deemed to have economic connection where one of them is in a 
position to exert a decisive influence on the other, directly or indirectly, with regard to the 
exploitation of a patent, or where a third party is in a position to exercise such an influence on 
both persons. 
3. The preceding paragraph shall not apply in the case of a product put on the market under a 
compulsory licence. 
Article 77 Compulsory licences in respect of national patents 
Article 46 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the grant of compulsory licences for lack or insufficiency of 
exploitation of a national patent. 
European Patent Convention 
Article 64 Rights conferred by a European patent 
(1) 
(2) 
A European patent shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor ~m. ~ 
date of publication of the mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in respect of which It IS 
granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State. 
If the subject matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent 
shall extend to the products directly obtained by such process. 
Article 69 Extent of protection 
(1) The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a ?~pean paten~ application shall 
be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless. the descnpllon and drawmgs shall be used 
to interpret the claims. 
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Protocol on the Intetpretation of Article 69 of the Convention 
Article. 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of the protection conferred by a European 
patent IS ~o ~ understood as .that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the wordings used in the claims. 
the des~nptton. and the dra~lOgs. being emp!oyed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in 
the claIms. N~Ither should It be lOterpreted 10 the sense that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the 
actual pro.tectt~n conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a per~~n skilled 10 the art, the patentee has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a 
POSItIon between these two extremes which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable 
degree of certainty for third parties. 
Ghana 
The Patent Law 1992. of Ghana 
Section 46 Compulsory licences based on the interdependence of patents. 
(1) Where a patented invention cannot be worked without infringing rights derived from an earlier 
patent, the owner of the later patent may, in proceedings instituted by him against the owner of the 
earlier patent or in proceedings instituted against him, request, request the Tribunal at any time to 
grant a compulsory licence with respect to the earlier patent to the extent necessary for the working 
of his invention if the invention -
(a) serves industrial purposes different from those served by the invention which is the 
subject of the earlier patent; or 
(b) constitutes substantial technical progress in relation to the later invention. 
(2) Where the two inventions mentioned in subsection (1) serve the same industrial purpose, a 
compulsory licence may be granted under that subsection only on condition that a compulsory 
licence shall also be granted in respect of the later patent to the owner of the earlier patent if he so 
requests. 
(3) In this section, "earlier patent" means a patent granted on an earlier application or benefiting from 
an earlier validly claimed priority date, and "later patent" shall be construed accordingly. 
Korea (Republic of) 
Patent Law (No. 950 of 1961. wholly amended by Law No. 4207 of 1990) 
Section 33 Persons Entitled to Obtain a Patent 
(1) 
(2) 
Any person who makes a new invention or his successor in title shall be entitled to obtain a patent 
in accordance with this Law; however, employees of the Korea Industrial Property Office shall not 
be entitled to obtain patents during their employment at the Office except in the case of inheritance 
or bequest. 
If two or ore persons jointly make an invention, the right to obtain a patent shall be jointly 
owned. 
Section 39 Employee's Inventions 
(1) 
(2) 
An employer, a legal entity, or the Government or a local public entity (hereinafter referred to as 
the "employer") shall have a non-exclusive licence to the patent right concerned, where an 
employee, an executive officer of such a legal entity, or a public official (her:einafter refared to .as 
"employee") or successor in title has obtained a patent for an invention WhiCh, by ~on ~f ItS 
nature, falls within the scope of the business of the employer and an act or. acts resultIng In the 
invention were part of the present or past duties of the employee (heremafter referred to as 
"employee's invention"). 
An employee's invention made by a public official shall pass to the State and the patent right shall 
thereby revert to the State. 
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(3) In the case of ~ . inventi~n made b~ an employee which is not an employee's invention, any con~actual provIsIon, servIce regulatIOn or other stipulation providing in advance that the right to ~btaIn a patent ?r the. patent right shall pass to the employer or that he shall have an exclusive 
lIcence on such InVentIOn, shall be null and void. 
(4) The disposal and management of a patent right which has reverted to the State, in accordance with 
para~aph (2~, shall be governed by the Commissioner of the Korea Industrial Property Office, 
notwlthstandmg the provisions of the National Property Law. 
(5) The disposal and management of a patent right under paragraph (4) which has reverted to the State 
shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree. ' 
Section 40 Remuneration for Employee's Invention 
(1) The employee shall have the right to obtain reasonable remuneration when he has transferred to the 
employer the right to obtain a patent or the patent right, with respect to an employee's invention, 
or has given the employer the right to obtain a patent or the patent right, with respect to an 
employee's invention, or has given the employer an exclusive licence in accordance with a contract 
or service regulation. 
(2) The amount of the remuneration provided for in paragraph (1) shall be calculated in accordance with 
the profits realised by the employer from the invention and in accordance with the amount of the 
employer's contribution to the creation of the invention; any suggestion made by the employee as 
to the method of settlement shall also be taken into account. 
(3) If the State succeeds to the employee's invention made by a public official, the State shall provide 
reasonable remuneration to the employee for it. Matters relating to the payment of remuneration, 
etc., shall be prescribed by a Presidential Decree. 
(4) Employers may set up a committee to review matters relating to the employee's invention made by 
their employees. 
Sin&apore 
The Patents Act 1994. No. 21 of 1994. Sin~apore. 
Section 66 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person infringes a patent for an invention if, but only if, 
while the patent is in force, he does any of the following things in Singapore in relation to the 
invention without the consent of the proprietor of the patent. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or 
imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise; 
where the invention is a process, he uses the process or he offers it for use in Singapore 
when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that its use 
without the consent of the proprietor would be an infringement of the patent; 
where the invention is a process, he disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports any 
product obtained directly by means of that process or keeps any such product whether for 
disposal or otherwise. 
(2) An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an 
invention shall not do so if -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
it is done privately and for purposes which are not co~ercial; .. 
it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the IDvenbon; 
it consists of the extemporaneous preparation of a medicine fo~ ~ individual. in ~ 
with a prescription give by a registered medical or dental pracbboner or consIsts of dealing 
with a medicine so prepared; .,
it consists of the use of a product or process in the body or operabon of a relevant aircraft 
it 'consists of the use, exclusively for the needs of a relevant ship, of a product or process 
in the body of the ship or in its machinery ... 
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(t) it co~sists. of the use of an exempted aircraft which has lawfully entered or is lawfully 
crossmg Smgapore ... 
(g) it consists of the i~port, use, disposal or offer to dispose of, of any patented product. or 
of any pr~uct O~tai~ed by means of a patented process or to which a patented process has 
been ~pphed, which IS produced by or with the consent (conditional or otherwise) of the 
propnetor of the patent o~ any person licensed by him, and for this purpose "patent" 
mcludes. a patent gran~ m. any country outside Singapore in respect of the same or 
~ubstantIally the same mventlOn as that for which a patent is granted under this Act arxl 
patented product", "patented process" and "licensed" shall be construed accordingly. 
Switzerland 
Federal Law on Patents for Invention (Patent Law. LBD of 1954. as last amended on February 3. 1995). 
Article 36 ])ependentInventions 
(1) If a patented invention cannot be used without infringing a prior patent, the owner of the more 
recent patent shall have the right to the grant of a non-exclusive licence to the extent required for 
such use of his invention, provided that the invention represents an important technical advance of 
considerable economic interest in relation to the invention that is the subject of the first patent. 
(2) A licence to use the invention that is the subject matter of the first patent may only be assigned 
jointly with the second patent. 
(3) The owner of the first patent may make the grant of a licence conditional on the fact that the holder 
of the second patent afford to him in turn a licence to use his invention. 
United Kin&dom 
Patents. Desi~ns and Trade Marks Act. 1883 
Section 32 
Where any person claiming to be the patentee of an invention, by circulars, advertisements, or otherwise, 
threatens any person with any legal proceedings or liability in respect of any alleged manufacture, use, sale, 
or purchase of the invention, any person or persons aggrieved thereby may bring an action against him, arxl 
may obtain an injunction against the continuance of such threats, and may recover such damage (if any) as 
may have been sustained thereby, if the alleged manufacture, use, sale, or purchase, to which the threats 
related, was not in fact an infringement of any legal rights of the person making such threats: provided that 
this section shall not apply if the person making such threats with due diligence commences and prosecutes 
an action for infringement of his patent. 
United KinKdom Patents Act 1977 (Chapter 37) 
Section 7 Right to apply for and obtain a patent 
(1) Any person may make an application for a patent either alone or jointly with another. 
(2) A patent for an invention may be granted-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
primarily to the inventor or joint inventors; 
in preference to the foregoing, to any person or persons who, by virtue of any enactment 
or rule of law, or any foreign law or treaty or international convention, or by virtue of an 
enforceable term of any agreement entered into with the inventor before the making of the 
invention, was or were at the time of the making of the invention entitled to the whole of 
the property in it (other than equitable interests) in the United Kingdom. 
in any event, to the successor or successors in title of any person or persons mentioned in 
paragraph (a) or (b) above or any person so mentioned and the successor or successors in 
title of another person so mentioned; 
and to no other person. 
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(3) ~~ ~i~ Act "i~,ventor" in relation to an invention means the actual deviser of the invention and 
Jomt mventor shall be construed accordingly. 
(4) Except so far as the contr~ is e~tablished, a person who makes an application for a patent shall be 
taken to be the person who IS entItled under subsection (2) above to be granted a patent and two or 
more persons who made an application jointly shall be taken to be the persons so entitled. 
Section 30 Nature of, and transactions in, patents and applications for patents 
(1) Any patent or application for a patent is personal property (without being a thing in action), and 
any patent or any such application and rights in or under it may be transferred created or granted in 
accordance with subsection (2) to (7) below. ' 
(2) Su~ject to section 39(3) below, any patent or any such application, or any right in it, may be 
assIgned or mortgaged. 
(3) Any patent or any such application or right shall vest by operation of law in the same way as any 
other personal property and may be vested by an assent of personal representatives. 
(4) 
Section 36 Co-ownership of patents and applications for patents 
(1) Where a patent is granted to two or more persons, each of them shall, subject to any agreement to 
the contrary, be entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent 
(2) Where two or more persons are proprietors of a patent, then subject to the provisions of this 
section and subject to any agreement to the contrary-
(a) each of them shall be entitled, by himself or his agents, to do in respect of the invention 
concerned, for his own benefit and without the consent of or the need to account to the 
other or others, any act which apart from this subsection and section 55 below, amount to 
an infringement of the patent concerned; and 
(b) any such act shall not amount to an infringement of the patent concerned. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of section 8 and 12 above and section 37 below and to any agreement for 
the time being in force, where two or more persons are proprietors of a patent one of them shall 
not without the consent of the other or others grant a licence under the patent or assign or 
mortgage a share in the patent or in Scotland cause or permit security to be granted over it. 
(4) Subject to the provisions of those sections, where two or more persons are proprietors of a patent, 
anyone else may supply one of those persons with the means, relating to an essential element of 
the invention, for putting the invention into effect, and the supply of those means by virtue of this 
subsection shall not amount to an infringement of the patent. 
(5) Where a patented product is disposed of by any of two or more proprietors to any persons, that 
person and any other person claiming through him shall be entitled to deal with the product in the 
same way as if it had been disposed of by a sole registered proprietor. 
(6) Nothing in subsection (1) and (2) above shall affect the mutual rights or obligations of trustees or 
the personal representative of a deceased person, or their rights or obligations as such. 
(7) The foregoing provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to an application for a patent 
which is filed as they have in effect in relation to a patent and -
(a) 
(b) 
references to a patent and a patent being granted shall accordingly include references 
respectively to any such application and to the application being filed; and . 
the reference in subsection (5) above to a patented product shall be construed accordingly 
Section 39 Right to employee's invention 
(1) Notwithstanding anything in any rule of law, an invention made by an employee shall, as between 
him and his employer, be taken to belong to his employer for the purpose of this Act and all other 
purposes if-
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(a) it ~as mad~ in ~e course of the nonnal duties of the employee or in the course of duties 
~all~ng outsIde his nonnal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances 
m eIt?er case we~e such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the 
carrymg out of hIS duties; or 
(b) the i.nvention ~as ~ in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of 
making. ~~e. mv~~tlOn, because of the nature of his duties and the particular 
res~onsIblhtIes ansmg from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further 
the mterests of the employer's undertaking. 
(2) Any other invention made by an employee shall, as between him and his employer, be taken for 
those purposes to belong to the employee. 
(3) Where by virtue of this section an invention belongs, as between him and his employer, to an 
employee, nothing done-
(a) 
(b) 
by or on behalf of the employee or any person claiming under him for the purposes of 
pursuing an application for a patent, or 
by any person for the purpose of performing or working the invention, 
shall be taken to infringe any copyright or design right to which, as between him and his 
employer, his employer is entitled in any model or document relating to the invention. 
Section 40 Compensation of employees for certain inventions 
(1) Where it appears to the court or the comptroller on an application made by an employee within the 
prescribed period that the employee has made an invention belonging to the employer for which a 
patent has been granted, that the patent (having regard among other things to the size and nature of 
the employer's undertaking) of outstanding benefit to the employer and that by reason of those facts 
it is just that the employee should be awarded compensation to be paid by the employer, the court 
or the comptroller may award him such compensation of an amount determined under section 41 
below. 
(2) Where it appears to the court or the comptroller on an application made by an employee within the 
prescribed period that -
(a) a patent has been granted for an invention made by and belonging to the employee; 
(b) his rights in the invention, or in any patent or application for a patent for the invention, 
have since the appointed day been assigned to the employee or an exclusive licence under 
the patent or application has since the appointed date been granted to the employee: 
(c) the benefit derived by the employee from the contract of assignment, assignation or grant 
or any ancillary contract ("the relevant contract") is inadequate in relation to the benefit 
derived by the employer from the patent; and 
(d) by reason of those facts it is just that the employee should be awarded compensation to be 
paid by the employer in addition to the benefit derived from the relevant contract: 
the court or the comptroller may award him such compensation of an amount determined under section 41 
below. 
Section 41 AJnountofcompensation 
(1) 
(2) 
An award of compensation to an employee under section 40(1) or (2) above in relation to a patent 
for an invention shall be such as will secure for the employee a fair share (having regard to all the 
circumstances) of the benefit which the employer has derived, or may reasonably be expected.to 
derive, from the patent or from the assignment, assignation or grant to a ~rson conn~ .Wlth 
the employer of the property or any right in the invention or the property tn, or any nght m or 
under, an application for that patent. 
For the purposes of subsection (1) above the amount of any benefit derived or expected to be 
derived by an employer from the assignment, assignation or grant of -
(a) the property in, or any right in or under, a patent for an invention or an application for 
such a patent; or 
(b) the property or any right in the invention; 
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to ~ person connected wi!h him shall be taken to be the amount which could reasonably be expected to be so 
denved by the employer If that person had not been connected with him. 
(4) In ~ete~ning ~e fair share of the benefit to be secured for an employee in respect of a patent for 
an mve~tlOn which has alwa~s belonged to an employer, the court or the comptroller shall, among 
other thmgs, take the followmg matters into account, that is to say-
(a) the nature. of the emp~oyee's duties, his remuneration and the other advantages he derives 
or has denved from his employment or has derived in relation 0 the invention under this 
Act; 
(b) the effort and skill which the employee has devoted to making the invention; 
(c) the effort and skill which other person has devoted to making the invention jointly with 
the employee concerned, and the advice and other assistance contributed by any other 
employee who is not a joint inventor of the invention; and 
(d) the contribution made by the employer to the making, developing and working of the 
invention by the provision of advice, facilities and other assistance, by the provision of 
opportunities and by his managerial and commercial skill and activities. 
(5) In detennining the fair share of the benefit to be secured for an employee in respect of a patent for 
an invention which originally belonged to him, the court or the comptroller shall, among other 
things, take the following matters into account, that is to say-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
any conditions in a licence or licences granted under this Act or otherwise in respect of the 
invention or the patent; 
the extent to which the invention was made jointly by the employee with any other 
person; and 
the contribution made by the employer to the making, developing and working of the 
invention as mentioned in subsection (4)(d) above. 
Section of 42 Enforceability of contracts relating to employee's inventions 
(2) Any tenn in a contract to which this section applies which diminishes the employee's rights in 
inventions of any description made by him after the appointed date and the date of the contract, or 
in or under patents for those inventions or applications for such patents, shall be unenforceable 
against him to the extent that it diminishes his rights in an invention of that description so made, 
or in or under a patent for such an invention or an application for any such patent. 
(3) Subsection (2) shall not be construed as derogating from any duty of confidentiality owed to his 
employer by an employee by virtue of any rule of law or otherwise. 
Section 43 Supplementary 
(2) 
(3) 
Section 39 to 42 above shall not apply to an invention made by an employee unless at the time he 
made the invention one of the following conditions was satisfied in his case, that is to say-
(a) 
(b) 
he was mainly employed in the United Kingdom; or 
he was not mainly employed anywhere or his place of employment could not be 
detennined, but his employer had a place of business in the United Kingdom to which the 
employee was attached, whether or not he was also attached elsewhere. 
In section 39 to 42 above and this section, except in so far as the context otherwise requires. 
references to the making of an invention by an employee are refer:ences to his m~n~ it al~ne or 
jointly with any other person, but do not include references to his merely contnbutmg adVIce or 
other assistance in the making of an invention by another employee. 
Section 44 Avoidance of certain restrictive conditions 
(I) Subject to the provisions of this section. any condition or term of a contract for the supply of a 
patented product or of a licence to work a patented invention. or of a contract relating to any such 
supply or licence. shall be void in so far as it purports -
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
in th~ case of. a con~act for supply, to require the person supplied to acquire from the 
supplIer, ~r. hIS nom1Oee, or prohibit him from acquiring from any specified person, or 
from acqumng except from the supplier or his nominee, anything other than the patented 
product; 
in the cas~ of a licence to work a patented invention, to require the licensee to acquire 
from the lIcensor or . ~is nominee, or prohibit him from acquiring from any specified 
person, or fro~ ~qumng except from the licensor or his nominee, anything other than 
the ~roduc~ whIch IS the patented invention or (if it is a process) other than any product 
?bta~ned drrectly by means of the process or to which the process has been applied; 
10 eIther case, to prohibit the person supplied or licensee from using articles (whether 
patented product or not) which are not supplied by, or any patented process which does not 
belon~ to, th.e supplier or licensor, or his nominee, or to restrict the right of the person 
supplIed or lIcensee to use any such articles or process. 
(2) Subsection (1) above applies to contracts and licences whether made or granted before or after the 
appointed day, but not to those made or granted before 1st January 1950. 
(3) In proceedings against any person for infringement of a patent it shall be a defence to prove that at 
the time of the infringement there was in force a contract relating to the patent made by or with the 
consent of the plaintiff or pursuer or a licence under the patent granted by him or with his consent 
and containing in either case a condition or term void by virtue of this section. 
(4) A condition or term of a contract or licence shall not be void by virtue of this section if _ 
(a) at the time of the making of the contract or granting of the licence the supplier or licensor 
was willing to supply the product, or grant a licence to work the invention, as the case 
may be, to the person supplied or licensee, on reasonable terms specified in the contract or 
licence and without any such condition or term as in mentioned in subsection (1) above; 
and 
(b) the person supplied or licence is entitled under the contract or licence to relieve himself of 
his liability to observe the condition or term on giving to the other party three month's 
notice in writing and subject to payment to that other party of such compensation (being 
in the case of a contract to supply, a lump sum or rent for the residue of the term of the 
contract and, in the case of a licence, a royalty for the residue of the term of the licence) as 
may be determined by an arbitrator or arbiter appointed by the Secretary of State. 
(5) If in any proceeding it is alleged that any condition or term of a contract or licence is void by virtue 
of this section it shall lie on the supplier or licensor to prove the matters set out in paragraph (a) 
of subsection (4) above. 
(6) A condition or term of a contract or licence shall not be void by virtue of this section by reason 
that it prohibits any person from selling goods other than those supplied by a specified person or, 
in the case of a contract for the hiring of or licence to use a patented product, that it reserves to the 
bailor (or, in Scotland, hirer) or licensor, or his nominee, the right to supply such new parts of the 
patented product as may be required to put or keep it in repair. 
Section ~O Meaning of infringement 
(1) 
(2) 
Subject to the provisions of this section, a person infringe~ a pat~nt f~r an inve~tion i~, but on~y 
if, while the patent is in force, he does any of the follow1Og th10gs 10 the UOlted Kingdom 10 
relation to the invention without the consent of the proprietor of the patent, that is to say-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of. uses or 
imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise; . . . 
where the invention is a process, he uses the process or he offers It for use 10 the Uruted 
Kingdom when he knows. or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances. 
that its use there without the consent of the proprietor would be an infringement of the 
patent; .. 
where the invention is a process. he disposes of. offers to dispose of. uses or Imports any 
product obtained directly by means of that process or keeps any such product whether for 
disposal or otherwise. 
Subject to the following provisions of this section. a person (other than the proprietor of the 
patent) also infringes a patent for an invention if. while the patent is in force and without the 
consent of the proprietor. he supplies or offers to supply in the United Kingdom a person other 
than a licensee or other person entitled to work the invention with any of the means. relating to 
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~ ess~ntial element of the invention, for putting the invention into effect when he knows, or it 
IS ObVlO~S to a reasonable ~rson ~n t~e circumstances, that those means are suitable for putting, 
and are Intended to put, the InventIOn Into effect in the United Kingdom. 
(3) Subsection (2) above sh.all not apply to the supply or offer of a staple commercial product unless 
the supply or the offer IS made for the purpose of inducing the person supplied or, as the case 
may be, the person to whom the offer is made to do an act which constitutes an infringement of 
the patent by virtue of subsection (1) above. 
(4) Wi~out prejudice to section 86 below, subsections (1) and (2) above shall not apply to any act 
WhIC.h, under any pro~ision of the Community Patent Convention relating to the exhaustion of 
the nghts of the propnetor of a patent, as that provision applies by virtue of that section, cannot 
be prevented by the proprietor of the patent. 
(5) An act which apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an 
invention shall not do so if -
(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; 
(b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention; 
(c) it consists of the extemporaneous preparation in a pharmacy of a medicine for an 
individual in accordance with a prescription given by a registered medical or dental 
practitioner or consists of dealing with a medicine so prepared; 
(d) it consists of the use, exclusively for the needs of a relevant ship, or a product or process 
in the body of such a ship or in its machinery, tackle, apparatus or other accessories, in a 
case where the ship has temporarily or accidentally entered the internal or territorial waters 
of the United Kingdom; 
(e) it consists of the use of a product or process in the body or operation of a relevant aircraft, 
hovercraft or vehicle which has temporarily or accidentally entered or is crossing the 
United Kingdom (including the air space above it and its territorial waters) or the use of 
accessories for such a relevant aircraft, hovercraft or vehicle; 
(f) it consists of the use of an exempted aircraft which has lawfully entered or is lawfully 
crossing the United Kingdom as aforesaid or of the importation into the United Kingdom, 
or the use or storage there, of any part or accessory for such an aircraft. 
(6) For the purposes of subsection (2) above a person who does an act in relation to an invention 
which is prevented only by virtue of paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (5) above from 
constituting an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not be treated as a person entitled 
to work the invention, but-
(a) 
(b) 
the reference in that subsection to a person entitled to work an invention includes a 
reference to a person so entitled by virtue of section 55 above, and 
a person who by virtue of section 28A(4) or (5) above or section 64 below is entitled to 
do an act in relation to the invention without it constituting such an infringement shall, 
so far as concerns that act, be treated as a person entitled to work the invention. 
Section 62 Restrictions on recovery of damages for infringement 
(1) In proceedings for infringement of a patent damages shall not be awarded, and no order shall be 
made for an account of profits, against a defendant or defender who proves that at the date of the 
infringement he was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for supposing, that the patent 
existed; and a person shall not be taken to have been aware or to have had reasonable grounds for so 
supposing by reason only of the application to a product of the word "~atent" or "patented", or by 
any word or words expressing or implying that a patent has been obtaIned for the product, unless 
the number of the patent accompanied the word or words in question. 
Section 66 Proceedings for infringement by co-owners 
(1) In the application of section 60 above to a patent to which there are two or more joint proprietors 
the reference to the proprietor shall be construed-
(a) 
(b) 
in relation to any act, as a reference to that proprietor or those proprietors who, by virtue 
of section 36 above or any agreement referred to in that section, is or are entitled to cb 
that act without it amounting to an infringement; and 
in relation to any consent, as a reference to that proprietor or those proprietor who, by 
virtue of section 60 above or any such agreement, is or are the proper person or persons to 
give the requisite consent. 
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(2) One of ~wo ~r more joint proprietors of a patent may without the concurrence of the others bring 
proceedmgs I? respect of an act alleged to infringe the patent, but shall not do so unless the others 
~e made parties to the proceedings; but any of the others made a defendant or defender shall not be 
lIable for any costs or expenses unless he enters in appearance and takes part in the proceedings. 
Section 64 Right to continue use begun before priority date 
(1) Where a patent is granted for an invention, a person who in the United Kingdom before the priority 
date of the invention-
(a) does in good faith an act which would constitute an infringement of the patent if it were 
in force, or 
(b) makes in good faith effective and serious preparations to do such an act, 
has the right to continue to do the act or, as the case may be, to do the act, notwithstanding the 
grant of the patent; but this right does not extent to granting a licence to another person to do the 
act. 
(2) If the act was done, or the preparations were made, in the course of a business, the person entitled 
to the right conferred by subsection (1) may-
a) authorise the doping of that act by any partners of his for the time being in that business, 
and 
b) assign that right or transmit it on death (or in the case of a body corporate on its 
dissolution) to any person who acquires that part of the business in the course of which 
the act was done or preparations were made. 
(3) Where a product is disposed of by any person to another in exercise of the rights conferred by 
subsection (1) or (2), that other and any person claiming through him may deal with the product in 
the same way as if it had been disposed of by the registered proprietor 9f the patent. 
Section 70 Remedy for groundless threats of infringement proceedings 
(1) Where a person (whether or not the proprietor of, or entitled to any right in, a patent) by circulars, 
advertisements or otherwise threatens another person with proceedings for any infringement of a 
patent, a person aggrieved by the threats (whether or not he is the person to whom the threats are 
made) may, subject to subsection (4) below, bring proceedings in the court against the person 
making the threats, claiming any relief mentioned in subsection (3) below. 
(2) In any such proceedings the plaintiff or pursuer mrul, if he proves that the threats were so made and 
satisfies the court that he is a person aggrieved by them, be entitled to the relief claimed unless:-
(a) 
(b) 
the defendant or defender proves that the acts in respect of which proceedings were 
threatened constitute or, if done, would constitute an infringement of a patent; and 
the patent alleged to be infringed is not shown by the plaintiff or pursuer to be invalid in 
a relevant respect. 
(3) The said relief is -
(4) 
(5) 
(a) a declaration or declarator to the effect that the threats are unjustifiable; 
(b) an injunction or interdict against the continu~c.e of the threats; and . 
(c) damages in respect of any loss which the plamtIff or pursuer has sustaIned by the threats. 
Proceedings may not be brought under this section for a threat to bri~g proceedings f?r an 
infringement alleged to consist of making or importing a product for disposal or of usmg a 
process. 
It is hereby declared that a mere notification of the existence of a patent does not constitute a threat 
of proceedings within the meaning of this section. 
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Section 72 Power to revoke patents on application 
(1) Subj~t . to the following provisions of this Act, the court or the comptroller may on the 
apphc~tlon of any pers~n by order revoke a patent for an invention on (but only on) any of the 
followmg grounds, that IS to say-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
the invention is not a patentable invention; 
that the p.atent. was granted to a person who was not entitled to be granted that patent; 
the speCIficatIon of t~e patent does not disclose the invention clearly enough arxI 
completely ~nough for It to be performed by a person skilled in the art; 
the ~att~r dIsclosed in the specification of the patent extends beyond that disclosed in the 
apphcatIo~ for the patent, as filed, or, if the patent was granted on a new application filed 
under sectIOn 8(3), 12 or 37(4) above or as mentioned in section 15(4) above, in the 
earlier application, as filed. 
the protection conferred by the patent has been extended by an amendment which should 
not have been allowed. 
(2) An application for the revocation of a patent on the ground mentioned in subsection (1)(b) above-
(a) 
(b) 
Section 100 
may only be made by a person found by the court in an action for a declaration or 
declarator, or found by the court or the comptroller on a reference under section 37 above, 
to be entitled to be granted that patent or to be granted a patent for part of the matter 
comprised in the specification of the patent sought to be revoked. 
may not be made if that action was commenced or that reference was made after the end of 
the period of two years beginning with the date of the grant of the patent sought to be 
revoked, unless it is shown that any person registered as a proprietor of the patent knew at 
the time of the grant or of the transfer of the patent to him that he was not entitled to the 
patent. 
Burden of proof in certain cases 
(1) If the invention for which a patent is granted is a process for obtaining a new product, the same 
product produced by a person other than the proprietor of the patent or a licensee of his shall, 
unless the contrary is proved, be taken in any proceedings to have been obtained by that process. 
(2) In considering whether a party has discharged the burden imposed upon him by this section, the 
court shall not require him to disclose any manufacturing or commercial secrets if it appears to the 
court that it would be unreasonable to do so. 
Section 125 Extent of Invention 
(1) For the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent for which an application has been made or 
for which a patent has been granted shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be that 
specified in a claim of the specification of the application or patent, as the case may be, as 
interpreted by the description and any drawings contained in that specification, and the extent of the 
protection conferred by a patent or application for a patent shall be construed accordingly. 
Section 130 Interpretation 
"employee" means a person who works or (where the employment has ceased) worked under a contract of 
employment or in employment under or for the purposes of a government department or a person who 
serves (or served) in the naval, military or air forces of the Crown 
"employer", in relation to an employee, means the person by whom the employee is or was employed 
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United States 
United States Code. Title 35 - Patents 
Section 100 Definition 
(a) The term "invention" means invention or discovery. 
Section 101 Inventions patentable 
Whoever invents or disc.overs any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or a~y new and u~eful Improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions aOO 
requIrements of thIS title. 
Section 102 Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed 
pub~icatio~ in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
the lDventlOn was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States, or 
he has abandoned the invention, or 
the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject matter of an inventor's 
certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the 
date of the application for patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's 
certificate filed more than 12 months before the filing of the application in the United States, or 
the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another fIled in the 
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international 
application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 
371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or 
before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who tm 
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be 
considered not only the respective date of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but 
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a 
time prior to conception by the other. 
Section 111 Application 
(a) General 
(1) Written application. - An application for patent shall be made, or authorised to be made, by the 
inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the Commissioner. 
(2) Contents - Such application shall include -
(A) a specification as prescribed by section 112 of this title; 
(B) a drawing as prescribed by section 113 of this title; 
(C) an oath by the applicant as prescribed by section 115 of this title. 
(3) Fee and oath - The application just be accompanied by the fee required by law. The fee and oath 
may be submitted after the specification and any required drawing are sub~tted, within such. ~od ani 
under such conditions, including the payment of a surcharge, as may be prescnbed by the ComrrusslOner. 
(4) Failure to submit - Upon failure to submit the fee and oath within such prescribed period, the 
application shall be regarded as abandoned, unless it is shown ~o the. satisfaction ~f the Commission~r ~at 
the delay in submitting the fee and oath was unavoidable or uruntennonal. The fillD~ da~ of an applicanon 
shall be the date on which the specification and any required drawing are receiVed 10 the Patent Rl 
Trademark Office. 
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Section 112 Specification 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention and of the d f aki d'" , manner an process 0 
m . n~ an U~tng It, tn. such full, clear, concise, and exact tenns as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
WhICh It pertains, or WIth which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
The sp<:cification shal.l conclude ',Vith one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 
the subject matter which the applIcant regards as his invention. 
Section 115 Oath of applicant 
The applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent; 
and shall state of what country he is a citizen. Such oath may be made before any person within the United 
States authorised by law t? administer oaths, or, when made in a foreign country, before any diplomatic or 
consular officer of the Untted States authorised to administer oaths, or before any officer having an official 
seal and authorised to administer oaths in the foreign country in which the applicant may be, whose 
authority is proved by certificate of a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, or apostille of an 
official designated by a foreign country which, by treaty or convention, accords like effect to apostilles of 
designated officials in the United States. Such oath is valid if it complies with the laws of the state or 
country where made. When the application is made as provided in this title by a person other than the 
inventor, the oath may be so varied in fonn that it can be made by him. 
Section 116 Inventors 
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each 
make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly 
even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same 
type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim 
of the patent. 
If a joint inventor refuses to join in an application for patent or cannot be found or reached after diligent 
effort, the application may be made by the other inventor on behalf of himself and the omitted inventor. The 
Commissioner, on proof of the pertinent facts and after such notice to the omitted inventor as he prescribes, 
may grant a patent to the inventor making the application, subject to the same rights which the omitted 
inventor would have had if he had been joined. The omitted inventor may subsequently join in the 
application. 
Whenever through error a person is named in an application for patent as the inventor, or through an error 
an inventor is not named in an application and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, 
the Commissioner may permit the application to be amend accordingly, under such tenns as he prescribed. 
Section 117 Death or incapacity of inventor 
Legal representatives of deceased inventors and of those under legal incapacity may make application for 
patent upon compliance with the requirements and on the same tenns and conditions applicable to the 
inventor. 
Section 118 Filing by other than inventor. 
Whenever an inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot be found or reached after 
diligent effort, a person to whom the inventor has assigned or agreed in writing to assign the invention or 
who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter justifying such ac~on, may make 
application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof of the perttnent facts and a 
showing that such action is necessary to reserve the rights of the parties or to pre~ent irre~ble damages; 
and the Commissioner may grant a patent to such inventor upon such notIce to hIm to as the 
Commissioner deem sufficient, and on compliance with such regulations as he prescribes. 
Section 256 Correction of named inventor 
Whenever though error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is 
not named in an issued patent and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the 
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Co~ssioner may, on .applicati~n of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other 
requIrements as may be Imposed, Issue a certificate correcting such error. 
Th~ error of omitting inve~to~s or naming persons who are not inventors shall not invalidate the patent in 
WhICh ~uch err~r occUO:OO If It can be corrected a provided in this section. The court before which such 
matter IS call~ I~ questlOn n.tay order correction of the patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned 
and the COmmISSIOner shall Issue a certificate accordingly. 
Section 261 Ownership; assignment 
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property. 
A~p.lications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in 
wntmg. ~e a~phcant, pat~ntee, ~r hi.s assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey 
an exclUSIve nght under hIS apphcatlOn for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the 
United States. 
An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void a against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a 
valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three 
months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage. 
Section 262 Joint owners 
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the 
United States without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners. 
Section 271 Infringement of Patent 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or 
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or 
apparatus for use in practising a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing 
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a 
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by 
reason of his having done one or more of the following: 
(e)(I) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
derive revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would 
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; 
licensed or authorised another to perform acts which if performed without his consent 
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; 
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; 
refused to license or use any rights to the patents; or 
conditioned the licence of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on 
the acquisition of a licence to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, 
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the licence or sale is conditioned. 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or 
import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary 
biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the 
Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant 
RNA. hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation 
techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
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under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products. 
(2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit _ 
(A) ~ application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in 
sectIOn 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a 
patent, or 
(B) an application under section 512 of such Act or under the Act of March 4, 1913 (21 USC 151-
158) f~r a drug or veteri~ary biological ~roduct which is not primarily manufactured using 
reco~bInant I?NA, ~ecom?Inant RNA, hybndoma technology, or other processes involving site 
sp~cIfic ~enet1c mampulatlOn techniques and which is claimed in a patent or the use of which is 
claImed In a patent, 
if the pu~ose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the 
commercIal ma~ufa~ture,. use, ?r sale of a drug or veterinary biological product claimed in a patent 
or the use of whIch IS claImed In a patent before the expiration of such patent. 
(3) In any action for patent infringement brought under this section, no injunctive or other relief may 
be granted which would prohibit the making, using, offering to sell or selling within the United 
States or importing into the United States of a patented invention under paragraph (l). 
(4) For an act of infringement described in paragraph (2) _ 
(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug or veterinary biological product 
involved in the infringement to be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the 
patent which has been infringed. 
(B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, 
offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the United States of an approved 
drug or veterinary biological product, and 
(C) damages or other monetary relief may be awarded against an infringer only if there has been 
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the 
United States of an approved drug or veterinary biological product. 
(f)(t) 
(2) 
(g) 
The remedies prescribed by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) are the only remedies which may be 
granted by a court for an act of infringement described in paragraph (2), except that a court may 
award attorney fee under section 285. 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are 
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such 
components outside of the United State in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any 
component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the 
invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non 
infringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such 
component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of 
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within 
the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells or uses within the 
United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States sh~l be liable as 
an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs dunng the term of 
such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be ~ted 
for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there IS no 
adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, otTer 
to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of 
this title, not be considered to be so made after -
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product 
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(h) As used in this section, the term "whoever" includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, arxI 
any officer or empl~yee of a Sta~e or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity. Any 
~tat~, and any such IOstrumentahty, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this 
tItle 10 the same manner and to the same extent as any non governmental entity. 
(i) As used in. this section, an "offer for sale" or an "offer to sell" by a person other than the patentee, 
or any asSIgnee of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the 
term of the patent. 
Section 283 Injunction 
~e s.everal cou~ having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunction in accordance with the 
pnncIples of eqUIty to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable. 
Section 284 Damages 
yp~n finding for t~e claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
IOfringement, but 10 no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. 
Where the damages are not found by the jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. 
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would 
be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Section 287 Limitation on damages and other remedies; marking and notice 
(a) Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented 
article for or under them or importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the 
public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", 
together with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not be done, by 
fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In 
the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for 
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe 
thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. 
Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such notice. 
(b)(1) An infringer under section 271(g) shall be subject to all the provisions of this title relating to 
damages and injunctions except to the extent those remedies are modified by this subsection or section 9006 
of the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988. The modifications of remedies provided in this subsection 
shall not be available to any person who -
practised the patented process; (A) 
(B) owns or controls, or is owned or controlled by, the person who practised the patented 
process; or 
(C) had knowledge before the infringement that a patented process was used to make the 
product the importation, use, offer for sale, or sale of which constitutes the infringement. 
(2) No remedies for infringement under section 271(g) of this title shall be available with respect to 
any product in the possession of, or in transit to, the person subject to liability ~der sU7h .~tion before 
that person had notice of infringement with respect to that product. The person subject to lIabIlity shall bear 
the burden of proving any such possession or transit. 
(3) (A) In making a determination with respect to the remedy in an action brought for 
infringement under section 271 (g), the court shall consider-
(i) the good faith demonstrated by the defendant with respect to a request for ~sclosure, 
(ii) the good faith demonstrated by the plaintiff with respect to a request for disclosure. and 
(iii) the need to restore the exclusive rights secured by the patent. 
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A). the following are evidence of good faith: 
(i) a request for disclosure made by the defendant; 
(ii) a response within a reasonable time by the person receiving the request for disclosure; and 
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(iii) the submission of the response by the defendant to the manufacturer or if the 
manufacturer is not .known, to the supplier, of the product to be purc~ by the 
defen~t, toge~er WIth a request for a written statement that the process claimed in any 
patent dISclosed In the response is not used to produce such product. 
~e failure to perform anr .ac~ de~bed in the preceding sentence is evidence of absence of good 
faIt.it unless there are mItIgatIng CIrcumstances. Mitigating circumstances include the case in 
~hIch, due to the nature of the product, the number of sources for the product, or the commercial 
cIrcumstances, a reque~t for disclosure is not necessary or practicable to avoid infringement. 
(4)(A) For the p~ose of thIS subsection, a "request for disclosure" means a written request made to a 
person then engaged In. the manufacture of a product to identify all process patents owned by or licensed to 
~at. person, as of th.e tIme of the request, that the person then reasonably believes could be asserted to be 
lllfI:inged under section 271(g) if that product were imported into, or sold, offered for sale, or used in, the 
Uruted States by an unauthorised person. A request for disclosure is further limited to a request-
(i) which is made by a person regularly engaged in the United States in the sale of the same 
type of products as those manufactured by the person to whom the request is directed, or 
which includes facts showing that the person making the request plans to engage in the 
sale of such products in the United States; 
(ii) which is made by such person before the person's fIrst importation, use, offer for sale, or 
sale of units of the product produced by an infringing process and before the person bOO 
notice of infringement with respect to the product; and 
(iii) which includes a representation by the person making the request that such person will 
promptly submit the patents identified pursuant to the request to the manufacturer, or if 
the manufacturer is not known, to the supplier, of the product to be purchased by the 
person making the request, and will request from that manufacturer or supplier a written 
statement that none of the process claimed in those patents is used in the manufacture of 
the product. 
4(B) In the case of a request for disclosure received by a person to whom a patent is licensed, that person 
shall either identify the patent or promptly notify the licensor of the request for disclosure. 
4(C) A person who has marked, in the manner prescribed by subsection (a), the number of the process 
patent on all products made by the patented process which have been offered for sale or sold by that person 
in the United States, or imported by the person into the United States, before a request for disclosure is 
received is not required to respond to the request for disclosure. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, 
the term "all products" does not include products made before the effective date of the Process patent 
Amendments Act of 1988. 
5(A) For purposes of this subsection, notice of infringement means actual knowledge, or receipt by a 
person of a written notification, or a combination thereof, of information sufficient to persuade a reasonable 
person that it is likely that a product was made by a process patented in the United States. 
5(B) A written notification from the patent holder charging a person with infringement shall specify the 
patented process alleged to have been used and the reasons for a good faith belief that such process was used. 
The patent holder shall include in the notification such information as is reasonably necessary to explain 
fairly the patent holder's belief, except that the patent holder is not required to disclose any trade secret 
information. 
5(C) A person who receives a written notification described in subparagraph (B~ or a ~tt~n response .to 
a request for disclosure described in paragraph (4) shall be deemed to have notice of Infringement WIth 
respect to any patent referred to in such written notification or response unless that person, absent 
mitigating circumstances-
(i) 
(ii) 
promptly transmits the written notification or response to the manufacturer or, if the 
manufacturer is not known, to the supplier, of the product purchased or to be purchased by 
that person; and 
receives a written statement from the manufacturer or supplier which on its face sets forth 
a well grounded factual basis for a belief that the identified patents are not infringed 
5)(0) For purposes of this subsection, a person who obtains a product made by a process patented in the 
United States in a quantity which is abnormally large in relation to the volume of business of such person 
or an efficient inventory level shall be rebuttably presumed to have actual knowledge that the product was 
made by such patented process. 
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(6) A person who receives a response to a request for disclosure under this subsection shall pay to the 
person to w~om the request was made a reasonable fee to cover actual costs incurred in complying with the 
~equest, whic~ may not exceed the cost of a commercially available automated patent search of the matter 
tnvolved, but tn no case more that $500. 
Section 295 Presumption: Product made by patented process 
In actions a.lle~ing infringement of a process patent based on the importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of a 
product which IS made from a process patented in the United States, if the court finds-
(1) that a subs~?al1ikelihood exists that the product was made by that patented process, and 
(2) that the plaIntIff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually used in the 
productIon of the product and was unable to so determine, 
the product shall be presumed to have been so made, and the burden of establishing that the product was not 
made by the process shall be on the party asserting that it was not so made. 
WIPO Model Law on Inventions 
WIPO Model Law for Developin~ Countries on Inventions Volume 1 Patents 
Chapter III: Ri~ht to Patent: Namin~ of Inventor 
Section 119: Right to Patent 
(1) The right to the patent shall belong to the inventor. 
(2) If two or more persons have jointly made an invention, the right to the patent shall belong to them 
jointly. 
(3) The right to the patent may be assigned, and it may be transferred by succession. 
Section 120: Inventions Made in Execution of Commission or by Employee 
(1) (a) Notwithstanding Section 119, when an invention is made in execution of a commission 
or an employment contract, the right to the patent for the invention shall belong, in the absence of 
contractual provisions to the contrary, to the person having commissioned the work or to the 
employer. 
(b) When the invention has an economic value much greater than the parties could have 
reasonably foreseen at the time of concluding the contract, the inventor shall have a right to special 
remuneration, which shall be fixed by the court in the absence of agreement between the parties. 
(2) Alternative A: (a) Notwithstanding Section 119, when an employee whose employment contract 
does not require him to engage in inventive activity makes, in the field of activities of his 
employer, an invention by using data or means available to him through his employment, the 
right to the patent for that invention shall belong, in the absence of contractual provisions to the 
contrary, to the employer. 
(b) The employee shall have a right to equitable remuneration taking into account his salary, 
the economic value of the invention and any benefit derived from the invention by the employer. In 
the absence of agreement between the parties, the remuneration shall be fixed by the court. 
Alternative B: (a) When the employee whose employment contract does not require him to engage 
in inventive activity makes, in the field of activities of his employer, an invention by using data or 
means available to him through his employment, the right to the patent for that invention shall 
belong to the employee, except if, within a period of four months from the date at which the 
employer received the report referred to in paragraph (b) or the date at which the invention became 
otherwise known to the employer, whichever date is earlier, the employer notifies the employee by 
a written declaration of his interest in the invention. 
(b) The employee who makes an invention of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) shall 
immediately submit it to his employer in a written report. 
(c) Notwithstanding Section 119, if, within the period referred to in paragraph (a), the 
employer makes the declaration of interest, the right to the patent shall be considered as having 
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bel?ng~ to him fo~ the beginning. The employee shall have a right to equitable remuneration tak.i~g Int~ account hls salary, the economic value of the invention and any benefit derived from 
the InVentIOn by the employer. In the absence of agreement between the parties, the remuneration 
shall be fixed by the court. 
(3) Any. contractual provisions which is less favourable to the inventor than the provisions of this 
Section shall be null and void. 
Section 121: Judicial Assignment of Patent Application or Patent 
~er~ the essent~al eleme~ts of the invention claimed in a patent application or patent were derived from an 
InVe~tIOn for whlch the nght to the patent belongs under section 119 or 120 to a person other than the 
appbcant o~ o~ner of the patent, that person may request the court to order the assignment to him of the 
patent appbcatlon or patent. The request for assignment may not be made after five years from the date of 
the grant of the patent. 
Section 122: Naming of Inventor 
The inventor shall be named as such in the patent, unless in a special written declaration addressed to the 
Patent Office he indicates that he wishes not to be named. Any promise or undertaking by the inventor made 
to any person to the effect that he will make such a declaration shall be without legal effect. 
ChapterN: Patent Application: Examination of Application: Grant of Patent 
section 123: Application 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(a) The application for a patent ("the application") shall be filed with the Patent Office arxl 
shall contain a request, a description, one or more claims, one or more drawings (where required), 
and an abstract. 
(b) Where the applicant's normal residence or principal place of business is outside the 
country, he shall be represented by an agent admitted to practise before the Patent Office. 
(a) The request shall contain a petition to the effect that a patent be granted, the name of arxl 
other prescribed data concerning the applicant, the inventor and the agent, if any, and the title of the 
invention. 
(b) Where the applicant is not the inventor, the request shall be accompanied by a statement 
justifying the applicant's right to the patent. 
The description shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the 
invention to be evaluated, and to be carried out by a person having ordinary skill in the art, arxl 
shall, in particular, indicate the best mode known to the applicant for carrying out the invention. 
(a) The terms of the claim or claims shall determine the scope of the protection. The 
description ad the drawings may be us~ to interpret the claims. . . 
(b) Claims shall be clear and conClse. They shall be fully supported by the descnptlon. 
Drawings shall be required when they are necessary for the understanding of the invention. 
The abstract shall merely serve the purpose of technical information; in particular, it shall not be 
taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the scope of the protection. 
Rule 123quaner: Description 
123quater.l Manner of description 
(a) The description shall state the title of the invention as appearing in the request and shall: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
specify the technical field to which the invention relates; 
indicate the background art which, as far as is known to the applicant, can be regarded as 
useful for the understanding, searching and examination of the invention, and, preferably, 
cite the documents reflecting such art; 
disclose the invention in such terms that it can be understood, and state its advantageous 
effects. if any. with reference to the background art; 
briefly describe the figures in the drawing. if any; 
set forth at least the best mode contemplated by the applicant for canying out the 
invention; this shall be done in terms of examples, where appropriate, and with reference 
to the drawings, if any; 
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(vi) indicate ~xplic.itly, when it is not obvious from the description or nature of the invention. 
the way In which ~h~ invention is industrially applicable and the way in which it can be 
made or used, or, If It can only be used, the way in which it can be used. 
(b) The manner ~d or~ specified in paragraph (a) shall be followed except when, because of the 
nature of the Invention, a different manner or a different order would result in a better understanding 
and a more economic presentation. 
Section 131: Examination as to Substance 
(1) The patent office shall examine whether the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(i) that which is claimed is an invention within the meaning of section 112(1) and is not 
excluded from patent protection under section 112(3); 
(ii) the claimed invention is patentable within the meaning of sections 113 to 116; 
(iii) the claimed invention is not excluded from patent protection under section 117 or 118; 
(iv) the description and the claims comply with the requirements of section 123(3) and (4) arKl 
the regulations pertaining thereto; 
(v) any drawing which is necessary for the understanding of the claimed invention has been 
furnished in accordance with section 123(5); 
(vi) the application complies with the requirement of unity of invention prescribed by section 
125 and the regulation pertaining thereto; 
(vii) where applicable, the amendment or the divisional application does not go beyond the 
disclosure in the initial application, as provided in section 126; 
(viii) the applicant has complied with any request of the Patent Office under section 128. 
(2) Where the Patent Office is of the opinion that the conditions referred to in subsection (1) are not 
fulfilled, it shall notify the applicant accordingly and invite him, several times if it deems it 
necessary, to submit his observation and, where applicable, to amend or divide his application. 
(3) Where, despite any observation, amendment or division submitted by the applicant, the Patent 
Office finds that the conditions referred to in subsection (1) are not fulfilled, it shall refuse the grant 
of a patent. Any decision refusing the grant of a patent shall be in writing and state the reasons for 
the refusal. The Patent Office shall notify the applicant of the decision. 
Chapter V: Rights and obligations of awlicant or owner of patent 
Section 134: Rights and obligations; Definition of "workini" 
(1) The applicant or the owner of the patent shall have the following rights: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
to be granted the patent, as provided for in Chapter N, where the requirements of this Part 
are fulfilled; 
once the patent has been granted, the right, subject to Section 136(1) to (3), 137, 153(1) 
and 156(1), to take action against any person exploiting the patented invention in the 
country, within the meaning of section 135(2), without his agreement. 
to assign or transfer by succession the patent application or patent, as provided for in 
section 140, and to conclude licence contracts, as provided for in Chapter vm. 
(2) The applicant or owner of the patent shall have the following obligations: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
to disclose the invention in a clear and complete manner and in particular to indicate the 
best mode for carrying out the invention, as prescribed in section 123, subject to the 
sanctions provided for in Section 131 and 158; 
to give information concerning corresponding foreign. applications ~ paten~ or oth~r 
titles of protection, as prescribed in Section 128, subject to the sanchon proVIded for 10 
Section 131; 
to work the patented invention in the country within the time limits and subject to the 
sanctions provided for in Chapters VI and IX; 
to pay fees to the Patent Office, as prescribed in this Part, subject to the sanctions 
provided for therein. 
(3) For the purposes of this Law, "working" of a patented invention means, 
(i) where the patent has been granted in respect of a product, the making of the product; 
(ii) where the patent has been granted in respect of a process, the use of the process. 
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Section 135: Effects of Grant of Patent: Definition of "Exploitation" 
(1) Once the patent has been granted , the exploitation of the patented invention in the country by 
persons other than the owner of the patent shall require the latter's agreement. 
(2) For the purposes of this law, "exploitation" of a patented invention means any of the following 
acts: 
(a) when the patent has been granted in respect of a product: 
(~~ maki~g, importing, offering for sale, selling and using the product; 
(11) stocking such product for the purposes of offering for sale, selling or using; 
(b) when the patent has been granted in respect of a process: 
using the process; (i) 
(ii) doing any of the acts referred to in paragraph (a), in respect of a product obtained directly 
by means of the process. 
Section 136: Limitation of Rights 
(1) !he rights under the patent shall extend only to acts done for industrial or commercial purposes and 
10 particular not to acts done for scientific research. 
(2) The rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of products which have been put on 
the market in the country: 
(i) by the owner of the patent; 
(ii) by a person having the right referred to in section 137; 
(iii) by a licensee within the meaning of section 142( 1); 
(iv) by a beneficiary of a non-voluntary licence within the meaning of section 147(ii); or 
(v) by a person exploiting the patented invention under section 156. 
(3) The rights under the patent shall not extend to the use of the patented invention on any foreign 
vessel, aircraft, spacecraft or land vehicle which temporarily or accidentally enters the water, 
airspace or land of the country, provided that the patented invention is used exclusively for the 
needs of the vessel or in the construction or operation of the aircraft, spacecraft or land vehicle. 
(4) The rights under the patent shall be limited in duration as provided for in Chapter VI. 
(5) The rights under the patent shall be limited by the provisions on non-voluntary licences, as 
provided for in Chapter IX, and by the provisions on exploitation by the government or third 
persons authorised by the government, as provided for in section 156. 
Section 137: Rights derived from prior manufacture or use 
Where a person, at the filing date or, where appropriate, priority date of the patent application and in the 
country, 
(i) was making the product or using the process which is the subject of the invention claimed in the 
application, or 
(ii) had made serious preparations toward the making or using referred to in item (i), 
that person shall have the right, despite the grant of the patent, to exploit the patented invention, provided 
that the product in question is made, or the process in question is used, in the country by the said person. 
and provided that he can prove that his knowledge of the invention was not by reason or in consequence of 
acts committed by the owner of the patent or his predecessor on title or of an abuse committed with regard 
to the owner of the patent or his predecessor in title. Such right cannot be assigned or transferred by 
succession except as part of the establishment of the said person. 
Chgpter VU: Cbanae in Ownership apd Joint Ownership of Patent ApplicatiOn or Patent 
Section 140: Change in Ownership of Patent Application or Patent 
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Section 141: Joint Ownership of patent application or patent 
(1) ~ere there are joint applica~ts of.a patent application, each of the joint applicants may separately 
~~Ign or ~sfer by succe~sI0!l hIS share of the application, but the joint applicants may only jOIn~ly .wIthdraw the applIcatIOn or conclude licence contracts with third parties under the 
applIcatIon. 
(2) Where ther~ are JOint owners of a patent, each of the joint owners may separately assign or transfer 
by succes~IOn hIS share of the .~atent or institute court proceedings for an infringement of the 
patent ~g~Inst any person eXplOItIn~ ~e patented invention in the country without the agreement 
?f. the JOint owners, and t~e explOItatIOn of the patented invention in the country by one of the 
JOint .o~ners shall not reqUIre the agreement of the other joint owners, but the joint owners may 
only JOintly surrender the patent or conclude licence contracts with third parties under the patent. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall be applicable only in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary between the joint applicants or owners. 
Chapter IX: Non-V oluntaIy Licences 
Section 147: Definitions 
(i) "non-voluntary license" means the authorisation to perform in the country without the agreement 
of the owner of the patent, in respect of the patented invention, any of the acts referred to in section 
135(2), with the exception of importation; 
(ii) "beneficiary of the non-voluntary license" means the person to whom a non-voluntary license has 
been granted in accordance with this Chapter. 
Section 148: Non-Voluntary license for non-working or insufficient working 
(1) On the request of any person who proves his ability to work the patented invention in the country, 
made after the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application 
or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last, the Patent 
Office may grant a non-voluntary license if the patented invention is not worked or is insufficiently 
worked in the country. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a non-voluntary licence shall not be granted if the Patent Office is 
convinced that circumstances exist which justify the non-working or insufficient working of the 
patented invention in the country. Importation shall not constitute such a circumstance. 
Section 149: Non-voluntary license based upon interdependence of patents 
(1) 
(2) 
If the invention claimed in a patent (later patent") cannot be worked in the country without 
infringing a patent granted on the basis of an application benefiting from an earlier filing or, where 
appropriate, priority date ("earlier patent"), and provided that the invention claimed in the later 
patent constitutes an important technical advance in relation to the invention claimed in the earlier 
patent, the Patent Office, upon the request of the owner of the latter patent, the licensee of a license 
contract under the later patent or the beneficiary of a non-voluntary license under the later patent. 
may grant a non-voluntary license to the extent necessary to avoid infringement of the earlier 
patent. 
If a non-voluntary license is granted under subsection (1). the Patent Office. upon the request of the 
owner of the earlier patent, the licensee of a license contract under the earlier patent ~r the 
beneficiary of a non-voluntary license under the earlier patent, may grant a non-voluntary license 
under the later patent. 
Section 150: Request for grant of non-voluntary license 
(1) The request for the grant of a non-voluntary license (lithe request") shall be made to the Patent 
Office and shall contain: 
(i) the name of and other prescribed data concerning the requesting person; 
(ii) the number of the patent in respect of which the non-voluntary license is requested; 
(iii) a statement of the ground on which the request is based. 
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(2) If the requ~st is made under section 149, it shall also contain the number of the patent owned by 
the requesting person. 
(3) The request shal! be accompanied ~y evidence that the owner of the patent has received a request 
from th~ requestmg person to obtaIn a contractual license, but that he has been unable to obtain 
such a lIcense on reasonable terms and within a reasonable time. 
(4) The request shall be subject to the payment of the prescribed fee. 
Section 151: Procedure for Grant of Non-Voluntary Licence 
(1) The ~~tent Office shall. examine whether the requirements of section 150 and the Regulation 
p~rtaJ.mng thereto are satisfied. Where the said requirements are not satisfied, the Patent office shall 
reject the. req.ue.st. Any decision rejecting the request shall be in writing and shall state the grounds 
upon whIch It IS based. Before rejecting the request, the Patent Office may inform the requesting 
person of the defect and allow him to make the necessary correction. 
(2) (a) Where the requirements of section 150 and the Regulations pertaining thereto are satisfied, 
the Patent Office shall notify the owner of the patent with respect to which the non-voluntary 
licence is requested and the evidence accompanying it, and shall invite him to make his 
observation. 
(b) The owner of the patent shall have the obligation to notify licensees of the request and the 
evidence accompanying it. The licensees shall have the right to make their observations to the 
Patent Office. 
(c) The Patent Office shall notify the beneficiaries of non-voluntary licences and the person 
exploiting the invention under section 156 of the request and the evidence accompanying it. 'The 
said beneficiaries and the persons shall have the right to make their observations to the Patent 
Office. 
(d) The Patent Office shall notify the requesting person of the observations made under 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). 
(e) The Patent Office shall hold a hearing, to which shall be invited the requesting person, the 
owner of the patent and the persons who made the observations under paragraphs (b) or (c). 
(f) If the Patent Office finds that the conditions for the grant of the non-voluntary licence are 
fulfilled, it shall make the decision to grant the non-voluntary licence. Otherwise, it shall make the 
decision to refuse the non-voluntary licence. 
(3) The decision granting the non-voluntary licence shall fix: 
(4) 
(5) 
(a) the scope of the licence, specifying in particular: 
(i) for what period the licence is granted; and 
(ii) to which of the acts referred to in section 135(2) the licence extends, provided 
that it may not extend to the act of importation. 
(b) the time limit within which the beneficiary of the non-voluntary licence must begin to 
work the patented invention in the country; and 
(c) the amount and conditions of the payment due by the ~neficiary of the non-volun~ 
licence to the owner of the patent and to any person whose nghts are affected under sectJon 
153(3)(iii). such payments being determined on the basis of the extent to which the patented 
invention is worked. 
The decisions shall be in writing and shall state the grounds upon which it is based. The Patent 
Office shall record the decision. publish it and notify the requesting person. the own~r.of the patent 
and the other persons invited to the hearing referred to in subsection (2)(e) of the deciSion. 
The Regulations shall fix the time limits for the acts to be perfonned by the Patent Office under 
this section. 
Section 152: Appeals 
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Section 153: Rights and Obligations of Beneficiary of Non-Voluntary Licence; Other Effects of Non-
Voluntary Licence 
(1) !he beneficiary of th~ non-voluntary licence shall have the right to exploit the patented invention 
In the country accordIng to the decision granting the licence. 
(2) The beneficiary of the non-voluntary licence shall have the following obligations: 
(i) ~o begin t?~ working of the patented invention in the country within the time limit fixed 
In the deCISIon gra~ting the .licence and thereafter, in the case of a non-voluntary licence 
granted on the basIS of sectIon 148, to work the patented invention sufficiently in the 
country; 
(ii) to respect the scope of the licence as fixed in the decision granting the licence', 
(iii) to make payment when due, according to the decision granting the licence. 
(3) The grant of the non-voluntary licence: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
Section 154: 
shall exclude neither the conclusion of licence contracts nor the grant of other non-
voluntary licences; 
shall not affect non-exclusive contractual licences in force; 
shall deprive exclusive contractual licences in force of their exclusivity, but only with 
regard to the non-voluntary licences in force; 
shall not affect non-voluntary licences in force 
shall not exclude the exploitation of the patented invention under section 156. 
Sublicence Prohibited; Transfer of Non-Voluntary Licence. 
(1) The beneficiary of the non-voluntary licence may not conclude licence contracts with third persons 
under the patent in respect of which the non-voluntary licence is granted. 
(2) (a) The non-voluntary licence may only be transferred with the establishment of the 
beneficiary of the licence or with the part of the establishment within which the patented invention 
is being worked. Such transfer shall not be laid without a decision of the Patent Office authorising 
the transfer. 
(b) The authorisation of the Patent Office may be requested wither by the beneficiary of the 
non-voluntary licence whose name appears as such in the Patent register, or by the person to 
whom the non-voluntary licence is to be transferred, or jointly by both. 
(c) Before making its decision, the Patent Office shall give the owner of the patent and the 
other persons referred to in section 151(4) an opportunity to make their observations. 
(d) The decision of the Patent Office shall be in writing and state the grounds upon which it 
is based. The Patent Office shall record the decision, publish it and notify all the persons referred to 
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the decision. 
(e) Any person referred to in paragraph (d) may, within one month from the pUblication 
referred to in that paragraph, appeal to the Minister [ ... ] against there decision of the Patent Office. 
The appeal shall have suspensive effect. 
(t) The decision made by the Minister on there appeal referred to in paragraph (e) shall ~ in 
writing and state the grounds upon which it is based. The Patent Office. s~all recml ~e. deciSion. 
publish it and notify all the persons referred to in paragraph (d) of the decISion. The deciSion of the 
Minister shall not be the subject of an appeal. 
(g) Once the transfer is authorised, the new beneficiary of .the non voluntary licence shall 
assume the obligations that were incumbent on the former beneficiary. 
Section 155: Amendment and cancellation of Non-Voluntary Licence: Surrender of Non-Voluntary 
Licence 
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Chapter X: Exploitation by Government or by Third Persons Authorised by Government 
Exploitation by Government or by Third Persons Authorised by Government. Section 156: 
(1) Where ~he public interest, in particular, national security, nutrition, health or the development of 
other v~tal sectors of the natIonal economy, so requires, the Minister concerned may decide that, 
eve~ WIthout the a~~ment of the owner of the patent, a government agency or a third person 
deSignated by the MI.mster ~ay exploit the patented invention in the country by performing any of 
the acts referred to In sectIon 135(2), including importation if necessary, subject to payment 
therefor. 
(2) (a) When the Minister intends to make a decision under subsection (1), he shall consult the 
Patent Office, notify the owner of the patent and the beneficiaries of non-voluntary licences of his 
intention and invite them, as well as other persons whose participation he considers useful, to a 
hearing. 
(b) The owner of the patent shall have the obligation to notify the licensees of the hearing 
referred to in paragraph (a). The licensees shall have the right to participate in that hearing. 
(3) (a) Once the hearing referred to in subsection (2) has been held, the Minister shall make his 
decision. The decision shall be written and state the ground upon which it is based. 
(4) 
(b) If the decision of the Minister authorises the exploitation under subsection (1), the Patent 
Office shall fix the amount and conditions of the payment due by the State to the owner of the 
patent and to any exclusive licensee whose rights are affected by the decision of the Minister, such 
payment being determined on the basis of the extent to which the patented invention is exploited. 
(c) The Patent Office shall record the decision of the Minister and the decision of the Patent 
Office fixing the amount and conditions of the payment, publish the decisions and notify the owner 
of the patent and the other participants in the hearing referred to in subsection (2) of the decisions. 
(a) The decision of the Minister may not be the subject of an appeal. 
(b) The decision of the Patent Office fixing the amount and conditions of the payment may be 
the subject of an appeal to the court by the owner of the patent or any licensee referred to in 
subsection (3)(b). Such an appeal shall not preclude the exploitation of the patented invention 
according to the decision of the Minister. 
(c) When the decision of the court on the appeal referred to in paragraph (b) becomes final, 
the Registrar of the court shall notify the Patent Office of the decision, which shall record the 
decision and publish it. 
Chapter XI: Surrender and Invalidation 
Section 157: Surrender of Patent 
Section 158: Invalidation of Patent 
(1) Any interested person may institute court proceedings against the owner of the patent for the 
invalidation of the patent. 
(2) The court shall invalidate the patent if the person requesting the invalidation proves that: 
(3) 
(i) 
(ii) 
any of the conditions referred to in section I3I(I)(i) to (v) were not fulfilled at the time 
the patent was granted; or 
the right to the patent does not belong to the person to whom the patent w.as granted. 
provided that the patent has not been assigned to the person to whom the nght to the 
patent belongs. 
(a) Where the provisions of subsection (2) apply only to some of the claims or some parts of 
a claim, such claims or parts of a claim shall be invalidated by the court. 
(b) The invalidity of part of a claim shall be declared in the form of a corresponding 
limitation of the claim in question. 
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(4) The ~ou~ may require the owner of the patent to submit to it for the purpose of examination 
publIcations and other documents showing the prior art which has been referred t 'the' 
connect" 'th I" 0 el r 10 
, Ion WI an ~pp Ic~tlon for a patent or other title of protection filed, for the same or ~ssenti?lly the same IOVentI?n, by the, own~r of the patent, with any other national or regional 
IOdustnal,property office, or 10 connectIon WIth any proceedings relating to the patent or other title 
of protectIon granted under such application, 
(5) (a) ,The own~r of the patent shall have the obligation to notify the licensees of the 
proc~~lOgs, The hcensees shall have the right to join in the proceedings in the absence of any 
provIsIon to the contrary in the licence contract. 
(b) The pe~son requesting invalidation shall have the obligation to notify the beneficiaries of 
non-volun,tary lic,e~ce,s granted under section 148 of the proceedings. The said beneficiaries shall 
have the nght to JOIO 10 the proceedings. 
(c) . w~ere ~he ~ound for invalidity referred to in subsection (2)(ii) is invoked, the person 
requestmg mvahdation shall have the obligation to notify the person alleged to have the right to 
the patent of that fact. 
Section 159: Effect of invalidation 
(1) Any invalidated patent, or claim or part of a claim shall be regarded as null and void from the date 
of the grant of the patent. 
(2) When the decision of the court becomes final, the registrar of the court shall notify the Patent 
office of the decision, which shall record the decision and publish it as soon as possible. 
Chapter XII: Infringement 
Section 160: Acts of infringement 
Subject to Sections 136(1) to (3),127,153(1) and 156(1), an infringement of the patent shall consist of the 
performance of any act referred to in section 135(2) in the country by a person other than the owner of the 
patent and without the agreement of the latter, in relation to a product or a process falling within the scope 
of protection of the patent. 
Section 161: InfringeDlentProceedings 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The owner of the patent shall have the right to institute court proceedings against any person who 
has infringed or is infringing the patent. The owner of the patent shall have the same right against 
any person who has performed acts or is perforD1ing acts which make it likely that infringement 
will occur (,imDlinent infringement"). The proceedings may not be instituted after five years from 
the act of infringement. 
(a) If the owner of the patent proves that an infringement has been coD1D1itted or is being 
cODlDlitted, the court shall awaro damages and shall grant an injunction to prevent further 
infringeDlent and any other remedy provided in the general law. 
(b) If the owner of the patent proves iD1D1inent infringement, the court shall grant an 
injunction to prevent infringeDlent and any other remedy provided in the general law. 
The defendant in any proceedings referred to in this Section may request in the same proceedings 
the invalidation of the patent. In that case, the provisions of section 158(2) to (5) shall apply. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
For the purposes of this subsection, "beneficiary" means: 
(i) 
(ii) 
any licensee, unless the licence contract provides that the provisions of this 
subsection do not apply or provides different provisions; 
the beneficiary of a non-voluntary licence granted under section 148. 
Any beneficiary may request the owner of the patent to institute court proceedings for any 
infringement indicated by the beneficiary, who must specify the relief desired. 
The beneficiary may, if be proves that the owner of the patent received the request but 
refuses or fails to institute the proceedings within three months from the rec::eipt of the 
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(d) 
Section 163: 
req~es~, inst~tute the proceedings in his own name, after notifying the owner of the patent 
of his IntentIon. The owner shall have the right to join in the proceedings. 
Even before the end of the three-month period referred to in paragraph (c), the court shall, 
on the req~~st. of the ?eneficiary, grant an appropriate injunction to prevent infringement 
or to prohibit Its contInuation, if the beneficiary proves that immediate action is necessary 
to avoid substantial damage. 
Threats if Infringement Proceedings 
(1) Any pe~son thr~atened with infringement proceedings shall have the right to institute court 
proceedIngs agaInst the person making the threats. The proceedings may not be instituted after five 
years from the making of the threats. 
(2) If ~he person instituting the proceedings proves that the acts he has performed, is performing or is 
gOIng to perform do not constitute a patent infringement, the court shall award damages fro 
financial loss resulting from the threats and shall grant an injunction to prohibit such threats. 
(3) The notification of the existence of the patent and the calling to the attention of the legal 
consequences of a patent infringement shall not in themselves constitute threats for the purposes of 
this section. 
GATT-TRIPS A&reement 
Document MIN/FA II-AIC - A~eement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual PrQperty 
Ri~hts. inclydin~ Trade in CQunterfeit Goods 
Part I: General PrQvisiQns and Basic Principles 
Article 1 Nature and Scope of Obligations 
1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be 
obliged to, implement in their domestic law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. 
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice. 
Article 2 Intellectual Property Conventions 
1. In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 to 12 
and 19 of the Paris Convention (1967). 
2. Nothing in Parts 1 to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existin~ obligations that Mem~ 
may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne ConventIon, the Rome Conventlon 
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. 
Article 6 Exhaustion 
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement,. subject to the pro~isions. of Articles 3 and 4 
above nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the Issue of the exhaustion of Intellectual property 
rights. 
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Part II: Standards Concerning the Availability. Scope and 
Use of Intellectual Property Rights 
Section 5: Patents 
Article 27 Patentable Subject Matter 
1. ~ubje~t to the provisions of paragraph 2 and 3 below, patents shall be available for any new 
~nventlOns, .whe~er products or process, in all field of technology, provided that they are new, 
mv?lve an mventi~~ step. and are capable of industrial application. [fn - For this purpose of this 
Article, the term mventIve s~ep" and "capable of industrial application" may be deemed by a 
Member to be sy~onymous WIth the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" respectively] Subject to 
paragraph 4 of ~cle 65, (transitional provisions - period of grace for developing countries etc.) 
paragraph 8 of ArtIcle 7? (spe~ial provisions for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
) .an~ p~a~aph 3 of thIS ArtIcle, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
~bscnmmatIon as to the place of the invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
Imported or locally produced. 
Article 28 Rights Conferred 
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having his consent 
from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing [fn - This right, like ail 
other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the use, sale, importation or other 
distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6 (exhaustion) above] for these 
purposes that product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having his consent 
from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. 
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts. 
Article 29 Conditions on Patent Application 
1. Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art arxI 
may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor at the filing date or, where priority date is claimed, at the priority date of the application. 
2. Members may require an applicant for a patent to provide information concerning his corresponding 
foreign applications and grants. 
Article 30 Exceptions to rights conferred 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties. 
Article 31 Other use without authorisation of the right holder 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use [fn - "other use" refers to use other than that allowed under 
Article 30] of the subject matter of a patent without the authorisation of the right holder. including use by 
the government or third parties authorised by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(a) 
(b) 
authorisation of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
such use may only be permitted if. prior to such use. the proposed user has made efforts to obtain 
authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such 
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be 
waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency 
or in case of public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other 
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(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
G) 
(k) 
(1) 
circumstances o! extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as re~onably p~acticable. In case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor. 
wIth?ut making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is 
or wIll be used by ~r for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
!he scope and dur~tlOn of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorised, aOO 
10 the ~ase of senu-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy 
a practIce determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
such use shall be non-exclusive' , 
such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys 
such use; 
any such use shall be authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorising such use. 
authorisation for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests 
of the person so authorised, to be terminated if and when the circumstance which led to it cease to 
exis~ and are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon 
motivated request, the continued existence of these circumstances; 
the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorisation; 
the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorisation of such use shall be subject to 
judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in sub-paragraph (b) and (f) above where 
such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be 
anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in 
determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the 
authority to refuse termination of authorisation if and when the conditions which led to such 
authorisation are likely to recur; 
where such use is authorised to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second patent") which 
cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the first patent"), the following additional 
conditions shall apply: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical advance of 
considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent; 
the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use 
the invention claimed in the second patent; and 
the use authorised in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the 
assignment of the second patent. 
Article 32 Revocation/forfeiture 
An opportunity for judicial review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent shall be available. 
Article 33 Term of protection 
The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from 
the filing date. [fn - It is understood that those Members which d~ not hav~ a system of ori~i~al grant may 
provide that the term of protection shall be computed from the fihng date 10 the system of ongmal grant.] 
Article 34 Process patents: Burden of proof 
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of infringement of the ri~hts of the owner ~ 
to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28 above. if the subject matter of a patent IS a process for obtalOlOg 
a product. the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the 
process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented proces~. ~refore. Members 
shall provide. in at least one of the following circumstances, that any IdentIcal product when 
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall. in the absence of proof to the contrary. be 
deemed to have been obtained by the patented process: 
(a) 
(b) 
if the product obtained by the patented process is new; 
if there is substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the 
owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process 
actually used. 
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2. Any memb~r s~all be free: to provid~ ~hat the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on 
the ~l~ged lOfringer ~nly If the conditIOn referred to in sub-paragraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the 
condItIon referred to 10 sub-paragraph (b) is fulfIlled. 
3. In the addu~tion of pro?f to the contrary, the legitimate interest of the defendant in protecting his 
manufactunng and busmess secrets shall be taken into account. 
Article 65 Transitional arrangements 
paragraph 1 
Subj~~t to the .provisions of paragraph 2, .3 and 4 below no. Members shall be obliged to apply the 
provIsIons of this Agreement before the exprry of a general penod of one year following the date of entry 
lOto force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
para~aph 2 
Any developing country Member is entitled to delay for a further period of four years the date of application 
as defined in paragraph ' 
I above, of the provisions of this agreement other than Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Part 1. 
para~aph4 
To the. extent that a developing country member is obliged by this Agreement to extend product patent 
protectIon to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory on the general date of application of this 
Agreement for that Member, as defined in paragraph 2 above, it may delay the application of the provisions 
on product patents of section 5 of Part IT of this Agreement to such areas of technology for an additional 
period of 5 years. 
Article 70 Protection of existing subject matter 
paralUaph 8 
Where a Member does not make available as of the date of the entry into force of the agreement Establishing 
the WTO patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products commensurate with its 
obligations under Article 27, that Member shall: 
(i) notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, provide as from the date of entry into force of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO a means by which applications for patents for such 
invention can be filed; 
(ii) apply to these applications, as of the date of application of this Agreement, the criteria for 
patentability as laid down in this Agreement a if those criteria were being applied on the date of 
filing in that Member or, where priority is available and claimed, the priority date of the 
application. 
(iii) provide patent protection in accordance with this Agreement as from the grant of the patent and for 
the remainder of the patent term, counted from the filing date in accordance with Article 33 of this 
Agreement, for those of these applications that meet the criteria for protection referred to in sub-
paragraph (ii) above. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic 
law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of human or animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subaparagraph 
shall be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
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The "Basic PrQPosal" for the Treaty and the Regulations Submitted. under Rule 29{ 1) of the Draft Rules of 
Procedure. by the Director-General ofWIPO (PLTIDCI3) 
Article 19 Rights conferred by the Patent 
Alternative A: 
Note: No article on the rights conferred by the patent. 
Alternative B: 
(1) Products 
(2) Process 
(3) Exceptions to Paragraphs (1) and (2) 
(a) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), any Contracting Party may provide that the owner of a 
patent has no right to prevent third parties from performing, without his authorisation, the acts 
referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) in the following circumstances. 
(b) 
(4) 
(a) 
(b) 
(i) where the act concerns a product which has been put on the market by the owner of the 
patent, or with his express consent, insofar as such act is performed after that product has 
been so put on the market in the territory of that Contracting Party, or, where the 
Contracting Party is a member of a group of States constituting a regional market, in the 
territory of one of the member States of such group. 
(ii) where the act is done privately and on a non-commercial scale or for a non-commercial 
purpose, provided that it does not significantly prejudice the economic interests of the 
owner of the patent; 
(iii) where the act consists of making or suing exclusively for et purpose of experiments that 
relate to the subject matter of the patented invention [or for the purpose of seeking 
regulatory approval for marketing]; 
(iv) where the act consists of the preparation for individual cases, in a pharmacy or by a 
medical doctor, or a medicine in accordance with a medical prescription or acts concerning 
the medicine so prepared. 
Contributory Infringement 
Subject to subparagraph (b), a patent shall also confer on its owner [at least] the right to prevent a 
third party from supplying or offering to supply a person, other than a party entitled to exploit the 
patented invention, with means, relating to an essential element of that invention, for carrying out 
the invention, when the third party knows, or it is obvious in the circumstances, that those means 
are suitable and intended for carrying out that invention. This provisions shall not apply when the 
means are staple commercial products and the circumstances of the supply of such products do not 
constitute inducement to infringe the patent. 
Persons performing the acts referred to in paragraph (3)(a)(ii), (iii) and (iv) shall not be considered 
to be parties entitled to exploit the invention within the meaning of subparagraph (a). 
Alternative C: 
Article 20 Prior User 
(1) Right of Prior User 
Alternative A: 
Any Contracting Party may provide that, notwithstanding Article 19, 
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Alternative B: 
N?twiths~nding .Article 19.' a patent shall have no effect against any person (hereinafter referred to as "the 
p~or. us~r wh.o, 10 good f~th~ for the purposes of his enterprise or business before the filing date or, where 
pn~nty IS claimed, the pnonty ~te of the application on which the patent is granted, and within the 
temtory.where the patent produces ItS effect, was using the invention or was making effective and serious 
pre~aratlOns for .such use; any such person shall have the right, for the purposes of his enterprise or 
busmess, to contmue such use or to use the invention as envisaged in such preparations. 
(2) Successor in Title of the Prior User 
~e right of the P?or user ~ay only be transferred or devolved together with his enterprise or business, or 
WIth that part of his enterpnse or business in which the use or preparations for use have been made. 
Article 21 Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims 
1 . Determination of the Extent of Protection 
(a) !he extent of protection conferred by the patent shall be determined by the claims, which are to be 
mterpreted in the light of the description and drawings. 
(b) For the purposes of subparagraph (a), the claims shall be so interpreted as to combine fair 
protection for the owner of the patent with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. In 
particular, the claims shall not be interpreted as being confined to their strict literal wording. 
Neither shall the claims be considered as mere guidelines allowing that the protection conferred by 
the patent extends to what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled 
in the art, the owner has contemplated, but has not claimed. 
(2) Equivalents 
(a) Notwithstanding paragraph (l)(b), a claim shall be considered to cover not only all the elements as 
expressed in the claim but also equivalents. 
(b) An element ("the equivalent element") shall generally be considered as being equivalent to an 
element as expressed in a claim if, at the time of any alleged infringement, either of the following 
condition is fulfilled in regard to the invention as claimed: 
(i) the equivalent element performs substantially the same function in substantially the same 
way and produces substantially the same result as the element as expressed in the claim, 
or 
(ii) it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that the same result as that achieved by means 
of the element as expressed in the claim can be achieved by means of the equivalent 
element. 
(c) Any Contracting party shall be free to determine whether an element is equivalent to an element as 
expressed in a claim by reference to only the condition referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or to only 
the condition referred to in subparagraph (b)(ii), provided that, at the time of depositing its 
instrument of ratification of or accession to this Treaty, it so notifies the Director General. 
(3) Prior Statement 
In determining the extent of protection, due account shall be taken of any statement limiting the scope of 
the claims made by the applicant or the owner of the patent during procedures concerning the grant or the 
validity of the patent. 
(4) Examples 
If the patent contains examples of the embodiment of the invention or examples of the functions or results 
of the invention, the claims shall not be interpreted as limited to those examples; in particular, the mere fact 
that a product or process includes additional features not found in the examples disclosed in the patent~ lacks 
features found in such examples or does not achieve every objectives or possess every advantage Cited or 
inherent in such examples shall not remove the product or process from the extent of protection conferred by 
the claims. 
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(5) Abstract 
The abstract of a patent shall not be taken into account for the purpose of detennining the protection 
conferred by the patent. 
Article 25 Obligations of the Right Holder 
Alternative A: 
Note: No article on obligations of the right holder 
Alternative B: 
(1) The owner of a patent shall have at least the following obligations in addition to any other 
provided for in this Treaty: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
to disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to 
be carried out by a person skilled in the art; the description shall set forth at least one 
mode for carrying out the invention claimed; this shall be done in tenns of examples, 
where appropriate, and with reference to the drawings, if any; however, any Contracting 
Party may provide that the description set forth the best mode for carrying out the 
invention known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, priority 
date of the application. 
to provide such infonnation and supporting documents in his possession as is requested 
by the competent Office concerning corresponding foreign applications and grants; 
to work the patented invention in the territory of the Contracting State for which it is 
granted within the time limits as provided by national law; 
to pay, or cause to be paid, such fees as prescribed by national law in relation to the 
application and the maintenance of the patent granted on it; 
in respect of licence contracts and contracts assigning patents, to refrain from engaging in 
abusive, restrictive or anti-competitive practices adversely affecting the transfer of 
technology. 
(2) The applicant or holder of a patent shall comply with any other obligations established in the 
national law of the State in which the patent granted in connection with the acquisition and the 
exercise of the rights conferred by the patent and with the exploitation of the patented invention. 
Article 26 Remedial Measures Under National Legislation 
Alternative A: 
Note: No article on remedial measures under national legislation. 
Alternative B: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Any Contracting State is free to provide appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the 
obligations referred to in the Article entitled "Obligations of the Right Holder," and for measures to 
remedy non-compliance with such obligations, including the grant of non-voluntary licences am 
the revocation or forfeiture of the patent. 
A non-voluntary licence under paragraph (1) shall be refused if the owner of the patent proves, to 
the satisfaction of the national authorities competent to grant non-voluntary licences, that there are 
circumstances which justify the non-working or insufficient working of the patented invention. 
Any Contracting State is free to provide, at any time, on grounds of public interest, national 
security, nutrition, health, or the development of other vital sectors of national economy, for the 
grant of non-voluntary licences or for the exploitation of the patented invention by the Government 
of that country or by third persons authorised by it. 
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